インドネシア都市部における卸売流通拠点としてのバザール

ジャカルタ青果物中央卸売市場の事例

抄録

Public wholesale marketplaces, which work as agricultural wholesale channels handling urban Indonesia’s changing demands, still retain the characteristics of the traditional marketplace—the ‘bazaar’—where intimate buyer–seller relationships underlie transactions. Generally, in developing countries, conducting optimal transactions necessitates third-party enforcement by legal institutions. A number of theoretical researches on this governance utilize transaction cost analysis as the primary concept. However, experimental field research does not sufficiently clarify the trading mechanisms in agricultural wholesale marketplaces, where efficiency is necessary for the increased number of repeated transactions.
Through the testing of theoretical models, this paper aims to explain quantitatively the relationship structure forged by merchants in agricultural wholesale marketplaces and the self-enforcement system of their transactions.
On the basis of field interviews and previous findings, I proposed ten theoretical hypotheses about the interactions between three dimensions: indirect factors in transactional relationships, vertical relationships, and transaction performance. I then tested these hypotheses using structural equation modeling on 206 sample cases obtained during fieldwork at the Kramat Jati central agricultural wholesale market in Jakarta.
This paper clarified two causal connections between buyer–seller relationships at the market and their opposite effects on the self-enforcement of the transaction. In one part of the causal connections, sellers acquired prior information about the buyers, e. g. their reputation, in order to ensure good trade, thus increasing trust levels and business performance. Moreover, self-enforcement is supported by the trust. Other aspects, e. g. environmental uncertainty, increase the level of transaction-specific investments and, thus, vertical relationships. Contrary to previous findings, this causality makes the self-enforcement nonfunctional because, incidentally, it causes hold-up problems even though the effect for self-enforcement is smaller than that in the empirical model.
Further, this paper revealed that the business network among sellers strengthens the link with their vertical relationships and complements the market’s capabilities of setting the right price for fresh produce. Although the business network also plays the role of mutual aid—social capital—hindering the proper functions of the marketplace in order to construct efficient channels is not considered suitable.
Finally, this article presents the fundamental information required to discuss the trading potential between merchants using traditional marketing channels and supermarkets—modern-marketing channels. By focusing on the differences between dealers in vegetables and fruits, it is suggested that dealers in fruits have a greater possibility of transactions with modern traders owing to their strong rationality.