Advancement of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Survivability under the Kim Jong Un Regime: An Assessment based on Nuclear Deterrence Theory

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to verify the advancement of nuclear weapons under the Kim Jong Un regime and its survivability in terms of Nuclear Deterrence Theory, which would become the first step, to providing an answer to the question: What brought about the historic June 2018 summit between the US and the DPRK that had not been held for over 70 years? Firstly, this article will explore the development of its advanced nuclear weapons by both qualitative and quantitative methods by examining how the Kim Jong Un regime made the decision to accelerate its nuclear development and then put it into practice. Secondly, I will review how the Trump administration and the Kim Jong Un regime changed their perceptions of each other after North Korea proved its ability to invulnerably attack the US mainland and its allies through its advancement of nuclear weapons. Finally, the survivability of the Kim Jong Un regime will be considered according to its analytical framework, namely the nuclear deterrence theory. Based on these verification results where the DPRK’s survivability has been consolidated in a military sense and crisis stability between the US and the DPRK has been improved, this article also clarifies implications for North Korea’s new security strategy, regional studies on the DPRK, and Nuclear Deterrence Theory itself.