<Special Lecture>

Bilaterals, Trilaterals and Quadrilaterals: Japan-Australia Security Cooperation and Asia’s Future Order

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The growth in security cooperation with Japan is one of the most significant developments in Australian strategic policy in the early 21st century. The signing of the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in March 2007 is also a very important milestone in Japan’s foreign policy. Increasing security cooperation between Japan and Australia will help shape the contributions both countries make to regional security in Asia. It has implications for the region’s overall security order including the vital question of future great power relations. This is the case even though Australia is a middle power and Japan continues to observe constraints on the application of its considerable latent power potential. In short, Australia-Japan security relations have the ability to affect the four most important bilateral relationships in Asia—between Japan and China, the United States and China, the United States and Japan, and, to a lesser degree, between China and India. As these great power relations will determine whether Asia has a stable and peaceful future, or an unstable and conflict-ridden one, getting the level and nature Japan-Australia cooperation right is no small matter.

How far and how deep Australian-Japan security cooperation will end up going is more than a question of how the two countries want the regional environment to evolve. It will also be shaped by domestic politics in Australia and Japan. At the time of writing this article in mid-November 2007, the domestic politics of the two countries were in a state of transition. Mr Yasuo Fukuda had recently become Japan’s new Prime Minister. His two immediate predecessors, Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe, had put significant emphasis on extending Australia-Japan strategic relations as part of Japan’s increasing assertiveness in regional security affairs. How Mr Fukuda’s more reserved approach to foreign policy will affect Australia-Japan security relations remains to be worked out, although the early signs suggest that we might expect a significant degree of continuity without too many new initiatives on Japan’s part.

In Australia, the Federal Election of late November 2007 seemed poised to end the decade-long Prime Ministership of John Howard who in the last twelve months of his office emphasised the extension of Australia’s strategic relationship with Japan. An election defeat for Mr Howard’s Coalition government would bring into power an Australian Labor Party government under Kevin Rudd’s leadership. Again, a good degree of policy continuity on foreign and defence policy might be expected here. But Mr Rudd’s rather cautious support for the Australia-Japan security declaration and his well-known background as a student of Chinese affairs, suggest that Australia-Japan security relations under his leadership will not be identical to the experience of the last few years.\(^I\)

This article discusses four ways of looking at Japan-Australia security cooperation. The first way

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is to examine the increase in bilateral security cooperation between Japan and Australia. The second way is to look at the increase in trilateral strategic cooperation between Australia, Japan and their respective ally, the United States. The third way is to consider the possibility of a quadrilateral relationship between Japan, the United States, Australia and India as four of the region’s leading democracies. The fourth way is to examine what these arrangements mean for Asia’s security, and in particular for China-US and Japan-China strategic relations.

1. Japan-Australian bilateral security cooperation

Security cooperation between Australia and Japan has intensified since the early 1990s. In Australian and international media reporting, this growing relationship was highlighted and symbolised by the deployment of Australian soldiers to Iraq in 2005 to guard Japan Self Defence Force engineers. But as the Australian National University’s Desmond Ball has shown, the substance of growing security cooperation between Australia and Japan has gone far deeper than this more than a decade.

The close bilateral relationship between the two countries has strong economic foundations. For 36 straight years until July 2007, Japan was Australia’s number one trading partner. That position has now been taken by a rapidly growing China. Alongside China’s seemingly insatiable appetite for Australian mineral and energy supplies, Japan’s continuing and very significant demand for Australian resources remains a major driver of Australia’s economic growth.

The diplomatic element of the bilateral relationship is also very important. Japan was a strong supporter of Australia’s participation in the inaugural East Asian Summit (alongside India and New Zealand) which took place in late 2005. This wider regional position won out over the more exclusive East Asian membership favoured by China. Australia’s presence at that Summit was even more significant given the absence of major power ally the United States. In the build up to the third East Asian Summit in Singapore which was expected to focus on climate change and energy security issues, Mr Fukuda emphasised Australia’s role in these areas, a position building on the statement on both issues signed by his predecessor Mr Abe and John Howard during the September 2007 APEC Summit in Sydney. In turn, Australia’s support for Japan’s quest for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, which is confirmed in their 2007 Joint Security Declaration, suggests an “I’ll scratch your back if you’ll scratch mine” approach to international politics. Japan receives backing for the quest for a stronger international role which befits its power potential and Australia gets support for its desire to be more than an ordinary middle power in international and regional affairs.

Australia and Japan have also become more active in responding to a range of emerging ‘non-traditional’ security challenges. These became more much more noticed in a post-Cold War world, a period which coincided with Japan’s increasing participation in international deployments. For example Japan was one of a number of regional countries to contribute defence personnel to the East Timor humanitarian mission which began in 1999 as a coalition intervention under Australia’s leadership. The two countries were also involved in the multinational response to the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean.

Such issues feature prominently in the 2007 Joint Security Declaration which includes a commitment to working together on humanitarian missions (which are specifically mentioned as a basis for ‘joint exercises and training’), disaster relief, counter-terrorism and ‘law enforcement on
combating transnational crime. The closest the Declaration gets to dealing specifically with great power strategic relations in Asia is the commitment to 'strengthen cooperation and consultation' on efforts to stem North Korea's nuclear weapons program (where there is also a reference to 'the abduction issue' which runs strongly in Japan's domestic politics). But the words of the Declaration are only part of the story. Before making the trip to Tokyo to meet with Mr Abe, John Howard held a press conference in which he explained that the Declaration would mean that Australia's 'security relationship with Japan will be closer for Japan than with any other country with the exception of the United States.' Given the importance of the alliance relationships which Australia and Japan both enjoy with the United States, the significance of this observation should not be underestimated.

The declaration has drew a mixed response in Australia. For example, Richard Tanter, a critic of the declaration, observed that 'the pact is a clear signal of intent to exclude China.' Former Australian government official Rory Medcalf argued that the declaration would actually offer Australia opportunities to broaden the basis of its security options in a future Asia, suggesting that 'It shouldn't scare China. And it could end up making the United States's strategic life in Asia more complicated.' But while analysts have been divided over whether the declaration is a good idea, they have been united on the main frame of reference: the implications for great power relations in Asia and in particular for Australia's very important relations with both China and the United States.

The centrality of China's likely reaction in Australian views of the declaration was also evident in a prominent Australian Broadcasting Corporation television news program which quoted John Howard's observations that 'This document is not designed at China any more than other arrangements between Australia and other countries have been designed at third countries'. The same program immediately followed the Prime Minister's comment with one from Qin Gang of China's Foreign Ministry which was translated as 'We wish that countries, when they're strengthening bilateral security cooperation, would pay more attention to the concern and interests of other countries in the region.' There is no doubt that the impact on regional relations involving great power China is the basis for Kevin Rudd's position on the Joint Security Declaration. The declaration has his support but there are some strings attached. One the one hand Mr Rudd has indicated that the Joint Declaration has bipartisan support in the Australian parliament. In a speech to the Brookings Institution in April 2007 which dealt extensively with China's importance in Asia's future, Mr Rudd indicated that 'both sides of Australian politics support the recent joint security declaration between Australia and Japan, which seeks to enhance various forms of security cooperation between the two countries.' Yet a media statement which Mr Rudd issued before the signing of the Declaration had reflected a sense of unease at where closer Australia-Japan strategic cooperation might one day lead. Here Mr Rudd indicated that a government under his leadership would work to enhance Australia's counter-terrorism, intelligence and maritime cooperation with Japan, including naval exercises, and support the training of Japanese personnel in Australia. But in that statement he also noted that 'The new level of cooperation would not equate to a formal alliance with Japan.'

Technically speaking this last point was unnecessary since the Joint Security Declaration does not amount to an alliance. But it must be admitted that Mr Howard did little to rule out such a possibility. Mr Rudd therefore used the alliance question as a vehicle to raise concerns about China's potential reaction to Australia-Japan security collaboration without opposing the declaration. In a speech delivered the day after his March statement, Mr Rudd argued that a 'formal defence pact' between
Australia and Japan would be unwise in the current strategic environment because it 'may unnecessarily tie our security interests to the vicissitudes of an unknown security policy future in North East Asia.' In a television interview shortly after the Declaration was signed, Mr Rudd argued that Japan’s relations with both China and Korea would need to be on a much sounder footing before Australia ought to consider entering into with Japan a 'formal bilateral defence pact involving assurances of mutual security assistance.' A central policy aim for Mr Rudd is to ensure Australia has strategic flexibility in Asia’s often difficult great power relations. Expectations about what might develop from the Japan Australia Declaration under a Rudd government need to be viewed in this light: cooperation, yes; strategic alignment in Asia, no.

2. The US-Japan-Australia strategic triangle

The alignment question is vital for understanding the nature and implications of contemporary Japan-Australian security relations. One reason for this is that Japan and Australia share the same major ally, the United States-Japan through the Mutual Security Treaty and Australia through the ANZUS alliance. The signing of both of these treaties in 1951 was not unconnected: Australia sought ANZUS partly as insurance against concerns that Japan might remilitarise. But historically these alliances remained rather separate in what some scholars have referred to as the hub and spokes model of mainly bilateral alliances in Asia, compared to the experience in Europe of a single multilateral alliance underwritten by an American security guarantee. This is not to deny the common and continuing interest of Japan and Australia in retaining the United States as a security guarantor in Asia against any unfavourable developments in the strategic balance (which extends in today’s world to any conceivable quest by China for regional domination). But these common interests were not accompanied by much in the way of formal links between the individual alliance relationships that both Tokyo and Canberra were able to enjoy with Washington.

Coordinating the Japan-US and Australia-US alliances is not a new idea. Many years ago some analysts began speaking about a “JANZUS” arrangement. While a treaty-based triangular alliance is some way off and may never come to pass, one can note the emergence over the last decade of a strategic triangle between the United States, Japan and Australia (which not incidentally parallels the beginning of closer Australia-Japan strategic relations at the bilateral level noted in the previous section of this article).

The informal part of the strategic triangle is reflected in the increasing convergence in the positions and roles of Japan and Australia as leading American allies in Asia, a process which the United States has encouraged strongly. In the wake of the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which prompted the newly elected Howard Coalition government in Australia to side with the United States over China in one of its very first foreign policy decisions, the US reaffirmed its alliance relationship with Australia. (This was now the only active alliance relationship which Washington enjoyed under ANZUS in the wake of its mid-1980s anti-nuclear dispute with New Zealand). At about the same time, the United and Japan negotiated revised guidelines to their Mutual Security Treaty which signalled Japan’s more active role in regional (and especially maritime) strategic relations.

While China saw this double-alliance strengthening as a pincer movement and part of a strategy of containment, Japan and Australia have been seen by the United States as strategic lynchpins in their respective parts of the region. Especially as South Korean public opinion has questioned the value of
the US-South Korea alliance at a time when China's power has been rising. Japan's value in East Asia in US eyes has only been enhanced. And as concerns have grown about state weakness and state failure in the so-called 'arc of instability' to Australia's north, Washington has looked upon Canberra as a stabilising factor in the southern parts of the Asia-Pacific region.

Under the George W. Bush Administration, the United States has also welcomed Japanese and Australian support for its strategy outside East Asia. This became even more important to Washington after its invasion of Iraq in 2003 which removed much of the international sympathy it had enjoyed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks less than two years beforehand. The coincidence between the Koizumi and Howard eras with the 2003 Iraq crisis was especially telling: Australia and Japan not only have made contributions to coalition efforts in Afghanistan (with Australia invoking ANZUS for the first time after the September 2001 attacks) but also to the more select group of countries involved in Iraq.

There are some important differences in the two countries' operational participation in both of these extra-regional campaigns. Australia committed early to the combat phase of operations against Iraq in 2003 and its Special Forces have been especially prominent in the Afghanistan campaign. Japan's commitment to combat operations has been necessarily constrained due to constitutional limitations. As a result the Japan Self Defence Force has played more of a supporting role and even this was cut short by Ichiro Ozawa's notable success in 2007 in voting down the continuation of Japan's naval refuelling assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.\(^{(18)}\) It may be interesting to compare this change in Japan's role to Mr Rudd's commitment to 'negotiate a staged withdrawal of Australian combat forces from Iraq' alongside a 'continuing commitment to the deployment of Australian forces in Afghanistan.'\(^{(19)}\) While Afghanistan has become a (perhaps temporary) source of US-Japan difficulties in the early Fukuda era, it may well be the temporary glue that helps hold Australia-US relations together under Mr Rudd as the change in Australia's participation in Iraq is negotiated.

Japan and Australia are both committed to cooperating with the US on missile defence issues and have continued to devote resources to building their advanced maritime military capabilities which could well be called on in a regional contingency in East Asia. Japan's annual "2+2" security discussions with the United States (at Defence and Foreign Minister level) are now mirrored in a similar process between Australia and the United States. However these talks have not necessarily produced identical outcomes. In February 2005, the US-Japan 2+2 meeting in Tokyo produced a public statement which for the first time referred to their mutual interest in peaceful resolution in the Taiwan Strait as one of their 'common strategic objectives.'\(^{(20)}\) China's condemnation of this development received close attentive coverage in regional media, including in Australia\(^{(21)}\), and the prospects of a similar comment on Taiwan emanating from a US-Australia meeting are rather slim, not least because of Australia's interest in maintaining good relations with China.

Australia's different, and more positive view, on China's rise was also on show in the build-up to the first Foreign Minister level of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue between the United States, Japan and Australia in Sydney 2006.\(^{(22)}\) This is the formal element of their emerging strategic triangle, having begun in a low-key fashion at senior officials level in 2002. US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, who travelled to Australia to meet her counterparts Foreign Ministers Taro Aso and Alexander Downer, articulated a much less rosy position on China than her Australian counterpart.\(^{(23)}\) In the event the trilateral communique was a very muted affair, with the only reference to the rising great

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dower in question significant in welcoming 'China's constructive engagement in the region,' a comment in line with Australian perspectives.

On the sidelines of the 2007 APEC Summit in Sydney, the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue was elevated to Prime Ministerial level with President Bush, Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Howard meeting together on 8 September. This was accompanied by the now standard denials from Canberra that China was the target of this cooperation. Australia's attempt to maintain a balancing act was evident in the announcement two days earlier of an annual strategic dialogue between the Australian and Chinese foreign ministers to begin in 2008. But it had become clear well before the APEC gathering that the Howard government's line on China had moved closer to the concerns of the United States and Japan. It is more than likely, for example, that one of the main reasons for Vice President Richard Cheney's rare visit to Australia in late 2006 was to encourage Australia to agree to the bilateral security declaration with Japan, perhaps out of a sense of concern in Washington that Australia was becoming a bit too favourable in its view on China's regional role.

By the middle of 2007, the third Update to Australia's 2000 Defence White Paper was arguing that China's 'military modernisation'...could create misunderstandings and instability in the region.' This sentiment is especially interesting to read alongside corresponding concerns in the Pentagon's annual estimate of China's military power. This worried tone also stands in contract to the immediately previous section of the Update devoted to Australia-Japan strategic relations which noted that 'Australia has no closer nor more valuable partner in the region than Japan', and which supported Japan's 'efforts to contribute more directly to regional and global stability'. The Update also endorsed the trilateral cooperation between Australia, Japan and the US and the Japan-Australia Declaration. This intersection between the trilateral and bilateral levels of cooperation was also evident in the Action Plan to implement the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration, announced by John Howard after his bilateral leaders meeting with Prime Minister Abe at the APEC Summit.

The first trilateral leaders gathering at APEC was overshadowed by domestic political developments in all three countries. Mr Abe, on what would prove to be his final overseas visit as Japan's Prime Minister, cut a very low profile. Mr Bush seemed distracted by developments in Iraq which he had visited en route to Australia. Mr Howard's low ratings in the Australian opinion polls also proved to be a distraction. These issues are significant because the personalities and preferences of political leaders have played an important role in the elevation of the trilateral strategic dialogue.

By comparison, the clearest memory of Mr Rudd's involvement in the APEC Summit is his meeting with China's President whom he addressed in Mandarin. Speaking first of all in English to President Hu Jintao, Mr Rudd observed that peace in Asia depended upon the relationship between the United States (which he called 'our great friend and ally') and China ('our great friend and partner'). This is the main prism through which a Rudd government would understand strategic relationships between the great powers in Asia. Trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan and Australia could be expected to continue under Mr Rudd's Prime Ministership. But he might be expected to soften the elevation of Japan as a central focus for Australia's strategic policy which has occurred in the latter years (and even months) of the Howard government. Moreover the new Defence White Paper promised by Mr Rudd is likely to take a more understanding line on China's regional role than did the 2007 Defence Update. The message is clear in terms of a Labor government's outlook: the US and China are first among relative equals, and relations with Japan will be approached not in terms of the development of the trilateral US-Japan-Australia relationship but in
terms of their impact on Australia’s balancing act between the US and China.

3. An Asian quadrilateral—and India makes four?

In addition to their growing involvement in the bilateral and trilateral strategic collaboration already discussed in this article, Japan and Australia are part of an embryonic quadrilateral grouping which also includes the United States and India. As Asia’s second rising great power after China, India is enjoying an enhanced profile with its dynamic economy, significant military capabilities, and the soft power advantages which come from being the world’s largest democratic polity.

While the idea of the quad is still in its an exploratory stage, elements of this grouping have already come to pass. On the sidelines of an ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in the Philippines in May 2007, senior diplomatic officials from the United States, Japan, India and Australia met to discuss security collaboration between the four countries. The meeting was not heavily publicised. The United States, for example, did not issue a public statement at the time. The official focus for potential cooperation between four of the Asia-Pacific’s leading democracies follows a familiar pattern—an emphasis on humanitarian relief and maritime issues (rather than higher level military cooperation). But the meeting was still enough to generate China’s concern: Beijing issued a diplomatic note (or demarche) to all four capitals enquiring about the purposes of the quad.31 As if to confirm China’s fears, just two months later it was announced that naval vessels and armed forces personnel from these same four countries and Singapore would be involved in a substantial maritime exercise in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007.32 (This followed an inaugural trilateral maritime exercise near Guam in April 2007 involving India, Japan and the United States33).

Significant differences exist, however, in the relative enthusiasm of the four members of the putative quadrilateral. Japan has been the most enthusiastic—at least while Mr Abe was in power with Taro Aso as his foreign minister. The quad is widely regarded as a product of Mr Abe’s concept of an arc of freedom34. Among its critics, however, the quad translates all to easily into a four-way democratic alliance designed to counter China. There might be incentives for Japan to view such an alliance as an advantage in its all-too competitive relationship with China. The quad would increase the recognition of Japan as an active player in regional security and help justify an extended remit for the activities of the Self-Defence Force. It also gives further credence to Japan as a leading democratic actor in the region: one of the few cards which Tokyo can play but which Beijing certainly can’t.

How the quad idea will fare under Mr Fukuda’s leadership remains to be seen, but it is unlikely that his more cautious and conservative approach will match Mr Abe’s enthusiasm for the concept. Among the remaining three parties, the United States appears neither entirely excited nor dismissive about the quad. Philosophically the quad fits in rather well with American beliefs in the pacifying implications of democratic polities in international affairs. An Asian democratic concert, presumably under US guidance, could also provide Washington with a welcome boost in the region in the wake of its growing exclusion from the East Asian Summit more East-Asian centric arrangements such as ASEAN+3. It could be an obvious benchmark for America’s capacity to maintain a regional coalition to balance China’s growing profile, an appealing notion to Richard Cheney and others with hawkish views on US-China relations. Working with three of Asia’s most capable maritime military players could offer the United States ongoing support for its current presence and future commitments.
Yet the United States could easily achieve most of these objectives through its system of existing alliances with Asia-Pacific democracies (including with Japan and Australia) and its growing bilateral relationship with India, especially if the civilian nuclear agreement between New Delhi and Washington can be consummated. These relationships can all be maintained without raising China’s hackles in the way that a formal four-way arrangement could be almost guaranteed to do, especially because the quad would effectively add one of China’s immediate neighbours and a long-term rival for regional strategic influence to the existing triangle between the United States and its two closest regional allies, Australia and Japan.

Australia has taken a cautious approach to the issue. During a visit to India in July 2007, Australian Defence Minister Brendan Nelson said that the Howard government did not desire formal quadrilateral cooperation because it might remove energy from the trilateral strategic dialogue between Japan, the US and Australia. While welcoming ‘India’s increasing look toward East Asia’, and noting Australia’s participation in the Bay of Bengal maritime exercise and its officials’ earlier participation in the Manila meeting, Dr Nelson observed that he had ‘assured China that Australia is not seeking a quadrilateral strategic dialogue on core security and defence issues’.

Influential Australian journalist Paul Kelly who has a very close understanding of the Howard government’s foreign policy, has also argued that Australia should emphasise the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue but stay away from the Asian quad on the basis that “There is only one conclusion from such a strategic body: that it is a China containment strategy. This is very much the logic we could expect from a Labor government under Mr Rudd’s leadership. Quoting from an interview, another leading Australian journalist has placed the following concern by Mr Rudd on the public record: ‘Australia has to be mindful in the future of China’s concerns about containment and encirclement. A future Labor government would support a trilateral security dialogue between Australia US and Japan’ but ‘We have reservations about any future expansion of that which would unnecessarily exacerbate unresolved tensions between the US and China in particular.’

A Rudd government might just be spared from having to worry too much about the quad because India, the vital fourth participant, seems the most ambivalent of all of the parties. India is enjoying enhanced security relations with the other three countries, and especially with the United States and Japan. But this does not mean that India endorses the idea of an Asian quad of democracies which distils these patterns of bilateral (and trilateral) cooperation into a single mechanism. With the ghosts of non-alignment not yet dissipated, New Delhi places a high value on the autonomy of its foreign policy towards the great powers including China, with whom it has enjoyed reasonably favourable relations in recent years (on the surface at least). Wishing to keep its options and lines of communication open, India is the only member of the quad to have observer status with the potentially rival Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which is in effect a China-Russia condominium.

4. Conclusion: Implications for Asia’s security

This last point raises an important question about the wider forms of strategic collaboration in which Australia and Japan are both involved. Is it possible that a regional divide is emerging in Asia between an alliance of maritime democracies and an alliance of continental autocracies? For example, when the members of the SCO conducted a major exercise in Russia in August 2007, the host country
denied that the grouping was a military alliance in the making. But it is widely known that a shared reservation about US primacy in international politics is a central motivation for China's and Russia's involvement in the SCO. The scale and nature of the August "counter-terrorism" exercise sent a significant military message. Those worried about the prospects for rival blocs in Asia might see the five-way exercise in the Bay of Bengal, barely two weeks later and in the middle of the APEC Summit, as a symbolic response.

A divided and dangerous Asia is far from inevitable but Japan and Australia have a common interest in making sure that Asia in 2014 does not end up looking like Europe in 1914. Not least because both Japan and Australia enjoy very close economic ties with China, neither can afford an escalation of great power competition in Asia. Japan and Australia both need to encourage the sort of security collaboration which involves rather than excludes China. This means less of the quad logic. It means more of the logic we have seen in the Six Party Talks, even though Japan feels that North Korea has been given too many concessions and even though Australia is not even a member of the six. In that sense, both Japan and Australia may need to restrain their immediate self-interests in favour of developments which allow for enhanced great power relations in Asia.

The US-China relationship will remain the most vital of all great power issues in Asia. It is in both Australia's and Japan's long-term interests that the US and China continue their modus vivendi over Taiwan beyond the 2008 Beijing Olympics. It is also crucial from an Australian perspective that Japan and China, the two giants of North Asia, can avoid the zero-sum-game thinking which can so easily characterise their perceptions of one another's role in regional security. As a new Prime Minister, Mr Fukuda has a fresh opportunity to seek progress with Mr Hu's government on the deeper aspects of the relationship between Japan and China. The United States and Australia need to make sure that their respective foreign policies towards China and Japan also support this objective.

In other words, it is important to consider security cooperation between Japan and Australia in terms of the wider regional environment in which it is occurring. The main question is not what sort of bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral cooperation is good for the security relationship between Japan and Australia. The really important question for Australia-Japan relations is what sort of cooperation between them and others can help Japan play a role in the wider region which supports collaboration rather than competition between the great powers, including China, the US and India. Japan's future role in the region is of great importance. It is very important for us all in the region, including in Australia, that Japan gets its future role right.

[Notes]
(2) For example, see 'Australia boosts Iraq deployment', BBC News, 22 February 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ [accessed 16 November 2007].
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(18) See 'Japan pulls out of Afghan role', The Australian, 1 November, 2007.


(21) See 'China scolds US, Japan on Taiwan', Sydney Morning Herald, 21 February 2005.


(23) 'In Sydney, Rice tough on Beijing: But Downer differs on 'containing' China', International Herald Tribune, 17 March 2006.


(25) For a less charitable view of this comment, see Aurelia George Mulgan, Australia-Japan relations: New Directions, (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 2007), p.5.


See Chellaney, "Quad initiative".

The Hon Dr Brendan Nelson, Minister for Defence, Transcript of 'Doorstop, New Delhi', 11 July 2007.


Peter Hartcher, 'Rudd looks to alliance in Asia-Pacific'. Sydney Morning Herald, 24 August 2007.

See 'Putin denies Shanghai regional group is military bloc', RIA Novosti, 17 August 2007.