東南アジアの「民主化」分析における理論的課題

抄録

This article challenges a popular theory of democratization (i.e. liberal theory) which has largely shaped our understanding of the subject. This theory focuses on the presumed link between economic development and the emergence of pro-democratic civil society, which then drives a democratic transformation: a strengthening of civil society implies a corresponding weakening of the authoritarian state. Driven by a naïve belief in the universal potential of the civil society factor, it is often assumed that all countries are travelling on the same historical path, ending with the establishment of a liberal democracy. This theory has also been utilized in the analyses of political change in Southeast Asia, though experience of the region casts doubt upon its relevance. For example, in Malaysia and Singapore, high levels of economic development have yet to produce strong pro-democracy civil society forces and authoritarian states continue to exist. Also, the role played by civil society forces in the process of so-called ‘democratisation’ in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia has been rather limited. Furthermore, democracies in these countries display many features that suggest their democracies are more formal than substantive and that a liberal democracy is one of the least likely outcomes.
These observations suggest the limits of this popular theory in Southeast Asia, though much of the literature still operates within the context defined by this theory, with many scholars seeking to ‘save’ the theory by introducing an array of auxiliary hypotheses. This article emphasizes the importance of breaking free of this liberal mindset and presents an alternative framework not only to capture the broad pattern of illiberal democracies in Southeast Asia but also to shed a different light on how the prospects of political transition are assessed in other non-democratic regimes in the region. To this end, this article suggests that democratization in Southeast Asia does not present a change in the balance of the state–society relationship but offers a mechanism through which to manage differences among the elite. More specifically, this article locates the proximate cause of political transition in the disruption of stable circulation of patronage within the state, which creates disgruntled elites who have lost access to state resources. These regime elites in turn push for political change in an attempt to regain access to patronage networks. Against this backdrop, political transition—which is commonly referred to as ‘democratization’—entails a reorganization of patronage networks within the state.