タイ中央銀行の信用秩序維持政策

金融3法改正から通貨危機直前まで

抄録

This paper aims to reveal the mechanism of how prudential policy such as differential regulations and corrective actions resulted in unexpected outcomes in Thailand, and thereby to demonstrate the features of the prudential policy of the Bank of Thailand (BOT).
The prudential policy of BOT is considered characteristic in the following respects. Firstly, BOT is the major enforcing agency of prudential policy in Thailand. After the three laws related to finance (Bank of Thailand Act, Commercial Banking Act, Act on the Undertaking of Finance Business, Securities Business and Credit Foncier Business) were revised in 1985, BOT became the supervisor and de facto regulator for local commercial banks as well as finance companies. Secondly, while pursuing prudential policy, BOT had to take commercial banks into consideration in order to obtain their cooperation in implementing monetary policy. Thirdly, prudential policy was pursued consistently by BOT in order to maintain the credibility of the domestic financial market, especially in the eyes of foreign investors. Prior to the economic bubble bursting in 1996, the purpose was to attract international funds to underpin economic growth. On the contrary, BOT attempted to stop the outflow of international short-term funds after 1996. At the same time, the economical and financial situation of Thailand has gone through rapid changes. This, together with the above features of prudential policy, brought the unintended results in reality.
This paper’s originality lies in the demonstration of the overall features of prudential policy in Thailand even though this failed to prevent the severe destabilization of the financial system. This paper presents a new view on further discussions related to the Asian currency crisis.