Japan’s ‘Hui-Muslim Campaigns’ (回民工作) in China from the 1910’s to 1945

An Introductory Survey

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Introduction:

Through the whole process of its invasion of China, from the late 19th century onward, Japan constantly implemented various campaigns to get around and co-opt non-Han ethnic minorities. These campaigns formed an essential part of the Japanese Empire’s strategy, because the movements of non-Han people strongly affected military operations, governance of occupied regions, and the struggle against the Han Chinese nationalism.

One of the principal objects of such manoeuvring was Hui-Muslim (回民).

The ethnonym ‘Hui’ (回) usually refers generically to the Muslim people who live dispersed across China, using Chinese as their daily language. Their ancestors are said to
have been foreign Muslim immigrants from West and Central Asia, most of whom migrated between the Tang and Yuan periods. They were mostly assimilated with Han Chinese after several centuries of coexistence, but continued to hold persistently a unique identity and ethnic communality based on the beliefs and practice of Islam. At present, they are officially identified by the PRC government as a ‘minority ethnic group’ (少数民族), whose total registered population now numbers nearly 10 million.

The Hui-Muslim people are distributed most densely in the strategically important areas of the inland Northwest, Huabei, and Yunnan. During the mid- and late Qing period, they often rebelled against local authorities and seriously threatened the dynastical rule over the regions they inhabited. In the early 20th century, a group of ‘Hui-Muslim Warlords’ (回民军阀) emerged from former rebels who had surrendered, and, taking advantage of the unstable situation of the 1910’s and 20’s, established strong military and political/economic hegemony over the provinces of Gansu, Ninxia, and Qinghai. Consequently, in the political space of Republican China, the ‘Muslim question’ (回民回教問題) became quite a significant issue in terms of such matters as governing (=nationalizing) ethnic minorities and the integration and development of the Northwest provinces.

Japan’s political and cultural campaigns aimed at Hui-Muslim (回民工作/回教工作) intervened deeply into this context and produced diverse socio-political effects, interacting dynamically with many sorts of discourse and movement. At the same time, the promotion of such manipulative operations went abreast with and synergized Japanese interest in the whole Islamic World (‘Kaikyo-ken’ 回教圈), which led to the conception of a comprehensive plan - ‘Islam Policy’ (回教政策) - to incorporate that World into the periphery of Japan’s ‘informal empire’.

Therefore, a study of Japan’s ‘Hui-Muslim campaign’ should provide an effective key to exploring and understanding some important topics of the East Asian modern history: for example, ‘nationalism’ and ‘the ethnic question’, the historical dynamism of the Japanese Empire, and the Empire’s relationship to the Islamic world.

However, hitherto few reliable academic studies have been conducted on this subject(1). Thus this paper, which is intended as a preparation for a more detailed study, 1) summarizes the general outline of the ‘Hui-Muslim campaign’ from the 1910’s to the 1940’s, paying attention to the ideological and discursive linkage with the Islamic World - the ‘Kaikyo-ken’ - in general, and, 2) takes a brief look at ‘the China Islamic Union’ (中国回教総聯合会; abbreviated as ‘CIU’) in the occupied area from 1937 on(2), as a concrete example of one of the most highly organized and large-scale operations of that time.
II. The Origins and the Background of the ‘Hui-Muslim Campaign’:


Yamaoka Kotaro (山岡光太郎), one of the earliest Japanese Muslims and the first hajji in Japan, wrote in his book that his “first motive to study Islam and Muslim” had been “to understand Manchurian Muslims” [Yamaoka 1928: 256].

Japan’s second hajji, Tanaka Ippei (田中逸平), who was also a famous Asianist activist (tairiku-ronin: 大陸浪人), was even more typical. Tanaka, who was born in Tokyo in 1882, was educated in the Taiwan Association Institute (台灣協会学校: the predecessor of the present Takushoku University), and began his career in China as an intelligence agent for the Japanese army during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). After the war, he became an investigator for the South Manchurian Railway Company (abbreviated as SMRC). He resigned from the SMRC three years later, but remained in China and settled down in Jinan to study Confucianism. During the First World War, He served in the army again as an intelligence and administration staff member.

Tanaka had already been deeply attracted by the Islam during his first stay in Beijing in 1902 [Tanaka 1925: 31]. He was a religious-minded person: he had trained himself in a sect of Shinto and studied the Bible earnestly in his youth. His primary purpose in studying Confucianism in Jinan, the birthplace of ancient Confucianism, was to seek the universal truth of the ‘Oriental mind’ (東洋精神) that would be the mental basis of the ‘Asian Revival’ against the invasion of the West. He sought to discover a spiritual aspect held in common by all the Asian people and, at the same time, compatible with Japan’s popular ‘absolutist’ nationalism centred around the imperial family. Through personal association with Hui-Muslim in Jinan and the encounter with the writings of ‘Hui-Muslim Confucians’ (回儒), especially those of Liu Zhi (劉智), he thought he had found a clue to such spiritual commonality [Tanaka 1925; Mori 2002; Tsubouchi 2002]. He declared that he found Islam “not at all contrary to (the virtue) of Confucianism nor the virtue and duty of our Imperial Path in Japan (皇国の道)” [Tanaka 1925: 35], and wrote:

“...I have lived for long time in former Qi Kingdom (=Shandong) and devoted myself to the study of the thoughts of Guanzhong (管仲) and his school when I come to think about the huge task of ‘appeasing the universe’ (平天下). I could not help thinking about Muhammad who was born in Mecca, the city at the western edge of Asia. The fact that the virtue of Islam and Confucianism are exactly same (回儒不二) has
been pointed out many times by Chinese scholars so there is no to repeat it here. Islam and Confucianism have fused together; so as a Japanese, I cannot help thinking more keenly about a fusion and syncretism between our ancient Shinto (神道) and Islam. The ancient priests full of Japan Spirit (日本精神) learned Buddhism in China and fused it into our spirit to bring about the rise of a new Japanese Civilization. The Japan Spirit is an extremely harmonious one that embraces everything and abandons nothing. Now it is even re-founding Christianity in a Japanese style. Islamic Civilization has much more in common with Confucianism and ancient Shinto than Christianity. Therefore, Islamic Civilization has to be fused by the Japanese nation in perfect harmony as the basis of the great movement - the revival of Asia. ...” [Tanaka 1928: 203].

For him, Islam, Confucianism, and ‘ancient Shinto’ were all different expressions of a single Pan-Asian virtuous spirit, and the fusion of Islam into the ‘Japan Spirit’ was imperative to realize the ‘revival’ - led by Japan - of whole Asia, including the huge population of the Islamic World; Hui-Muslims in China who ‘fused and syncretized’ Islamic and Chinese (Confucian) culture was living evidence of the fusibility of Islam into Japanese ‘ancient Shinto’ - ‘the right path of God’, and also represented a key factor in connecting different parts of Asia - East Asia and the western Islamic World.

In 1923, Tanaka converted to Islam at a Mosque in Jinan and made his first hajj with a group of Chinese Muslims. During the last decade of his life, Tanaka returned to Japan and devoted himself to disseminating knowledge and the viewpoint about Islam as a professor of Daito Bunka Gakuin. He died in 1934, shortly after making his second hajj.

Some academic theorists of ‘Asianism’ also noticed the ‘importance’ of Islam in China. The most famous one of them was Okawa Shumei (大川周明), who regarded the reformist and anti-Western movements in the Islamic World as the ‘vanguard of the Asian Revival’ (復興アジアの前衛) against Western colonialism [Okawa 1922: Chap.11].

Strongly influenced by the ideas of Neo-Confucianism and later by the doctrine of the Do-kai (道会), a ‘Japanized’ Christian sect, Okawa considered religion as ‘the supreme form of the human mind’ and sought for ‘the union of religious faith and secular socio-political actions’ [Takeuchi 1975; Fukuda 2002 etc]. Thus, he focused on Islam because, as Takeuchi Yoshimi (竹内好) has pointed out, he thought it was “the perfect combination of religion, as the supreme expression of the spiritual mind, or internal value, and politics as the power to embody and realize this spiritual mind in society” [Takeuchi 1975: 406].

Moreover, critical of the values and structures of the ‘Western modernity’ itself, Okawa highly appreciated movements like the Wahhabi or Pan-Islamism, as well as
Gandhi’s revolutionary movement in India, as alternatives to the existing versions of secular (=modern) nationalism which seemed to him ultimately incapable of liberating Asia from the oppressive rule of the West. In his view, these alternative movements were truly radical revolutions based on the ‘spiritual ethos’ expressed in religions of every people [Matsumoto 1986: 13-9; Fukuda 2001: 92-3][10]. On the other hand, he did not favour the revolutionary nationalism in China, regarding it as merely a mimicry of Western ideas that were inconsistent with the Chinese ethos of wang-dao (王道: kingly way) [Hashikawa 1975: 431; Takeuchi 1975: 403-4].

It was in this context that he directed attention to Chinese Muslims. As early as 1913, he wrote as follows, after reviewing the corrupt conditions of religions in China:

“Among these (degenerate) religions in China, only Islam still furnishes religious spirit to its 25 million of believers. China’s population is almost 500 million and 25 million is no more than one-twentieth of this huge number. But while Confucians and Buddhists are merely believers in statistics after all, the people who follow Islam are truly religious adherents without exception: they more or less hold communion with the spirit of the Founder (=Muhammad) and strictly obey the precepts established by him. Therefore, in my opinion, the 25 million of Muslim people can be regarded as the most influential religious force in contemporary China. ...” [Okawa 1913: 121].

Here the Muslim people are presumed to be a spiritually superior - then politically the most forceful - potion of the ‘500 million’ of Chinese population: it can be said that, in Okawa’s perspective, Muslims offered a possibility for China to prevent the loss of religious ethos and join the ‘Pan-Asiatic tide of revival’.

On the backdrop of such ideological attentions to Muslim and Islam in China, from the late 1910’s, some activists began to engage in actual campaigns to approach and co-opt the Hui-Muslim people.

III. Unofficial and Sporadic Manoeuvrings: 1910’s - 1920’s:

Co-optation campaigns directed at Hui-Muslims began in the form of diverse unofficial and isolated private activities by individual tairiku ronin activists.

A typical example is the ‘Chinese Muslim independence movement’ plotted by Fukuda Kikuo (福田規矩男). Fukuda, born in Hirado in 1884, went to China in 1905 and, a few years later, converted to Islam in Zhoujiakou, Henan. He took the Chinese name Zheng Chaozong (鄭朝宗) and ran a school for Muslim youth to inculcate them with pro-Japanese ideas [Komura 1988: 218-22].
In 1919, strange pamphlets entitled Wo wei Wo (我在: We for Ourselves), authored probably by Fukuda, were suddenly began being distributed over a large part of Huabei and the Northwest provinces [Shen Bao: 1919/1/16, 11/16, 19, 25, 30]. These pamphlets called upon the Muslim people to “secede from declining China and found their own nation-state”, presenting a version of the ethno-racial genealogy of Chinese Muslim, an agenda of the ‘independence movement’, and a plan for a secret ‘advance organization’ by the name ‘Langtou Hui’ (狼頭会: the Wolf-head Society) [Wo wei Wo]. The authorities of Gansu report that the pamphlets were distributed together with Shuntian Shibao (順天時報), a popular newspaper published by a Japanese Buddhist organization [Shen Bao: 1919/11/25].

Due a lack of source materials, it is difficult to make clear the details of this incident. The project declared in Wo wei Wo was bereft of any political or economic foundation and neither mentioned anything about Islam itself nor any real socio-economic matters. In fact, probably Fukuda’s activity had little or no practical effect upon local Hui-Muslim societies. Yet it is a clear example that shows evidently the ‘adventurous’ nature of the ‘Muslim campaigns’ in their earliest stages.

Another typical example was a ‘cultural’ campaign by Sakuma Tiejiro (佐久間貞次郎). Sakuma, born in Tokyo in 1883, began his career as a newspaper reporter. Later he became acquainted with the well-known ‘Asianists’ Miyazaki Toten (宮崎滔天) and Kita Ikki (北一輝), eventually taking part in the revolutionary movement in China himself. At the beginning of the 1920’s, he settled in Shanghai, where he converted to Islam and founded a cultural society named ‘Guang She’ (光社: the Society of Light) [Komura 1988: 190-2]. This society published the magazine entitled Hui Guang (回光: Muslim Light), and raised the propaganda for the ‘promotion of Islamic culture’ and an ‘alliance between Japan and Chinese Muslims’(11). Sakuma wrote many articles in Chinese under the penname Zuo Dongshan (左東山), and established friendly relations with some Muslim elites in Shanghai before returning to Japan in 1925.

Although these early attempts of co-optation were quite limited, both in scale and in actual effect, they had already represented clear outlines of distinctive logical structures - so to speak, the ‘practical versions’ of the aforementioned logics of Tanaka or Okawa - which came to form the basis of the ‘Hui-Muslim campaigns’ thereafter.

1. First, these attempts took up Chinese Muslim metonymically as a key factor to deal with the urgent ‘China problems’ and, utilizing Islam as joint, articulated the latter with a broader geopolitical context. Fukuda’s ultimate goal was “to ally with all Asian Muslim to stand against Russia” [Komura 1988: 221]. Sakuma, too, correlated the movements of Chinese Muslim with the situation in the Middle East as follows:
"...After the War in Europe, urged on by the cry for self-determination, Turkey, the leader of Islamic states, rose first, and the rest of the 250 millions of Muslim nations all together embarked in high spirits on a movement to liberate them from the chains. Therefore, it is a natural trend and an inevitable destiny that no fewer than 35 millions Chinese Muslim embark on a similar movement of progress, following the revelations of Allah, and gazing upon the revived crescent flag in the Near East" [Sakuma 1923: 15-6].

Sakuma goes on to define the main purpose of his activity as 1) to realize a "broad unity (大同団結) of Asian nations" through their participation into "pan-Islamism" and 2) to find opportunities to establish economic relations with Russian Central Asia or Near East Islamic states, utilizing an 'alliance with Islam' [ibid.: 50-1]. His primary intention expressed here is to create a comprehensive linkage between various parts of Asia, from the Near East to the Far East, by taking advantage of the bond of Islam as a medium, and connect this linkage to both the world strategy and the China policy of Japan; thus, the Muslim population of China were expected to serve as the 'starting point' for such project.

2. Secondly, such a position regarding Chinese Muslim was complemented and reconfirmed by ethno-racial genealogies. Wo wei Wo presented a Turkic genealogy that traced the roots of Chinese Muslims back to the Xiong-nu (匈奴) and other ancient northern tribes [11-29][12], while Sakuma was of the opinion that:

"... The Muslim people in China identify themselves as a Turkic nation and are proud of being a West Asian race. So in general they resent anti-foreign nationalism prevailing among the ordinary Chinese people. ... The future of China will be determined by these Muslims who submit to this pure and true doctrine without any deviation" [Sakuma 1923: 19, 21].

Here Chinese Muslims are 1) identified as a unique 'nation' (民族) clearly distinct from Han-Chinese, 2) set into a family tree related to Central and West Asia, and 3) highly praised as having a 'fine national character'. This logic was deduced from the existence of Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang. Yet certainly it was also fostered by academic and semi-academic discourses seeking 'Ural-Altaic' roots for the 'Japanese nation' to prove 'hereditary ties' with the Continent, which were quite popular in Japan at that time[13]. Japan's 'manifest destiny' toward Inner Asia and the Islamic World via China is being justified again genealogically by the existence of Chinese Muslims.

3. Finally, in these narratives, the relation between 'Chinese Muslim' and 'China' is oriented within a complex multiplicity. The argument in Wo wei Wo illustrates one extreme: it separated 'Chinese Muslim' completely from 'China' and opposed them to the state dominated by Han-Chinese. This kind of argument led to the idea of an independent
‘Muslim State’ (同教国). On the other side, there were arguments that considered the Muslim population as the ‘best part’ of China: from this point of view, approaching and co-opting them was seen as a good means to ‘reviving China’. Between these two extremes, many variations were formed. For example, there were arguments dividing ‘Muslim in China’ into three groups - Hui-Muslims in the eastern provinces, North-western Hui-Muslims (Donggan), and Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang - identifying relations of each to ‘China’ differently. Such ambivalence of orientation greatly and consistently affected the form, course, and manner of the ‘official’ campaigns that would come later.

In addition to these ‘unofficial’ campaigns, some official agencies also began to make investigations of Chinese Muslim during 1920’s, though sporadically. Well-known reports are those of the Qingdao Garrison (青島守備軍) written by Obayashi Kazuyuki (大林一之) in 1922 and of the Research Bureau of the SMRC (滿鉄調査部: abbreviated as RBSMRC) written by Dazai Matsusaburo (太宰松三郎) and Goto Hideo (後藤英男) in 1924. Obayashi’s report pointes to Chinese Muslims as a key factor in linking together the ‘world Muslim movement’ and the politics in China and the Soviet Union, asserting to positively co-opt them into Japan’s strategy. Dazai refutes the expectation and cry for ‘Muslim independence’ from China. He writes.:

“... I would like to emphasize that the Chinese Muslim are primarily Chinese. At least, the Hui people in the Republic of China are not its political criminals. They share all responsibilities of the Republic as a true part of it” [RBAMRC 1924: 1-2].

Goto focuses on the influence of Pan-Islamism and lists three points to heed in any ‘Muslim campaign’, the third of which questions the effectiveness of utilizing a world religion in a geographically limited policy [36-8]. These reports show again remarkable amorphousness of the logic and the etymology concerning the geopolitical position of Chinese Muslim, as well as ambiguity of the ultimate aim of campaigns.

IV. The Shift to ‘Official’ Campaigns and Occupation Policy: 1930’s - 45:

From the early 1930’s, ‘Hui-Muslim operations’ conducted by Japan were gradually transformed into systematic activities undertaken by official agencies and organizations. The main turning point was the founding of Manchoukuo, as Japan faced the tasks of 1) controlling and securing the border area around the eastern part of Inner Mongolia (Mokyo: 蒙疆)(14), an area linked closely to the territories of the ‘Hui-Muslim warlords’, 2) and administrating more than 300 thousands of Muslim inhabitants of the Northeast provinces (東三省).
The Muslim population in the Northeast consisted of two ethnic categories: one is Hui-Muslims who migrated from Shandong and the Northwest in the early 19th century; the other is about 6,000 Russian ‘Tatar’ immigrants. After the founding of Manchoukuo, a semi-official nationwide ethno-religious organization for Hui-Muslims, ‘the Manchurian Islamic Association’ (滿洲伊斯蘭協会), was set up in 1934 by a Muslim ronin Kawamura Kyodo (河村狂堂). The Tatar immigrants fell under the supervision of the Special Service Agency (特務機関) in Harbin [Sakuma 1938; Yamamoto 1941]. Actually, in the case of Hui-Muslims, no substantial ‘ethnic policy’ was adopted throughout the 1930s, because there was no consensus among the concerned authorities whether to treat the Hui-Muslim people as a ‘religious group’ or as an ‘ethnic group’ [Yamamoto 1941: 44-5; MFA I.2.1.0.1-2/vol.2: Manshu no Kaikyo]. Yet, the ‘strategic significance’ of these people was fully recognised as a group that would help connect Japan, North China and Inner Asia together; as mentioned later, many ‘Manchurian Muslims’ were utilized in the campaign conducted in the Huabei provinces and the Northwest.

The transition to ‘official’ operations in general developed through the formation and disposition of organizations.

1. From the mid 1930s on, most of the activities targeting the Muslim people in China were placed under the Special Service Agencies of the Army: several Agencies were set up locally; each of them was in charge of and responsible to operations in its respective area, sometimes utilizing the existing unofficial organizations such as the Zenrin Kyokai (善隣協会: Friendship Association) [MFA Report 3/65 etc.]. With the exception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the RBSMRC continuing to make their own investigations independently, all the organizations and individuals not under the command of the Agencies were virtually excluded from the activities.

2. Within Japan, as political and economic relations with the Kaikyo-ken - the ‘Islamic World’ - became strategically more and more important, several official and semi-official organizations related to Islam were established in sequence. The affairs concerning Chinese Muslim were among their most important duties. Here is a listing of these organizations [Itagaki 1981: 162; Komura 1988: 397-417 etc.]:

- **Virtually official supervisory organizations**: Nihon Kaikyo Bunka Kyokai (日本回教文化協会: Japan Association of Islamic Culture; 1936)→Islam Bunka Kyokai (イスラム文化協会: Islamic Culture Association; 1937)→Dai Nihon Kaikyo Kyokai (大日本回教協会: Japan Islamic Association; 1938).

- **Organizations for investigation and academic research**: Kaikyo-ken Kokyuojo (回教圈研究所: Institute for Studies on the Islamic World; 1938); the ‘Islam Section’ (回教班) of the Investigation Bureau of the MFA; To-a Keizai Chosa Kyoku (東亜経
From the personnel they staffed, two features are particularly prominent about these organizations.

1. First, they mobilized comprehensively the 'private' activists mentioned above. For example, Sakuma Teijiro was one of founding members of the Nihon Kaikyo Bunka Kyokai and, after the Japanese occupation of Beijing, became a kind of advisor for 'Islam policy' in the occupied areas [MFA 1.2.1.0.2-5/vol.2/1: Hokushi Kaikyoto Kaiju Keikaku]. Mita Ryoichi (三田一), another well-known Japanese Muslim activist, took the lead in the campaigns conducted in the Huabei provinces and Mokyo, enrolling in the RBSMRC and two Special Service Agencies [Komura 1988 etc.]

2. Secondly, the research projects - both academic and otherwise - conducted by these organizations widely mobilized China specialists in academic circles. For example, among the staff of the Kaikyo-ken Kokyuujo, one can find the names of leading figures of post-war Chinese studies, such as Takeuchi Yoshimi and Nohara Shiro (野原四郎). They engaged in overall research on Islam and Muslims in China, including a philological study of the writings of 'Muslim Confucians'. This was probably intended not only as the compilation of basic references for the campaigns and the occupation policy-making, but also as an attempt to understand Islam and the Islamic World utilizing the abundant property of Japanese Sinology - toyoshi (東洋史) and kangaku (漢学) (17).

As a result of such transition to 'official' operations, campaigns and occupation policy targeting Hui-Muslims after the outbreak of the all-out war in July 1937 took on a complex aspect, directly reflecting the aforesaid logical structures formed during earlier attempts. Each Special Service Agency had its own orientation and principle; the multiple and ambivalent orientation concerning the positioning of 'Chinese Muslims' and 'China' was prominent even within each local policy measure and campaign. Moreover, the etymological framework that interwove the relationship, 'Japan/Hui- Muslim/China', into a broader geopolitical disposition of 'Japan/East Asia/the Islamic World/the West', was reinforced and sophisticated through combination with academic research, affecting strongly the development of campaigns and other policy moves. Here is a summary of what actually happen in Manchukuo, Huabei, and Mokyo:

1. In Manchoukuo, the Manchurian Islamic Society was reorganized in 1938 after a detailed census of the Muslim population in 1937 [Yamamoto1941: table] (18). Through the reorganization, this society was turned into a fully official ethnic organization: "all Hui-Muslim inhabitants in Manchukuo" had to be its members, and then it determined the membership of Hui-Muslim and controlled them unitarily [ibid.: appendix]. The main pur-
pose of this policy might have been the military mobilization of Hui-Muslims, in addition to the reinforcement of control over them. In fact, a 'Hui battalion' was founded within the puppet 'national army' in 1939 [Komura 1988: 445-6].

2. In the occupied area of Huabei, the 'Morikawa Agency' (茂川機関) in Beijing took charge of the affairs concerning Hui-Muslims. At the end of 1937 the Morikawa Agency founded two local semi-puppet relief associations, the 'Beijing Islamic Association' (北京回教会) and the 'Tianjin Islamic Association' (天津回教会), utilizing some Muslim intellectuals from Manchoukuo in addition to Japanese agents. In February 1938, the two associations were integrated into the 'Huabei United Headquarter of the China Islamic Union' (中国回教総聯合会華北聯合總部: abbreviated as HUH) [Huijiao 1-1]. Wang Ruilin (王瑞蘭), the Imam of Niujie Mosque, the oldest and largest mosque in Beijing, was installed as Chairman (委員長) of the CIU, and Liu Jinbiao (劉錦標), the leader of the Hui-Muslims from Manchoukuo, as General Consultant (最高顧問). Japanese Muslim Takagaki Shinzo (高垣信三) became the first General Advisor (主席顧問), and Mita Ryoichi the second [Komura 1988: 447]. The CIU itself was merely a symbolic and nominal entity, so in real terms the HUH was its active part. By 1943, it had set up seven District Headquarters (区本部), one liaison office (連絡処), two joint branches (聯合分会), and more than 500 single branches (分会) [Kurihara 1943: 6].

3. In Mokyo, the Special Service Agency of the Hasunuma Legion (連沼部隊特務機関) founded the 'Northwest Islamic Union' (西北回教聯合会: abbreviated as NIU) towards the end of 1938. This organization set up its headquarters in Houhe and was run by some Japanese Muslims, including Komura Fujio (小村不二男). It is identified as the 'autonomous authority (自治機関) of Hui-Muslims'. However, because Mokyo was close to the Soviet border and also had strong geo-economic ties with the Northwest provinces under the rule of the 'Hui-Muslim warlords', several different Special Service Agencies and their puppet organizations were established, with various aims such as gathering information, co-opting the 'Hui-Muslim warlords', or controlling trade and local economy [MFA Report 3/65: 14-26; Yang 1944: 14-5; Komura 1988: 448-54 etc.]. Only further research can clarify the details surrounding these organizations(19).

V. The Local Contexts: the Case of the 'China Islamic Union':

Among the local appeasement campaigns conducted and policy implemented after 1937, the CIU is relatively easy case to study, since a considerable amount of source materials concerning its structure, management and activities are available(20). The following is
a brief sketch of this organization from several aspects to show a part of its actual local
contexts.

1. First, the membership of the CIU was provided to be the ‘whole Muslim popula-
tion of in China’, which was defined as a unique nationality (民族) “inseparable from its
religion”. Due its ‘inseparability’ from religion, on the one hand, the ‘Muslim nationality’
(回教民族) was placed in sharp opposition to both the Communist Party which “refused
and attacked all religions” and the Nationalist government which had “allied with the com-
munists” [Huijiao 1:1: 5, 39]. On the other hand, this ‘nationality’ is clearly identified as ‘a
part of China’. Thus the basic line of ‘Muslim policy’ in Huabei was 1) to “unite (against the
communists) the Muslim nationality in China starting from North China (北支)” [MFA
2.1.0.2.5/vol.2/1: Hokushi Kaikyo Minzoku Kyokai Setsuritsu-an], and 2) to “guide Muslims
to be a firm brick in wall of the Republic of China and to complete their duty to play a part
in the Xinmin movement (新民運動)” [Mita 1941: 9] 21. This policy intended at the same
time to form a trans-regional category of ‘Muslim nationality’ and to give it a rigid contour
determined by the national borders of China, in contrast to the condition in Mokyo where
the intent of the campaigns and policy was probably to found an independent ‘Muslim
state’ (回教国)(22).

Interestingly, such narrative on the part of CIU is quite similar to the rhetoric of
urban Hui-Muslim intellectuals before the War. Some of these intellectuals remained in
the occupied areas and continued to publish their opinions on religious, ethnic or social
affairs in the CIU’ journals, Huijiao (回教: Islam) and Huijiao Zhoubao (回教週報: Islam
Weekly). It could be said that the CIU and the Morikawa Agency co-opted the existing
mainstream discourse of Muslim intellectuals into their strategic narrative and imposed it
on the local Muslim societies once again. The CIU also tried to formulate a geo-
political/cultural image of the relationship between ‘Chinese Muslim’, ‘the Islamic World’
and ‘Japan’ through various activities: Hajj delegations, propaganda events geared towards
inducing anti-Western sentiment, inviting CIU leaders and young Hui-Muslims to Japan,
and so on [Huijiao ; Tang 1943].

2. Secondly, the structure of the CIU was a pyramid-like one: the HUH (=the only
active part of it) was, so to speak, intended to be the ‘central government’ of the ‘Muslim
nationality’ in Huabei; and the District Headquarters were to be its local governments,
gathering local Hui-Muslim elites as members or emeritus members of the executive com-
mittees [Huijiao 1-1: 8-13]. However, on the basic level, the existing Hui-Muslim communi-
ties centred around mosques were directly organized into the branches (分会): that is,
‘one mosque - one community - one branch’ [ibid.: 13-4]. This system was designed 1) to
control Muslim inhabitants through their traditional communities and 2) to establish a def-
inite code to regulate relations between the communities and manners of their joint activities. Japan's primary purpose was to intensify its rule over the occupied areas and impose a network of 'cooperation' among the local societies. Yet, from another aspect, it can be said that, in some ways, the formulation of such a system exactly corresponded to the aspirations of urban Hui-Muslim elites to integrate dispersed communities organically into a visible and substantial ethno-religious entity. It also institutionalized the path of petition and relief as well as officially establishing the category and membership of 'Muslim nationality'. These phases of local context may have provided motivation on the side of Hui-Muslims to 'utilize' the structure and discourse of the CIU. In fact, until 1945, the HUH and the District Headquarters dealt with hundreds of civil matters - including ethnic conflicts, protests against local authorities, and even troubles with the Japanese army. 

3. Finally, the principles and structures of all the District Headquarters were not always uniform. For example, the Tianjin District Headquarters directly supervised the affairs of each branch within its jurisdiction, prohibiting any forms of branch other than the 'one mosque - one branch' style regardless of any particular circumstances; by contrast, the Beijing District Headquarters permitted to organize joint branches (聯合分会) between the Headquarters and the branches to "supervise the affairs of branches by proxy for the Headquarters" [Huijiao 1-2; 52, 74]. Here, one can see 'feedback' of local contexts which affected the development of Japanese campaigns.

VI. Conclusion:

As outlined above, Japan's political and cultural campaigns to approach and co-opt the Hui-Muslim population in China developed from sporadic 'private' activities of individual Asianist ronins to constitute a significant part of the official strategy and policy toward North China and the global Islamic World - the Kaikyo-ken.

It was a complicated mixture of nationalism, colonialism, religious idealism, and anti-West revolutionism that drove the early activists. Through their incorporation into the official projects, this complex of ideas persisted as the ideological and discursive axes of the operations until 1945, being fertilized and reinforced by systematic academic research. Of course, in practice, the whole effort served merely as a tool of - or an excuse for - the coercive political invasion and oppression. However, it also reflected an essential feature of 'Asianist' passion, questioning the 'Western modernity' and groping for an alternative way by connecting to the Islamic World. A careful study of its logical structure and dynamism will cast light on some important phases of the Asiatic context of modern Japanese nation-
alism - and 'Japan's modernity' itself.

Institutionally, on the other hand, the campaigns did not have any unitary guidelines or single chain of command. Locally organized activities varied both in structure and in rhetoric. But exactly because of such multiplicity and ambivalence - so to speak, 'multi-accentuality' - the development of the operations actively interacted with diverse socio-political contexts and geo-cultural/political discourses. These processes of interaction include many points yet to be minutely probed and discussed, concerning both East Asian studies and Islamic studies.

From the early 1940's on, the 'Muslim campaigns' constantly faced difficulties and, in fact, ultimately failed much earlier than Japan's surrender. At the last stages of the War, a considerable number of branches of the CIU had already become 'covers' for guerrilla forces fighting against the Japanese army [Kurihara 1943 etc.]. The projects and rhetoric making up the campaigns were defeated by the counter-projects/discourse of Chinese nationalism. Further research is also necessary to investigate this circumstance. (24)

Notes:
(1) In China, for example, Yu Zhengui has afforded an introductory survey in his book [1996], while in Japan, although there are several good studies on 'the relationship between Japan and the Islamic World' and 'the history of the Islamic studies in Japan', which include some critical references to the political and ideological commitment to Muslim people in China by early Japanese Muslims, rightwing activists, the army, colonial organizations, and so on; but little detailed tracing and analysis has done concerning how they actually promoted the manoeuvring and how the Muslim people reacted to or interacted with that manoeuvring through action and socio-political discourse. See, for example, Itagaki [1981], Sugita [1995], Rezrazi [1997], Tazawa [1998], and Usuki [2000]. To date, the research done by Shimpo Atsuko [1998; 1999; 2000] represents the only academic work specializing on this subject.

(2) In this paper, the names of 'puppet' organizations were transcribed only in English translation instead of transcribing both Japanese and Chinese pronunciations.

(3) Even for the 'Asianists' who cooperated mainly with Muslim refugees from India, Central Asia, and Middle East, like Yamaoka and Hatano Uho (波多野烏峰), the first contacts with Islam and Muslim were encounters with the Muslim people in China. About the case of Hatano, see Rezrazi [1997].

(4) Detailed studies have been done recently on the biography and the thought of Tanaka by the scholars related to the Takushoku University, from which Tanaka graduated. See, for example, Mori [2002] and Tsubouchi [2002]. The references made in this paper to Tanaka are largely based on these works. Also see Kato [1940] as a semi-contemporary biography of him.

(5) Jinan, the capital of Shandong province, has a large Hui-Muslim population and used to be one of the centres of Muslim socio-cultural movements during the Republican era.

(6) Hui-Muslim intellectuals of Ming and Qing periods who were well acquainted with traditional
Chinese literature and interpreted the philosophy and Theology of Islam into Chinese utilizing the terminology of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. Their writings are now called the ‘Han-kitabs’, holy scripture in Chinese, by Hui-Muslim.

(7) An ancient Kingdom located at present Shandong. Guanzhong was a Minister of Qi Kingdom, whose thought is said to be an important source of Confucianism.

(8) The Do-kai (Society of the Way) was organized by famous Christian intellectual Matsumura Kaiseki (松村介石) in 1907. Okawa was one of its core member during the 1910’s.

(9) About the detailed biography of Okawa, see Hashikawa [1975], Otsuka [1990].

(10) For original texts see, for example, Okawa [1922: Chap.1]. It has been pointed out that this anti-Western stand point was the basis of his seemingly ambivalent logic by which he could simultaneously appreciate Gandhi’s thought and while emphasizing the supremacy of Japan [Matsumoto 1986: 17-8]. This ‘ambivalence’ rather resembles the logic of Tanaka Ippei mentioned above, as well as most of other early Japanese Muslims who believed piously in Islam, but at the same time earnestly revered the Emperor and the divine imperial blood.

(11) As another example, Kawamura Kyodo, who will be mentioned later, also engaged in such ‘cultural’ manoeuvring in Beijing during the 1920’s.

(12) Of course, in fact, it is difficult to positivistically discuss the ethnic genealogies of these ancient tribes.

(13) About the ‘Ural-Altaic’ discourse, see, for example, the detailed analysis done by Stefan Tanaka [1993: Chap. 3].

(14) As to the concept of Mokyo, see Mori [2000].

(15) This institute was founded by Okubo Koji (大久保幸二), one of the pioneers of Turkish studies in Japan. Its journal, Kaikyo-ken, was the only academic journal specializing in the Islamic studies at that time and containing fairly high quality research.

(16) Originally, this institute was affiliated with the SMRC. In 1938, it was separated from the SMRC by Okawa Shumei under the sponsorship of the Army and the MFA.

(17) The relationship between Chinese studies and Islamic studies in the wartime remains a neglected problem in the academic history of Japan, and sorely needs to be re-examined.

(18) The Chinese transliteration of the word Islam, Yiislan (伊斯蘭), in its name was replaced by the translation, Hujiiao (回教).

(19) Shimpo [1999] discusses some actual phases of the ‘Muslim campaigns’ conducted in Mokyo, especially the Muslim women education promoted by a Special Service Agency.

(20) A more detailed paper is now being prepared on this puppet organization. See also Shimpo [1998] etc.

(21) The Xinmin (=New People) movement was a puppet civil movement in the occupied area of Huabei organized by the occupation army to propagandize anti-communism.

(22) For example, a confidential document made by Japanese authorities in Mokyo states that their basic guideline pertaining to the Muslim inhabitants was to induce them “to support the pro-Japanese and anti-communism movement for the independence and revival of the Northwest Muslim population” [MFA A.1.1.0.30/vol.19/28: Mokyo Juyo Seisaku ni taisuru Siso Tosei ni tsutte].

(23) See the various issues of Hujiiao and Hujiiao Zhubao.
It might be too simple and fruitless to explain all these processes merely referring to some ‘official’ slogans catering for the discourse of Chinese nationalism dominant at that time.

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