HOW MINIMALISTIC IS HUMAN LANGUAGE?

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1. Introduction

Howard Lasnik's Minimalist Analysis is a collection of articles that he wrote (one of them with Mamoru Saito) in the past ten years. The main theme of the book, as its title indicates, is to examine some consequences of the central thesis of Minimalism that the faculty of human language is an optimal solution to the conditions imposed by the interface levels of Phonetic Form (PF) and Logical Form (LF). Lasnik's discussions center around three issues.

First, the notions of S-structure and government, which played important roles in the Government and Binding (GB) framework, do not follow from interface conditions and therefore are expected not to play a role if the above-mentioned central thesis is tenable. Lasnik examines cases which were explained in terms of these notions in the GB framework, such as the accusative DP in the Exceptional Case Marking (ECM) construction and simple transitive sentences.

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Second, Lasnik discusses the question of what drives syntactic movement. Unlike in Lasnik and Saito (1984), in which movement was completely optional, he pursues the idea that movement is a last resort and not allowed unless it is required, and attempts to make this idea precise. He compares the hypothesis that elements can move only if they have some defective property that can be remedied by movement (Greed) and the hypothesis that elements can move to satisfy a morphological requirement of the host (Enlightened Self Interest). He argues for the latter on several bases including his analysis of the existential construction in English.

The third issue concerns syntactic variations within and across languages. Lasnik presents an analysis of sentences with and without V-to-I movement in English and French, in which he explores the possibility that such variations reflect different options in morphological properties of lexical items involved in the sentences.

The book is organized as follows. I will refer to the articles in the volume by the chapter number with the year of the original publication in square brackets. Chapter 1, “Introduction,” explains some fundamental issues discussed in the following chapters and the directions the discussion leads to. Chapter 2, “On the Subject of Infinitives” [1991], written with Mamoru Saito, explores the possibility that the ECM construction involves movement of the embedded subject to the [Spec, Agr,P] position of the matrix clause. Chapter 3, “Lectures on Minimalist Syntax” [1993], surveys questions that arise, in the context of the Minimalist Program, from considerations on such issues as Case-licensing (of nominative and accusative NPs as well as NPs in the existential construction), the EPP requirement (the requirement that clauses must have a subject in overt syntax), the phenomena of Antecedent Contained Deletion, and binding phenomena. For each case, Lasnik carefully examines what moves at what point for what reason. The directions proposed there are further developed in later chapters. Chapter 4, “Case and Expletives Revisited: On Greed and Other Human Failings” [1995], develops his analysis of the existential construction and supports Enlightened Self Interest over Greed. Chapter 5, “Verbal Morphology: Syntactic Structures Meets the Minimalist Program” [1995], discusses syntactic behaviors of verbal elements in English and French with respect to V-to-I movement (and Affix Hopping), and presents an analysis where their behaviors are explained in terms of their abstract morphological properties. Chapter 6, “Last Resort” [1995], further sup-
ports Enlightened Self Interest over Greed on empirical and conceptual grounds, reexamines his previous analysis of the existential construction, and proposes a revision according to which agreement features of the post-verbal NP, rather than the whole NP, move in LF. The contrast between the existential construction and the ECM construction with respect to binding and scope leads him to the claim that accusative NPs move overtly to [Spec, Agr_oP]. In Chapter 7, “A Note on Pseudogapping” [1995], Lasnik argues that overt raising to [Spec, Agr_oP] coupled with the PF deletion approach to ellipsis allows pseudogapping to be analyzed as an instance of VP ellipsis. The analysis entails that verbs move overtly out of VP in non-pseudogapped sentences. Lasnik takes up the question of what motivates this movement. Chapter 8, “On Central Structural Aspects of Anaphora” [1996], discusses consequences of overt raising of accusative NPs for the analysis of binding. Each chapter is accompanied with a brief introduction, which relates it to other chapters and helps the reader understand how important questions have arisen and how his answers have been developed and substantiated.

I will discuss Lasnik’s analysis of the existential construction (presented mainly in Chapters 3, 4, and 6) in Section 2, his analysis of the auxiliary and main verbs in English and French (in Chapter 5) in Section 3, and the driving force of the verb movement that he proposes in his analysis of Antecedent Contained Deletion and Pseudogapping (in Chapters 6 and 7) in Section 4.

2. Existential Sentences

In this section I will first examine Lasnik’s proposal that the post-verbal NP of existential sentences in English has its Case checked by be or the unaccusative verb. I will point out that one of the cases he cites as evidence for his proposal has another possible account and therefore is not persuasive, but I will also point out a possible area where evidence for it can be explored. I will then examine how the analyses that Lasnik proposes address some of the important questions related to existential sentences.

2.1. The Case on the Associate NP

Chapter 4 [1995] cites the following examples as evidence for the claim that the post-verbal NP of existential sentences in English has its
Case checked by the verb.

(1) a. I want there to be someone here at 6:00.
    b. *I want there someone here at 6:00. (Ch. 4: 82)

(2) *There someone laughed. (Ch. 4: 84, Ch. 6: 130)

I will call the post-verbal NP "the associate NP." The evidence based on small clause constructions as in (1) is more extensively discussed in Lasnik (1996), where he cites the following examples.1

(3) a. We consider [there likely [t to be a man in the room]]
    b. *We consider [there a man in the room]

While (3a) shows that there can appear as the surface subject of a small clause, (3b) is not possible. Lasnik attributes the difference in grammaticality to the presence/absence of the verb be, which he argues checks Case of the associate.

Travis (1996) in her comments to Lasnik (1996) takes up the question of whether (3b) has a position that can host there. Her conclusion is that it does. It is a derived object position, a non-θ-position, to which the subject of a small clause moves into. The position corresponds to [Spec, Agr_P] for Lasnik and [Spec, vP] for Chomsky (1998, 1999). However, there is evidence that there cannot be directly merged into this position. Consider the following examples from Safir (1993).

(4) a. *?At three o'clock we saw there be a fight.
    b. At three o'clock we saw there appear to be a fight
       (though actually, it was faked).

(5) a. *At three o'clock we heard there be a knocking sound.
    b. ?At three o'clock we heard there begin to be a knocking
       sound.

(Safir (1993: 67f))

Safir argues that the bare infinitive complement to verbs of direct perception (the bare infinitive complement that is temporally dependent on the matrix clause) lacks an independent I-node, while the expletive

1 Lasnik (1996: 164) also cites the following example as evidence that the associate NP must be in a Case-checking position.

(i) *There is likely someone to be here.

Alternative accounts of such examples based on economy conditions are found in Chomsky (1995a: 428) (Procrastinate) and Chomsky (1998: 104) (Merge over Move).
there is possible only if it can be licensed in [Spec, IP]. The expletive there in the (a)-examples is not in [Spec, IP] at any stage of the derivation, while there in the (b)-examples is first generated in [Spec, IP] and then moved to the position where it has its Case checked by the perception verb. Safir assumes that the latter position is the position adjoined to the bare infinitive. However, since the moved there has its Case checked in this position by the matrix verb, one can reinterpret it as [Spec, Agr₀P] or [Spec, vP] of the matrix clause.

Let us now briefly consider why there must be generated in [Spec, IP]. Safir argues that there cannot be generated directly in the position adjoined to the bare infinitive but can only be generated in [Spec, IP] because only the latter position is required, and therefore licensed, by the Extended Projection Principle. The argument cannot be carried over to a system in which, as Lasnik assumes, accusative Case is checked in [Spec, Agr₀P] (or [Spec, vP]). If AGR₀/v, as well as T (= I), has the EPP feature, the (a)-examples and the (b)-examples of (4) and (5) cannot be distinguished in terms of the EPP. We will need another account of why there cannot be directly merged into [Spec, Agr₀P]/[Spec, vP].

I will present two possible approaches without going into details. One possibility is that the verb be can check Case only if it is under T for some reason. While it has been proposed in other contexts (e.g. Larson (1988: 360)) that Case-checking/assignment by a verb is possible only when the VP is under T, one would have to assume, to accommodate the above observation, that T is relevant only for the partitive Case checked by be/unaccusatives. It is not clear why there should be such a requirement only for the partitive Case in existential sentences but not for accusative Case in transitive sentences. Another possibility is that T is necessary in existential sentences for a semantic reason. For example, Basilico (1997: 281ff) argues that existential sentences with there makes an assertion on the existence of some event rather than of some individual. The following sentence, for instance, asserts the existence of an event of comets being visible rather than the existence of comets (which are visible).

(6) There are comets visible.

It may be the case that in order to be the focus of the assertion, the event argument must denote an independent event, rather than a sub-event of a larger event, and for this reason must be related to an instance of T. The interpretation of T may be independent of other
occurrences of T in the sentence, as in the case of finite clauses, or may be totally dependent on another occurrence of T, as in the case of defective T in ECM and raising complements.

I will not pursue the problem of what requires T in existential sentences here, but whatever the answer is, Safir's observation that existential sentences with there require an instance of T has a consequence on Lasnik's argument based on (1) and (3) with respect to Case on the associate NP. Not only do the small clause complements in the ungrammatical examples in (1b) and (3b) lack the verb be, but they also seem to lack tense. Safir's examples demonstrate that the presence of be is not sufficient to make the existential sentence grammatical. The observation is compatible with Lasnik's claim that the associate NP must have its Case checked by the verb be: If Lasnik is correct, then the (b)-examples of (1) and (3) are doubly excluded—by the absence of be and by the absence of T. The observation shows, however, that the examples in (1) and (3) are not decisive evidence for the claim.

On the other hand, there is an observation which suggests that the associate NP in existential sentences is not nominative, and therefore must have its Case checked not by T but by the verb. The data to be given is not new, but even the core part of the data, called "the that-trace effect," has not been the focus of attention for some time because the previous approaches to the phenomenon crucially relied on the notion of government. In the Minimalist Program, the notion has been reexamined and alternative analyses have been proposed for other cases subsumed under this notion, for example, by Lasnik and Saito (Ch. 2 [1991]). However, an alternative approach to the that-trace effect that does not employ the notion of government was not proposed in the Minimalist Program until very recently. Pesetsky and Torrego's (2000) reanalysis of the core data, which is another attempt to shed new light on the old data and to pursue their implications, has made possible the following discussion on the implication of the phenomenon for the present purpose.

The following examples illustrate the core part of the data of the subject-object asymmetry with respect to the that-trace effect.

(7) a. *Who does John think [t that [t' left]]
   b. Who does John think [t [t' left]]
   c. Who does John think [t that [Bill saw t']]
   d. Who does John think [t [Bill saw t']]  
   (Chomsky (1981: 244))
The wh-phrases in (7) have been moved from the complement clause with the finite tense. The ungrammaticality of (7a) with the trace in the subject position is referred to as "the that-trace effect" after the surface filter proposed in Chomsky and Lasnik (1977). The that-trace effect was attributed to the Empty Category Principle in the GB framework (e.g. Chomsky (1981)). The principle requires that empty categories, including wh-traces, be properly governed. While the object is properly governed by the verb, the subject is only governed, and not properly governed by I (=T). The wh-trace in the subject position can be properly governed by the intermediate trace in [Spec, CP], but this government relation is blocked by the overt complementizer that. Koopman (1983) argues that the subject-object asymmetry in matrix wh-questions with respect to Subject-Aux Inversion (SAI) should be grouped together with the above set of data. This well-known asymmetry is illustrated in the following examples.

\begin{align*}
(8) \quad & a. \ *[\text{Who did } [t \text{ leave}]]? \\
& b. \ [\text{Who } [t \text{ left}] ]? \\
& c. \ [\text{Who did } \text{John see } [t]]? \\
& d. \ *[\text{Who } \text{John saw } [t]]?
\end{align*}

Pesetsky and Torrego (2000) propose that the subject-object asymmetries found in these data reflect the difference between nominative Case and other Cases. Take the subject-object asymmetry in the matrix question, for example. The subject in (8a, b) is nominative and agrees with T. Pesetsky and Torrego propose that a nominative DP bears the same feature as T does that allows T-to-C movement. C agrees with this feature and requires that a category with this feature move into its projection. Movement of the nominative wh-phrase satisfies this requirement as well as the EPP requirement of the wh-feature of C. Since all the requirements of C are thus satisfied, T-to-C movement is not necessary and therefore not allowed, because movement is possible only if it is required. T-to-C movement is necessary in (8c, d), where the wh-phrase does not bear nominative Case and does not agree with T, and therefore cannot satisfy the requirement that T is expected to fulfill in C. Pesetsky and Torrego propose basically the same line of analysis for the that-trace phenomenon in (7) on the assumption that the occurrence of that reflects T-to-C in embedded clauses.

The details of Pesetsky and Torrego's analysis do not concern us here, but their proposal that the subject-object asymmetries in these
data should be captured in terms of nominative Case has an important consequence for the present discussion. If that proposal is correct, and if, contrary to Lasnik's claim, the associate NP in the existential construction is nominative, the associate NP should exhibit a that-trace effect and disallow SAI as nominative subjects do. The following examples show that the predictions are not borne out.

(9) a. How many men did John say that there were __ in the room?
   b. *How many men did John say that __ were in the room?

(Safir (1985: 159))

(10) a. How many books are there here?
   cf. There are five books here. *Five books are there here.
   b. *How many people did leave?

The grammaticality of (9a) and (10a) as opposed to (9b) and (10b) suggests, under the assumption that nominative Case is at issue, that the associate NP does not bear nominative Case. To the extent that the assumption is tenable, Lasnik's proposal receives support.

2.2. Theoretical Importance of the Existential Construction

In this subsection, I will examine how Lasnik's analyses cope with four theoretically important questions related to the existential sentences. The first, and the most basic question is how the agreement facts illustrated in (11) are obtained.

2 In addition, a declarative complement with an existential sentence in it may or may not contain an overt that.

( i ) I think that there is something here in this box.
( ii ) I think there is something here in this box.

The grammaticality of (ii) without that suggests that there is nominative if Pesetsky and Torrego (2000) are correct in claiming that that-less complement clauses are possible only when the clause-initial phrase bears nominative Case.

3 See Safir (1985: 159) and Chomsky (1991: 445) for accounts of the grammaticality of (9a) based on the Empty Category Principle.

4 See Culicover (1993) for the observation that the that-trace effect is suspended if there is a sentential adverb between that and IP, which may weaken the force of the argument here. Also, it remains to be seen how the proposal that the that-trace effect should be explained in terms of nominative Case can be extended to languages with quirky Case subjects. I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing out this second problem.
(11)  a. There is/*are a book on the table.
b. There *is/are some books on the table.
(12)  a. A book is on the table.
b. Some books are on the table.

The predicate agrees in number with the associate NP as if it were in the subject position as in (12). That is, the associate NP behaves, with respect to agreement, as if it had been moved into the subject position. Of course, it has not, at least overtly. It stays in the post-verbal position and the subject position is occupied by the expletive there. The agreement facts signal some syntactic relation other than overt syntactic movement. It could be covert movement or something else. If it is covert movement, it raises an important question in the context of the Minimalist Program: What triggers the movement? This is the second question I will discuss below. The third question concerns the observation that appears to contradict the observation mentioned above. While the associate NP behaves as if it had been raised to the subject position with respect to agreement, it exhibits behaviors that are expected from its post-verbal position in other respects. Consider the following examples.

(13)  a. Many linguistics students aren’t here.
b. There aren’t many linguistics students here.

(Ch. 6: 136f [1995])

(14)  a. The DA proved two men to have been at the scene during each other’s trials.
b. *The DA proved there to have been two men at the scene during each other’s trials.

(Ch. 2: 17 [1991], Ch. 6: 137 [1995])

Many linguistic students cannot take a scope over the negation in (13b), while it can in (13a). Two men can serve as the antecedent of each other in (14a) but not in (14b). How to account for those “low behaviors” of the associate is the third question. The fourth question is how to rule out cases like the following, in which the associate NP bears a Case other than partitive Case. I assume here that the indefinite NPs in these examples bear accusative Case.⁵

⁵ Lasnik (Ch. 6: 122) assumes that the indefinite NP in (15a) bears oblique Case, but the argument he presents there carries over if it bears accusative Case. It is
(15) a. *There seems to a strange man that it is raining outside.  
(Chomsky (1993: 32), Ch. 4: 75 [1995])
b. *There strikes someone that Mary is intelligent.  
(Ch. 6: 133 [1995])

One straightforward answer to the question on agreement is the following. The associate NP exhibits the agreement as if it had been raised to the subject position. It is not moved overtly. Therefore, it is moved covertly in the LF-component. This is the view pursued in Chomsky (1986b). The moved NP replaces the expletive *there*, which would otherwise violate the principle of Full Interpretation. Since this movement is not reflected in the binding relations as we have seen above, Lasnik and Saito (Ch. 2: 18 [1991]) argue that Condition (A) of the Binding Theory applies at S-structure. Subsequent research in the field, however, has aimed at an account that does not rely on this hypothesis. Chomsky (1991, 1993), for example, argues that the associate NP does not replace the expletive but adjoins to it in the LF-component. It is assumed that *there* is an LF affix. Chomsky (1991: 443f) argues that since it is adjoined to *there*, the associate NP does not c-command what the subject normally c-commands in the sentence, for example, the negation in (13). Lasnik (Ch. 6: 136 [1995]), however, points out that the shift to LF-adjunction does not solve the problem of scope relations because the associate should c-command the negation on the theory of adjunction proposed by May (1985) and developed in Chomsky (1986a). Chomsky (1993: 32f) argues that the LF-adjunction is motivated because the associate NP is not in the position for Case checking. The driving force is Greed on the part of the moved phrase. The indefinite NP in such examples as (15), which is already in a Case-only crucial there that it is not nominative or partitive Case. Lasnik (Ch. 6: 142f) argues that the prepositions in (ia–c) check accusative Case while the preposition *near* in (ii) does not.

( i ) a. Dulles spoke to Philby.  
b. Dulles talked about Philby.  
c. John took advantage of Bill.

( ii ) Mary stood near Susan.

I assume that *to* in (15a) belongs to the former class. I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing these parts of Lasnik's discussion to my attention.
checking position, cannot raise, because the NP itself has no need to raise. Examples like (15) contain no illegitimate object at LF so that the derivation converges, but the sentence will have no coherent interpretation, with the freestanding *there* receiving no semantic interpretation. Lasnik (Ch. 4: 91f note 1 [1995]) argues that the extension of the range of Case-checking positions to include the position adjoined to the specifier is undesirable.

Lasnik (Ch. 6 [1995]) pursues the idea that *there* is an LF affix, and argues that it is this property of *there* and not any property of the associate that triggers LF-adjunction. The associate NP raises not for its own reason under the principle of Greed, but to save *there* from being stranded at LF under the principle of Enlightened Self Interest. The associate NP bears partitive Case and has it checked in the postverbal position, while the expletive *there* checks its own Case in its position. The analysis therefore does not require extension of the range of Case-checking configurations. In order to avoid extension of the range of agreement configurations, Lasnik (Ch. 4: 93, Ch. 6: 127 [1995]) proposes that the expletive *there* is freely generated with any set of \(\Phi\)-features, and that *there* and the associate cannot disagree in \(\Phi\)-features. *There* must be affixed to an NP with partitive Case, which cannot be satisfied in the examples in (15), where the indefinite NP bears accusative Case.

The notion of LF affix raises several questions. What does it mean for a morpheme to have an affixal status only in LF but not in PF or in overt syntax? Why should word boundaries matter in LF? What is the locality condition for the LF-affixation? Why should Case matter? In addition, Chomsky (1995b) argues that under the Minimalist assumption that all movement is driven by the need for formal features to be checked, movement should be of the formal features only, unless pied-piping is necessary for PF requirements. Under such a theory, LF-affixation is not possible. The property of being an (LF) affix is not a formal feature that needs checking. Furthermore, the entire category of the associate NP cannot move covertly, due to economy. Features can move, but adjoining features to the expletive *there* does not save it from the status of a stranded affix. Lasnik (Ch. 6: 133ff [1995]) takes this last problem very seriously and proposes an alternative analysis.

His proposal is that feature-movement, the only movement allowed in LF, explains the properties of the existential sentences discussed so
He proposes that the expletive *there* lacks agreement features, so that the agreement features on Agrs will not be checked in overt syntax. The features of the associate move to Agrs (in LF because of Procrastinate). Since only formal features move, properties relevant to anaphora and scope remain *in situ*, which explains the "low behaviors" of the associate NP. The analysis does not require extension of the range of Case-checking configurations, because as before the associate NP has its partitive Case checked in the post-verbal position and nominative Case is checked between the expletive *there* and Agrs. It does not require extension of the range of agreement configurations either, because the agreement facts are now explained in terms of the head-head relation between Agrs and (the head of) the associate NP.

Let us now consider how Lasnik (Ch. 6 [1995]) explains the contrast between examples like (15), repeated here as (16), and ordinary existential sentences as in (17).

(16) a. *There seems to a strange man that it is raining outside.
   b. *There strikes someone that Mary is intelligent.

(17) a. There is someone in the room.
   b. There seems to be someone in the room.
   c. I believe there to be a solution to this problem.

Lasnik (Ch. 6: 134ff [1995]) proposes that once the Case feature is checked off, the category or its feature bundles are no more available for A-movement or feature movement for agreement. Formal features cannot move from the indefinite NPs in (16) because these NPs have had their Case feature already checked off. Lasnik argues that the Case borne by the associate NP in existential sentences as in (17) is checked but not checked off because it is an inherent Case as argued by Belletti (1988). He correctly points out that the proposal that unchecked structural Case makes the constituent/its feature bundle avail-

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6 The strongest argument that the partitive Case is inherent is not that it has some semantic property responsible for the definiteness effect, but that it is limited to cases where there is a thematic relation between the assigner and the assignee. (See Ch. 4, Belletti (1988).) Lasnik (1996) presents cases where specificity/definiteness effects are observed with structural Case that can be assigned exceptionally (i.e., where no thematic relation holds between the assigner and the assignee).
able for A-movement is "in the nature of a compromise between Greed and Enlightened Self Interest" (p. 134). It is so in the sense that, while elements move in order to save other elements (as required by Enlightened Self Interest), not everything can move (as follows from Greed). A similar idea is pursued in Chomsky (1999), where a head (a probe) with an uninterpretable feature seeks a matching goal so that they can agree to eliminate the uninterpretable feature, and the goal moves if the probe has the EPP feature. The moved element does not move for its own reason, but it moves because the probe needs it. Chomsky further proposes that both the probe and the goal must be active for Agree to apply, and uninterpretable features make syntactic objects active. Once uninterpretable features are assigned their values and are deleted, the constituent is no longer active and can no longer participate in agreement/movement. Thus, both Lasnik (Ch. 6 [1995]) and Chomsky (1999) propose that movement/agreement is triggered by the need on the part of the host, that only certain elements can participate in movement/agreement, and that once structural Case is checked off, the element can no longer participate in movement/agreement. While the two approaches look very similar, there is one very important difference.

In Lasnik's (Ch. 6 [1995]) analysis, the associate NP has inherent partitive Case. The Case stays until LF, and makes the NP visible for agreement. Accusative NPs/DPs become unavailable for agreement once the Case is checked. Now, how can unchecked structural Case and checked/unchecked inherent Case form a natural class? One possible interpretation will be that DP/NP is available for A-movement/agreement only if it bears Case, structural or not. Inherent Case stays until LF, and DPs/NPs with inherent Case stay active throughout the syntactic derivation. DPs/NPs with structural Case become inactive once the Case is checked, because it is literally checked off and disappears from the syntactic structure. A slightly different interpretation would be that everything that stays until LF stays active throughout the syntactic derivation, checked-off structural Case is erased as before, and Agrs/T and Agr0/v look for Case feature for agreement. In either case, Case matters, regardless of interpretability. In Chomsky's (1999) approach, it is not structural Case per se, but uninterpretable features in general that make syntactic elements active. Inherent Case, then, should not make NP/DP active, if it is interpretable and stays until LF. Of course, Chomsky (1999) assumes that the
associate NP does not have its Case checked by the verb *be*, but has its Case checked off when it agrees with *T*. But if Lasnik is correct in that the associate NP has its Case checked by *be*, is it still possible to distinguish good cases like (17) from bad cases like (16) on the assumption that uninterpretable features make syntactic elements active?

Lasnik (Ch. 4 [1995], Ch. 8 [1996]) explores the possibility that inherent Case, as well as structural Case, is licensed in a specifier-head relation rather than in a head-complement relation. If this is correct, NPs with inherent Case must be active not only for Agree as discussed above but also for movement into [Spec, Agr_oP]. Suppose now that all Case-marked NPs, whether the Case is structural or inherent, bear an uninterpretable feature, call it [Case], which makes them active for Agree and Move. Suppose also that when an uninterpretable feature is checked, it is not deleted immediately but is deleted on the completion of the phase (Chomsky (1999), Pesetsky and Torrego (2000)). Then, the associate NP will still be active when Agr_s/T or Agr_o/v looks for a match for agreement.\(^7\)\(^8\) Now suppose further that agreement is not possible between elements with two distinct specifications for structural Case. The accusative NP in (16) will also be active when Agr_s/T looks for a match for agreement, but agreement fails, by hypothesis, because the NP and Agr_s/T have distinct structural Cases. (A nominative NP in a lower clause cannot agree with Agr_s/T in a higher clause because the Case feature of the NP has already been deleted at the completion of the lower CP.) Given that partitive Case is inherent, the associate NP with partitive Case can agree with Agr_s/T or Agr_o/v without Case crash.

\(^7\) When [Case] is checked and assigned nominative or accusative as its value, it stays uninterpretable. I assume that the same is true for [Case] on partitive NPs. Alternatively, if inherent Case is not checked until LF, as proposed by Lasnik (Ch. 4: 86ff, Ch. 6: 148 note 25), the associate NP keeps [Case] without a value and stays active until LF.

\(^8\) Another alternative will be that the associate NP bears a structural Case in addition to the inherent partitive Case. The structural Case stays unchecked when the partitive Case is checked and the associate NP stays active so that it can agree with Agr_s/T or Agr_s/v above *be*. I will not pursue this possibility because the associate NP will then have structural nominative Case and inherent partitive Case and the nominative Case should induce *that*-trace effects discussed in the previous subsection.
In summary, Lasnik’s research on the existential construction and Chomsky’s recent works have led to similar answers to the first three questions. I have proposed an alternative answer to the fourth question which is in accord with Lasnik’s claim that the associate NP has partitive Case and Chomsky’s proposal that only uninterpretable features make syntactic objects active.

3. Verbal Inflection

If human language is an optimal solution to the interface conditions, how can there be language variations? A possible answer lies in options in (inflectional) morphological properties of lexical items reflected in the syntactic structures they participate in. Lasnik’s analysis of English and French verbal inflection in Chapter 5 [1995], along with his arguments for it, is a textbook case of a syntactic analysis which explains crosslinguistic/language-internal syntactic variations in terms of (inflectional) morphological properties of lexical items involved in the phenomena. It is also a good example of shedding new light on the old insight and finding a new meaning in it within a new theoretical framework. Due to space limitations, I will not go into the details of Lasnik’s arguments for his analysis or the historical backgrounds of it, which go back to Chomsky (1975) (originally 1955) and include Lasnik (1981). I would like to simply mention that these are beautifully explained in Lasnik (2000), which guides readers through the history and the central questions of generative grammar from the earliest days to his own Minimalist analysis in this chapter.

Lasnik proposes that verbal inflections can be on verbal elements in two ways: one as morphological features on the verbals and the other as an affix. In the former case, different inflectional forms of a single verbal are generated in the lexicon with full information on their agreement properties. In the latter case, the bare form of the verbal is selected from the lexicon and thrown into the syntactic derivation. The inflectional affix is later attached to the bare form not by a syntactic operation but by a PF operation. The PF operation corresponds to the traditional Affix Hopping, and observes the string adjacency requirement, thus being blocked by the negative element *not*. When string adjacency cannot be observed, *do* is inserted (in PF) to save the affix from being stranded. French verbs and English auxiliaries employ the option of being fully inflected. Main verbs in the present-day
Lasnik proposes that (finite) tense (T) can also be one of two forms: It can either be a set of formal features that agree with the inflectional features on an inflected verbal, or it can host the inflectional affix mentioned above. The agreement between the featural T and an inflected verbal is accompanied by movement of the verbal into T. Among the four combinations of the two choices of T and the two choices of verbal forms, only two are well-formed.

(18) a. Featural T Inflected verbal
    (English auxiliaries, French verbs) V to T
b. *Featural T Bare verbal
c. *Affixal T Inflected verbal
d. Affixal T Bare verbal
    (English main verbs) PF Affixation

Lasnik (Ch. 5: 105 [1995]) proposes that finite featural Infl (=T) in French and English is strong and triggers overt head-movement of inflected verbals, while the subjunctive Infl in English and the finite Infl in Swedish are weak so that the inflected verbals stay in situ and undergo LF-movement into Infl. The latter cases can be seen as cases with agreement without movement. The former cases should involve some marked property on the part of Infl, a strong feature or something similar to the EPP-feature, which requires some element adjoined to it.9,10

In addition to the syntactic patterns which these verbals show with

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9 See Pesetsky and Torrego (2000) for discussion of the EPP-feature that trigger head-movement.

10 Lasnik (Ch. 5: 118 [1995]) assumes that the property of being an affix is not a feature relevant to syntactic head-raising. As Lasnik (Ch. 6: 146 note 10) acknowledges, this analysis crucially differs from his analysis of the existential construction in Chapter 3 [1993] (p. 34) and Chapter 4 [1995] (p. 78), where LF-movement of the associate is triggered by the LF-affixal status of *there, though he has abandoned the latter position in Chapter 6 [1995].

Lasnik’s analysis, as well as the revision proposed here, leaves open the possibility of languages with the same properties as English except that main verbs are inflected in the lexicon while auxiliary verbs are not. If there is no such language, it remains to be seen whether there is a deep reason for the gap.
respect to question formation, negation, do-support, etc., Lasnik’s analysis captures the apparently mysterious behaviors of English verbals with respect to VP-deletion. Main verbs can undergo VP-deletion when the corresponding verb in the antecedent VP is in a different inflectional form, while the verb be and the auxiliary verb have (as well as the main verb have for speakers for whom the main verb have moves to T) cannot, as the following examples show.

(19)  John slept, and Mary will too. (Ch. 5: 108 [1995])
(20)  a. *John was here, and Mary will too. (Ch. 5: 109 [1995])
     b. ?*The children have been very good here. I wish they would at home. (Ch. 5: 110 [1995])
(21)  a. *John has left, but Mary shouldn’t have left. (Ch. 5: 110 [1995])
     cf. John has left, but Mary shouldn’t leave.
     b. *John hasn’t a driver’s license, but Mary should. (Ch. 5: 111 [1995])

A different inflectional form may serve as an antecedent only when it consists of the bare form of the verbal and an inflectional affix.

Lasnik’s analysis has two options for T (=Infl): T can either be a set of formal features that agree with the inflectional features on an inflected verbal OR it can host an inflectional affix. It is not clear if it is necessary or even desirable to have these two options. Suppose that there is only one type of T for finite clauses in English and French. It is a set of formal features that agree with the inflectional features of an inflected verbal element (either an inflected verbal or an inflectional affix), AND it has a feature that requires that the element it agrees with is adjoined to it—call it the EPP-feature for the head. Either an inflected verbal (such as an English auxiliary verb or a French verb) or the inflectional affix that Lasnik proposes can satisfy the EPP-feature for the head. The latter is directly merged with T, rather than moved from a lower position. Bare verbs, on the other hand, cannot agree with this T, and cannot adjoin to it either, because they lack inflectional features. The Swedish finite T and the English subjunctive T lack the EPP-feature for the head. This simplified version of Lasnik’s analysis seems to take over all the desirable results that the original proposals have.

With the revision proposed here, one can find parallelism between T and C. Yoshida and Yoshida (1996) propose that yes/no questions in Japanese require either the presence of a question particle in C or
movement of a tensed verb into C.\textsuperscript{11} Like T, C has formal feature(s) that need agree either with an affix directly merged to it, or with a lower head.\textsuperscript{12}

4. The Driving Force for Movement

In addition to his arguments based on the existential construction, Lasnik (Ch. 4 and Ch. 6 [1995]) provides empirical and conceptual support for the Enlightened Self Interest over Greed. One piece of empirical support comes from multiple \textit{wh}-questions in English. The observation that only one \textit{wh}-phrase moves indicates that \textit{wh}-phrases do not move for themselves, but move for the benefit of C. One piece of conceptual support is found in the fact that the Enlightened Self Interest allows strictly local computation, while Greed requires look-ahead. For cases of successive A-movement, an analysis with Greed assumes that DP moves to have its Case checked in the ultimate destination through positions in which none of its features are checked off. Under an analysis with Enlightened Self Interest, DP moves to the intermediate positions in order to satisfy requirements of the intermediate targets.

As we have seen above, the basic idea of Enlightened Self Interest is that movement/agreement is triggered by the need to satisfy the requirement of the host. The basic idea of Greed is that elements cannot move/participate in an agreement relation once their Case feature (or uninterpretable features in general) has been checked off. Both ideas have found their place in Lasnik’s analysis of existential sentences in Chapter 6 [1995], as well as in Chomsky’s (1999) more recent analysis of the construction. On the other hand, Lasnik (Ch. 6 [1995], Ch. 7 [1995], Ch. 8 [1996]) proposes that the English verb moves overtly to a position higher than AGR\textsubscript{o}, and that this movement is driven by the

\textsuperscript{11} See Ueyama (1990) for a similar claim.

\textsuperscript{12} The parallelism between the English T and the Japanese C will be complete if T in Japanese moves to C in overt syntax. Yoshida and Yoshida, however, argue that in Japanese interrogatives without the question particle -\textit{ka}, T-to-C movement takes place in LF. See also Kato (2000), where it is argued that English Infl was once affixal and strong requiring V-to-I movement.
need on the part of the moved verb itself. In this section, I will examine this proposal along with the revision he proposes in Lasnik (1999), in which the driving force of the movement lies in the host element. Since his arguments for the overt V-movement in English are based on his view that accusative objects in English moves overtly to [Spec, AGR_oP], let us begin with the arguments for overt Object Shift in English.

Lasnik (Ch. 6 [1995]) relates his discussion of the existential construction to the observation he and Mamoru Saito have discussed in Chapter 2 [1991]. The observation is that the infinitival subject of the ECM construction behaves as if it is in the matrix clause with respect to binding and scope.

(22) Joan believes [he_i is a genius] even more fervently than Bob’s_i mother does.

(23)*Joan believes him_i to be a genius even more fervently than Bob’s_i mother does.

(24)*Joan believes him_i even more fervently than Bob’s_i mother does.

On the assumption that Quantifier Raising is LF-movement of the whole quantificational phrase, Lasnik and Saito (Ch. 2 [1991]) assume that Condition (C) of the Binding Theory must apply prior to LF-movement. On the assumption that scrambling can be undone in the LF-component, they further assume that Condition (C) cannot apply at LF and therefore must apply at S-structure only. This means that Object Shift in the ECM construction and in simple transitive sentences must be overt. The puzzle that Chapter 2 ends up with is that overt movement of the accusative DP should result in the wrong word order, unless the verb also raises.

As we have seen, Lasnik (Ch. 6 [1995]) notes a contrast between an infinitival subject and the associate NP of an existential sentence in the ECM construction as illustrated in the following pair.

(25) a. *The DA proved [there to have been two men at the scene] during each other’s trials.

b. The DA proved [two men to have been at the scene] during each other’s trials.

In the analysis of the existential construction in Chapter 6, only formal features of the associate NP move in LF, so that the associate NP does
not behave as if it is in a higher position with respect to scope and binding relations. If the ECM subject and the object of simple transitives in English also move covertly, one incorrectly expects the accusative DP to exhibit low behaviors. The above contrast again supports the view that the accusative DP overtly moves to the matrix clause.

Lasnik (Ch. 6) pursues the view, proposed by Johnson (1991) and Koizumi (1993, 1995), that Object Shift is overt in English. The VO-order both in the ECM construction and simple transitive sentences then indicates that the verb moves to a position higher than AGRo in overt syntax. More specifically, Lasnik proposes that the verb raises in ordinary sentences as in (26) and the matrix clause of (27) with Antecedent Contained Deletion (ACD), but stays in situ in the subordinate clause of (27) and pseudogapping in (28).  

(26) Dulles suspected Philby.
(27) ?Dulles suspected Philby, who Angleton did as well.
(28) If you don’t believe me, you will the weatherman.

The movement is driven by a feature of the moved verb itself. If the verb does not move, it causes PF crash, unless the feature, along with the verb, is deleted as in the ACD and pseudogapping constructions.

The idea that ellipsis involves deletion of a syntactic structure along with its phonetic information, and as such saves the structure which would otherwise cause PF-crash is a very interesting one. A similar approach is proposed for comparative constructions by Kennedy and Merchant (2000). Unlike Lasnik’s analysis of ACD and pseudogapping, however, their analysis does not require that movement is motivated by a feature on the moved element.

Lasnik (Ch. 7: 161 [1995]) suggests that the feature that triggers overt movement of V is a \( \theta \)-feature. This means that \( \theta \)-roles are formal features that need be checked off in a specific syntactic configuration.

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13 According to Lasnik’s analysis, (26) and (28) will have the following structures, respectively.

( i ) Dulles suspect \( [Agr_P \text{Philby}_j [t^{Agr}_o + V [VP t_V t_j]]] \)
( ii ) ... you will V \( [Agr_P \text{the weather man}_j [Agr_o [VP believe t_j]]] \)

VP is deleted in (ii).

14 See Bošković and Takahashi (1998) for an argument that \( \theta \)-roles are formal features that trigger movement. See Saito and Hoshi (2000) for an analysis of the Japanese light verb construction in which lexical heads raise to discharge their \( \theta \)-roles in LF.
If the verb does not move overtly, the $\theta$-feature remains unchecked and causes PF crash unless the verb is deleted. If it is deleted, the PF-side will not contain any illegitimate object. Lasnik (Ch. 7: 167f) proposes that a strong feature that is unchecked in overt syntax causes an LF crash as well as a PF crash, and attributes the somewhat degraded status of pseudogapping examples to the LF crash so caused.  

Lasnik himself points out in the brief introduction added to Chapter 7 (p. 151) that this analysis stands out as an exception to the generalization that movement is driven by a requirement of the host element. He refers to Lasnik (1999), in which he presents a revision of the analysis which is in accord with the generalization. In that alternative (Lasnik (1999: 213)), the feature that triggers movement of the lexical V resides in the host element, and attracts the matching feature of the lexical V. If the matching feature is attracted without pied-piping the lexical V, the lower V becomes defective and causes a PF crash. The crash is once again avoided if the V, along with other elements in VP, is deleted. While this alternative allows the V-raising he proposes to conform to the generalization that movement is triggered by a feature on the host, it still raises a question. If movement is copying, it is not clear why feature-movement (or feature-copying) turns the remaining category defective. The same question arises if Attract is reinterpreted as Agree. Why should agreement without movement make the lower element defective on the PF-side? The exceptional nature of the V-raising he proposes thus seems to remain.

5. Conclusion

In this volume, as in other works of his, Lasnik presents explicit analyses and illuminating arguments pertaining to issues of great

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15 If V-raising is necessary for $\theta$-marking, then the lexical verb (or the $\theta$-feature of the verb) should raise covertly in pseudogapping sentences to make $\theta$-marking (of the external argument) possible. If so, lexical verbs move overtly or covertly. This is reminiscent of such cases as the indefinite NP in existential sentences and inflected verbals in English and Swedish finite clauses. The situation, however, is crucially different in precisely that when overt movement is required, it is required by a property of the moved element rather than by a property (such as an EPP-feature) of the host.
theoretical importance. The remaining problems also shed light on where one should look at to explore the consequences of the central idea of Minimalism, and to understand the nature of human language. The collection is a good illustration of how one can make concrete steps forward in such an abstract inquiry.

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