a great extent, determined the activities of the Islamist movement in Sudan, and that a number of unique aspects of the Sudanese Islamist movement can be better understood by making reference to Dr. al-Turabi’s personality.

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“A Study of the History of U.S.-Egyptian Relations in the Context of the Middle Eastern Wars” (in Japanese)
【中東戦争との関連における米国・エジプト関係史の研究】
(Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo, 2001/ 東京大学大学院総合文化研究科, 2001年)

Summary
On the four Arab-Israeli wars, there have been war stories written or translated and journalistic descriptions published in Japan, but few serious studies of their political processes exist. The reason for the paucity may lie in difficulty of their study as the number of countries involved is great and related documents are written in many languages (few Japanese studies have used Arabic sources). The present study has tackled this research task from the context of U.S.-Egyptian relations, as Egypt was the core of the Arab side in the Arab-Israeli wars and the United States was the facilitator from the time of Israel’s independence through its peace with Egypt. These wars were important events in international politics as the Arab side depended on Soviet military assistance, thus producing occasional tensions in the Cold-War rivalry, so even a study with a limited scope such as this one should still be valuable indeed.

This author lived in both Egypt and the United States and collected related studies, documents, and interview records. Then he read, compared and analyzed them for more than seven years and has written a history of U.S.-Egyptian relations in the context of the Middle Eastern wars during the long period (roughly between 1947-1979, maybe longer than any books in Japan and abroad). Declassification of public records and their study are most advanced in the United States (and Great Britain), and then Israel, but little is done in Egypt. The related scholarly books in the United States, Great Britain, and Israel are generally objectively written, but tend to be either overly sympathetic to Israel or fair to the Arab side. Egyptian and other Arab authors’ scholarly works are critical of Israel and the United States. This author has compared such diverse analyses and views and tried to determine the facts and evaluate them with such questions in mind as how and why the wars erupted, how they could have been avoided, and how these conflicts could have been
resolved sooner.

In "Introduction," the author describes his research topics and reviews the principal existing literature in the genre, related to the above situation. In "Chapter 1: The Israeli Independence War and the United States," he explains how the American Truman administration and Jewish-American citizens played a decisive role in the process of Israeli independence accomplished in 1948 and Israeli military victory against the Arab states. In "Chapter 2: The Egyptian Revolution and the United States," he discusses how the defeat of the Arabs served as the big factor for the Egyptian coup d'état by young officers in 1952; how the United States helped the new regime achieve withdrawal of British troops from Egypt, which had stayed to protect the Suez Canal; and also how the Eisenhower administration tried (in vain) to persuade Egypt to make peace with Israel in exchange for financial aid to construct the Aswan High Dam.

In "Chapter 3: The Suez War and U.S.-Egyptian Relations," the cause and process of the Suez War are analyzed: Egypt’s Nasser regime sought to elevate its international status by building its military forces, but the United States and Great Britain didn’t sell much weaponry; therefore, Egypt began to buy arms from the Soviet Union, which caused the United States and Great Britain to cancel their offer to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam; Egypt retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, which pushed Great Britain and France, holders of the company’s stocks, to try to overthrow the revolutionary Egyptian regime; as the United States refused to consent in fear of the probable reaction of Asian and African nations, the two European countries conspired with Israel which wanted to weaken Egypt before she became too strong; and so, Israel first invaded, and Britain and France intervened to "protect the Suez Canal," but the Eisenhower administration was so enraged that it forced the three countries to withdraw under United Nations’ condemnations and American economic sanctions.

In "Chapter 4: American Aid to Egypt and its Suspension," the author describes how the United States aided Nasser’s regime to buy its friendship as Nasser became the charismatic leader of the Arab peoples with Egypt’s "victory against imperialist powers" and the formation of the United Arab Republic with Syria as the first step toward Arab unification; how Egypt gained maximum benefits from Cold War rivalry with both American and Soviet aids; how Egypt intervened in the Yemeni civil war to restore its prestige damaged by the secession of Syria, and her collision with Saudi Arabia which helped the Yemeni Emir; and how the United States, guardian of Saudi Arabia, became increasingly antagonistic toward Egypt under the Johnson administration and eventually suspended U.S. aid.
In “Chapter 5: The Third Middle Eastern War and the U.S. ‘Involvement’,” how the U.S. was “involved” in the war is analyzed. As Egypt was engaged in the Yemeni war, Egypt had to endure criticism for “hiding behind the UN peace keeping forces” and doing nothing to prevent Israeli raids into Syria and Jordan in retaliation against Palestinian guerilla operations. But in 1967, it did mobilize the army and asked the UN troops to leave, upon Soviet and Syrian requests to deter a possible Israeli invasion. Israel decided to strike when Egypt forbade ships bound to Eilat to go through the Tiran Straits from the Red Sea, but the United States demanded her to wait until she did something through the UN. Egypt was joined not only by Syria but also the normally conservative Jordan in her mobilization against Israel, which was being reinforced by troops from other Arab countries. The Johnson administration tried to organize an international fleet to force Egypt to open the straits to Israel, but it was difficult and the Arab side was triumphant seeing both Israel and the U.S. unable to fight against them. However, Israel just took time to give Americans a try, and eventually struck first, destroying ill-prepared and ill-coordinated Arab armies one by one in a mere six days. Nasser couldn’t believe it was possible and condemned the United States for allegedly having aided Israel. But the author finds no proof of U.S. ‘involvement or complicity with Israel to keep the Arabs off guard.

In “Chapter 6: ‘The Attrition War’ and U.S.-Egyptian Relations,” the author discusses how Egypt restored the army with Soviet weapons bought by Saudi money (after reconciliation in exchange for withdrawal from Yemen); how Egypt started an “attrition war” along the Suez Canal to put pressure on Israel to return the occupied Sinai Peninsula; Cairo and other inward places having been bombarded by Israel, Nasser hastened to Moscow to plead for protection; with Soviet air forces thus stationed in Egypt, Nixon administration had to react and Secretary of State Rogers managed to make Egypt and Israel accept a cease-fire as the first step for negotiating peace.

In “Chapter 7: The Fourth Middle Eastern War and U.S.-Egyptian Relations,” the U.S. failure to prevent another Arab-Israeli war is analyzed: Upon Nasser’s sudden death, Sadat succeeded him and tried to regain Sinai from Israel with American pressure. So, Sadat expelled Soviet troops from Egypt and waited for a U.S. response. But Nixon and Kissinger saw no chance to persuade a triumphant Israel to concede, and did nothing. Egypt then allied with Syria to try another war to pressurize the U.S., and after repeated mock operations, the two countries struck Israel off guard in 1973. With Soviet surface-to-air missiles, they successfully fought in the initial phase, and Arab oil exporters had time to resort to “oil weapons,” by declaring an export ban on Israel’s allies. Faced with this oil crisis, the
U.S. promised Egypt to mediate peace with Israel, and arranged a cease-fire, forcing Israel to stop encircling Egyptian troops as the Soviets threatened intervention.

In “Chapter 8: The Camp David Accords and Peace between Egypt and Israel,” the author describes how Kissinger managed to separate Israeli troops from first Egyptian and then Syrian ones; how the feeble Ford administration was unable to pressurize Israel to concede much; how the Carter administration tackled the Middle East problem for the sake of energy security and tried to convene a Geneva conference for peace talks; how Sadat took the initiative to courageously visit Israel and started direct negotiation for peace; how President Carter invited Sadat and Israeli Premier Begin to Camp David in 1978 and led them to agree on two accords; how one accord resulted in peace between Egypt and Israel in the next year with Carter's help, while the other one only produced temporary “self-rule” of Palestinians in occupied territories but failed to draw participation of Jordan and PLO in the negotiation on the future of the territories.

In the “Closing Chapter,” the author explains the characteristics of Egyptian and American policies toward the above wars and their respective decision-making processes. The United States pursued, with some difference in stress depending on Presidents, the following policy objectives, which are somewhat in conflict with each other: (1) rivalry against the Soviet Union, (2) support of Israel, (3) friendship with Arab oil states. (1) was imposed by the Soviets' supply of arms to Egypt, Syria, etc. and the United States tried to befriend Egypt. (2) was based on the influence of the Jewish lobby in the U.S. and also Americans' relative affinity with the Israeli people in culture and thoughts. After the third war, Israel was regarded as a reliable ally in the Middle East. (3) was necessitated by Western Europe's, and gradually U.S.' as well, dependence on Arab oil. As this policy was in conflict with (2), the United States wanted to persuade Arab states to make peace with Israel, and to prevent the Soviets from allying with radical Arab states, thus involving itself with wars and peace efforts. However, American interests as a superpower and Egyptian interests as a regional power were often in contradiction, and so the United States failed to establish peace in the Middle East.

In the case of Egypt, King Faruk, Nasser, and Sadat had clearly different characters, but they basically pursued consistent policy objectives: (1) to make Egypt a military power, (2) to make her the leader of the Arabs with that power, (3) to extract foreign aid for that purpose. (1) was needed to counter the facts that Britain stationed troops in Egypt and interfered in its politics until 1956, and that Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula since 1967. Nasser and Sadat were originally military men, and so naturally wanted to have a respectable
army. (2) was desired for self-respect as Egypt was the greatest in population, industry and culture among Arab countries. So, Egypt tried to assert its leadership in a contest with Jordan and Iraq during the first war period, with Syria among others during the third war period, and with Saudi Arabia among others since the fourth war. (3) was imposed by the paucity of natural resources and the need for weapons, foods, and capital provided by other countries. Moreover, her political power was augmented by the United States which led British troops to withdraw, and “win” the Suez war. Egypt’s status as Arab leader led the U.S. and the Soviets compete to aid her to buy friendship, but an inflated sense of self-importance caused Egypt to venture into the disastrous war with Israel. After that Egypt still managed to draw aid from Arab oil states to buy Soviet arms, and even Soviet troops to protect her, but resorted to the fourth war with Israel to get back the Sinai Peninsula. Therefore, foreign aid was costly as long as they were intended for the war effort.

As for the decision-making processes of both countries, that of the Americans can be explained by the bureaucratic politics model in ordinary times and the rational actor model in times of crisis. Egypt is an authoritarian polity and much depends on the personal wills of President: therefore decisions can be arbitrary and often erroneous, but radical change of policy tools (if not basic policy aims) is possible with change of leaders. Indeed, Sadat’s bold decision to adopt a conciliatory policy toward Israel opened the way to the first Arab-Israeli peace.

P.S. A slightly revised version of this dissertation was published in book form by Ochanomizushobo, Tokyo, in 2003, as “The Middle Eastern Wars and the United States – In the Context of the History of U.S.-Egyptian Relations.”


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「乾燥熱帯の沿岸域における人間・ヒトコブラクダ関係の人類学的研究—スーダン東部、紅海沿岸ベージ族における事例分析から—」
(Graduate School of Human and