住宅再建支援NGOの組織と事業実態

－ハリケーン・カトリーナ災害による重大被災地区の事例から－

抄録

 The challenges regarding rehabilitation and reconstruction of housing after the Great East Japan Earthquake revealed limitation of government-led approach. That includes large burden of local official staffs, huge expenditure for implementation of recovery programs, and future expenditure for maintenance of public housings. Although Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction emphasize importance of sharing responsibility among stakeholders, there is still lack of practical knowledge on how each stakeholder embodies assistances for permanent housing recovery, and how it influences to housing recovery of the assisting area. In order to clarify characteristics of NGOs in housing recovery, this study examines organizational design and project implementation of NGOs in New Orleans city after Hurricane Katrina. This study 1) examines recovery status and distribution of NGOs in the city, and in the selected district, 2) categorizes NGOs by its assistance type, and 3) clarifies program schemes and distribution of projects for selected NGOs.
 The data collection methods include in-depth, semi-structured interviews with personnel from nine NGOs and New Orleans Redevelopment Authority consist of three research trips. This study also draws on a review of tax records and other secondary sources. Hurricane Katrina was selected due to its magnitude of economic losses. We selected New Orleans city for case study due to scale of housing damage, status of NGOs' participation in housing recovery, and availability of precise data.
 This research found the relationship between market value and recovery rates of households in the city. We categorized 14 districts into three, based on market value and level of damage to housing stock. Through an observation of recovery rates and number of active NGOs in each group, we found that the group with lower market value recorded the lower recovery rates and had more NGOs. Government assistance scheme tend to give less grant to lower market value area, therefore, there are high needs of external assistance from NGOs.
 The Lower 9th Ward (L9W) was selected for detail study, because it significantly improved recovery rates from 2008 to 2015 and had the most NGOs. Nine NGOs in L9W had different scale of activity from district to national level, and implemented more than 800 projects in the district. We categorized NGOs by the type of assistance, such as (1) new construction (4 NGOs), (2) repairing (4 NGOs), and (3) securing fund from government programs (1 NGO), with subgroups designated as (a) and (b) in term of the size of program expenditure. Each category shared similar assistance phase and scheme of payment, but strategy for selecting target area was different.
 The study analyzed program scheme and project distribution of selected NGOs from each category. The pilot NGO from (1a) played role as developer who brought 75% households from outside; almost all projects were aggregated in least value blocks with high damage by levee breach. The pilot NGO from (2a) and (2b) applied volunteer labor scheme for repairing; project distribution showed around 80% of aggregation in the neighborhood in relatively high value blocks on natural levee with less damage. The pilot NGO from type (3) assisted displaced households to get government fund; projects were scattered, and more than 70% of projects were locating in least value blocks with high damage.
 In conclusion, under market-based-approach in New Orleans, districts with low market value received less government grant, showed low recovery rates, and had more NGOs. Nine NGOs in L9W had various organization designs and assistance schemes. Dependent on NGOs' strategy, budget, and assistance scheme, each NGO tended to assist specific households and areas, which were partially causing unequal recovery. Thus, coordination mechanisms of NGOs and guiding principle for spacial development are necessary.