EMOTIONS ACROSS LINGUISTIC THEORIES

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Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals,
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Emotion terms have been in the spotlight of linguistic investigation for over 30 years, under the label of Psych Predicates. Psych Predicates owe their central position in linguistic studies to their syntactic peculiarities. Generalizations concerning the linking between semantic arguments and syntactic positions and the principles of Binding Theory have been challenged with data coming from this semantic field. As a consequence, most of the studies of Psych Predicates are motivated not so much by an interest in emotions and their expression as by the need to render the recalcitrant data compatible with certain theoretical assumptions.

Like other linguists working with Emotion (or Psych) Predicates, Wierzbicka regards the investigation of this semantic area as a necessary move in the quest for linguistic universals, although unlike most of her colleagues, she seems to have a genuine interest in emotions, going beyond the linguistic aspects. It is quite obvious that the universals sought by Wierzbicka are not the same as the universal principles that generative linguists, for instance, are trying to uncover. Can the book

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Emotions across Languages and Cultures be of interest to an audience of linguists from other theoretical camps? It will be argued that it can.

Wierzbicka's book *Emotions across Languages and Cultures* is a book that any linguist interested in the syntax and semantics of Psych Predicates ought to read, yet, paradoxically, it is the type of book that most linguists interested in the syntax and semantics of Psych Predicates are quite unlikely to read. The main aim of this review article is to draw attention to the relevance of the book for students of Psych Predicates from the generative camp. As Enfield wrote: "Many scholars are put off by a simple universalist claim at the heart of her [Wierzbicka's] approach—namely, that all languages have a directly translatable primitive semantic core, and it is at this level that linguistic and cultural analysis is to be done. But to ignore her work on this basis is unjustified. One may refrain from making the same theoretical commitments, yet still engage with the rich and careful descriptions of grammar and culture that Wierzbicka has produced over more than twenty years" (Enfield (2002: 5–6)). This review will follow Enfield's lead and adopt a neutral stance towards the theoretical framework of the book. Aspects of the framework will be discussed only to the extent to which this is necessary for understanding the arguments at hand.

This article is organized as follows: Section 1 offers an outline of the book, Section 2 discusses briefly the history of the study of Psych Predicates and some of the current problems in this domain, and Section 3 presents some of the implications of Wierzbicka's model by contrasting it with two of the most influential alternatives.

1. Overview

The book *Emotions across Languages and Cultures* is faithful to Wierzbicka's belief that "The study of the interplay between the universal and the culture-specific aspects of emotions must be seen as an interdisciplinary undertaking, requiring collaboration of psychology, anthropology, and linguistics" (Wierzbicka (1992: 120)). The book under review is an interdisciplinary work, drawing from studies of emotion in the fields of psychology, anthropology, philosophy, sociology and linguistics. This feature gives the book its peculiar flavor, which sets it apart from purely linguistic works. The researcher used to what has nowadays become the norm of linguistic writing might be confused by the lack of illustrative examples complete with numbers and glosses, of

the usual diagrams and tables. The evidence used to support Wierzbicka's hypotheses and generalizations has a multitude of sources such as novels, biographies, diaries, psychological, sociological or anthropological work, etc., and it is sometimes hard to distinguish between illustrative examples and stylistic quotations.

The introductory chapter, besides presenting the framework and the general assumptions adopted in the book, offers a criticism of the most influential ideas concerning emotion universals. Wierzbicka's main claim is that present studies in the field of emotions are flawed by the cultural bias associated with the English word *emotion*, as well as the words referring to specific emotions such as *anger*, *fear*, *sadness*, *joy*, etc. These words, belonging to the language used by the researcher, reflect a culture-specific folk psychology and, consequently, they introduce certain preconceptions in the investigation. Wierzbicka argues that this difficulty can be overcome only by using a more appropriate descriptive tool, that is, a language-independent semantic metalanguage. The metalanguage is none other than the set of semantic primes proposed by Wierzbicka and her colleagues and known as the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM).

Chapter 2 offers a model analysis of the English emotion lexicon. The chapter presents and justifies the explications for 53 English emotion words, a sufficient number to provide a fairly detailed chart of the sphere of emotions in Anglo culture.

Although each of the terms defined is accompanied by comments clarifying the inclusion of certain elements in the explication, it is in Chapter 3 that we are allowed a glimpse of the immense lexicological work behind the apparently naive explications. The chapter concentrates on a single emotion concept, a concept charged with cultural implications. Wierzbicka gives an in-depth analysis of the German word *angst*, tracing the semantic shift from the Old German meaning close to 'distress,' 'inner turmoil' to the modern meaning closer to 'fear' back to the influence of one man, Martin Luther.

Chapter 4 is not concerned with linguistic data, but with the facial expression of emotion. Wierzbicka addresses the issue of the universality of certain facial expressions and proposes an analysis where such expressions are not defined in terms of culture-bound terms like *anger*, *joy* or *fear*, but in terms of meaningful facial components such as "raised eyebrows" or "wrinkled nose." She isolates eight such meaningful facial gestures, associated with invariant meanings formulated in

the NSM.

Chapter 5 dwells a little longer on the role of the body in the economy of emotion. The chapter is devoted to the analysis of Russian collocations from the semantic field of emotion which involve reference to body parts. Wierzbicka contrasts the Russian attitude reflected in the collocations with the Anglo attitude towards emotions, and captures the general trends predominant in the respective cultures through two general “cultural scripts.”

Chapter 6 pursues further the concept of cultural script, this time extending the sphere of investigation beyond the realm of verbal behavior. The Polish and the American cultural models are confronted and explicated.

Chapter 7 returns to the matter of universals in the domain of emotions. Wierzbicka tentatively proposes eleven universals governing human verbal and non-verbal behavior linked to emotions. These are quoted below:

1. All languages have a word for FEEL.
2. In all languages, some feelings can be described as “good” and some as “bad” (while some may be viewed as neither “good” nor “bad”).
3. All languages have words comparable, though not necessarily identical in meaning, with *cry* and *smile*; that is words referring to bodily expression of good and bad feelings.
4. In all cultures people appear to link some facial gestures with either good or bad feelings, and in particular, they link the raised corners of the mouth with good feelings (cf. Ginsburg (1997)) whereas turned down corners of the mouth or a wrinkled nose appear to be linked with bad feelings.
5. All languages have “emotive” interjections (i.e. interjections expressing cognitively based feelings).
6. All languages have some “emotion terms” (i.e. terms designating some cognitively based feelings).
7. All languages have words linking feelings with (i) the thought that “something bad can happen to me”, (ii) the thought that “I want to do something”, and (iii) the thought that “people can think something bad about me”, that is words overlapping (though not identical) in meaning with the English words *afraid*, *angry* and *ashamed*.
8. In all languages, people can describe cognitively based feelings

via observable bodily “symptoms” (that is, via some bodily events regarded as characteristic of these feelings).

9. In all languages, cognitively based feelings can be described with reference to bodily sensations.
10. In all languages, cognitively based feelings can be described via figurative “bodily images”.
11. In all languages, there are alternative grammatical constructions for describing (and interpreting) cognitively based feelings.

(cf. Wierzbicka (1999: 275–276))

The organization of the book might appear somewhat chaotic to the casual reader, moving back and forth as it does, from general to specific problems, from linguistic issues to the examination of non-verbal expression, from Russian collocations to Polish and American cultural scripts. Why should the chapter devoted to the German word *angst* be followed by a chapter dealing with facial expression? Why should the chapter treating Russian collocations follow rather than precede the chapter on facial expression?

The student of syntax, eager to find a solution to specific questions such as the source of the inverse mapping exhibited by the Experiencer Subject verb *fear* and the Experiencer Object verb *frighten* might dismiss the book as irrelevant. The author’s modest remark that “The unity of the analysis lies in its methodology: looking at the phenomena discussed through the prism of the same universal human concepts” (Wierzbicka (1999: 45)) does not do much to help. It can give the wrong impression that the book is no more than a collection of essays, treating disparate topics related to the same general field and clad in the same terminology, but lacking any deeper scheme linking the chapters. This is emphatically not the case. The structure of the chapters is not random and, in spite of the apparent diversity and discontinuity, each chapter builds on the previous one and sets the ground for the following.

The book opens with a challenge. Wierzbicka begins by setting the stage with a critical review of the present state of the art. She attacks the very notion of “emotion,” which lies at the base of psychological, anthropological, philosophical and linguistic studies of a certain type of human experience. It could be said that her first step is to destroy the scaffolding on which the reader expected her to build her work. The rest of the book is devoted to the reconstruction of the concept of emotion and to the unveiling of a distinct set of universals in this domain.

Chapter 2, the analysis of the English emotion lexicon, is more than an illustration of how the framework functions, or an exercise in lexicology. True to her statement that “words matter” (Wierzbicka (1999: 24)), Wierzbicka begins her work with a thorough analysis of words. In choosing the English lexicon, rather than the lexicon of any other language, the author’s aim is more general. By showing that words like *anger*, *fear* and *joy* are associated to culture specific concepts Wierzbicka continues the attack on the current conceptions about emotion universals, while, through the details of the proposed analysis, she sets the stage for a novel approach to the topic. In the author’s own words: “By uncovering the cognitive scenarios encoded in such words and discussing them in a cross-cultural and often historical perspective, I hope to identify many cognitive components which play a role in ‘emotion universes’ other than that encoded in the contemporary English lexicon, and thus prepare the ground for the study of ‘emotion universals’ in chapters 4 and 7” (Wierzbicka (1999: 46)).

The chapter following deals precisely with such an unfamiliar “emotion universe.” The analysis of the German word *angst*, aside from its intrinsic interest, offers a perfect illustration for the position advocated by Wierzbicka. It has been claimed that there is a number of fundamental human emotions (see Ekman (1972)) and that fear is one of the candidates at universality. The German word *angst* corresponds roughly to the English word *fear*. The two words differ only with respect to the duration of the feeling they imply and the perceived intensity of the triggering events. Thus, the explication for the word *angst* (see Wierzbicka (1999: 134)) contains the clause “sometimes a person thinks FOR SOME TIME,” whereas the corresponding clause in the explication for the word *fear* (see Wierzbicka (1999: 75)) is simply “sometimes a person thinks.” The clause referring to the triggering events reads: “MANY BAD THINGS can happen to me,” in the case of *angst*, and “some bad things can happen” in the case of *fear*. However, as Wierzbicka’s analysis of the word amply shows, it makes little sense to treat *angst*, whose semantic content was shaped by the personality of a specific individual, as an emotion universal. But what can guarantee the universality of the emotion identified by the English word *fear* when a semantically related word in a closely related language is so far from being universal?

At this point the author has exposed the pitfalls of the attempt to find emotion universals by basing the investigation on culture-laden labels

such as *fear*, *joy* or *sadness*. She can now proceed with her argument and attack another set of proposed universals in the field of emotion: the facial expressions. It has been argued in the psychological literature that certain facial expressions are universally associated with specific emotions. The same facial expression is associated with the emotion triggered by a tragic situation such as the loss of a son, whether the person judging belongs to the Anglo culture or to the Papua New Guinea culture (cf. Ekman (1972)). But, as Wierzbicka notes, even this type of research is biased. The choice of basic emotions, to be identified across cultures, is made from the English lexicon and carries with it the Anglo ethno-philosophy. Wierzbicka proposes to capture the universals of human facial expression at a more elementary level. Instead of global emotional reactions (describable in terms of emotion labels such as *joy* or *anger*) associated with global facial expressions, she offers decodable meanings for individual facial gestures such as “eyes open wide,” “raised eyebrows,” “down-turned mouth,” “nose wrinkled,” etc. These gestures, although natural and universal, are not used in the same way or to the same extent in all cultures. The management of the face and of the body in emotional behavior is governed by cultural scripts. This leads to the topic of the next chapter, Chapter 5, the analysis of Russian emotional display as reflected in collocations involving body parts. Cultural scripts do not govern only emotional display, they decide every aspect of inter-personal relations. After the first encounter with cultural scripts in Chapter 5, the book proceeds to Chapter 6, where the reader meets the American and the Polish model of a person, captured through a number of families of scripts.

By Chapter 6 of the book, the reader has been warned against the dangers of accepted theories concerning emotion universals and is ready to be introduced to a new vision about emotions. As Wierzbicka notes in the final chapter of the book: “false universals are a major obstacle in our search for true universals; and in searching for the latter we must first of all, debunk the former” (Wierzbicka (1999: 273)).

2. The Study of Psych Predicates

The investigation of Psych Predicates has a long and turbulent history. Since Lakoff’s first mention of the Flip Rule in Lakoff (1977), linguists have been frustrated and fascinated by this unruly lexical class. But what exactly is “this class”? Articles dealing with Psych Predicates,

either take the label as self-defining or provide very frugal definitions. Belletti and Rizzi (1988) in their much quoted article use the paraphrase “verbs expressing psychological states” (cf. Belletti and Rizzi (1988: 291)) to refer to Psych Predicates, but offer no discussion beyond that.

Grimshaw refers to this class of predicates as “experiencer or psychological verbs, which have an Experiencer argument and another argument that I will call a Theme, although its label is not important for the point at hand so long as it has a role that is lower in the hierarchy [thematic hierarchy] than that of Experiencer” (Grimshaw (1991: 8)). Pesetsky talks about “Experiencer predicates/verbs” without characterizing the class in any way.

As this very brief overview shows, the semantic characterization of Psych Predicates in the existing linguistic literature is not very illuminating. The few words that introduce syntactic studies of the properties of this class betray the semantic confusion surrounding the topic. Many authors delimit the class of Psych verbs in terms of their argument structure, more precisely in terms of the presence of an Experiencer argument. But an argument structure containing an Experiencer is not sufficient for setting apart the problematic predicates. Verbs of cognition, such as *think*, *believe*, *know*, verbs of wanting like *want* or *desire*, verbs of perception such as *see*, *hear*, *smell* are also candidates for membership in this class, along with Emotion Predicates. It is, however, only the latter that exhibit cross-linguistically the syntactic properties that have focalized linguistic interest. The syntactic studies of Psych Predicates are not concerned with why it should be so. In the rest of this article I will treat the two terms Psych Predicates and Emotion Predicates as synonymous, the choice between one and the other being determined mainly by stylistic reasons.

The research on Psych Predicates has gone a long way from Lakoff's rather unmotivated Flip Rule to Pesetsky's detailed discussion of Causes, Targets and Subject Matters of emotion. The direction towards which linguistic analysis is clearly heading is that of an ever more subtle semantic basis for the analysis. Early work on Psych Predicates, such as Perlmutter (1984) and Belletti and Rizzi (1988), dwelt mainly on syntactic matters, and the assignment of a particular verb to a syntactic class was regarded as a matter of lexical stipulation. These accounts were rightly criticized in subsequent work for this fact. Pointing out the robust cross-linguistic association between certain semantic classes of verbs and a particular linking option, i.e.

Experiencer Subject (ES) or Experiencer Object (EO), Grimshaw writes "All this suggests that it is not possible for a verb meaning what *fear* means, to have its arguments realized like *frighten*, nor vice versa. Hence, lexical stipulation cannot be the source of the differences between them" (Grimshaw (1991: 22)). In spite of the evident progress, consensus is far from reigning in this domain.

From a semantic point of view, all the major proposals concerning the treatment of Psych Predicates, Grimshaw (1990), Pesetsky (1995), Croft (1991), hover around what could be dubbed the Causative Hypothesis. The gist of the hypothesis is that *fear*-type verbs (ES) are state verbs, denoting psychological states, whereas the *frighten*-type verbs (EO) are lexical causatives. A careful history of the Causative Hypothesis could serve very well as a prime example of the birth of a linguistic myth. Space does not allow a detailed discussion of this topic. A look at Grimshaw's argumentation, however, will suffice. Grimshaw (1991) proposes that ES verbs are stative whereas EO verbs are causative, hence accomplishments. That is, the two classes of verbs differ with respect to their lexical aspectual properties. On this basis she argues for the existence of "a dimension of prominence relations distinct and autonomous from the thematic dimension" (Grimshaw (1991: 24)), and identifies it as the Aspectual Dimension.

Grimshaw's entire analysis is constructed on the assumption that EO verbs are accomplishments. No aspectual tests are performed anywhere during the analysis, although such a minimal precaution would have immediately revealed the falseness of the premise. Incidentally, only one year after the publication of Grimshaw's book Van Voorst (1992) demonstrated that the class of verbs in question do not have accomplishment properties and that they do not differ substantially, from an aspectual point of view, from other classes of Psych Predicates. Consequently, Van Voorst argued, one cannot treat these verbs as lexical causatives. Van Voorst's warning did not do anything to limit the popularity of the Causative Hypothesis supported, though with different technical apparatus, by Pesetsky (1995), Croft (1991), Pustejovsky (1995), to mention only the most frequently quoted studies.

Linguistic research had to wait for another 10 years before the theoretical problem raised by the Causative Hypothesis was explicitly addressed. Discussing a class of Finnish EO verbs that have clear stative properties, Pylkkanen (2000) notes: "Since causative meanings usually have some internal structure, and since many Experiencer-object

verbs are aspectually stative, this proposal [EO verbs are causative] entails that the meanings of stative verbs are not necessarily basic. Given the traditional view of states as primitive elements in word meaning, the claim is not trivial and therefore calls for further investigation" (Pylkkanen (2000: 417)). The solution proposed by Pylkkanen, tributary to Pustejovsky's model, is not without its own problems. This could represent a real impasse in the study of Psych Predicates. The situation seems to be a consequence of the fact that the semantic apparatus used by linguists interested in Emotion Predicates is not sophisticated enough to meet the requirements of the data. I believe that Wierzbicka's work contains a number of insights that could give new impetus to research in this area. Wierzbicka brings a very refined semantic apparatus to the study of emotion words and it is beyond doubt that the linguistic community would have only to gain from a closer familiarity with her work. In what follows I will discuss some of the innovations proposed by Wierzbicka in her book and compare her proposals with some alternative accounts.

3. Wierzbicka's Proposals

For lack of space I will focus only on the general schema of Emotion Predicates proposed by Wierzbicka. The explication for an emotion term contains a considerable amount of information. A few words are in order regarding the notation. The explication (semantic representation) of an emotion word is a translation into the NSM, that is, a paraphrase in terms of the 60 odd semantic primitives. The information is arranged on several lines, each line representing a semantic component. Indentation plays an important role: blocks of lines with the same indentation form a unit of semantic structure. A group of lines placed under the scope of the element THIS can also form a larger unit.

As the explication quoted below shows, indentation separates the semantic material forming the explication for an emotion word into two main components: the 'frame' consisting of lines (a), (i), (j) and the content, consisting of lines (b) to (h).

Fright

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "something has happened now

- (d) I didn't know that this would happen now
- (e) I know now that something bad can happen to me in a short time
- (f) I don't want this to happen
- (f) I want to do something because of this if I can
- (g) I don't know if I can do anything"
- (h) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (i) X felt something like this
- (j) because X thought something like this

(cf. Wierzbicka (1999: 76))

The frame is shared, with minor exceptions, by all the "emotion terms." It gives the prototypical model of an emotion.

X felt something because X thought something

.....

X felt something like this

because X thought something like this

Emotions are defined as "thought-based feelings." Note that although the framework asserts that the experiencer thought and felt something, the actual content of the thoughts and feelings is described indirectly, through a comparison with a prototypical scenario. The content part of the explanation gives the details of the scenario.

Although there is no indentation, the content can be further separated into two parts. Lines (b) and (h) represent a sort of inner frame to which lines (c)-(g), placed within quotation marks, are linked through the cataphoric use of THIS in line (h).

(b) sometimes a person thinks

(h) when this person thinks THIS this person feels.....

The inner frame appears redundant at first sight, since it repeats the theme of the "outer frame," the "feelings linked to thoughts" definition of emotions. The function of this apparent redundancy is to ensure that the feelings are not attributed directly to the experiencer, but via a prototypical situation. This feature of the explication allows Wierzbicka to remain non-committal as to whether the experiencer actually goes through all the stages of the scenario, having the thoughts in question or being involved in any specific events. What the explication claims is that the experiencer has an experience comparable to the one described by the prototypical scenario.

Compared with the outer frame, the inner frame contains more specific information regarding the type of feeling associated with the emotion

in question. This component of the explication gives more detail regarding the actual feelings of the experiencer (good, bad, etc.) Although this part of the explanation corresponds to the “state predicate” of other accounts, such as Croft (1991), Pustejovsky (1995), Van Valin and LaPolla (1997), it is clear that the evaluation component of the explication cannot serve on its own to distinguish among individual emotions. For instance, fear and anger are both associated with unpleasant feelings (“when this person thinks this this person feels something bad”) but this does not make them semantically equivalent.

The innermost lines describe the prototypical triggering situation for each emotion. It is this part of the explication that serves to distinguish among individual emotion words. Thus, what distinguishes *fear* from *indignation* is not the particular flavor of the internal experience, but the details of the eliciting situation, as illustrated below.

Fear

- (c) “I don’t know what will happen
- (d) some bad things can happen
- (e) I don’t want these things to happen
- (f) I want to do something because of this if I can
- (g) I don’t know if I can do anything”

(cf. Wierzbicka (1999: 75))

Indignation

- (c) “I know now: someone did something bad
- (d) I didn’t think that someone could do something like this
- (e) I don’t want things like this to happen
- (f) I want to say what I think about this”

(cf. Wierzbicka (1999: 90))

The picture of the semantic representation of Emotion Predicates emerging from the explication is the following. An emotion word has a complex structure to which three main components can be distinguished. The outer layer gives the characteristics of the “genus” of “thought-based feelings.” The second layer classifies the type of feelings associated with each emotion, while the inner component gives the specification of the individual emotion in terms of its eliciting conditions.

In what follows I will briefly discuss the main aspects of this model and their implications for the syntactic study of Psych Predicates.

3.1. Emotional States

The most striking feature of Wierzbicka’s model is the lack of a

semantic component similar to the stative predicates ANGER, FEAR, etc., found in the semantic representations of Psych Predicates in previous studies. As mentioned before, the presence of such primitive emotion predicates betrays the assumption that emotion words are basically labels for recognizable psychological states. It seems that this assumption has no psychological basis. As Errol Bedford writes: "What evidence is there for the existence of a multitude of feelings corresponding to the extensive and subtle linguistic differentiation of our vocabulary for discussing emotions? This assumption gains no support from experience. Indignation and annoyance are two different emotions; but, to judge from my own case, the feelings that accompany indignation appear to differ little, if at all, from those that accompany annoyance. I certainly find no feeling, or class of feelings, that marks off indignation from annoyance, and enables me to distinguish them from one another. The distinction is of a different sort from this. (Perhaps I do not remember very clearly—but then, is not this part of the difficulty, that the words 'indignation' and 'annoyance' do not call up recollections of two distinct feelings?) I might add that at the present time this is psychological orthodoxy" (Bedford (1986: 16)).

Semantic representations describing EO verbs in terms of the morphologically related stative ES verbs are not always convincing, even if we admit the existence of distinct emotional states associated with Emotion Predicates. For instance, the representation of *frighten* in terms of 'cause to fear' or even 'cause to be afraid' is not entirely convincing. Wierzbicka's model successfully avoids these difficulties.

3.2. The Causative Hypothesis

In Section 2 I have argued that the evidence for the Causative Hypothesis is not as strong as it might appear. The fact that the hypothesis has gained such wide support can only be due to its intuitive appeal. A sentence such as *The article in the Times angered Bill*, used by Pesetsky (Pesetsky (1995: 18)), has an unmistakable causative flavor.

Wierzbicka's model can capture the intuition that Emotion Predicates are causative while avoiding the difficulties present in other accounts. In what follows, I will look in more detail at the differences between Wierzbicka's account and some of the best known 'causative' accounts from the linguistic literature.

What corresponds to the causing event in the semantic representation of Emotion Predicates? The answers to this question vary among pro-

ponents of the Causative Hypothesis. Pesetsky argues that the Cause(r) argument of an EO Psych Predicate refers to individuals or events. This seems to be the most widespread position (see also Croft (1991), Van Valin and LaPolla (1997)). Accounts of this type tend to identify Psych Predicates with other classes of lexical causatives and run into difficulty when required to offer an explanation for the peculiar behavior of Psych Predicates with regard to lexical aspectual tests. (Van Valin and LaPolla (1997) is an exception.)

Unlike Pesetsky, Pustejovsky (1995) does not take the cause argument as referring to the physical event associated with the emotion, but with an experiencing event, more precisely, the perception of a certain physical event. This means that on Pustejovsky's account the cause of the emotion described in the sentence *John's behavior angered me* is not an event involving John in the role of agent, but my becoming aware of the respective event, either directly through the senses, or indirectly by hearing or reading about it. This allows him to distinguish "experienced causation" from "direct causation," but the distinction is not enough to avoid difficulties concerning lexical aspectual properties, (see Căluianu (2002) for detailed criticism). At first sight, Pustejovsky's analysis seems very close to Wierzbicka's proposal in claiming that events do not elicit emotions directly, but via certain cognitive experiences.

In spite of the apparent similarities, the models proposed by Wierzbicka and Pustejovsky are not equivalent. The most important difference is that, whereas Wierzbicka does not assume the existence of distinct emotional states associated with individual emotions and definitory for the emotion, Pustejovsky's analysis implies such an assumption. On Pustejovsky's account, what distinguishes individual EO predicates is the psychological state included in the formal qualia. That is, the lexical entries for the EO verbs *anger* and *bore* are identical in all details except their formal qualia, which contain the state predicates ANGRY and BORED, respectively. On the other hand, the role played by the prototypical eliciting event in the semantic representation of the Emotion Predicate is essential on Wierzbicka's account, while for Pustejovsky it is secondary. Pustejovsky briefly mentions the possibility that the characteristics of the eliciting event might influence the aspectual properties of the Emotion Predicate, but only via the experiencing event. That is, the duration of the eliciting event can determine the duration of the experiencing event, and this will be reflected in the

aspectual behavior of the predicate (for details see Pustejovsky (1994: 213)). It is clear that Pustejovsky is not referring to the prototypical triggering conditions for any particular emotion but to the accidental characteristics of particular occurrences of emotions.

Wierzbicka's answer to the question is entirely different. Her model describes emotions in terms of the causative relation between thoughts and feelings. The thoughts, however, are not the external causes of independently existing emotional states. The thought component is a constitutive part of what we perceive as an emotion. An emotional state is a complex state consisting of the feelings caused by certain thoughts. The thoughts cannot be considered merely a cognitive experience on a par with the "experiencing event" posited by Pustejovsky. Wierzbicka makes it very clear that the thoughts are restricted to thoughts about prototypical scenarios. Although the book does not address this problem explicitly, it appears that the non-Experiencer argument of Emotion Predicates can be construed as referring to the objects of the thoughts. Emotion Predicates are causative because their semantic representation includes a causative relation, but they do not involve a Cause(r) argument. The differences among the three approaches could be very informally stated as below.

Pesetsky: x CAUSE-State y , where x = Cause(r) y =Experiencer

Pustejovsky: x CAUSE-State y ; where x =Experiencing Event (Cause) y =Experiencer

Wierzbicka: x THINK-CAUSE-FEEL y ; where x =Prototypical Event ($\neq$ Cause) y =Experiencer

The notation above is meant to capture the fact that, on Wierzbicka's account, emotion words are not causative, although they contain a causative element. Notice that the predicate CAUSE is not the head of the complex predicate THINK-CAUSE-FEEL, but only a connector, linking the THINK component to the FEEL component. Consequently, the y argument need not be assigned the semantic role of cause. Individual Emotion Predicates are distinguished along two semantic dimensions: the nature of the associated feeling (good, very good, bad, etc.) and the selectional restrictions for the non-Experiencer argument. The difference between *anger* and *frighten* is, on Wierzbicka's account, closer to the one between *slaughter* (cows) and *assassinate* (politicians) than to the difference between *break* (cause to become broken) and *open* (cause to become open). The causative relation between thoughts and feelings accounts for the intuition that Emotion Predicates have a

causative semantic component without forcing them into the general schema for lexical causatives.

It seems that Wierzbicka's account is compatible with the lexical aspectual properties of Emotion Predicates. Wierzbicka frequently refers to emotions as "thought-based feelings" or "thought-related feelings." These collocations indicate that the author considers the feeling component of the emotion as central to the definition. This implies that FEEL can be regarded as the head of the complex predicate THINK-CAUSE-FEEL. I have argued at length in Căluianu (2002) that EO predicates are unprototypical stative predicates, more precisely states with a specified initial point, similar to resultatives. These properties fit neatly into the "thought-based feelings" description.

4. Final Remarks

The space of this article does not allow a more detailed discussion of the implications of Wierzbicka's model. True to her creed that a thorough study of semantics should precede the study of syntax, Wierzbicka does not even mention the syntactic peculiarities that have stimulated so much work on Psych Predicates. The failure to pursue the syntactic consequences of the proposed model, coming from the linguist who has repeatedly stressed the relation between syntax and semantics, may surprise the reader familiar with Wierzbicka's earlier work, particularly Wierzbicka (1988). Since the book does not offer any comments on the mapping between the proposed semantic structures and syntactic configurations it is difficult to assess the advantages of the model in syntactic terms. In this sense, the book can be regarded more as a promise than as a solution to the problem. But *Emotions across Languages and Cultures* is indeed a book full of promise and it is unfortunate that the wealth of ideas contained in the book has not made a stronger impact on the study of Psych Predicates.

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