Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, or Arabism?
Comparison of the 2007 Survey of the Greater Cairo Area and the Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008

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I. Introduction

Based on the results of surveys conducted in 2007 and 2008, this report examines the relationship between regional identity and political awareness of Egyptians.

The 2007 survey of three governorates, Cairo, Qalyubiya, and Giza, gave a glimpse into the high degree of concern citizens generally had about politics and, on the other hand, the extremely low sense of political effectiveness they felt. With regard to either the central or local administrations, the vast majority of the Greater Cairo residents thought that individual citizens were almost entirely unable to exert any kind
of influence on policies; furthermore, there were no steps they could take to do so. In addition, a sense of more active political awareness was seen among citizens who identified themselves readily with the Islamic Community (al-Umma al-Islāmīya). Moreover, the impoverished classes showed little support for either the party in power or the opposition parties, and in elections, their voter turnout rate was the lowest\(^1\).

While paying heed to some of the features that came to light in the 2007 Cairo Survey, this report presents cross tabulations of items on Egyptians’ regional identities with items on their political awareness from the Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008\(^2\) and compares the results over a sample of six governorates.

In this way, we can examine how Egyptians’ regional identities tie in with their economic dissatisfaction and with the higher degree of active political awareness seen currently at the citizen level on a nationwide scale.

II. The 2007 Cairo Survey

1. Regional Identity

   Question 24: “To which one of the following communities or regions do you feel you belong? Which of the following really expresses your identity/individuality?” (Only one response is allowed.) (See Figure 1)

   The regional unit that Cairo’s citizens felt the most personal unity or identity with on a daily basis was the nation of Egypt (71%), followed by the governorate or district (municipal administrative district) in which they resided (14%) and the Islamic Community, which extended beyond their nation’s borders into a wider global community (13%). Thus, it is clear that Egyptians have a strong sense of national identity.

   Of Cairo respondents, 13% felt a strong sense of identity with the Islamic Community, while 3% felt strong unity with the Arab nation (al-Umma al-‘Arabiya).

2. National Pride

   Question 25: “In what attributes of Egypt today do you take pride? Which one of the following do you feel most proud of?” (Only one response is allowed.) (See Figure 2)

   Of Cairo’s citizens, 31% took pride in the peace and stability of their nation;
19%, in the upholding of religious principles; 14%, in the distinctive characteristics of the country’s people (unity, cooperative inclination, consideration for others, etc.); and 10%, in Egypt’s physical features. Just as with the abovementioned sense of identity with the Islamic Community, one senses an inclination among Cairo’s citizens to view Islam seriously.

In addition, just 0.2% of respondents indicated that they took pride in their political system and none took pride in their economic system, which can be seen as an expression of deep dissatisfaction among Cairo’s citizens with the state of political participation and economic difficulties.

3. Viewing Islam Seriously and the Activation of Political Awareness among Cairo’s Citizens

An interesting phenomenon arises when Cairo citizens’ Islamic tendencies are cross tabulated with other results. Islamic tendencies were reflected in the simple (Source) The 2007 Survey of the Greater Cairo Area data.
tallied results of Q24 and Q25. In the cross tabulations of regional identity (Q24) with regime evaluation (Q14), participation in local communities, ideal and actual (Q5 and Q6), and use of influence on the national government (Q8), 77% of the respondents who replied to Q24 that they identified themselves with the Islamic Community (who themselves constituted 13% of the total number surveyed) had an unfavorable assessment of the performance of the national administration. Of this group, 91% thought that ordinary citizens should be involved in decisions in their communities and play a significant, active role, 73% answered that citizens had absolutely no right to participate in community decisions, and 70% said that their efforts would not be influential at all in opposing decisions of the national government. The Cairo survey indicates that the citizens who viewed Islam seriously were critical of the central government and had a strong motivation for political participation.

Cairo citizens who expressed their Islamic identity also showed distinctive perceptions of other countries. In cross tabulations of regional identity (Q24) with the
importance of other countries in national foreign relations (Q32) and favorable nations (Q33), 52% of those who identified themselves more with the Islamic Community than with the Egyptian state considered the United States “extremely important” (25% perceived the US as “not important at all”). However, 48% of this group replied that the US was a “very unfavorable country” (compared with the total average of 31%). They exhibited the highest degree of disregard for the US among all groups with various identities including those who identified themselves with the Arab Republic of Egypt, among whom 27% felt likewise.

III. The Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008

Among the selection items in Q23, “Trends in religious belief or political thought with which you normally sympathize (select up to three),” the three most popular responses were Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, and Arabism. We tabulated figures for each of the six governorates that served as sample points and analyzed the relationship between the regional identity indices of Egypt’s citizens and their political awareness. Cross tabulations of these three regional identity indices were carried out for seven items: “the six governorates (Demographics: Governorate),” Q7 “Concern for politics,” Q10 “Appraisal of current state of citizen participation in the local community,” Q19-16 “America’s degree of contribution to Middle Eastern peace,” Q28 “General appraisal of the central administration,” Q26 “Presumed support for political parties at the People’s Assembly election,” and “income levels (household monthly income; Demographics F13).”

The results of the cross tabulations are shown as Appendix at the end of the paper. The reader can consult this table if necessary as he/she reads ahead.

1. Sympathies for Political Ideologies and Religious Beliefs

Question 23: “Please select from among the following choices the trends in religious belief or political thought with which you normally sympathize. Please choose up to three selections that best express your views.” (See Table 1)

In order of prevalence, Egyptians’ support for political ideologies and religious beliefs was concentrated in Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, and Arabism. Their resonance with these three “isms” can be considered at the
Table 1: The Sympathy with Political Ideology/Religious Belief in the Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008 (Average of the Six Governorates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The sympathies with religious belief/political thought</th>
<th>percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabism</td>
<td>78.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Nationalism</td>
<td>79.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamism</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribalism</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasserism</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Specify:                                     )</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source) The Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008 data.

same time to reflect Egyptians’ regional identity and national awareness.

2. Governorates: Governorate (Demographics)

The total sampling number of 1000 was distributed among the governorates as seen in Figure3.

Cross tabulation of governorates with sympathies for Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, and Arabism: Governorate (Demographics) × Questions 23-1, 23-2, and 23-4

First, we examine the trends in the percentages of citizens’ expressed sympathy for these three doctrines on a governorate-by-governorate basis. Higher rates of support than the nationwide average for Islamism were seen in the Cairo, Beni Suef (95%), and Sohag (93%) governorates; governorates in which sympathy for Egyptian Nationalism ran higher than the nationwide average were Port Said (81%), Beni Suef (97%), and Sohag (98%); and governorates in which sympathy for Arabism exceeded the nationwide average were Cairo, Beni Suef (94%), and Sohag. Sympathy for Arabism was strikingly high in Beni Suef.

In other words, from the results of this survey, we can see that in Beni Suef and Sohag governorates in Upper Egypt, the rate of sympathizing with Islamism and Egyptian Nationalism was over 90%, much higher than in the four governorates of Lower Egypt, and that the rate was also over 90% for Arabism, in addition to the other
two doctrines in Beni Suef.

3. **Interest in Politics**

   Question 7: “How interested are you in political issues and themes, such as the organization of the new ministerial cabinet or living conditions in Egypt, such as unemployment, price levels, and salaries?” (See Figure 4)

   **Cross tabulation of interest in politics with sympathies for Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, and Arabism: Question 7 × Questions 23-1, 23-2, and 23-4**

   The percentage of Egyptians concerned about political problems directly related to standards of living, that is, responding either “Considerably interested” or “Somewhat interested,” averaged 43% nationwide, with Menufiya (47%), Kafr Sheykh (50%), and Beni Suef (52%) governorates exceeding the national average.

   Among respondents who expressed an interest in politics in Menufiya, 68% sympathized with Islamism. In Kafr Sheykh and Beni Suef, the figures were 80% and 97% respectively. Among respondents expressing an interest in politics in Menufiya,
77% sympathized with Egyptian Nationalism. In Kafr Sheykh and Beni Suef, the figures were 60% and 97% respectively. Of the same respondents in Menufiya, 70% sympathized with Arabism. In Kafr Sheykh and Beni Suef, the figures were 78% and 95% respectively.

In Beni Suef Governorate, respondents expressing an interest in politics had a high rate of sympathizing with Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, and Arabism, over 90% in each case. In contrast, in the two rural governorates of Lower Egypt, respondents expressing an interest in politics sympathized with these three forms of regional identity at rates ranging from approximately 60% to 80%.

4. The Appraisal of Citizen Participation in Local Communities

Question 10: “In real life, to what extent do you think citizens actually participate in decision making in your community?” (See Figure 5)
Cross tabulation of the appraisal of citizen participation in local communities with sympathies for Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, and Arabism: Question 10 × Questions 23-1, 23-2, and 23-4

Next, let us consider the relationship between the respondents’ sympathies for Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, or Arabism, and their impression of the current situation with regard to citizen participation in their local communities.

Nationwide, an average of 35% of Egyptians think that citizens do not have the right to participate in local administration at all, although they would like to contribute more actively. Governorates exceeding this nationwide average are Cairo (40%), Port Said (39%), Menufiya (38%), and Kafr Sheykh (39%). Although Beni Suef (33%) is similar to these four governorates of Lower Egypt, Sohag is considerably lower with 17%.

Among respondents expressing strong dissatisfaction with the current state of citizen participation in local governance in these four governorates of Lower Egypt, 67% to 82% sympathized with Islamism, which is not a notably high figure.

(Source) The Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008 data.
Among respondents in Cairo expressing strong dissatisfaction with the current state of citizen participation in local governance, 78% sympathized with Egyptian Nationalism, with figures of 81% in Port Said and 75% in Menufiya. The figure was much lower in Kafr Sheykh at 57%.

Among respondents expressing strong dissatisfaction with the current state of citizen participation in local governance, 71% to 82% had Arabist sympathies, which is roughly the same rate as for Islamism.

In the two urban (Cairo and Port Said) and two rural (Kafr Sheykh and Menufiya) governorates of Lower Egypt, more respondents expressed strong dissatisfaction with the current state of citizen participation in local governance than in the two rural governorates (Beni Suef and Sohag) of Upper Egypt, but it is not a striking difference. Citizens in the four governorates of Lower Egypt who had a strong dissatisfaction with citizen participation in local governance had sympathies distributed fairly equally between Arabism, Islamism, and Egyptian Nationalism at roughly 70% to 80% each; again, these figures are not notably high.

5. The Degree of US Contribution to Middle East Peace

Question 19-16: “To what extent do you think the US, its institutions, and people contribute to settling the political problems and achieving stability in the Middle East?” (See Figure 6)

Cross tabulation of the degree of US contribution to Middle East peace with sympathies for Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, and Arabism: Question 19-16 × Questions 23-1, 23-2, and 23-4

Next, we consider the relationship between respondents’ sympathies for Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, or Arabism, and their evaluation of the US.

Nationwide, an average of 49% of Egyptians thought that the US “did not contribute at all” to achieving stability in the Middle East; governorates in which that response exceeded the nationwide average were Beni Suef (59%) and Sohag (79%). Combining responses that the US “did not contribute very much” with responses that it “did not contribute at all,” 88% of respondents had a negative appraisal of the US in Sohag compared with 78% in Beni Suef.

Of the respondents in Beni Suef who thought that the US “did not contribute at all” to achieving stability in the Middle East, 99% sympathized with Islamism. In Sohag, the figure was 92%.
Of the respondents who thought the US “did not contribute at all” to achieving stability in the Middle East, in Beni Suef, 99% of them sympathized with Egyptian Nationalism. In Sohag, the figure was 97%.

In Beni Suef, 92% of respondents who thought the US “did not contribute at all” to achieving stability in the Middle East had sympathy for Arabism. In Sohag, the figure was 81%.

Over 90% of respondents with rigorously anti-US appraisals in Egypt’s two southern governorates had strong sympathies for both Islamism and Egyptian Nationalism. This impression was somewhat weaker among those sympathizing with Arabism in Sohag.

6. **Overall Judgment of the Central Administration**

Question 28: “What is your overall judgment when you think of the administration run by the central government?” (Asked of 382 respondents who
answered “Yes” in Q24: “Did you vote in any previous elections or referendums?”) (See Figure 7)

*Cross tabulation of the overall judgment of the central administration with sympathies for Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, and Arabism: Question 28 × Questions 23-1, 23-2, and 23-4*

Next, we look at the relationship between respondents’ sympathies for Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, or Arabism, and their evaluation of Egypt’s central administration.

Combining “Not good” and “Not very good” responses, the nationwide average of Egyptians with a negative appraisal of the current central administration was 18%, and governorates in which these responses exceeded the national average were Beni Suef (55%) and Sohag (20%).

Of the respondents in Beni Suef with a negative appraisal of the current central administration, 100% had sympathies for Islamism. In Sohag, the figure was 97%.

All respondents in Beni Suef with a negative regime appraisal sympathized with
Egyptian Nationalism. In Sohag, the figure was also 100%.

In Beni Suef, 96% of the same respondents as mentioned above had sympathies for Arabism. In Sohag, the figure was 77%.

Our survey revealed strong dissatisfaction in Beni Suef with the policies of the central administration. Almost all respondents with a severe appraisal in Egypt’s two southern governorates sympathized with both Islamism and Egyptian Nationalism. Sympathies with Arabism were somewhat less strong in Sohag.

7. Presumed Support for Political Parties at the People’s Assembly Election

Question 26: “If the parliamentary election were to take place tomorrow, what political party would you vote for?” (Only one response allowed; asked of 382 respondents who answered “Yes” in Q24: “Did you vote in any previous elections or referendums?”) (See Figure 8)

Cross tabulation of the presumed support for political parties at the People’s Assembly election with sympathies for Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, and Arabism: Question 26 × Questions 23-1, 23-2, and 23-4

Nationwide, an average of 26% of respondents chose voting for the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) candidate; 3.5%, for an independent candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood; 3.3%, for an independent candidate not of the Muslim Brotherhood; and tiny fractions, for any of the other candidates, from al-Wafd to al-Jabha al-Dimuqrāṭī.

Looking at different governorates, support for the NDP exceeded the nationwide average in Menufiya (30%), Beni Suef (47%), and Sohag (41%). Moreover, support for the independent candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood exceeded the nationwide average significantly in Beni Suef (21%). Support for the independent candidate not of the Muslim Brotherhood also exceeded the nationwide average in Beni Suef (8%), Sohag (8%), and Kafr Sheykh (6%).

First, we examine the support for the NDP. Of the respondents supporting the NDP in Menufiya, 58% sympathized with Islamism. In Beni Suef, the figure was 98%, and in Sohag, 96%. Among respondents supporting the NDP in Menufiya, 69% sympathized with Egyptian Nationalism, with 98% in Beni Suef and 100% in Sohag. Among respondents supporting the NDP in Menufiya, 69% sympathized with Arabism, with 95% in Beni Suef and 73% in Sohag.

Next, we look at support for the independent candidate of the Muslim
Brotherhood. In Beni Suef, respondents who supported the independent candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood sympathized equally with Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, and Arabism at 96% each.

Finally, we consider the support for the independent candidate not of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Kafr Sheykh, of those supporting the independent candidate not of the Muslim Brotherhood, 78% sympathized with Islamism, with 100% in both Beni Suef and Sohag. Of those supporting the independent candidate not of the Muslim Brotherhood in this governorate, 56% sympathized with Egyptian Nationalism, again with 100% in both Beni Suef and Sohag. Of the same respondents mentioned above, 89% sympathized with Arabism, with 90% support in both Beni Suef and Sohag.

It is apparent from these data that irrespective of support for the parties in or
out of power, clear differences between governorates are reflected in the three regional identity indices (rates of sympathizing). Moreover, it can be considered that the high rates of sympathizing in the two southern governorates reflect a general activation of the political awareness of citizens of these governorates. In Beni Suef and Sohag, support was high for all of the NDP candidate, the independent candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the independent candidate not of the Muslim Brotherhood; however, no inclinations could be seen among those supporters for any of the three indices. There were high rates of sympathizing between approximately 90% and 100% for each of the three doctrines among people supporting both the party in power and the independents. It should be noted that the percentage of those sympathizing with Arabism was slightly lower and that this trend was especially pronounced in Sohag among NDP supporters. This finding coincides with the trend seen in the analysis of results of other items in the Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008 presented in this chapter.

8. Income Groups

Demographics F13: “What is your household’s usual monthly income?” (See Figure 9)

Cross tabulation of income groups with sympathies for Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, and Arabism: Demographics F13 × Questions 23-1, 23-2, and 23-4

The respondents’ household incomes were concentrated in the “Less than 500 L.E.” (Egyptian pounds)⁴ (the lowest income stratum) and “501–1,000 L.E.” strata, which together accounted for 69% of total respondents. Governorates in which these two low-income strata exceeded the nationwide average were Kafr Sheykh (80%), Beni Suef (89%), and Sohag (80%).

In Kafr Sheykh, among respondents with monthly household incomes of 1000 LE or less, 73% sympathized with Islamism, with 96% in Beni Suef and 92% in Sohag. Among respondents in Kafr Sheykh with monthly household incomes of 1,000 L.E. or less, 55% sympathized with Egyptian Nationalism, with 97% in both Beni Suef and Sohag. Among the same respondents in Kafr Sheykh as mentioned above, 72% sympathized with Arabism, with 93% in Beni Suef and 79% in Sohag.

Respondents in Egypt’s two southern governorates with monthly household incomes of 1,000 L.E. or less showed high rates of sympathizing with Egyptian Nationalism, Islamism, and Arabism in descending order, with rates between 90% and 100%. By contrast, in Kafr Sheykh, respondents with the same monthly household
incomes of 1,000 L.E. or less sympathized with Islamism and Arabism in the low 70%–80% range, with considerably lower sympathy for Egyptian Nationalism.

IV. Results of Analysis of the Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008

The results of the analysis indicate the following three points.

1. General Activation of Political Awareness of Citizens of Beni Suef and Sohag Governorates in Upper Egypt

In the cross tabulations of the three regional identities with the seven items, large differences were found in rates of sympathizing with the identity indices between the four governorates of Lower Egypt and the two governorates of Upper Egypt that served as the sampling regions. However, these reflected differences between the governorates rather than differentials between the three identities. In effect, in the two urban governorates of Lower Egypt (Cairo and Port Said) and the two rural
governorates of Lower Egypt (Menufiya and Kafr Sheykh), rates of sympathizing ranged from 60% to 80% for Islamism, from 50% to 80% for Egyptian Nationalism, and from 70% to 80% for Arabism. However, in the rural governorates of Upper Egypt (Beni Suef and Sohag), rates of sympathizing with Islamism and Egyptian Nationalism were both in the 90%–100% range, while those for Arabism were 94% in Beni Suef and 79% in Sohag. Through their selection of regional identities closely connected to politics, that is, the Egyptian nation, the Arab region, and the Islamic region, we get a glimpse of citizen consciousness in the two governorates of Upper Egypt, which is more activated than in the four governorates of Lower Egypt. An analysis of the underlying causes is essential.

2. A Technical Point Concerning Question 23

The cross tabulations were carried out for the political awareness items, etc., with which an effect on the choice of regional identity was anticipated, but almost no fluctuations were seen in sympathies for the three regional identities with respect to the survey items. This may be partly because Q23 allowed respondents to choose up to three doctrines in religious belief or political thought with which they sympathized, and as a result, responses were centered on the three “isms.” If the question had required respondents to choose only one doctrine with which they sympathized, more of a trend may have appeared in rates of sympathizing with respect to the political awareness items.

3. Probable Exchange and Fusion of Different Regional Identities Induced in Egyptian Citizens’ Consciousness

Although influenced by this second point, in Egyptian citizens’ consciousness, which allows these three “isms” to coexist, it may be that there is some degree of exchange and fusion in the assertion of these three identities. In particular, in cases where a general activation of political awareness is induced, both Islamism and Egyptian Nationalism may serve as its index, indicating rates of sympathizing of 90% to 100%, as seen in Beni Suef and Sohag. For some reason, they have become an index of general activation of political awareness rather than of any particular political issue, and thus indicate higher rates. For almost all items surveyed in Beni Suef, rates of sympathizing with Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, and Arabism were between 90% and 100%. In Sohag, however, the role of Arabism as an index of general
activation of political awareness was weaker than that of the other two “isms.” The rate of sympathizing with Arabism in Sohag was between 70% and 80% for each of the items: governorate, anti-American appraisal, administration appraisal, political party support, and income level.

V. Comparison with the 2007 Cairo Survey

In the 2007 Cairo Survey, the regional identity index (Q24) allowed for only one selection and there was a choice at the subnational level of the respondents’ governorate or municipal administrative district. Responses were primarily seen to focus on the level of Egyptian national consciousness, and governorates or municipal administrative districts came second. The Islamic Community came third with fivefold the number of responses compared with the fourth-ranked Arab nation. Furthermore, those respondents who selected Islamic Community were severely critical of a number of issues including Egypt’s administration, political participation, and relations with the US.

On the other hand, responses to Q23 of the 2008 Survey: “Trends in religious belief or political thought with which you normally sympathize (up to three),” centered around three particular choices, Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, and Arabism. However, among these three regional identities, there were almost no trends in rates of sympathizing in relation to the political awareness items. Instead, under certain conditions, there may have been cross-linking and fusion between the three identities, and the selection of the three regional identities can be considered an index of general activation of political awareness.

As noted above, in the Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008, rates of sympathizing with the regional identity indices were higher in the two governorates of Upper Egypt than in the four of Lower Egypt. In center-region relationships, it is commonly thought that the consciousness of citizens in central cities creates and fosters an active political awareness. This nationwide survey presents results that challenge this view.

VI. Concluding Remarks

It is often assumed that large cities such as Cairo will present a lively political
context for their citizens with heightened political awareness, political dissatisfaction, and eagerness to participate in politics. By posing the same questions on this topic to people nationwide and comparing responses in the Greater Cairo area to those in six governorates throughout Egypt, we gain insight into the sense of the people’s political awareness and the degree of satisfaction with their lives.

For a detailed comparison, it is necessary to have uniformity in sampling as well as in the premises and terms adopted; the two surveys compared here have some limitations in this respect. Nevertheless, we can see from a comparison of the 2007 and 2008 survey data that citizens’ dissatisfaction with their lives and heightened political awareness were in no way limited to Cairo.

This analysis of the relationship between regional identity and political awareness suggests that a cross-linking and fusion of multiple regional identities could occur as a result of the general activation of citizens’ political awareness.

Notes

(3) See Tomita [2010: 35–36].
(4) L.E. 1.00 is equivalent to US$ 0.17 and 14.01 yen (exchange rate on December 31, 2010)

References

<Reports>

<Data from Web sites>
### Appendix: The Cross Tabulations of Rates of Sympathizing with the Three Regional Identity Indices with the Seven Items on Political Awareness, etc., by the six governorates (The Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items for Cross Tabulations</th>
<th>Governorate (sampling number)</th>
<th>Cairo (250)</th>
<th>Port Said (200)</th>
<th>Menufiya (150)</th>
<th>Kafr Sheykh (150)</th>
<th>Beni Suef (125)</th>
<th>Sohag (125)</th>
<th>Nationwide (1000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rates of sympathizing with the three regional identity indices (Question 23)</td>
<td>“Islamism” (Question 23-4)</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Egyptian Nationalism” (Question 23-2)</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Arabism” (Question 23-1)</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics such as the new ministerial cabinet, living conditions in Egypt (Question 7)</td>
<td>Interest in Politics: “Considerably interested” + “Somewhat interested”</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Interest (Considerably + Somewhat interested) × Sympathy with Islamism</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Interest (Considerably + Somewhat interested) × Sympathy with Egyptian Nationalism</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Interest (Considerably + Somewhat interested) × Sympathy with Arabism</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens’ participation in local/communal affairs (Question 10)</td>
<td>Citizen Participation in Communal Affairs: “they do not have the right to participate”</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communal Participation (“No right to participate”) × Sympathy with Islamism</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communal Participation (“No right to participate”) × Sympathy with Egyptian Nationalism</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>79%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Communal Participation (“No right to participate”) × Sympathy with Arabism</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US contribution to Middle East peace (Question 19-16)</td>
<td>US contribution to Middle East peace (“US does not contribute at all”)</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>49%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“US does not contribute at all” × Sympathy with Islamism</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“US does not contribute at all” × Sympathy with Egyptian Nationalism</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“US does not contribute at all” × Sympathy with Arabism</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governorate (sampling number)</td>
<td>Cairo (250)</td>
<td>Port Said (200)</td>
<td>Menufiya (150)</td>
<td>Kafr Sheyk (150)</td>
<td>Beni Suef (125)</td>
<td>Sohag (125)</td>
<td>Nationwide (1000)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Items for Cross Tabulations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall judgment of the central administration (Question 28, which was asked of 382 respondents who answered “Yes” in Question 24: “Did you vote in any previous elections or referendums?”)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime evaluation: “Not good” + “Not very good”</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime evaluation (Not good + Not very good) × Sympathy with Islamism</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime evaluation (Not good + Not very good) × Sympathy with Egyptian Nationalism</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime evaluation (Not good + Not very good) × Sympathy with Arabism</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for political parties at parliamentary election (Question 26, which was asked of 382 respondents who answered “Yes” in Question 24: “Did you vote in any previous elections or referendums?”)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party support at election: National Democratic Party (NDP)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party support (NDP) × Sympathy with Islamism</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party support (NDP) × Sympathy with Egyptian Nationalism</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party support (NDP) × Sympathy with Arabism</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for political parties at parliamentary election (Question 26)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party support at election: Independent candidates of Muslim Brotherhood</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party support (independent candidates of Muslim Brotherhood) × Sympathy with Islamism</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party support (independent candidates of Muslim Brotherhood) × Sympathy with Egyptian Nationalism</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party support (independent candidates of Muslim Brotherhood) × Sympathy with Arabism</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for political parties at parliamentary election (Question 26)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party support at election: Independent candidates not of Muslim Brotherhood (MB)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party support (independent candidates not of MB) × Sympathy with Islamism</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party support (independent candidates not of MB) × Sympathy with Egyptian Nationalism</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party support (independent candidates not of MB) × Sympathy with Arabism</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Governorate (sampling number) | Cairo (250) | Port Said (200) | Menfia (150) | Kahr SHeykh (150) | Beni Suef (125) | Sohag (125) | Nationwide (1000)  
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---  
Income groups: “Less than 500LE” + “501–1,000 L.E.” | 58% | 59% | 68% | 80% | 89% | 80% | 69%  
Income groups (Less than 1,000 L.E.) × Sympathy with Islamism | 86% | 84% | 71% | 73% | 96% | 92% | 83%  
Income groups (Less than 1,000 L.E.) × Sympathy with Egyptian Nationalism | 79% | 82% | 75% | 55% | 97% | 97% | 80%  
Income groups (Less than 1,000 L.E.) × Sympathy with Arabism | 84% | 82% | 73% | 72% | 93% | 79% | 80%  

(Source) The Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008 data.

ABSTRACT
TOMITA Hiroshi
Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism or Arabism?: Comparison of the 2007 Survey of the Greater Cairo Area and the Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008

This report examines the relationship between the regional identity and political awareness of Egyptians, based on the results of the 2007 Survey of the Greater Cairo Area and the Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008.

The survey of three governorates, Cairo, Qalyubia, and Giza, in 2007 provided a glimpse into the high degree of concern the citizens generally had toward politics and, contrarily, the extremely low sense of political effectiveness they felt.

While paying heed to the features that came to light in the 2007 Cairo Survey, this report presents cross tabulations of Islamism, Egyptian Nationalism, and Arabism (the three “isms”) on Egyptians’ regional identities with seven items on political awareness, etc., in the Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008: “The six governorates,” “Concern for politics,” “Appraisal of current state of citizen participation in the local community,” “America’s degree of contribution to Middle Eastern peace,” “General appraisal of central administration,” “Presumed support for political parties at the People’s Assembly election,” and “income levels (household monthly income).” Then, it compares the results over a sample of six governorates.

In these cross tabulations, significant differences were found in ratios of sympathy for the identity indices between the four governorates of Lower Egypt and the two of Upper Egypt that served as the sampling regions. We get a glimpse of citizen consciousness in the two governorates of Upper Egypt, which is more activated than in the four governorates of Lower Egypt.

Under the environment of Egyptian citizens’ consciousness, which allows these three “isms” to coexist, it is thought that there is some degree of interlinking and fusion in the assertion of these...
three identities. In particular, in cases where a general activation of political awareness is induced, both Islamism and Egyptian Nationalism may serve as an index, showing almost complete correlation, with sympathy ratios of 90% to 100%, as seen in Beni Suef and Sohag. The activated awareness among Egyptians in these two governorates fits, to some extent, the hypothesis that traditionally, Upper Egyptians (al-Ṣa‘īdī) have harbored anti-centralism toward Lower Egypt, especially Cairo.

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