CAUSATIVE HAVE AND EXPERIENTIAL HAVE

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This paper deals with the “experiential” and “causative” readings of have-constructions with infinitival and past participle objective complements in terms of semantic representation. It is proposed that both readings share in common the conceptual structure containing the function INCH-BE where the first argument of BE is an event described by the complement and the second argument the subject NP. The main discussion centers upon the presence of the function INCH-BE and the arguments for the subject NP as the goal to which the event of the complement moves. Furthermore, it is shown that the present analysis will enable us to account for the relations between these constructions and other have-constructions.*

1. Introduction

The present paper is concerned with the semantic representation of “Have + Object + Infinitive” and “Have + Object + Past Participle” constructions. Both constructions can be interpreted either in an “experiential” sense, as seen in (1a–b) or in a “causative” sense, as seen in (1c–d). The purpose of the present paper is to argue that the semantic structures of (1a–b) and (1c–d) should be represented as (2a–b) and (2c–d), respectively:

(1)  
  a. John had his car break down.  
  b. John had his savings wiped out.  
  c. John had Bill wash the car.  
  d. John had the car washed.

* Part of this paper was presented in different forms at the Tenth National Conference of the English Linguistic Society of Japan at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. I am grateful to Carol Rinnert and Peter Goldsbury not only for patiently acting as informants but also for suggesting stylistic improvements. I am also indebted to two anonymous EL referees for insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper. All remaining errors and inadequacies are, of course, my own.

English Linguistics 12 (1995) 73-95 — 73 —
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(2) \[\text{a. } \text{[Event INCH([\text{State BE([Event JOHNi'S CAR BREAK DOWN])}], [\text{Place AT([Thing JOHNi])])])]}\]
\[\text{b. } \text{[Event INCH([\text{State BE([Event JOHNi'S SAVINGS BE WIPED OUT])}], [\text{Place AT([Thing JOHNi])])])]}\]
\[\text{c. } \text{[Event CAUSE([\text{Thing JOHNi}], [Event INCH([\text{State BE([Event BILL WASH THE CAR])}], [\text{Place AT([Thing JOHNi])])])])]}\]
\[\text{d. } \text{[Event CAUSE([\text{Thing JOHNi}], [Event INCH([\text{State BE([Event THE CAR BE WASHED])}], [\text{Place AT([Thing JOHNi])])])])]}\]

That is, the experiential have and causative have share in common the structure [INCH([BE([X],[Y])])], while the latter differs from the former only in the function CAUSE, which embeds the former structure. The following discussion centers upon this common structure, which shows that the subject NP is the goal to which Theme X moves, i.e. is the recipient of an event described by the complement. For example, what (2a) expresses is that John is the place where the event of John's car breaking down ends. This structure is isomorphic to such an "experiential" use of have as (3a), the semantic structure of which is assumed to be (3b):

(3) \[\text{a. } \text{John had a bad cold.}^1\]
\[\text{b. } \text{[Event INCH([\text{State BE([Event A BAD COLD])}], [\text{Place AT([Thing JOHN])])])]}\]

It is also this inchoative structure that distinguishes causative have from other periphrastic causative verbs such as cause and make. According to Inoue (1992a), the semantic representations of these verbs are proposed as in (4) and (5):

(4) \[\text{a. } \text{John caused Bill to work.}\]
\[\text{b. } \text{[Event CAUSE([\text{Thing JOHN}], [Event GO([BILLi], [Path TO([Event BILLi WORK)])])])]}\]

(5) \[\text{a. } \text{John made Bill work.}\]
\[\text{b. } \text{[Event CAUSE([\text{Thing JOHN}], [Event BILL WORK])]}\]

(4b) differs from (1c) in that in the former "Bill" is the first argument of the function GO, and the event [BILL WORK], the path argument, while in the latter the event is the first argument of the function BE

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1 It is clear from the pseudo-cleft test for Eventhood as in (i) below that (3a) permits an "experiential" use:

(i) What happened was that John had a bad cold.
included in the function INCH and JOHN, its place argument. (5b) differs from (1c) in that there is no thematic relation in the former.

Before we go on to the main discussion, there are two points to be noted. The first point concerns what distinguishes these two uses of have from other uses of have with objective complements and also what distinguishes these uses from each other. Unlike the sentences in (6), it is characteristic of (1a–d) that the sentences in (1) can serve as complement to what happened was that ..., as can be observed in the contrast between (7) and (8):

(6) a. John has a cake baking.  
b. John has a car parked.  
c. John has his room clean and tidy.  

(7) a. What happened was that John had his savings wiped out.  
b. What happened was that John had his car break down.  
c. What happened was that John had Bill wash the car.  
d. What happened was that John had the car washed.  

(8) a. *What happened was that John had a cake baking.  
b. *What happened was that John had a car parked.  
c. *What happened was that John had his room clean and tidy.  

The above contrast clearly suggests that the sentences in (1) are [Event] expressions but that those in (6) are [State] ones. The relations of these stative uses of have to inchoative ones will be discussed in Section 4.

As far as the distinction between "experiential" and "causative" readings is concerned, we can give four arguments. First of all, "experiential" have co-occurs with the phrase on NP, which implies an adversative effect, while "causative" have does not. Observe the following:

(9) a. John had his savings wiped out on him.  
b. John had his car break down on him.  
c. *John had Bill wash the car on him.  
d. *John had the car washed on him.  

Secondly, the subject NP of the "experiential" reading can appear in the test frame what happened to NP was ..., whereas that of the "causative" one cannot, as in (10):

(10) a. What happened to John was that he had his savings wiped out.
b. What happened to John was that he had his car break down.
c. *What happened to John was that he had Bill wash the car.
d. *What happened to John was that he had the car washed.

Thirdly and conversely, the subject NP of the “causative” reading can occur in the test frame *what NP did was ..., but not the subject of the “experiential” reading, as seen in (11):

(11) a. *What John did was have his car break down.
b. *What John did was have his savings wiped out.
c. What John did was have Bill wash the car.
d. What John did was have the car washed.

Similarly, the “causative” reading can be embedded under the phrase try to, while the “experiential” reading cannot, as seen in (12):

(12) a. *John tried to have his savings wiped out.
b. *John tried to have his car break down.
c. John tried to have Bill wash the car.
d. John tried to have the car washed.

The second point is concerned with the theoretical framework within which the present argument is being made. The theoretical apparatus adopted here follows basically that of Jackendoff (1976, 1983, 1990) except on the following point: the present analysis does not accept the “action” tier, which deals with the notions of Patient and Actor, apart from the “thematic” tier, the original conceptual structure dealing with the thematic relations since Gruber (1965) and Jackendoff (1972). To accommodate the newly-introduced notions, Jackendoff employs one special relation AFF(ect):

(13) \[ \text{Event} \rightarrow \left[ \ldots \text{AFF}(<\text{[Thing]},<\text{[Thing]}>)] \right] \]

Various tests are proposed to detect these two notions, such as:

(14) a. What happened to Y was ...
b. What X did to/for/with Y was ...

(where Y is a Patient and X is an Actor)

He also employs the action tier for the structural linking of syntactic arguments to semantic arguments. As for semantic argument types, he assumes the following Θ hierarchy: Actor>Patient>theme>location, source, goal. As for syntactic argument types, he assumes the following hierarchy: subject>1st object>2nd object. One of the reasons for
not adopting the action tier is the indeterminacy of the notion “affectedness”. Particularly with regard to Patient, the above tests are very weak in some cases. Consider the following:

(15) a. What happened to me was that the stranger approached me.
   b. ?What happened to me was that a car approached me.
   c. *What happened to me was that the train approached me.

(16) a. What the stranger did to me was approach me.
   b. ?What the car did to me was approach me.
   c. *What the train did to me was approach me.

Is the object me of the verb approach Patient or not? The second reason is that the uniform structural mapping of syntactic to semantic arguments does not hold in many cases. Consider the sentences below:

(17) a. What John did to the charity was donate easily traceable drug money to it. (Wescoat (1992: 155))
   b. What happened to her husband was that she communicated her suspicion to him.
   c. What Bill did to his razor was shave with it. (Jackendoff (1990: 230))
   d. What Fred did to the stove was cook on it. (Ibid.)
   e. What happened to John was that the dog snarled at him.

The italicized parts in (17) do fit the tests in (14) but cannot be Patients, since they are not syntactic arguments but adjuncts. Although Jackendoff terms these as “discourse Patients”, the line is hard to draw between “grammatical” and “discourse” Patients. In this connection it is of interest to note that most of the NPs in (15)–(17) that fit the tests in (14) can undergo Passivization as well while the ones that do not fit them cannot. Notice the following:

(18) a. I was approached by a stranger.
   b. *?I was approached by a car.
   c. *I was approached by a train.

(19) a. That charity was donated easily traceable drug money (*to).
   b. *Her husband was communicated her suspicion to.
   c. (?)That razor was shaved with by Bill.
   d. That stove was cooked on by Fred.
e. John was snarled at by the dog.

Since the NPs standing as the subject of the passive are nothing but syntactic arguments, this argues against Jackendoff's alleged difference between "grammatical" Patient and "discourse" Patient.

Then one might ask what the counterproposal for the action tier could be. For Actor, we can introduce a function indicating Action, as suggested by Miller & Johnson-Laird (1976) and others, such as:

(20) \([\text{Action DO}(\{\text{Actor } X\}, \{E\})]\)

Thus using this function, the conceptual structures (2c-d) are rewritten as in the following:

(21) a. \([\text{Action DO}(\{\text{Actor JOHN}_i\}, \{\text{Event CAUSE}(\{\text{Thing JOHN}_i\}, \{\text{Event INCH}(\{\text{State BE}(\{\text{Event BILL WASH THE CAR}, \{\text{Place AT}(\{\text{Thing JOHN}_i\})}\}\}\}\}\}\]\]

b. \([\text{Action DO}(\{\text{Actor JOHN}_i\}, \{\text{Event CAUSE}(\{\text{Thing JOHN}_i\}, \{\text{Event INCH}(\{\text{State BE}(\{\text{Event THE CAR BE WASHED}, \{\text{Place AT}(\{\text{Thing JOHN}_i\})}\}\}\}\]\]

As for the notion of Patient, it can be construed as the secondary reading of an entity undergoing an abstract movement or a change of state, that is, an entity involving non-agentively the functions GO or INCH. Thus either Theme or Goal can be interpreted as Patient in many cases, as observed in the italicized parts in (22), (23), respectively:

(22) a. What happened to Bill was that \textit{he} fell from the tree.

b. What happened to Bill was that \textit{he} rolled down the hill.

c. What happened to Bill was that \textit{he} went bankrupt.

d. What the horses did to the logs was drag them.

(23) a. What happened to Bill was that \textit{he} received a big blow.

b. What happened to me was that the stranger approached \textit{me}. \((= (15a))\)

c. What happened to her husband was that she communicated her suspicion to \textit{him}.

d. What he did for his descendants was pass down the tradition to \textit{them}.

In some cases Instrumentals or Locations can be interpreted as Patients, as in (17c) and (17d). Moreover, there are cases in which possessives play the role of Patient, as shown below:

(24) a. What happened to him was that \textit{his} wife died.

b. What happened to him was that \textit{his} company became bankrupt.
c. What they did to John was destroy his house.

Since, therefore, the notion of “affectedness” is derivative in that entities involved nonagentively in some abstract motion or change of state can be taken as Patients, there is no need to set up an independent category. This is the point I want to make throughout the present study. Particularly with regard to “experiential” have, though its subject is traditionally regarded as Patient, the following sections are intended to show that its “affected” sense comes from a structure such that the subject NP is the goal to which the event of the complement moves. In respect of the structural linking of conceptual structures to their syntactic structures without the action tier, a detailed discussion must be left to other occasions. As far as have-constructions are concerned, however, a tentative formulation of the linking is to be given in Section 2.1.

The remainder of this paper is made up of three sections. Sections 2 and 3 present arguments for “experiential” have and “causative” have being based on the function INCH-BE and for their subject being the goal of an event denoted by the complement. Finally, Section 4 is devoted to a summary of the preceding sections and deals with some implications of the present analysis for other have-constructions with objective complements.

2. On “Experiential” Have

Before we go on to the main discussion, a note should be made about the eventhood of the past participle complement. A question might be raised as to whether the first argument of the function BE is a STATE or an EVENT. Does the complement in sentence (1b), for example, express an event as seen in (25a) or a state as seen in (25b)?

\[(25)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{John’s savings were wiped out quickly.} \\
\text{b. } & \text{John’s savings seem to be wiped out.}
\end{align*}
\]

First, as evidence for STATE, consider the following sentence, where the past participle can be conjoined with an adjective:

\[(26)\]

John had his teeth broken and missing.

Moreover, the have-construction with an adjective complement also permits an “experiential” use, as seen below:

\[(27)\]

What happened was that John had his child sick in bed.

On the other hand, there are cases which are taken only as an event reading. Observe the following:
(28) a. *John has his reputation injured.
    b. *John seems to have his reputation injured.

Since the complement describes a one-time event, the *have sentence in (28) has no corresponding statal construction. Therefore, either a state or an event generally occurs as the first argument of BE, but there are some complements restricted to events, as in the case of the infinitive complement.

2.1. Evidence for “Experiential” *Have as the Function INCH-BE

Now let us begin with the question of whether the “experiential” *have is represented on the semantic level in terms of the function INCH BE or in terms of the functions GO TO. INCH is a function that maps a STATE into an EVENT:

\[
\text{(29) } [\text{Event INCH([State ])}]
\]

It was introduced into the framework of conceptual semantics by Jackendoff (1990).

A first piece of evidence comes from adversative on NPs occurring with the “experiential” use, as shown in (30a, b):

(30) a. Johni had his savings wiped out on himi.
    b. Johni had his car break down on himi.

The object NP of the preposition on here must be a pronoun coreferential to the subject NP. Hence the sentences in (31) are unacceptable:

(31) a. *John had his savings wiped out on Mary.
    b. *John had his car break down on Mary.

Identity of this kind in terms of reference is also found with the sentences of statal have-constructions as well, such as:

(32) a. The tablei has a book on iti.
    b. Johni had a book with himi.

As mentioned in Jackendoff (1990), the two identical NPs play one and the same role of Location, since (32a), for example, is semantically represented as (33) below:

\[
\text{(33) } [\text{State BE([Thing A BOOK], [Place ON([Thing THE TABLE])]})]
\]

Assuming that the semantic structure of (30a), for example, is (34), we could account for (30a, b) and (32a, b) in a coherent way:

\[
\text{(34) } [\text{Event INCH([State BE([Event JOHN’S SAVINGS BE WIPED OUT], [Place ON([Thing JOHN])])}]])]
\]

\[2\] The structure (34) might also be the representations of virtually synonymous
The substructure \([BE([JOHN'S SAVINGS ...], [ON([JOHN])])]\) in (34) will exactly correspond to the stative counterpart of (30a), as seen in (35):

(35)  
a. John has his savings wiped out on him.
b. John seems to have his savings wiped out.

Note that on NP is a locational expression but not a path expression. This favors the analysis in terms of INCH([BE ...]) function over that of GO([...]) function, such as:

(36) \([\text{Event GO([\text{Event JOHN'S SAVINGS BE WIPED OUT}],}\
\text{[Path TO([\text{Thing JOHN})])])}]\)

Interestingly enough, "experiential" get, an expression synonymous with the have in question, cannot take this on-phrase, as in:

(37) *Johni got his leg broken on himi.

A note should be made at this juncture as to the relation of the adversative "ON" to the element "AT" in (2). One might ask if the second argument of the function BE should be "ON". All the "experiential" have sentences, however, do not necessarily imply an adversative sense. Observe the sentence below:

(38) John had his name included in the list.

In the above example, the "experiential" reading has no implication of an "affected" sense against John's will. Thus it is plausible to assume that the adversative sense constitutes part (but not the whole) of the indirect "passive" meaning that the "experiential" have-construction conveys.

sentences like (i) below:

(i)  
a. John's savings were wiped out on him.
b. John's car broke down on him.

What differentiates (30) from (i), however, is tense: in (30) tense is on INCH, the function of the superordinate clause, but in (i) tense is on the function of the subordinate clause.

For the semantic analysis of adversative "on" as in (i), see Inoue (1994).

There is no stative counterpart of (30b), as seen in (i) below:

(i)  
*John seems to have his car break down.

This might be due to the following constraint placed upon the function BE: the first argument of the function BE is tensed or when the tensed function embedding the BE function as its first argument is stative. This constraint accounts not only for (34b) but also for such sentences as:

(ii) *John seems to have a kiss.
(iii) *John seems to have a walk.

The analysis in terms of the function GO was adopted in Inoue (1991, 1992b).
A second piece of evidence also concerns the contrast between the non-causative reading of have and that of get. Observe the following:

(39) ??John had a bad cold from Mary.
(40) John got a bad cold from Mary.

This difference in the co-occurrence with from, a function indicating a path, strongly suggests that while get can be treated as an instance of the function GO, the structure of which is something like (36), have is not an instance of the function GO but the function INCH. The same can hold for “experiential” get and “experiential” have with regard to the co-occurrence of the from-phrase indicating a cause. Notice the following:

(41) ??John had his leg broken from slipping on the road.
(42) *John had his forehead hit the ground from slipping on the road.
(43) John got his leg broken from slipping on the road.

Thus, (41) and (42) support the analysis of “experiential” have as INCH BE in contrast to the analysis of get as GO TO.

To conclude this subsection let us consider the structural mapping of the conceptual arguments of have-constructions to their syntactic arguments; in particular, how their Goal is linked to the syntactic subject. As for the linking to the subject the following two rules of correspondence seem to be at work:

(44) i. The first argument of a state/event function in a proposition is linked to the subject of the corresponding clause only when the function does not take a proposition as its unique argument; and in case it does, the first argument of the least embedded function is linked instead to the subject.

ii. The Thing argument of the Place/Path function working as the argument of either function BE, INCH-BE or GO in a proposition is linked to the subject of the corresponding clause only if the Thing argument is animate or definite.

Rules (i) and (ii) are mutually exclusive in that where Rule (i) does not

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5 This can be inferred from the sentences below, where the adverbial phrase all the way, which modifies the from-phrase, can occur with get in the sense of “receive”:

(i) John got a letter all the way from a friend in London.
apply, Rule (ii) can be applied, and *vice versa*. The application of Rule (i) or (ii) starts from the most deeply embedded proposition and ends with the highest tensed one. It is to the syntactic subject of the main clause that the argument in this highest tensed proposition is linked. Rule (i) can be applied to account for the linking of the first conceptual argument to the syntactic subject of sentences, as seen below:

(45)  
   a. The book is on the table.  
   b. \[\text{State BE}([\text{Thing THE BOOK}], [\text{Place ON}([\text{Thing THE TABLE}])])]  

(46)  
   a. A letter went to John.  
   b. \[\text{Event GO}([\text{Thing A LETTER}], [\text{Path TO}([\text{Thing JOHN}])])\]

(47)  
   a. The pages yellowed.  
   b. \[\text{Event INCH}([\text{State BE}([\text{Thing PAGES}], [\text{Place AT} ([\text{Property YELLOW}])])])\]

(48)  
   a. John made Bill work.  
   b. \[\text{Event CAUSE}([\text{Thing JOHN}], [\text{Event BILL WORK}])\] ((48a, b) = (5a, b))

(49)  
   a. John did research on hedonism.  
   b. \[\text{Action DO}([\text{Actor JOHN}], [\text{Event RESEARCH ON HEDONISM}])\]

Rule (ii) can be applied to account for how the Location or the Goal argument of all the “statal” and “experiential” *have*-constructions so far considered, such as (1a, b) and (32a, b), is realized as Subject. It also applies to other verbs whose subject is Location or Goal, as exemplified below:

(50)  
   a. The list includes his name in it.  
   b. \[\text{State BE}([\text{Thing HIS NAME}], [\text{Place IN}([\text{Thing THE LIST}])])\]

(51)  
   a. John received a letter.  
   b. \[\text{Event GO}([\text{Thing A LETTER}], [\text{Path TO}([\text{Thing JOHN}])])\]

As for the linking to the syntactic object, the following three rules are applicable:

(52)  
   i. The second argument of the function CAUSE is linked to the object. In case the second argument is a proposition, the argument linked to the subject in the proposition by (44i) or (44ii) is linked to the object of
ii. The first argument (i.e. Theme) of the function whose Place/Path argument is linked to the subject by (44ii) is linked to the object. In case the Theme argument is a proposition, the argument linked to the subject in the proposition is linked to the object of the matrix clause.

iii. The remaining Thing argument of the Place/Path function which is lexically incorporated into a verb is linked to the object.

Rule (i) applies to account, in terms of the mapping of the second argument to the object NP, for causative sentences not only with simple NP objects like “an earthquake”, in “The eruption of a volcano caused an earthquake”, but also with infinitival complements, as in (1c, d), (4) and (5). Rule (ii) can be applied to guarantee the correspondence of the Theme argument of all the “statal” and “experiential” have sentences to their syntactic objective complements. Rule (iii) handles cases like approach or cross. For example, since the Path function NEAR in a conceptual structure like \[\text{COME([X], [NEAR(Y)])}\] incorporates into a lexical item approach, and thus can have no overt syntactic category, Rule (iii) links the Thing argument of NEAR to the object of the verb approach.

2.2. Evidence Indicating the Subject as Goal

Now let us turn to the question of the role played by the subject of “experiential” have. What (2a) and (2b) indicate is that the subject is the point at which the change of state described by the complement ends, i.e. the recipient or the goal to which the event of the complement is directed.

First, observe the sentences below:

(53) a. John got a kick from Mary.
    b. *John got Bill’s kick from Mary.
       (Cf. John got Bill’s book from Mary.)

(54) a. Mary gave John a kick.
    b. *Mary gave John Bill’s kick.

(55) a. John had a shock.
    b. *John had Bill’s shock.

The unacceptability of the (b) sentences in (53)-(55) is due to the violation of a hitherto unformulated semantic constraint placed upon the Theme of the change of state mode, as in the following:
(56) Where the Theme is an Event and an entity occupying Goal is animate, the Theme must be one whose direct relation to the entity can be pragmatically established. Clearly, the Themes of the (b) sentences of (53)-(55) do not meet the condition required by (56), whereas the (a) sentences of (53)-(55) do. How can John in (53b), for example, get Bill’s kick from Mary? What John can get from Mary is Mary’s kick, not Bill’s. This constraint applies to “experiential” have as well. Consider the following:

(57) a. John had his wallet stolen.
   b. *John had Bill’s wallet stolen.
   c. John had a new wallet stolen.

The contrast between (57a) and (57b) results from the fact that the event of John’s wallet being stolen is most likely to be related to John while that of Bill’s wallet being stolen is much less likely unless otherwise specified fully by the context. In addition, (57c) implies that a new wallet is John’s or one John has something to do with. It follows then that the subject of “experiential” have is Goal and the event of the complement, the Theme, as diagramed below:

\[\text{E} \quad \text{John} \]

Moreover, it should also be noted that the same argumentation can hold for the reference of the pronouns in the complements of “experiential” have, as shown below:

(59) a. John had a strange thing happen to him.
   b. John had a severe punishment inflicted on him.\(^6\)

According to Masuoka (1976), the phrases to him and on him in (59) are obligatorily required. Thus this also argues for the claim that the subject of “experiential” have is Goal.

Furthermore, observe the following contrast:

(60) a. Johni had a strange rumour spread about himi.
   b. *Johni had strange rumour spread from himi.

The event of “a strange rumour spreading about John” fulfills the condition required by (56) whereas that of “a strange rumour spreading from John” does not. This again supports the claim that the subject is Goal.

\(^6\) According to the judgment of a native speaker, onto instead of on is also permissible with (59) although it sounds somewhat formal.
3. On "Causative" Have

Before we go on to the discussion of "causative" have, a note should be added about the eventhood of the past participle complement. Does the complement in (1d), for example, express an event as in (1c), or a state? With regard to evidence for the state analysis, consider the following sentence:

(61) John had the door shut at six when he went by.

Sentence (61) is interpreted as "John ordered the door to be in the state of being shut at six", thus the state reading. On the other hand, there are some cases which permit only the event reading, such as:

(62) Mary had the eggs boiled slowly over low heat.
(63) John had the work done quickly.

Thus, this will lead us to assume that either the state or the event analysis can be applied to the past participle of "causative" have, depending on the predicate it takes.

3.1. Evidence for "Causative" Have as the Function INCH-BE

First, let us consider the assumption that the "causative" have is represented on the semantic level in terms of the functions INCH BE rather than in terms of the functions GO TO. Regrettably, there is not much direct evidence to support this assumption.

One piece of indirect evidence for this assumption is provided by the co-occurrence with the from-phrase, a preposition indicating a path, with regard to the contrast between get and have. As noted in Gruber (1976), get with a Theme indicating some action, as in (64), can be identified as the same sense as get with a concrete Theme, as in (65):

(64) John got Bill to do the dishes.
(65) John got a book yesterday from Bill.

Thus, sentence (64) can be recognized as semantically identical to sentences such as (66) and (67) below:

(66) What John got from Bill was that he cleaned the room.
(67) What John got from Bill was his cleaning the room.

On the other hand, the causative use of have permits no such paraphrases:

(68) *What John had from Bill was that he cleaned the room.
(69) *What John had from Bill was his cleaning the room.

This difference between causative get and have with respect to a path expression suggests that the latter favors the analysis in terms of the
Another piece of evidence is concerned with the relation of the "causative" have to the "experiential" have. There are many cases in which either an "experience" interpretation or a "causative" interpretation is allowed, as exemplified below:

(70) John had some questions answered.
(71) She had herself accused.
(72) John had his wife wake him up.
(73) The actor had a lot of girls kiss him.
(74) John had his employee steal the money.

Provided that, as shown in Section 1.1., the analysis of the "experiential" have is made in terms of the functions INCH BE rather than GO TO, it will constitute evidence, albeit indirect, for the analysis of "causative" have in terms of the same functions. For it is always the case among verbs that alternate between the change of state reading and the causative reading that where the change of state use is treated as an instance of the function INCH, its causative counterpart is also treated as an instance of the same function, and that where the change of state use is treated as an instance of the function GO, its causative counterpart is also treated as an instance of GO. This is confirmed by the fact that GO-verbs appear with a range of Path-prepositions while INCH-verbs appear with a range of Place-prepositions. Consider the following pairs:

(75) a. A coin slid into the girl's hand.
     b. He slid a coin into the girl's hand.
(76) a. The logs rolled down the hill.
     b. He rolled the logs down the hill.
(77) a. The pencil pierced through the cushion.
     b. John pierced the pencil through the cushion.
(78) a. The ink spread over the paper.
     b. He spread the ink over the paper.
(79) a. The child sat at the table.
     b. He sat the child at the table.
(80) a. A bronze statue will stand on the square in May.
     b. They will stand a bronze statue on the square in May.

3.2. Evidence Indicating the Subject as Goal

Now let us consider the question as to whether the subject of the have-causative is Goal. The first piece of evidence for this assumption
is provided by the occurrence of reflexives as Object. Observe the following contrast between have and make:

(81) a. *John had himself wash the car.
    b. John made himself wash the car.

Assuming that the semantic structure of (81a) is (82) and that of (81b) is (83), we could account for the above contrast in an adequate way.

(82) \[ \text{Action DO([Actor } \text{JOHN}_\text{i}], [Event CAUSE([Thing } \text{JOHN}_\text{i}],
            [Event INCH([State } \text{BE([Event } \text{JOHN}_\text{i} \text{ WASH THE CAR},
            [Place } \text{AT([Thing } \text{JOHN}_\text{i}]))]))])\]

(83) \[ [Event CAUSE([Thing } \text{JOHN}_\text{i}], [Event } \text{JOHN}_\text{i} \text{ WASH THE CAR}])\]

The unacceptability of (81a) results from oddity of the fact that structure (82) indicates that John caused himself to be the recipient of his action of washing the car. Human language does not allow such a roundabout way of speaking; the speaker will simply express that situation by saying “John washed the car himself” or “John washed the car for his own benefit”. Almost the same can be applied to sentences using shitemorau in Japanese, which are assumed to have a similar semantic representation, such as:

(84) *Taro wa jibun ni kuruma o arattemoratta.

On the other hand, what the structure (83) indicates is that John is the immediate cause of his washing the car, not the recipient of his own action.

Quite the opposite can be seen in the case of have-causatives with past participles as complements, such as:

(85) a. John had himself washed.
    b. *John made himself washed.

The acceptability of (85a) in contrast to (81a) suggests that John can be the recipient of his body being washed by someone else. The unacceptability of (85b), however, is due to the violation of the constraint\(^7\) that the second argument of CAUSE must be the kind of event for which the first argument can be an immediate cause. In other words, John in (85b) cannot be an immediate cause for someone else’s action of washing his body.

\(^7\) This constraint also accounts for contrasts as seen below:

(i) a. The eruption of the volcano caused an earthquake.
    b. *Strong wind caused an earthquake.

For details of this constraint, see Inoue (1992a).
Next consider the following contrast:

(86)   a. *The candidate had his power felt.
       b. The candidate made his power felt.

The contrast above also seems to reflect the structural difference on the semantic level between causative have and make. The main difference between (86a) and (86b) lies in the fact that in the former the agent who feels his power is the candidate himself while in the latter it is the voters. Thus the oddity of (86a) comes from the fact that the candidate felt his own power by someone else's aid, although he should have felt it by himself. This also confirms the assumption that the subject of have-causatives is Goal.

A third piece of evidence concerns the reference of the pronoun his in the following pair:

(87)   a. John had Bill wash his dishes.
       b. John made Bill wash his dishes.

Syntactically, his in (87a, b) should refer to either John or Bill. The two sentences, however, differ in which reading is primary; in (87a) the reading of "John" but in (87b) that of "Bill" is primary. That the former reading is primary with causative have suggests that the subject is the recipient of the action denoted by the complement.

Before going to the next argument, let us observe the following well-known pair of examples:

(88)    John bought the book from Bill for $5.
(89)    Bill sold the book to John for $5.

These two sentences describe the same event with two kinds of transfer. The first is the change of Theme, the book, from Bill to John. The two sentences differ in whether the subject NP is Goal or Source. The secondary transfer, which is expressed by the for-phrase, is the changing of $5 in the opposite direction, i.e. from John to Bill. In this transfer the subject in (88) is Source and the subject in (89) Goal. This situation is diagramed as (88') and (89') below:

\[
(88') \quad \text{Book} \quad \text{JOHN} \quad \Leftarrow \quad \text{BILL} \\
\quad \text{JOHN} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{BILL} \\
\quad \text{\$5} \\
\]

8 The same oddity can be seen with get-causative such as:
(i)   *The candidate got his power felt.
(89') BILL $\rightarrow$ JOHN

It is important to note here that where the subject is Goal in the first transfer, the *for*-phrase indicates the subject is Source in the secondary transfer and *vice versa*. To return to the main argument, if we assume that in the first transfer the Theme of causative *have* is the action denoted by the complement and the subject is Goal, it follows that in the secondary transfer the subject is the Source of the Theme expressed by the object of the *for*-phrase. This prediction is born out by the following:

(90) John had the car washed for $5.
(91) John had Bill wash the car for $5.

Notice that both (90) and (91) imply that John paid $5, that is, John is the Source of $5.

It should be noted in passing that the *make*-causative occurring with a *for*-phrase means the subject or someone else paid the cost, such as (92):

(92) John made Bill wash the car for $5.

(⇒ John or someone else paid $5.)

The former reading seems to be a counterexample to the present analysis. This reading, however, can be accounted for in terms of the structure (5b). Since there is no transfer of Theme in (5b), either of the following interpretations will arise, depending on the context in which (92) is used: (i) John made Bill wash the car and paid the charge for the service; or (ii) John made Bill wash the car as an agent for someone else and that the person who John acted for paid Bill $5.

The next pieces of evidence are concerned with past participle complements. There is a tendency for verbs indicating the subject as Source to be more comfortably embedded in the complement position than those indicating the subject as Goal. Contrast the following pair:

(93) a. Mary had a precious diamond sold.
   b. *Mary had a precious diamond bought.

The acceptability of sentence (b) will be improved if we add phrases like “for someone” or “from someone”, but this tendency can be observed with past participles *per se*. The same can be said of verbs like *obtain, acquire, bring, inherit, take* etc. in contrast to *donate*, as seen below:
(94) John had a lot of money donated.
(95) *John had a lot of money obtained.
(96) *John had some estate acquired.
(97) ?John had lots of fish taken.
(98) *John had a lot of money inherited.

Why can this tendency exist? Assume that just as, in (88) and (89), the for-phrase indicates the opposite direction of transfer denoted by the verb it modifies, so the verb embedded in the complement of causative have is preferred, which denotes the transfer opposite to that of the matrix verb; thus we could account for this situation in a persuasive way.

An interesting case in this respect is the verb rent (or lease) whose subject can be interpreted as Goal as well as Source, as in:

(99) a. John rented (leased) the house to Mr. Smith.
    b. John rented (leased) the house from Mr. Smith.

Consider the following sentence with rent (or lease) embedded as the complement of the causative have-construction:

(100) John had the house rented (leased).

Does (100) have both readings of (99)? No, only the reading of (a) is allowed here. Moreover, as noted in Gruber (1976: 46), instrumental phrases such as “with one’s own money” can be used to disambiguate the (b) reading from the (a):

(101) John rented (leased) the house with his own money.

Now notice that sentence (101), in which rent (lease) occurs with this instrumental phrase, does not hold:

(102) *John had the house rented (leased) with his own money.

The unacceptability of (102) along with (93b), (95)-(98) strongly confirms the assumption that the subject of the causative have is Goal.

4. Implications

Through the foregoing sections I have tried to show that both the “experiential” and “causative” readings of the “have+object+infinitive (past participle)” constructions share the conceptual structure [INCH ([BE (...)])] and that the subject is the goal to which the event of the complement moves. Now let us turn to the question of what implications the present analysis will have, especially for the semantic accounts of other have-constructions with objective complements.

To begin with, consider have-constructions with adjective phrase,
noun phrase, prepositional phrase and present participle complements, as in the following:

\[(103)\]

a. John has his room clean and tidy.

b. John has his child sick in bed.

c. The army will have him a soldier in two months.

d. The provost had his students out of office in ten minutes.

e. The professor had his students doing a survey.

These sentences are assumed to fit the structural pattern \([BE([X], [Y]])\], in which \(X\), Theme, is a state denoted by the complement and \(Y\), Location, is the point at which the subject NP is located. Thus sentences \((103a-e)\) are represented as \((104a-e)\), respectively:\(^9\)

\[(104)\]

a. \([\text{State}\ BE([\text{State}\ \text{JOHNi'S ROOM BE CLEAN AND TIDY}], \text{Place}\ \text{AT([\text{Thing}\ \text{JOHNi}])}])\]

b. \([\text{State}\ BE([\text{State}\ \text{JOHNi'S CHILD BE SICK IN BED}], \text{Place}\ \text{AT([\text{Thing}\ \text{JOHNi}])}])\]

c. \([\text{State}\ BE([\text{State}\ \text{HE BE A SOLDIER}], \text{Place}\ \text{AT([\text{Thing}\ \text{THE ARMY}])}])\]

d. \([\text{State}\ BE([\text{State}\ \text{THE PROVOSTi'S STUDENTS BE OUT OF THE PROVOSTi'S OFFICE}], \text{Place}\ \text{AT([\text{Thing}\ \text{THE PROVOSTi}])}])\]

e. \([\text{State}\ BE([\text{State}\ \text{THE PROFESSORi'S STUDENTS BE DOING A SURVEY}], \text{Place}\ \text{AT([\text{Thing}\ \text{THE PROFESSORi}])}])\]

Although a detailed discussion must be left to another occasion, there are several indications which lend support to this analysis. As evidence for the representations of \((103a-e)\) in terms of a STATE function \(BE\) rather than in terms of EVENT functions \(INCH\) or \(CAUSE\), we note that these \(have\)-sentences can be embedded under the expression \(seem\ to\), as shown below:

\[(105)\]

a. John seems to have his room clean and tidy.

b. John seems to have his child sick in bed.

\(^9\) Sentences \((103a, c, d, e)\) are often treated as "causatives" in the literature of causative constructions. In the present analysis, however, the semantic representations of these sentences are not made in terms of the function \(CAUSE\), for \(CAUSE\) is itself an EVENT which also includes an EVENT expression as its second argument, as in the following example:

\[(i)\] The knife killed John.
c. The army seems to have him a soldier.
d. The provost seems to have his students out of his office.
e. The professor seems to have his students doing a survey.

For the assumption that the Theme is a state denoted by the complement and the Location is the subject NP, we can give three arguments. First of all, there are some cases which easily alternate between the “statal” reading and the “inchoative” reading. Observe the following:

(106) a. What happened was that John had a tooth missing.
b. What happened was that John had his child sick in bed.
c. What happened was that the provost had his students out of his office.
d. What happened was that the cook had the water hot in a jiffy.

Moreover, we can observe some cases of this kind which are conjoined with the “experiential” reading of the past participle complement, as shown below:

(107) In a traffic accident John had his teeth broken and missing.

Finally, a third piece of evidence comes from a semantic constraint placed upon the object NP of the possessional (or positional) have-construction, as observed below:

(108) a. *The table has itself.
b. *John has himself with him.

That is, the Theme of the function BE must not be coreferential to its Location. The same constraint seems to hold for the object NP in sentences (103a–e). Notice the following:

(109) a. *John has himself sick in bed.
b. *The professor had himself doing a survey.
c. *The provost had himself out of his office in ten minutes.
d. *John will have himself a soldier in two months.

Assuming that the semantic representations of sentences in (109) fit the structural pattern something like \([\text{BE}(\text{BE}(\text{[X]}, \ldots)), \text{[Y]}])\), where X is coreferential to Y, and that the above constraint is modified in such a way that any Theme embedded in the first argument of the function BE must not be coreferential to the second argument, namely, its Lo-
cation,\textsuperscript{10} we can obtain a generalization regarding all statal have-constructions. This will argue for the Theme being the state of the complement and the Location being the subject NP.

From the foregoing discussion, we may conclude that have-constructions indicating possession/position, state of affairs, experience and causation share as their core the conceptual structure \([\text{BE}([X],[Y])]\). Thus each of these structural patterns is represented as follows:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Possession/Position: \([\text{BE}([\text{THING}],[\text{AT}([\text{THING}]))])\]
\item State of Affairs: \([\text{BE}([\text{STATE}],[\text{AT}([\text{THING}]))])\]
\item Experience: \([\text{INCH([BE([\text{STATE/EVENT}],[\text{AT([THING)]})]]})]\]
\item Causation: \([\text{DO([THING]},\text{CAUSE([THING}],\text{INCH([BE([STATE/EVENT},\text{AT([THING])])])])})]\]
\end{enumerate}

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\textsuperscript{10} This constraint will predict that the object NP of the past participle complement is not a Theme, as shown by the acceptability of (71) and (85a).
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