Recent scientific breakthroughs in the study of imitation at multiple levels evoke further problems such as “Why should we imitate each other?” and “Why should we recognize another person as a model of ourselves?” which we can call ontological. Sartreʼs Being and Nothingness ought to be very helpful to an in-depth exploration of these. Although Sartreʼs book does not deal with imitation, it provides insights into important but overlooked aspects of this intriguing phenomenon. Following through with Sartreʼs arguments concerning being for-itself and being for-others in this book would offer a fundamental understanding of the imitative nature of human beings.
In this paper, three explanations are presented, which are intended to illuminate the ontological aspects of imitation. First, the fact that our consciousness has the special feature of not being identical with itself (this is called for-itself), explains why we spontaneously imitate others. Second, the fact that being looked at by others can provide us with recognition of the dimension of ourselves as object (this dimension is called for-others), explains why we recognize others as models. Finally, that the gaze of others is a hole through which my world drains from my grasp, explains what aspect of the world we are focusing on in the act of imitating.
I believe we can offer a firmer grounding for theoretical exploration of imitation than current experimental studies do in that we can provide arguments based on the specific features of consciousness, which are not available in these studies.