The Colombo Plan: Modernization, Memory and Cultural Engagement in Australia and New Zealand

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Your country has great plans for the improvement of the welfare of its people and you have been specially selected to contribute to this task. The people of your own country, and of New Zealand, will be watching your progress with great interest.1)

This introduction to a Handbook for Students and Trainees in New Zealand under the Colombo Plan in the mid-1960s establishes the double-gaze upon Colombo Plan students that has persisted in their remembering. It sets the tone for this paper, which considers the role of the Colombo Plan for aid to South and Southeast Asia in modern remembering in Australia and New Zealand. By virtue of both its success and its longevity – although the Colombo Plan still operates, the era of sponsored international students was from 1951 through the early 1980s – the plan became, at a popular level, almost synonymous with international students in Australia and New Zealand. And the progress of students became associated with the progress of Australia and New Zealand.

Australians and New Zealanders have developed a strong sense of pride in their country’s prominent role in the Colombo Plan for aid to South and Southeast Asia which was at its height from 1951 to the early 1970s. At anniversary moments such as 50 years later (ie 2001) they recall and celebrate the higher education and training opportunities provided to students from developing Asian countries and the work done in Asia by Australian and New Zealand experts. Helen Clark, for example, New Zealand Prime Minister in 2001 wrote in a commemorative booklet that ‘The Colombo Plan helped create links which today we take from granted. It helped bring an awareness that New Zealanders and the peoples of Asia are close neighbours, and that our destinies are inevitably intertwined.2)

Like other politicians and public servants, Clark steers towards ‘lessons’ learned through New Zealand’s involvement in the Colombo Plan – and there are comparable examples from Australia. Both countries take pride in recalling that significant numbers of Asian students who studied in New Zealand and Australia during the 1950s to 1970s returned home and became prominent in public life, including some in politics, and they carried with them fond memories of their times in New Zealand and Australia. The other effect was a gradual and mutual breaking down of racial and cultural barriers. In today’s parlance, ‘people-to-people’ connections were struck, friendships led to ongoing interactions and there grew greater awareness and levels of interest between Asian peoples and trans-Tasman peoples. In the case
of Australians, the 20,000 Colombo Plan students sponsored from the 1950s through 1970s helped pave the way for the many more private Asian students studying in Australia and they helped chip away at ingrained racism, ignorance and fear perpetuated by the so-called White Australia policy. Arguably, the Asian students in Australia may have even helped dismantle the White Australia policy progressively from the mid-1960s to its official end in 1973.\footnote{3} In both countries, the Colombo Plan was commonly associated with increasing numbers of Asians in Australian and New Zealand cities. As one member of New Zealand’s External Affairs Department put it in 1970, ‘the term Colombo Plan has a considerable popularity and is, in the public mind, rather synonymous with aid generally. For example, there is a widespread feeling among the public that any Asian must be a Colombo Plan student.’\footnote{4}

These ‘lessons’ of the Colombo Plan are perhaps over-simple but they are also backed by substantial detail on numbers of students educated, technical missions and capital aid in Asian countries, and many recollections of former students gathered for special publications etc.\footnote{5} They have been folded into state acts of official remembering. The pride that arises from remembering how government-sponsored activities under the Colombo Plan laid the foundations for rising levels of engagement with Asia focuses especially on student experiences. Students provide the type of human interest within government initiatives that readers/voters find compelling. This paper explores this phenomenon in greater detail. In seeking to understand how this process has occurred, and why the double-gaze on students and Australian/New Zealand societies is important in official remembering, I suggest that the Colombo Plan’s appeal is twofold. First, its story resonates with modern Australia and New Zealand as it can be seen as having been an agent in their modernisation. Secondly, and more familiarly, it provides an effective foundation for a story of gradual engagement with a changing region, and a basis for renewed contemporary forms of engagement. This is especially the case in Australia where the Abbott Government has launched a ‘New Colombo Plan.’ Further, I suggest that it is not the case that the two themes necessarily reinforce each other. In other words, remembering the Colombo Plan as a means by which Australia and New Zealand emerged into their region and into a modern world does not necessarily make for improved engagement with Asian nations today.

The (1951 onwards) Colombo Plan membership was important to Australian and New Zealand official thinking about their roles in the world for what it demanded of them in the broad and not just in its most captivating student-movement activities. In this context, it is important to recall that the Colombo Plan involved much official reporting. Less of a unitary plan, it was an umbrella structure under which the donor governments could provide aid to Commonwealth, and later non-Commonwealth, countries in South and South East Asia. In terms of organisation, a Consultative Committee meeting annually considered beneficiaries'
economic and progress reports and recommended appropriate actions, upon the basis of which donor countries such as Australia and New Zealand would provide bilateral aid (in other words, it was a series of bilateral aid agreements with a strong nod towards regional consciousness), which might include capital equipment or measures to finance big agricultural, dam-building and other development projects. A separate technical co-operation arm of the plan oversaw technical and educational assistance. The United States joined the donor countries at the end of 1951, Indonesia joined as a recipient two years later, and the membership of the plan grew from its Commonwealth South Asian roots into East and South East Asia through the 1950s (including Japan in 1954). Later, it extended to the Middle East.

In modest but important ways, the Colombo Plan helped modernise the young bureaucracies of countries such as Australia and New Zealand. In both countries small External Affairs departments were grappling with the multiple demands of increasing representation overseas and membership of the new United Nations. The Colombo Plan took shape in the context of the Cold War struggle against communism, and it is clear that some of the motivation for providing aid to postwar South and Southeast Asia stemmed from a Cold War concern to address the causes of poverty that might otherwise lead newly independent nations to gravitate towards communism. The Australians, for example, saw the Colombo Plan as a modest contribution towards development and the alleviation of poverty, but also as a vehicle for the acceleration of western strategic and economic planning to counter communism in South and Southeast Asia. In his private and public comments during the first half of 1950, External Affairs Minister Percy Spender stressed the need for American involvement if the Colombo Plan was to succeed, and he was delighted when they joined. The New Zealanders were even more categorical about the Cold War context in which the plan should be viewed. When Minister of External Affairs Fred Doidge described the scale and depth of poverty throughout Asia, he used bacteriological metaphors typical of the day; 'The ferment that is stirring in Asia is of terrifying proportions’, he said in April 1951. ‘Communism finds its most fertile breeding ground where the conditions I have described exist, and indeed, in my view, there is no other way of stemming the tide of communism than by raising living standards nearer to the level which we ourselves enjoy, and giving the people those conditions of comfort and decency which would render Communism as intolerable to them as it is to us.'

International aid was a new feature of the post-war world and the emerging Cold War, and it prompted bureaucratic change and growth. In the case of both Australia and New Zealand there was quick recognition that international aid would necessarily stretch the remits of the young Departments of External Affairs. ‘It has become clear in the post-war world’, the New Zealand Cabinet noted, ‘that the traditional methods of diplomacy need to be supplemented and direct but controlled economic assistance is one means of doing so. ... technical assistance is
designed to influence developments in other countries and, as such, it is a new instrument of diplomacy.\(^{10}\) It was one thing to analyse the needs of South Asia and another thing to address them effectively. It was hard for Australians or New Zealanders to think that they could lead the way in economic development. Both countries were themselves in short supply of some of the equipment most likely to assist in development projects overseas.\(^{10}\) In October 1950 the first six-year development programmes submitted totalled £1085 million. At this stage, the responses of the donor Commonwealth countries looked to approach only around £360 million, of which the Australians pledged £25 million, and New Zealand 3 million.\(^{11}\) The New Zealand Government began by approving of the Colombo Plan in theory more than in practice – neither the government of Prime Minister Sid Holland nor the New Zealand press were very keen to embark on what seemed a mismatch between Asia’s needs and New Zealand’s spare resources.\(^{12}\) But the Holland government recovered from the initial shock (for the next few years they spent roughly 1 million pounds NZ per year) and began matching their resources with needs in South and Southeast Asia as best they could. Having joined a new venture in Asia, to then fail to achieve at least some modest spending targets worried External Affairs Departments in both Australia and New Zealand. Public opinion, regarded with trepidation when it came to spending money, especially in Asia, could turn sharply against the plan; and Asian goodwill would be likely to change too, if promises were not matched by some action.\(^{13}\)

Both countries commenced capital aid funding for identified projects.\(^{14}\) Many of these projects were successful, to some degree, and well-reported; others were far less successful and much-less reported. Ministerial statements, parliamentary statements, press releases and accounts in the journals of respective External Affairs Departments, *Current Notes on International Affairs* in Australia and *External Affairs Review* in New Zealand all told of the great changes for the better occurring in Asia, and of Australian or New Zealand involvement. The language used to describe aid efforts was, in both cases, a mixture of: neighbourliness; encouragement of self-help; collaboration; freedom enhancement; progress; modernisation as the key to breaking the shackles of poverty; and growing Australian and New Zealand awareness of the interrelatedness of problems in the world and in the region.\(^{15}\)

Between 1955 and 1957, both countries placed emphasis on their contributions under the technical co-operation side of the Colombo Plan, which meant training for Asian students (including building student hostels in Australian and New Zealand universities), and sending instructors to Asia. This shift was accompanied by an increased preoccupation with publicity, thereby constituting an early form of cultural diplomacy.\(^{16}\) At the same time, an information and publicity unit based in Colombo increased production of information bulletins, pamphlets and photo calendars featuring content from all member nations.
As the Colombo Plan grew in membership from the mid-1950s the annual meetings of the Consultative Committee lengthened to somewhere between 18 and 20 days, including all officials’ meetings. With no permanent secretariat, this was where the annual report material was gathered and, despite some frustrations with the length of meetings, remained the giant workshop where most of the capital aid and technical assistance results were reported. Not surprisingly, then, New Zealand and Australian External Affairs and other departments were tested by such meetings and reporting requirements. Rising expectations around publicity created pressure elsewhere. Up to the end of the 1950s most information booklets about New Zealand were produced by the country’s Tourist and Publicity Department, but this body was used to addressing European and North American countries. Necessarily, the Department of External Affairs, in conjunction with posts opening up through Asia, had to fill the gap and provide for Colombo Plan countries.\(^{17}\) Although publicity efforts increased, achieving the right pitch for an audience of South and Southeast Asian peoples was not easy. One New Zealand analysis of their film-making achievements up to 1966 summarised it thus:

In recent years the National Film Unit has produced two films on New Zealand’s Colombo Plan activities. One, an eleven-minute, black-and-white “Pictorial Parade” film, studied the life of Colombo Plan trainees in New Zealand and was widely shown throughout the country, but not overseas. The other, a colour film concentrating on capital aid projects, attempted to cover activities in a number of Asian Colombo Plan countries and consequently succeeded in pleasing none of them.\(^{18}\)

From the late-1950s to late-1960s there was an established pattern of exhibitions attaching to the annual meetings of the Consultative Committee, and naturally these exhibitions developed a competitive flavor – given Australia’s and New Zealand’s proximity to Southeast Asia, it would not do to have an exhibit that was markedly inferior to, for example, Canada’s.\(^{19}\) An underrcurrent of familiar Australian-New Zealand competition sometimes found its way into Colombo Plan publicity.

And as student numbers in Australia and New Zealand grew, the capacity of universities to take students, and especially their capacity to house them was a recurring issue. Host families played important roles but in Australia and New Zealand there was also a need for more boarding accommodation at places of study. In both Australia and New Zealand, External Affairs Departments encourage and monitored the expansion of university accommodation. At the start of the 1960s, new building or purchased accommodation was increasing the capacities of Massey College, Canterbury and Otago Universities. Similarly, Victoria University in Wellington grew an English Language Institute in 1961 as a logical means of readying Colombo Plan students for tertiary study.\(^{20}\)
Transformation of Australian Studies in a Globalising Age

When exploring the 1950s and 1960s debates in Australia on the need for expanded university accommodation, one prominent theme is the distinctive role of community organisations in the building of international houses. In particular, the central role of Rotary Clubs stands out in ways suggestive for researchers in this field. The first one built, The University of Melbourne's, enjoyed a direct injection of funds from Australia’s Colombo Plan budget, but still required a big fund-raising effort for its completion. The subsequent houses were planned in the knowledge that Treasury would never allow this to happen again, (21) and in the wake of the formation of the Australian Universities Commission that would assume overarching responsibility for such actions. Before the Universities Commission came into being, it was the Rotary Club of Brisbane in April 1955 that launched the campaign to build Brisbane’s International House, recruiting some Chambers of Commerce and other groups to the cause. Bert Martín, then District Governor of Rotary, became first President of International House to be built at the University of Queensland, following a public appeal in 1956. (22) Rotary’s involvement in building two international houses in Sydney was similarly important. The two houses were opened in 1967 (University of Sydney) and 1968 (University of New South Wales). (23)

Thus, the Colombo Plan for Australia and New Zealand was not only about the provision of aid as an aspect of foreign relations, nor was it only a tale of how the two countries managed to forge lasting cultural ties with Asia through people-to-people contacts. It was also an agent of modernization for both countries, as they responded to growth and other demands and they empowered existing and new bureaucracies to deal with new needs. It would be overstating it to suggest that the Colombo Plan was a primary agent behind the growth of central government and its public service, or the ‘state’, in both countries; but it was a factor in such growth that also created both a ‘story’ about engagement with Asia and a need for lateral thinking. A departmental analysis in Wellington at the end of the 1960s captured this blend of impacts and summed up what would later be called ‘public diplomacy’ effects thus:

The Colombo Plan’s main purpose is to help promote the economic development of the member countries of South and South East Asia. This it is doing. But it is also achieving much more in improving international understanding and goodwill. It is a movement of people who by crossing international boundaries, living in other countries and learning new languages, are contributing to greater knowledge and greater appreciation of neighbouring peoples in a way that has never before been possible. The Colombo Plan has captured public imagination, provided a model for other aid programmes and in twenty years has established for itself an important place in the history of economic development after World War II. (24)
Remembering the Colombo Plan

In the last two years the Australians have led the way in state-sponsored remembering of the Colombo Plan, and have done so in connection with a new student-centred initiative. At the end of 2013, the new Abbott Government invoked the memory of the Colombo Plan by launching a “New Colombo Plan”, aimed at the reverse of the original plan, and sponsoring Australian students to spend time at an Asian university, and, ideally, a complementary internship experience in the country of study. Recalling the ‘old’ Colombo Plan involved historical narrative and invoking memories. The Coalition described the original Colombo Plan as a ‘remarkable’ phenomenon, reminding the electorate that some of the changes in the region had been led by those who had spent time in Australia under the Colombo Plan, including then-Vice President Boediono of Indonesia and National Development Minister of Singapore, Khaw Boon Wan. The original Colombo Plan was, according to the policy statement, ‘Australia’s most successful soft-power initiative in our region.’ Implicitly, the same capacity to bring about progressive change would now apply to Australian students, ‘our best brightest young people’, who would be sponsored to study in the region.\(^{(25)}\) The official descriptor aimed at students has them seizing the future. The banner attaching to the official Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade branding of the NCP invites young Australians to ‘connect to Australia’s future’ by studying ‘in the region.’\(^{(26)}\) And when she launched the New Colombo Plan in December 2013, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said she hoped that Australian tertiary students would come to see a period of study at an Asian university as ‘a rite of passage’ associated with their transition to adulthood.\(^{(27)}\)

Prior to its election in 2013, the Coalition acknowledged that Australia had global interests but wanted to focus on ‘the Asia-Pacific region, and ‘build stronger relations with our neighbours’. They committed to policies that would ‘deepen Australia’s relations with our region by developing closer people-to-people links and deeper knowledge of their societies, languages and ways of life.’\(^{(28)}\) In brief, the New Colombo Plan was point three of an eight-point plan. The first point was to strengthen relations with key partners – The United States, Japan, Indonesia, China and India; the second outlined a new emphasis on ‘economic diplomacy’, including the promotion of Australian businesses abroad and extending a previous commitment to ‘aid for trade’; and the other points were improved foreign aid; providing adequate diplomatic and consular services; providing a principled voice on human rights; promoting democracy in Fiji (which, since the military coup by Commodore Frank Bainimarama in 2009, had been subject to sanctions and evicted from the Commonwealth and the Pacific Islands Forum); and engaging with female leaders in the region, acknowledging the strong link between levels of gender equity and national development.\(^{(29)}\)

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Active and structured remembering of the old Colombo Plan is important in framing the new initiative because there was no neat, seamless continuity of the old plan leading to the new one. The story of Australia’s Colombo Plan as a means of gradually growing to know Asia logically only goes up to the early 1980s, when changes to Australia’s aid organization (and also New Zealand’s) meant that scholarships were offered primarily under other umbrella titles. And since then, much has also changed for connections between Asia and Australia. In many cases, Australian-Asian relations are characterised by a blend of contracted mutual-interest (especially present in realms such as trade, investment, security) and what we might called ‘special’ relationships and/or regionalism, between important Australian transactions with Asia and relationships that go beyond the transactional and suggest exchanges of the kind that imply friendship, partnership, shared purpose. It is an especially interesting time in 2014-15 to be thinking about such questions in the context of Australian-Japanese relations which have not only seen important developments in trade and defence ties but have also risen to new rhetorical heights recently, with Mr Abbott referring to Japan as ‘our best friend in Asia’ and Mr Abe declaring that the two countries were ‘moving towards a new special relationship.’ (30)

Such specialness is easier to declare than to measure. Australians have become better at measuring the volume of exchanges between Australia and Asia. Since 2009 the Price Waterhouse Coopers Melbourne Institute Asialink Index on Australian Engagement with Asia has been measuring exchange activity under seven headings: trade, investment, education, tourism, research and business development, migration, humanitarian assistance—with equal weighting for each of the seven, and using 1990 as base line. (31) While the index is very valuable for measuring trends and analysing rises and falls in particular fields, the concept of engagement logically demands more. Its more qualitative dimensions, going to how involvement is matched by commitment, take us in the direction of exploring the details of human interactions, past and present. Similarly, when considering the submissions to the Australian Government’s 2012 White Paper on Australia and the Asian Century, there were repeated flaggings of the importance of people-people exchanges. It is not always easy though, to translate this largely historical appreciation (‘we know what has been good when we have seen it work’) into a framework enabling considered evaluations of people-people exchanges.

People-to-people connections is terminology that described what has worked and, it seems, what might be. Under the New Colombo Plan, new people-to-people connections fostered by outward bound Australians should, it was and is hoped, continue to foster regional interest in Australian education opportunities – a two-way flow of students, if you like, replacing what has been largely a one-way flow of Asian students to Australia. (32) February 2014 marked the first tranche of funding under the New Colombo Plan, to 24 Australian universities sending more than 300 students to region for study, language training and sometimes an internship experience.
Parliamentary Secretary for the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Brett Mason heralded this start of the New Colombo Plan as consistent with the continued geopolitical and economic shift of focus towards ‘the Indo-Pacific’ and declared, ‘Already, we are starting to see a cultural shift as more Australian students look to pursue overseas study. While the US and Britain are still the favoured destinations for long-term study programs, Asia is leading destination of choice for short-term programs.’

Initial media comment was cautiously welcoming, with occasional question-marks over the historical binding presented in the title of the initiative; and the great task of identifying and motivating new cadres of students for whom Asia was often unknown beyond tourist pin-points and vaguely understood ‘otherness’. The decline in Asian language training in Australian schools and the rise in English instruction in Asian universities quickly became a talking point: how crucial was specialist language to something called ‘Asia literacy’, a concept that has grown steadily in public discourse? And if less important in a broader, less-linguistic definition of ‘Asia literacy’, how important was it in attracting interest and the motivation to study in Asia? Such questions persist – and Brett Mason was not the greatest champion of Asian language learning as part of the programme by implying that English would now be sufficient - but the New Colombo Plan continues to gather momentum as a flagship piece of government policy, buttressed by recurring splashes of publicity and high level conversation. On 20 May 2014, for example, the new scheme enjoyed a nice boost from Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natelegawa, himself a former student who was sponsored for study in Australia. Natelegawa offered to host some of the New Colombo Plan students as interns in his ministry.

Australia’s Foreign Minister Julie Bishop clearly attaches signal importance to the New Colombo Plan, creating a special space for it within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, a department which, by virtue of inheriting AusAID programs and staff, already has a formidably sized Australia Awards programme, covering scholarships and fellowships from and to Australia. Bishop said that she hoped that an Australian student experience of Asia in the course of higher education would become ‘the norm rather than the exception’. The first tranche of funding under the New Colombo Plan started in February 2014, and 24 Australian universities sent more than 300 students to Asia for study, language training and internships. The pilot program for 2014 involved Indonesia, Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong. In 2015, the New Colombo Plan will involve a much broader range of partner countries in the Indo-Pacific, including small Pacific nations and giants such as India, China and South Korea.

So, in the discourse around the New Colombo Plan, there are some very deliberate references to the old Colombo Plan, beyond just the title: strong echoes of the self-evident virtues of people-to-people connections, a vague sense of Australian students being generational pioneers for ‘our destiny’ in Asia (almost an inversion of the older development paradigm
through which Asians were encouraged to see education in Australia) and a deliberate, determined effort to couch this initiative as foreign policy. The New Colombo Plan has its own branch in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, separate from the Australia Awards area that administers the Australian-granted scholarships and fellowships programmes.

These recent developments are fascinating to watch, and have been warmly received in the main. In their latest initiative, the ‘New Colombo Plan’ the Australians have leapt ahead of New Zealanders in their embrace of the original Colombo Plan as a foundational tale of engagement from which new initiatives can still spring. That the original plan is not well-remembered in many parts of Asia (noting that it resonates somewhat in Malaysia and Singapore) matters less on account of its internal value in Australia and New Zealand. The Colombo Plan has become folded into narratives of how these two nations modernized and matured in their outlooks on the world. Even if we are invited to leap, in our remembering, from the 1980s to more recent times and new forms of engagement with Asia, this is the type of smoothing work that state-sponsored remembering does well. Commemorative publications and other memory works have resources aplenty. Both countries can and do also draw easily on anecdotal people-to-people connections in the form of fond memories of friendships forged and relationships built while students studied there. (37) Whether new initiatives such as Australia’s New Colombo Plan will generate the same warmth and memories is harder to predict, as the movement of students across boundaries is less special – the mobility of people in the Indo-Pacific region is far greater than pioneering student travels of the 1950s and 1960s. But as I have argued here, this is only one dimension of state-sponsored remembering. In their invoking the old Colombo Plan the governments of Australia and New Zealand invite remembering the growth and modernization of their own countries as much as they invite transformative views on relations with Asia.

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Notes:

(3) This is suggested in Daniel Oakman, Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan, Pandanus, Canberra, 2004.
(4) B. Angus (for Secretary, External Affairs) to Dr Minogue, 11 June 1970, ABHS 950 W 4627 item 118/7/4, Archives New Zealand, Wellington (Archives NZ).

(5) For example, see NZ Official Development Assistance, The Colombo Plan at 50.


(7) Spender; McIntosh’s undated memo (May 1950), ‘Colombo Plan’, McIntosh Papers, MS6759-182, National Library of New Zealand (Alexander Turnbull), Wellington.

(8) New Zealand External Affairs Record, no. 1, April 1951.

(9) Alister McIntosh, Draft Cabinet paper, ‘Colombo Plan – Technical Assistance Unit, Progress Report 1 June-30 November 1951, 20 December 1951, EA Access W2824 item 118/4/3/1, Archives NZ.

(10) 'Report on First Exploratory Discussions Among Departments on Questions Arising from an Economic Programme in South and South-East Asia' (unsigned, undated, but based on a meeting held 20 March 1950), CRS A1838 item 381/3/1/3 part 1A, NAA; 'Notes supplementary to interdepartmental discussion on supplying goods to South East Asia' (unsigned), 24 March 1950, CRS A5460 item 301/5, NAA; submission SEA 1, by DEA, 20 March 1950, CRS A4933/XM1, vol.1, NAA.

(11) Draft Paper by UK Economic Policy Committee, July 1951, DO 35/2774, PRO; Australian Cabinet meeting, decision 37A, CRS A4638/XM1 set 1, NAA.


(14) By 1955, the New Zealanders were committed to funding or had funded earth moving equipment for Pakistan, dry-farming research, two technical schools and an ambulance launch and a dental nurses training school for Ceylon, a new medical institute in New Delhi, a railway apprentices’ school in Cambodia, and a trade training school in Indonesia. The Australians had funded such projects as a hydroelectric and irrigation scheme, and earth-moving equipment for India, diesel electric locomotives, pipe-manufacturing equipment and pumping and communications equipment for Pakistan, and tractors and cultivating equipment for Ceylon. Both countries helped fund a cement factory built in Pakistan; and both provided regular, public updates on new and existing funded projects.

(15) For example, see two examples from 1960: Richard Casey, CMA, vol. 31, no. 1, 1960; and Walter Nash, EAR, vol. X, no. 6, June 1960, 11.


(17) Secretary External Affairs to Minister External Affairs, 3 August 1960, EA1 W2824 item 118/7/17/12, Archives NZ.

(18) External Affairs, Wellington, Briefing paper, ‘Four Power Conference in Information Activities in South East Asia and Oceania’, Canberra, October 1966, 30 September 1966, EA1 W2824 item 118/7/17/1 Archives NZ.

(19) A.S. Reid to R. Coomaraswamy, Ministry of Finance, Colombo, 7 May 1956, EA1 W2824 item 118/7/6, Archives NZ.

(20) New Zealand and the Colombo Plan, External Affairs Briefing Paper, 1 August 1961, ABHS 950 W4627 item 118/8/6/3, Archives NZ.
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(21) Fadden (in Washington) to Menzies, no. 930, 24 Sept. 1954, CRS A463 item 1958/2454, NAA.
(22) Bert Martin letter to Casey, 19 January 1956, CRS A10302/1 item 1959/305, NAA.
(23) Rotary Club of Sydney, District 975 of Rotary International, pp. 76-80. It is worth bearing in mind the first and fourth of Rotary’s aims, attaching to its overarching one of elevating the idea of service. The first aim is ‘the development of acquaintance as an opportunity for service’; and the fourth is ‘The advancement of international understanding, goodwill and peace through a world fellowship of business and professional persons united in the ideal of service.’
(24) External Aid Division, External Affairs, ‘New Zealand the Colombo Plan’, October 1969, ABHS 950 W 4627 item 118/7/4, Archives NZ.
(25) The Coalition’s Policy for Foreign Affairs, September 2013, at pp. 5-6.
(29) Ibid, pp. 4-8.
(32) An OECD report found that in 2011 Australia received nearly 20 times more international students than it sent abroad.
(34) For examples, see Rowan Callick The Australian, 24 June 2013, Simon Marginson, The Australian, 4 September 2013.

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