戦間期における日本の「ユーラシア政策」と三国同盟

「回教政策」・反ソ戦略の視点から

抄録

The term Eurasia is more than just a geographical statement; it acquired political meaning in the first half of the 20th century. As the term is capable of various definitions, here we restrict the meaning to former-Soviet lands. This paper examines the political intentions of imperial Japan towards the region in the interwar period in terms of Japanese policy towards Islamic populations and the Axis allies, especially German–Japanese military co-operation. The sources are mainly those that relate to questions about Islam and anti-Soviet feelings during this period.
The strategy of supporting those who opposed the regime in Russia dates back to the Russo-Japanese war. Based on this experience, Japan, in an attempt to play a more important role in international issues after the Paris Conference in 1919, tried to make Tokyo an émigré-center, like Berlin, Paris, and Istanbul at the time. From early 1920s Turkic-Muslim people were recruited and formed a community in Japan under the leadership of the influential Muhammed Abdulhay Kurbanali. Subsequently, Abdurresid Ibrahim arrived in 1933 and took the initiative by replacing Kurbanali in 1938. It was assumed that Japan was utilizing these anti-Bolshevik Muslim factions to foster the anti-Sovietism adopted by the military; this explains the infiltration of Japanese influence into the Muslim groups, especially those suppressed by Soviet Russia.
As is well known, imperial Japan and Nazi Germany signed the Anti-Commintern Pact in November 1936 against international communism in name, but in fact against Soviet Russia. Hiroshi Oshima, Japanese military attaché to Germany at the time, made an agreement with Wilhelm Canaris on behalf of the German army covering two areas: (i) anti-Soviet intelligence co-operation; and (ii) aid to support propaganda of anti-regime minorities based on an order from the Chief of the Army General Staff of imperial Japan. To summarize the agreement: ‘To collaborate with the German army concerning the intelligence of the Soviet Union so that the independence movements of minorities in the Soviet Union and anti-communist propaganda can be easily supported. This would assist the Japanese army to understand the deficiencies of Soviet Russia and move accordingly in the case of war between Japan and Russia’.
Finally, the plans mentioned above did not bear fruit in terms of putting Eurasia under Japanese influence due to the fact that Japanese military operations on the Asian mainland and the German invasion in Russia ultimately ended in failure.