TWO CONFLICTING MODELS OF THE ENGLISH TENSE SYSTEM

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1. Introduction

The tense theory presented by Wada (henceforth: W) in this book is to all intents and purposes the same as that presented in Wada (1998a) and Wada (1998b). In Declerck (1999a) I wrote a detailed criticism of this theory. In that article I raised fundamental objections, which have not been taken into account in this book, insofar as nearly all those aspects of the theory which I argued to be misconceived and to contribute to the failure of the theory have not been changed, and my objections therefore stand. This puts me in a difficult position. The Editorial Board of *English Linguistics* define a review article as one in which “the reviewer presents his or her own ideas and analyses as well as summarizes and reviews the contents of the book and/or main claims in it critically.” The main claims of W’s book (viz. those underlying W’s tense theory) have already been summarized and critically reviewed in Declerck (1999a) (which is a longer article than the present one can be). It seems fatuous to repeat the exercise here. I will therefore limit myself to presenting a rough summary of the essence of the two

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theories and replying to six arguments (most of them new) which Wada (2001) adduces against my theory. The discussion of these arguments will reveal that some of the problems which W sees for my theory actually turn out to be major problems for his own.

2. Declerck's Tense Theory

This theory is expounded in three books (Declerck (1991a: 86–156), (1991b), (1997)) and in some dozen articles published since 1991. It hinges on the following principles:

(a) Speakers using an English tense form conceptualize the time-line as consisting of two separate zones: one which includes the temporal zero-point (abbreviation: t_0), which is usually the time of speech, and one which precedes the zone including t_0 and is conceived of as completely separated from it. The two zones in question are called the 'present time-sphere' and the 'past time-sphere,' respectively. The present time-sphere includes t_0 and is divided by it into three 'sectors': the 'pre-present,' the 'present' and the 'post-present.' Together with the past time-sphere these sectors form the four 'absolute time-zones' (or 'absolute sectors'), i.e. the four time-zones that are defined in direct relation to t_0 . Thus, the past is the zone which precedes t_0 and does not belong to the present time-sphere; the pre-present is the zone (sector) which precedes t_0 but belongs to the present time-sphere; the present is the sector centred on t_0 ; and the post-present is the sector which follows t_0 in the present time-sphere. To locate the time of a situation (i.e. a 'situation-time,' henceforth abbreviated as 'SIT-time')¹ in these absolute time-zones we use the preterite, the present perfect, the present tense and the future tense, respectively. When used for this purpose, these tenses function as 'absolute tenses.'

(b) Any absolute tense form establishes a 'temporal domain' in one of the absolute time-zones. Such a domain is a set of times comprising one or more SIT-times that are temporally related to each other by means of tense forms. The absolute tense form, which locates its SIT-

¹ The 'SIT-time' means the same thing as what in earlier publications I called 'the situation-time of orientation' (first abbreviated as TO_{sit} and later as STO). (This label was inspired by the fact that a SIT-time is either an actual or a potential binding time, i.e. a 'time of orientation.')

time on the time-line (thus making clear how this SIT-time is temporally related to t_0), represents the 'central time' of the domain. Tenses that express a relation within a domain are relative tenses. A relative tense relates its SIT-time to another time in the domain and thus leaves vague the relation between its SIT-time and t_0 . For example, a past domain is established by an absolute preterite form and expanded by tense forms that express either anteriority (the past perfect), simultaneity (the 'relative' preterite) or posteriority (the 'conditional tense' or '*was/were going to + infinitive*'). For example:

- (1) Just now John *said* that he *was* tired because he *had worked* hard all day and that he *would go* to bed as soon as he *had eaten*.

(1) refers to a single past domain, which is established by the absolute tense form *said* and which contains five SIT-times. The relative past form *was* represents John's being tired as simultaneous with the time of his saying so; *had worked* relates its SIT-time as anterior to the time of John's being tired; *would go* represents its SIT-time as posterior to the SIT-time of *said*; and *had eaten* represents its SIT-time as anterior to the SIT-time of *would go*. As is clear from this analysis, there are three important points to be considered when we talk about the tense structures of tense forms locating their SIT-times in a past domain. Firstly, a past domain is defined as a domain whose central time is located in the past time-sphere. Secondly, the expression of a particular temporal relation in a past domain is always expressed by the same tense, irrespective of the location of the 'binding time' (i.e. the time to which the relevant SIT-time is related) in the domain. Thus, in (1), anteriority is each time expressed by the past perfect (*had worked*, *had eaten*) regardless of where the binding times (expressed by *was* [*tired*] and *would go* [*to bed*]) are to be found in the domain. Thirdly, because a relative tense just expresses the relation between its SIT-time and the binding time, a relative tense in a past domain leaves vague where the SIT-time lies relative to t_0 . It follows that it does not matter whether the SIT-time is actually interpreted as anterior, simultaneous or posterior to t_0 : this 'absolute relation' is not expressed by the relative tense form. This explains why (1) is perfectly grammatical although *had eaten* refers to a SIT (situation, i.e. state, action, event or process) which is actually interpreted as lying in the post-present. It follows that if we say that there is some absolute component in the semantics of the past perfect, that absolute component is not to be defined as 'The

binding time is anterior to t_0 ' (as in Reichenbach (1947), Comrie (1985) and Wada (2001)) but rather as 'The binding time belongs to a past domain, i.e. to a domain whose central time is located in the past time-sphere.' In (1) the binding time (expressed by *would go*) to which the SIT-time of *had eaten* is anterior is interpreted as posterior to t_0 but *had eaten* is impeccable because it realizes the invariant semantic structure (tense structure) of the past perfect, which is: 'SIT-time anterior to a binding time in a past domain.'

It is worth stressing that there does not appear to be an alternative way of explaining the use of *had eaten* in (1). The domain theory first proposed in Declerck (1991b) appears to be the only theory that accounts for this use. Other tense theories, such as the ones proposed by Reichenbach (1947), Comrie (1985), Hornstein (1990) and (as we will see) Wada (1998a, 1998b, 2001) are deficient because they do not accept the notion of temporal domain and therefore cannot account for the fact that a (nonmodal) past perfect (*had eaten*) can refer to a time which is interpreted as posterior to t_0 .

(c) When uttering a new clause, the speaker can either incorporate the SIT-time into an existing domain (by using a relative tense) or 'shift the domain,' i.e. use an absolute tense establishing a new domain. For example:

- (2) Ian got seriously ill. He {*would die / died*} shortly afterwards.

Whereas *would die* incorporates its SIT-time into the domain established by *got (seriously ill)*, *died* establishes a past domain of its own, i.e., it 'shifts the domain.'

(d) By 'semantics' of a tense we mean the invariant aspects of meaning of the tense, i.e. the 'tense structure.' On the level of semantics we must reckon with the possibility of the same tense form expressing different meanings. For example, a preterite form is an absolute tense form when establishing a past domain and a relative tense form when expressing simultaneity within a past domain. This means that there are two past tenses (preterites), with different invariant meanings (cf. Declerck (1995)).

(e) By 'tense interpretation' I mean the choice (if any) that is made by the speaker between the various semantic meanings that a tense can express. By 'temporal interpretation' I mean the interpretation of the temporal location of a SIT that is formed on the basis of the tense interpretation plus any other (contextual, adverbial or pragmatic) indica-

tion of time that is available. For example, the tense interpretation of *I had a walk last night* is that there exists a SIT of my having a walk whose time is located somewhere in the past time-sphere. The adverbial *last night* specifies exactly when it was that I had that past walk and in doing so provides us with a full temporal interpretation of the sentence.

3. Wada's Theory of Tense

W's theory of tense involves the following premises. Firstly, there are only two tenses in English, viz. the past tense and the present tense. This means that any tense form "establishes" either the "past time-sphere" or the "present time-sphere," depending on whether it shows past or present tense morphology. Secondly, an adequate theory of tense must be a "compositional" tense theory which "distinguishes a level of tense structure from a level of tense interpretation" (Wada (1998a: 107)):

At the level of tense structure, the semantic (or tense) structure of a tense form represents its original temporal value. At the level of tense interpretation, the temporal value represented by a tense form is finally determined under the influence of such elements as time adverbials, syntactic environments, and contexts.

A third ingredient of the theory is the following (1998b: 173-174):

In English, a finite predicate consists of both the absolute tense component (henceforth the A-component) and the relative component (henceforth the R-component). (...) The A-component is represented by a tense morpheme establishing either the past or present (or non-past) time-sphere. This component is absolute because the establishment of a time-sphere is based on a direct relation to the speaker's point of view, which adheres to S [=speech time], i.e. the absolute time point on the time line. The R-component is represented by the time of an event (or a situation). This component is relative in the sense that the position of the event time is not tense-structurally determined in a direct relation to S. (...) The temporal relation of the A-component to the R-component is always that of inclusion in the sense that the event time associated with the R-component always obtains somewhere (or is always included) in a time-sphere associated with the A-component.

Another important claim is that “auxiliary verbs have the same status as main verbs, at least semantically” (1998a: 108). It follows that an auxiliary which “conveys semantic content” (1998a: 108) refers to a SIT and therefore has an “event time.” Thus, *will* and *have* are treated as main verbs indicating the SITs of “prediction” and “resultative state,” respectively; the SIT-time of *will* is the time when the prediction obtains, while that of *have* is the time when the resultative state obtains. The bare infinitive which follows *will* also denotes a SIT with a SIT-time and also expresses a temporal relation, viz. “non-anteriority” (1998a: 114). However, the contribution of ‘*will / would* + infinitive’ is to be found on the level of “tense interpretation” only. At the level of tense structure (semantic structure), all that a form like *would come* expresses is that the past tense establishes the past time-sphere and that the SIT-time of *would* is included in that time-sphere.

Finally, W rejects the idea of a future tense. For him, *will* in *It will rain tomorrow* is a main verb referring to the SIT of making a prediction. It is therefore a modal verb, expressing “predictive modality” (rather than “assertive modality”).

This summary is based on Wada (1998a, 1998b), but Wada’s (2001) theory is unchanged, apart from a few minor adaptations that are meant to accommodate some of the criticism expressed in Declerck (1999a). In fact, there is nothing in Wada (2001) that can induce me to give up any of my major points of criticism. As noted in the introduction, it is both pointless and impossible (for lack of space) to repeat this criticism here. What I will do instead is defend myself against W’s criticism of my own theory, for Wada (2001) adduces six arguments against it.

4. Wada’s Arguments Against Declerck’s Tense Theory

4.1. Wada’s Argument 1

The first argument is directed at any tense theory that assumes the existence of a future tense. W first formulates it in connection with Comrie’s (1985) theory and then also applies it to mine. The argument is that whichever theory recognizes the existence of a future tense “cannot explain the close relationship between so-called future tense *will* and modal *will*” (Wada (2001: 319)):²

² Here, and in all the other quotations that follow, I have adapted the reference numbers of the examples, so that the numbering is consecutive throughout this article.

Seen from both a synchronic and a diachronic point of view, future *will* and modal *will* are semantically closely related and thus cannot easily be separated from each other. Observe the following:

- (3) a. It will rain tonight.
 b. I will go camping next Sunday if the weather is fine.

Let us start with a synchronic aspect of the close relationship under consideration. In (3a), for example, *will* can be said to express futurity. However, it can also be said to express a prediction holding at the speech time. Thus, it is not only unnecessary to distinguish the future tense marker *will* from the modal verb *will*, but also hard to explain the close relationship between them if we admit the sharp distinction between them. After all, that admission would raise the question of why the same form is used to express two grammatical-conceptually distinct categories, i.e. the future tense marker and the modal verb (here, we can ignore the possibility that the two *will*s are homonyms). On the other hand, it is easy to explain the phenomenon at issue if I consider the relationship between future *will* and modal *will* to be that of polysemy, and thus both senses are reflected in the same form, i.e. the finite verb *will*.

My answer to this is that I have never made a “sharp distinction” between “the future tense marker *will*” and “the modal verb *will*” expressing a prediction. I do distinguish between the tense auxiliary *will* and the nonepistemic modal auxiliary *will* expressing willingness, volition, insistence or habituality. But I have never made a distinction between ‘expressing futurity’ and ‘making a prediction.’ In Declerck (1991b: 10) I stress that in a sentence locating a SIT in the future “the future tense has modal connotations (since an utterance about a SIT that has not held at t_0 is, of necessity, ‘a subjectively modalized utterance: a prediction rather than a statement’ (Lyons (1977: 815)).” The term “modal connotations” here obviously refers to epistemic modality.³

³ Declerck and Reed (2001: 133–137) contains a section called ‘The future tense and modality,’ in which the epistemic nature of the future tense is investigated. The authors write the following: “The element of epistemic modality in the meaning of the future tense becomes stronger according as there is a stronger implication of

Wada (2001: 320) continues as follows: "Moreover, if we distinguish the future tense marker *will* from the modal verb *will*, we cannot explain the fact that sentence (3b) can be interpreted as representing the volitional sense and the futurity sense at the same time." In Comrie's and D's systems, "the two *wills* are interpreted as constituting two grammatical-conceptually different categories. Thus, they are viewed as being in an ambiguous (or homophonous) relationship. From this, it follows that if the volitional sense is chosen, the *will* at issue cannot express futurity, and, vice versa: two distinct senses which belong to two grammatical-conceptually distinct categories cannot be true at the same time."

In this passage we notice a relevant shift in the meaning of "the modal verb *will*." In the previous quotation "modal *will*" was equated with *will* expressing 'prediction' (see the second sentence below the examples in (3)),⁴ whereas in the above quote it means 'volitional *will*.' Surely, making a prediction is not the same thing as expressing volition (e.g. willingness, insistence, determination). Moreover, there is no theoretical basis for W's claim that if "the two *wills* are interpreted as constituting two grammatical-conceptually different categories, (...) it follows that if the volitional sense is chosen, the *will* at issue cannot express futurity, and, vice versa: two distinct senses which belong to two grammatical-conceptually distinct categories cannot be true at the same time." In *John may come (tomorrow)*, the modal verb *may* expresses epistemic possibility, but the actualization of the SIT

subjectivity, i.e. of speaker's judgement. We can roughly distinguish between 'pure future,' 'prediction' and 'predictability.' Pure future is the least subjectified: the speaker just locates a SIT-time in the post-present without there being a clear implication that it is her own expectation that the SIT is going to actualize (e.g. [*They tell me*] *the flower show will be held on 21 July*). Prediction (e.g. *He will not approve of this decision*) and predictability (e.g. *That will be the milkman*) involve a (respectively weaker and stronger) sense of expectation. (...) So, we agree with Werth (1997: 111) that, in a sense, "the true future ... is epistemic," and assume that *will*-forms with the weak or strong epistemic connotation of pure future, prediction or predictability can be treated as future tense forms. (...) In sum, our future tense will cover not only the 'pure future' interpretation but also the 'prediction' sense and the 'predictability' meaning of *will*."

⁴ This is in keeping with what Wada writes about "the future" on p. 72: "a future *will*-sentence (...) consists of the modal verb *will* representing prediction" and a non-finite verb.

expressed by *come* is clearly located in the future. In fact, many verb phrases involving a modal auxiliary express present modality concerning future actualization: *You ought to do it*, *Bill must leave the house*, *I can receive you tomorrow*, etc. The same is true of *I won't kill Susan*, which talks about a future action of killing Susan irrespective of whether *won't* is interpreted in terms of a refusal (= volitional *will*) or is used as a future tense auxiliary. And the same goes for W's (3b).

W's argument continues as follows (Wada (2001: 321)):

Let us now turn to a diachronic aspect of the close relationship between so-called future tense *will* and modal *will*. Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca (1991, 1994), Comrie (1989), and Traugott (1989) state that the derivation stream of *will* is: volitional *will* → future (weak epistemic) *will* (including simple and predictive future) → epistemic *will* (referring to a present situation). Thus, if (pure) future *will* is treated as a future tense marker, it follows that in the course of the derivation, the categorial change of grammatical concepts happened twice: the first change is one from a modal verb (volitional) to a tense marker and the second change is one from a tense marker to a modal verb (epistemic). In this case, however, we cannot explain what motivated the second change, namely, why after *will* goes from a modal verb to a tense marker, it goes from a tense marker back to a modal verb again. By contrast, with the proposed compositional tense theory, where future *will* is treated as a modal verb, I do not face such a difficult problem: the derivation stream of *will* is carried out in the same grammar-conceptual category, i.e. the category labeled "modal."

In my opinion, the derivational path 'modal *will* → future tense *will* → modal *will*' might seem problematic, but only if "modal *will*" meant the same thing twice. I see no reason why the derivation 'volitional *will* → future tense *will* → epistemic *will*' should present a problem for tense theories accepting the existence of future tense *will* in English, particularly if they accept (as my theory does) that 'future tense *will*' has an epistemic modal connotation (see above).

In sum, W's arguments against the existence of a future tense carry no weight. (In Declerck (1991b: 9–13) many arguments are given supporting the view that English does have a future tense, but W disregards all of them.)

4.2. Wada's Argument 2

This argument runs as follows (Wada (2001: 329)):

A second problem to be mentioned concerns D's treatment of the present perfect. He claims that the present perfect is used when the relevant SIT is situated in the pre-present sector, whereas the simple past tense is used when the relevant SIT is located in the past time-sphere (or the past sector); this difference of the time sectors means the difference between the two tenses. He does regard the current relevance represented by the present perfect as an implicature. However, if the current relevance (or the resultativeness) represented by the present perfect were merely an implicature, we could not account for the difference in acceptability between the (a)- and the (b)-sentences in (4) and (5):

(4) a. ??I have opened the door, but the door is not open.

(Depraetere (1998: 604))

b. I opened the door (a few minutes ago), but it is not open now.

(5) a. ?I have read that novel, but I remember nothing about it.

b. I read that novel, but I remember nothing about it.

(Brinton (1988: 11))

The perfect in (4a) is a resultative perfect and the perfect in (5a) is an experiential perfect. As is well known, an implicature is cancelable. Thus, if resultativeness or current relevance were just an implicature in the use of the perfect tense, we could not explain why (4a) and (5a) are odd. After all, on that assumption it is predicted that the content of the second conjunct can cancel the current relevance implied by the first conjunct. But this it is not the case. Thus, D's theory as it stands cannot explain this phenomenon.

It is true that my view that a tense theory should be primarily concerned with how tenses locate SITs in time (i.e. with the expression of temporal relations) leads to the conclusion that notions like 'experiential perfect' and 'resultative perfect' are only of secondary importance in the description of the PresPf [= present perfect]. Since the semantic structure of a tense is the way in which the tense locates a SIT-time in time, the only distinction that is relevant to the semantics of the PresPf (which locates a SIT-time in the pre-present) is the distinction between the 'continuative' and the 'indefinite' interpretation: it is a matter of

temporal interpretation whether the pre-present SIT-time is or is not interpreted as including t_0 . Other distinctions, such as the ones between a 'resultative perfect' and an 'experiential perfect,' are a matter of pragmatic interpretation-in-context.

However, my view on the notion of 'resultativeness' or 'current relevance' is much more balanced than W suggests. In Declerck (1991b: 324–326, 340–344) I state my position as follows. The indefinite reading is often accompanied by the idea that the pre-present SIT (which is over at t_0) has yielded a result that is relevant to the present. This is the case, e.g. in

- (6) a. You can come in. I've opened the door.
 b. *I HAVE eaten lobster*, but I did not like it.

In (6a) the message conveyed by *I've opened the door* is really 'The door is open'; in (6b) *I HAVE eaten lobster* suggests 'I know what lobster tastes like; eating lobster is part of the experience that I have acquired in my lifetime.' (This is an example of W's 'experiential perfect,' which he distinguishes from his 'resultative perfect' (illustrated by (6a)). In my opinion, (6b) suggests a present result no less than (6a) does, only it is a different kind of result.) The fact that sentences like (6a, b) yield a resultative interpretation has induced some linguists to speak of a 'resultative perfect' next to (or even instead of) the indefinite and the continuative perfect.⁵ However, it is doubtful that resultativeness is an inherent part of the meaning of the PresPf. The following observations appear to contradict this claim (which is also made in Wada (2001: 78): "the present perfect entails the resultative state as part of its semantics").

(a) In some sentences with an indefinite PresPf there is no clear sense of resultativeness:

- (7) a. These forks have been ours, they have been my cousin's,
 and now they belong to you. (Hirtle (1975: 5))
 b. Some people have been reluctant to believe this, [but
 everybody certainly believes it now].

(b) It often depends on the context which particular resultative inter-

⁵ For ease of reference I use the labels 'indefinite perfect' and 'continuative perfect' to refer to a perfect in a sentence that yields an indefinite or continuative interpretation, respectively. (I am aware of the fact that the interpretation in question is not due solely to the tense form.)

pretation is assigned to the PresPf. According to the context in which it is used, a sentence like *They've fallen into the river* can suggest various resultative interpretations. This is clear from the fact that the sentence can be used in answer to various questions, such as *Why do you say they need help?*, *How come they're soaking wet?*, *Why haven't they arrived yet?*, etc. When not used in answer to a question, *They've fallen into the river* can similarly invite various resultative interpretations, such as 'They need help,' 'That is why they are soaking wet,' 'So we'll never catch them now—they'll be washed away,' etc. Which of these readings will be selected by the hearer is clearly determined by the pragmatics of the context in which the sentence is uttered (including what the hearer is concerned with when it is uttered), not by the (invariant) semantics of the sentence. This means that at best one could argue that the PresPf functions as an instruction for the hearer to see if the SIT referred to has some result, while leaving it to him to identify the result in question (if any) by taking into account the (linguistic and extralinguistic) context. However, it is not true that this is the most essential element of meaning of the PresPf, which distinguishes it from the preterite. (Note that the preterite too can suggest a resultative reading. As Bryan (1936: 373–376) says, *It rained hard all last night* will lead us to infer that the earth is wet this morning, but nobody would say that this is because of the past tense.) In my opinion, the fact that the nature of the resultative interpretation can vary according to the pragmatics of the context can only lead to the conclusion that an analysis which treats resultativeness (if it is present at all) as following from a blending of the temporal meaning of the PresPf and pragmatics is much more plausible than an analysis which treats resultativeness as the core meaning of the perfect.

(c) If resultativeness were an inherent part of the meaning of a perfect that is interpreted as resultative, it would be impossible to couch such a perfect in a context explicitly denying resultativeness. Thus, the sentence *I have closed the door* could not be followed by *but now it is open again* without contradiction. In practice, however, such a sequence is not contradictory at all. We attempt to prove the opposite by referring to the following:

(8) a. ??I have opened the door, but the door is not open.

(Depraetere (1998: 604))

b. ?I have read that novel, but I remember nothing about it.

The oddness of (8a) follows from the fact that the same speaker first

announces that he has opened the door and then adds that it is not open. In doing so he violates the Gricean Maxim of Relation (relevance). Out of context, *I have opened the door* is a means of saying 'The door is open now,' because indefinite perfect sentences implicate present relevance. It follows that starting a discourse with *I have opened the door* cannot be relevant if one knows (and adds) that the door is closed. Under this condition, presenting the opening of the door as relevant at t_0 is downright misleading. As to (8b), this is not unacceptable, unless it is couched in a context showing that my reading of the novel was a recent SIT (in which case it is pragmatically implausible that I should remember nothing about it). At any rate, the PresPf clauses of (8a, b) can easily be fitted into a context in which they are fully acceptable:

- (9) a. "Have you made sure that they can get in when they arrive?"—"I have opened the door, but that was five minutes ago, so I can't be sure it is still open now. Old Mr Johnson is so afraid of strangers that he keeps closing it."
 b. "Have you read *Black Beauty*?"—"I have [read that novel], yes, but I don't remember anything about it—that was forty years ago."

(d) W claims that "D (...) does regard the current relevance represented by the present perfect as an implicature" (p. 329). In doing so he ignores the fact that on two occasions (viz. on p. 326 and on p. 343) Declerck (1991b) points out that not all resultant states are implicatures. Results that are irreversible are inherent in the lexical semantics of the verb and cannot be cancelled, irrespective of whether the tense that is used is the PresPf or the preterite:

- (10) a. *He {has been killed / has died} but he is not dead.
 b. *The next day he {died / would die}, but he is not dead.

In these examples the (irreversible) resultant state cannot be denied (without causing contradiction) because it is a logical entailment of the lexical semantics of the verb rather than an implicature of the tense used. This idea of resultant state is not triggered by the use of a 'resultative perfect' but is evoked whenever the verb is used.

(e) In Declerck (1991b: 340–341) I have also pointed out that there are SITs that imply a certain result whenever they are represented as completed, irrespective of the tense used. For example, it is inherent in the telic SIT of opening a door that the door in question is open imme-

diately after the action has been performed. This implication of a resultant state has nothing to do with the choice of tense: not only *I have opened the door* but also *I opened the door*, *I will open the door*, etc. imply the idea of the door being open right after the completion of the SIT. On the other hand, there are SITs that do not automatically imply a resultant state, whether they are referred to using the perfect or not. The SIT of a door being open is an example of this. If such a SIT is referred to (as in *The door has been open*, *The door was open*, *The door will be open*, etc.), there is no implication of any well-defined resultant state. Similarly, *I {have heard / will hear / heard / etc.} the truth* implies *I {know / will know / knew / etc.} the truth*, but there is no similar resultative implication in *I {have known / will know / knew / etc.} the truth*. This means that, if there is an idea of resultativeness, we should not trace it back to the choice of the tense alone: the nature of the SIT and the particular words chosen to describe it are equally important.

What does it mean, then, to say that *I have opened the door* “implies” current relevance, whereas *I opened the door* does not? The answer is that, as a result of the different tense structures, the resultant state brought about by the action of opening the door is located in different time-spheres. In *I opened the door* the action and the concomitant resultant state are located in the past time-sphere, i.e. in the time-sphere which is conceptualized as unrelated to t_0 . In consequence, *I opened the door* tells us no more than that the SIT (with its resultant state) held THEN. It tells us nothing about whether or not the resultant state still obtains NOW. Things are different when the PresPf is used. An indefinite PresPf locates a SIT in the pre-present, i.e., it represents it as actualizing before t_0 but within a period leading up to t_0 . This means that the speaker is not concerned with THEN, but with NOW. If the reference is to a SIT implying a resultant state, this state will be interpreted as still obtaining at t_0 , unless this interpretation is contextually or pragmatically excluded or unlikely. In a suitable context, *I HAVE opened the door* (with the nuclear accent on *have*) can be interpreted as ‘There has been (at least) one occasion in my lifetime when I opened the door.’ In that case there is no suggestion that the resultant state still holds at t_0 because the lapse of time between the action and t_0 may be very large. However, when used with a neutral intonation pattern, *I have opened the door* is normally interpreted differently: the implicit period-up-to-now within which the action is under-

stood to have actualized is assumed to be a much shorter period than my lifetime. As a matter of fact, it is normally the shortest possible interval that is allowed by the pragmatics of the sentence, the context and the situation of speaking.⁶ On this interpretation the action will therefore be taken to have occurred in the recent past, so that (failing an indication to the contrary) there is no reason to assume that the resultant state is not obtaining any more.

What I am arguing, then, is that, except for verbs like *die* or *kill* where 'be dead' is a logically entailed irreversible resultant state, current relevance (resultativeness) is no more than a conversational implicature attached to the use of the indefinite PresPf (of some verbs—see section (e) above) as a result of the fact that an indefinite PresPf locates its SIT-time in the present (rather than the past) time-sphere and therefore implies that the speaker is concerned with NOW rather than with THEN. The implicature arises only when it fits in with the pragmatics of the context. This means that, like any conversational implicature, it can be blocked or cancelled. Thus, the implicature 'I know his name' which arises from *She has told me his name* is cancelled in *She has told me his name, but I have forgotten it*.

This analysis explains why (a) not every indefinite PresPf form yields a resultative reading; (b) even when there is a clear idea of resultativeness, the preterite must be used when there is an adverbial indication of a definite past time (e.g. *I know what Paris is like. I {lived / *have lived} there until three years ago*); (c) some PresPf sentences (e.g. *They've fallen into the river*) may suggest different results, according to the context in which they are used; (d) the suggested result state can often be denied by the context. All these observations accord with the view that in these cases resultativeness is an implicature. However, they become totally inexplicable on the hypothesis that resultativeness is an inherent part of the meaning of the PresPf.

My conclusion from the discussion in section 4.2 is that W's criticism of my treatment of the perfect is unjustified. In fact, the discussion has actually provided strong evidence against W's analysis of the perfect, which is based on the claim that "the semantics of the perfect

⁶ This explains why it is pragmatically unacceptable to answer the question *Have you had lunch yet?* with *Yes, I have [had lunch]. I did two weeks ago*.

tense ‘entails’ a resultant state (represented by the event time of perfect *have*), direct or indirect, namely, that a resultant state is incorporated into, and thus part of, the semantics of the perfect tense.” (p. 330) This claim is essential to W’s theory, in which auxiliaries are treated as “main verbs.” In this theory, a PresPf contains two main verbs, which each refer to a different SIT: “the perfect tense” (*have...-en*) expresses ‘E₂ anterior to E₁,’ where E₂ is the SIT expressed by the lexical verb and E₁ is the resultative state expressed by *have*. Clearly, this analysis is refuted by our observation that there are PresPf sentences in which the idea of resultant state is not semantically entailed but rather implicated.

4.3. Wada’s Argument 3

According to Wada (2001: 330–331), my theory “cannot deal with the meaning of the following perfect sentences in terms of temporal structure”:

- (11) a. A week has elapsed since the preceding scene. (Fenn (1987: 74))
 b. A month has gone by since then. (Fenn (1987: 74))

In W’s opinion, “the present perfects in (11) have both resultative and continuative overtones.” He notes that I define the indefinite perfect as “the perfect whose ‘SIT has reached its terminal point before t_0 ,’ i.e. bounded, and the continuative perfect as the perfect whose ‘SIT is viewed as still in progress at t_0 ,’ i.e. unbounded, respectively.” W’s conclusion is that “D’s theory cannot distinguish the (pure) indefinite perfect from the perfects in (11), on the one hand, and the (pure) continuative perfect from those in (11), on the other; for if he gives the structure in [Figure] (61a) [= the structure of the ‘pure’ indefinite perfect] to the perfects in (11), he cannot distinguish them from the indefinite perfect; if he gives the structure in [Figure] (61b) [= the structure of the ‘pure’ continuative perfect] to those in (11), he cannot distinguish them from the continuative perfect.”

In my opinion, the PresPf forms in (11a, b) do not “have both resultative and continuative overtones.” These forms are pure indefinite perfects, but the SITs referred to are of a special kind: each SIT is the state of a certain interval (between a past time and t_0) having a certain duration. In other words, this type of sentence is used to measure the interval separating a past time from t_0 . The pragmatic function of (11a) is therefore the same as that of (12):

- (12) It {is / has been} a week since the preceding scene took place.

Sentences (11a) and (12) measure the time interval separating a past SIT-time (the actualization-time of “the preceding scene”) from t_0 . Measuring an interval requires considering it from beginning to end. It follows that *has elapsed* in (11a) can be analysed as a normal indefinite perfect, which seemingly acquires a “continuative overtone” because the purpose of the sentence is to measure the time between the occurrence of the scene and t_0 . W’s argument seems to be that in *A week has elapsed* the SIT of a week elapsing continues at t_0 . But as far as I am concerned, if a week has elapsed, it is not elapsing. That is, *A week has elapsed and is still elapsing* is nonsense. The claim that *has elapsed* is not a continuative perfect is also confirmed by the fact that it cannot possibly be replaced by *has been elapsing*. This means that the SIT is treated as ‘bounded,’ as is normal in a ‘measuring’ sentence (cf. Declerck (1991a: 178)). You cannot measure the length of a SIT unless you consider it from beginning to end. W is therefore mistaken when he sums up his argument in connection with (11) as follows: “To recapitulate, it is hard for D to attribute the conclusive characteristic of the sentences in (11) to the boundedness nature of the time of the situation (TO_{sit}), for in that case TO_{sit} itself cannot be viewed as reaching the speech time.” (p. 331) In fact, an indefinite perfect *CAN* refer to a SIT reaching up to t_0 provided the sentence is used to measure the length of an interval-up-to- t_0 . Unlike what is the case in non-measuring sentences with a continuative perfect (e.g. *I’ve lived here since 1993*),⁷ the SIT is then interpreted as coming to an end at t_0 , i.e. as bounded. In *A week has elapsed since then*, the SIT of a week having elapsed cannot continue at or beyond t_0 . By contrast, *I’ve lived here since 1993* remains true if the SIT is protracted beyond t_0 .

In sum, I see no reason why my treatment of the PresPf should be

⁷ In *I’ve lived here since 1993* the speaker does not measure the duration of the SIT as a whole, but only the length of the timespan between the beginning of the SIT and t_0 . The SIT itself may continue beyond t_0 . Because it is not the SIT as a whole that is measured, this sentence is not bounded and a progressive continuative perfect can be used: *I’ve been living here since 1993*. In this case t_0 is not the real endpoint of the SIT: it is just a provisional endpoint up to which the SIT is measured.

unable to handle sentences like those in (11). In my theory I can easily make a distinction between various uses of the indefinite perfect. The commonest use is in sentences saying that (or asking whether) a SIT has actualized (once or more) in the pre-present, as in *I have (not) read this book*, *Have you read this book?*, *I have met her {only once / three times} in my life*. (These sentences often have a resultative or experiential connotation.) Another use is illustrated by (11a) and (12). Here too the PresPf receives an indefinite (bounded) interpretation, but the SIT is now the state of a time interval having a certain length. The interval in question begins before t_0 and ends at t_0 . It is therefore bounded (to the right) by t_0 . In the same way as *The carpet goes up to the wall* means that the carpet stops where the wall begins, (11a) means that the week's elapsing stops where t_0 begins. The fact that there is no clear gap in time between the end of the SIT and the beginning of 'now' does not mean that the SIT includes or at all coincides with 'now.' (This is in keeping with the fact that the progressive form *has been elapsing* cannot substitute for *has elapsed* in (11a).) Contrary to what is claimed by W, sentences like (11a) present no problem for my treatment of the PresPf. They form no exception to my claim that indefinite perfects represent their SITs as bounded whereas continuative perfects do not.

W's own explanation of instances like *A week has elapsed since the accident* is not unproblematic: "In my theory the event time of the past participle (E_2) itself does not reach the speech time, but rather merges with the event time of perfect *have* (E_1) which shares the same time as the speech time; E_2 is only indirectly connected with the speech time via E_1 ." (p. 331) This explanation rests on the claim that *have* is a main verb, referring to a SIT (resultative state) and hence having a SIT-time (E_1) of its own. I have refuted this claim in section 4.2. Moreover, the claim that "the event time of the past participle (E_2) itself does not reach the speech time" seems to me to be debatable. In *A week has elapsed since the accident*, the SIT referred to is that of a week elapsing between the accident and t_0 . The SIT-time comes to an end at (and therefore reaches) t_0 . ('Reaching' does not necessarily imply 'including.' You can reach (arrive at) a fortified town and be refused entrance. Similarly, the normal interpretation of *The agreement ends at midnight* is that the agreement holds at 23.59 but does not hold at 00.00.)

4.4. Wada's Argument 4

In connection with the establishment of a post-present domain I have defended the following two claims (amongst others). Firstly, a post-present domain can be established not only by '*will* + infinitive' but also by other verb forms, as in *I'm going to do that later*, *I'm leaving tomorrow*, *The ship leaves in an hour*, *The Queen is to visit Canada next week*. Each of these forms has its own connotations (e.g. intention, personal arrangement, official arrangement), so that these various possibilities "are more or less in complementary distribution" (Declerck (1991b: 27)). Secondly, I argue that there are occasional examples in which a SIT referred to by *will* does not lie wholly after t_0 , but stretches from t_0 onwards into the future, as in *I will use the notation 'X > Y' to represent the relation 'X after Y.'* In Declerck (1991b: 369–370) I add that *be going to* can also express this relation 'SIT-time from t_0 onwards,' and that this is in keeping with the fact that "I consider *be going to* as an alternative to *will*, which is especially used when the speaker wishes to represent the future SIT as having its roots in the present."

W (2001: 331–332) raises two objections to this analysis. This is the first:

D's analysis (...) cannot distinguish *will*-sentences from *be going to*-sentences in terms of temporal structure. Declerck (1991b: 369–374) divides the future tense marker *will* into two subtypes: the type of *will* whose temporal meaning is ' TO_{sit} wholly after t_0 ' and that whose temporal meaning is ' TO_{sit} from t_0 onwards'; and he regards the temporal structure of *be going to* as equivalent to that of the latter type of *will*. This means that the distribution of *be going to*-sentences is contained in that of *will*-sentences; thus, his theory predicts that where *be going to* can be used, *will* can be used, but not vice versa. However, (...) this is not true: in some cases *be going to* can be used while *will* cannot.

The flaw in this argument is that the starting-point is mistaken: in the relevant passage (Declerck (1991b: 369–370)) I do not claim that the temporal structure of *be going to* is 'SIT-time from t_0 onwards.' What I claim is that the 'SIT from t_0 onwards' meaning can not only be expressed by *will* but also by *be going to*, because both temporal interpretations of *will* can also be expressed by *be going to*. This claim is in keeping with the claim that both forms can be used to establish a

post-present domain. This claim is made on p. 35 and accompanied by the following footnote: “In spite of the fact that *be going to* and *will/shall* are not always interchangeable, they do have the same basic temporal meaning. After investigating the use of the future tense and the *go*-future in various languages, Fleischman (1982: 97) concludes that her findings ‘mitigate strongly in favor of regarding the *go*-paradigm as a legitimate future-tense form.’”

The following is Wada’s (2001: 332) second objection to my treatment of *will* and *be going to*:

One might say that since D claims that *be going to* represents “the future SIT as having its roots in the present” (Declerck (1991b: 370)), he can say that this present-orientedness may bring about the SIT where *be going to*, but not *will*, is required. But saying this seems to be contradictory to his claim that the differences in syntactic behavior between the present perfect and the simple past (such as collocability with DTP adverbials like *yesterday*) should be reflected in the difference in temporal structure between the two tenses. (...) Since the fact is that (...) *be going to*-sentences differ from *will*-sentences in syntactic behavior (such as compatibility with *if*-clauses), he should differentiate the temporal structure of *be going to*-sentences from that of *will*-sentences in order to avoid contradiction.

To begin with, I have never claimed that we should recognize the existence of the PresPf *BECAUSE*, unlike the past tense, it cannot combine with adverbials like *yesterday*. What I have consistently argued is that if we accept the definition of tense as the ‘grammaticalized expression of how a SIT-time is located in time’ (see above), then we inevitably come to the conclusion that there must be as many tenses as there are different ways of locating a SIT-time in time. The PresPf locates its SIT-time in the pre-present sector of the present time-sphere, whereas the preterite locates it in the past time-sphere. These ways of locating a SIT-time in time are so radically different that we must recognize that the PresPf and the past tense are different tenses. The fact that only the latter can collocate with adverbials like *yesterday* is a *CONSEQUENCE* of this difference, not (as W says I claim) the *BASIS* for making the distinction between the two tenses. (This does not alter the fact that the incompatibility of the PresPf and *yesterday* can be seen as corroborating the analysis.) As to the fact that “*be going to*-sentences differ from *will*-sentences in syntactic behavior (such as compatibility with *if*-claus-

es),” what I claim is simply that this difference is due to the special connotation of *be going to*, which represents the post-present SIT as having its roots in the present and therefore presupposes that all the conditions for the actualization of the post-present SIT are fulfilled at t_0 (so that *be going to* is generally incompatible with *if*-clauses referring to a condition that is not yet fulfilled at t_0 —see Declerck (1991a: 115)). As far as temporal structure is concerned, *be going to* is exactly like *will*: it locates the SIT-time (of the SIT referred to by the lexical verb) as lying in the post-present. If I treated *be going to* and *will* as forming two different tenses (as W says my theory requires me to do), then I would go against my own definition of tense and against the concomitant claim that a post-present domain can be established by various verb forms, which may have different connotations but effect the same semantic structure because they all express the absolute temporal relation ‘SIT-time posterior to t_0 .’

4.5. Wada’s Argument 5

I consider this a very important argument, because, as in the case of argument 2 (about the alleged ‘resultative state entailment’ of the PresPf), the refutation of the argument automatically leads to a refutation of W’s own theory.

Wada (2001: 332–233) sees it as a problem for my theory that I distinguish between an absolute preterite (establishing a past domain) and a relative preterite (expressing simultaneity with a binding time somewhere in a past domain). He says that if my assumption of a relative preterite were correct, “the sentences in (13) below would be grammatical, for the past tenses in temporal clauses (TCs) can be incorporated into the past domains established by the absolute past tenses in the matrix clauses (MTCs). However, this is not the case.”

- (13) a. *Rieko said that she would leave when I *arrived* tomorrow.
 b. *John expected that he would be there before I *arrived* tomorrow.

This is the same argument which was already adduced in Wada (1998b), and which I refuted in Declerck (1999a: 496–498) as follows: “Every one of the (British) informants I have consulted considers these sentences as grammatical, and similar sentences have been treated as grammatical by Harris (1982: 266), Abusch (1988: 2) and Salkie & Reed (1997).” I also referred to Declerck (1995: 15), in which the fol-

lowing example is given:

- (14) The last time I saw him he told us about what he planned to do. When he *was* fifty-five he would retire. He would then undergo some kind of surgical operation. When he *was* sixty, he would have his autobiography written by a journalist. But he would have the world believe that he had written it himself when he *was* in hospital.

Declerck (1999: 497) notes that “in this passage, all three *was* forms refer to a future SIT, i.e. to a SIT that follows t_0 , exactly as *arrived* does in (13a, b). This time there is no doubt whatever about the acceptability of these sentences. The same is true of the following:”

- (15) a. Just now Russia announced that they would veto any decision about Iraq that *was taken* by the Security Council.
 b. Yesterday John promised that he would come over from South Africa next week if his presence here *was* really required (next week).
 c. John decided a week ago that in ten days at breakfast he would say to his mother that they *were having* their last meal together. (Abusch (1988: 2))

In Declerck (1999a: 497–498) I go on to make the following claims:

(a) “To my knowledge, my theory is the only comprehensive theory of tense that can explain the grammaticality of the past tense (with reference to the post-present) in examples like (13)–(15). In (15c) *decided* is an absolute preterite establishing a past domain. The form *would say* relates its SIT-time as posterior to this central time. Since *would say* does not relate its SIT-time to t_0 , it is possible for this SIT-time to be interpreted as actually following t_0 . (This does not alter the fact that the domain is a past domain. Any domain whose central time is located in the past time-sphere is a past domain.) The form *were having* is a relative past tense form relating its SIT-time as simultaneous to the SIT-time of *would say*. (Remember that in a past domain we always use the past tense for simultaneity, irrespective of the location of the binding time in the domain.) The fact that the SIT-time of *would say* is interpreted as following t_0 is immaterial to this: both the SIT-time of *would say* and that of *were having* belong to a past domain, and the past tense is the only way of expressing simultaneity in a past domain.” (p. 497)

(b) Declerck (1999a: 497) also claims that “the grammaticality of

examples like (13)–(15) falsify W’s tense theory.” Wada (1998b: 183) explains the alleged ungrammaticality of (13a) as follows: “The finite predicate *arrived* in the *when*-clause has the A-component establishing the past time-sphere, so that the time of arriving must happen in the past. Thus the co-occurrence of *arrived* with the future time adverb *tomorrow* results in a contradiction.” Declerck (1999a: 498) points out that “this argument is falsified by the linguistic facts. There is no contradiction between *arrived* and *tomorrow* in (13a). The ugly fact is that (13)–(15) are perfectly grammatical and that W’s tense theory [which wrongly predicts that these sentences must be ungrammatical] is disproved because of this.”

Wada (2001) relegates replying to this criticism to a footnote. The text proper just repeats that (13a, b) are ungrammatical and that my theory is disproved by this. The footnote (pp. 347–348) says the following:

(a) “Declerck (1999a: 27) claims that his British informants all judged (13a, b) to be acceptable, while my informants (three Canadians and one American) judged it to be unacceptable. (...) It is difficult to say which judgment is right.”

(b) My (= W’s) informants still reject (13a, b) if *tomorrow* is left out.

(c) “My informants’ judgment is the same as Comrie’s (1985) judgment with respect to the same kind of sentence as (13) above [viz. (16)]. Comrie (1985: 115) states that native speakers of English judge that the past tense in TCs [= time clauses] refers to a past time relative to the speech time.”

(16) John said that he would leave {before/after/while} Jane returned.

(d) “Mary Lee Field (personal communication), a north American, comments that the sentences in (13) can be acceptable in a special context (e.g. an opaque context). But she states that the sentences in (17) below are also acceptable and regarded as unmarked in comparison with the sentences in (13).”

(17) a. Rieko said that she would leave when I arrive tomorrow.
b. John expected that he would be there when I arrive tomorrow.

(e) W concludes his footnote with “I leave this issue for future research.”

I have several objections to what W writes in his footnote.

(a) It is not true that “Comrie (1985: 115) states that native speakers

of English judge that the past tense in time clauses refers to a past time relative to the speech time.” All that Comrie claims in connection with (16) is that this version (with *returned* in the time clause and *would leave* in its head clause) “is the only version possible if John has in fact already left and Jane has already returned” (Comrie 1985: 115). Sentence (16) is explicitly contrasted with *John said that he would leave before Jane returns*, “which leaves open the possibility that John has already left, but implies that Jane has not yet returned” (Comrie (1985: 115)). There is nothing in what Comrie says that is (directly or indirectly) relevant to the question of whether (16) can be used if both SITs lie in the post-present.

(b) W appears not to have troubled to check whether my examples (14) and (15a-c) are judged grammatical by native speakers.

(c) W does mention that “Mary Lee Field (...) comments that the sentences in (13) can be acceptable in a special context (e.g. an opaque context)” but he simply ignores the relevance of this remark. There is no reason why opaque contexts, which include all cases of indirect speech, should be disregarded. On the contrary, any tense theory that aims at being adequate must be able to account for indirect speech. Wada (1998b) agrees with this.

(d) The fact that British informants accept (13a, b) is treated as irrelevant by W. If W is going to dismiss British English speakers’ judgments on (13a, b) as irrelevant, then he needs to make it clear that his theory is not intended to account for British English and is not applicable to it.

(e) I have presented the following sentences to a number of native speakers, some of them British, others Australian or American, and not a single one of them has judged them ungrammatical:

(18) a. John called me up two weeks ago. He said he would come back from Australia next week. He also said that the flight was going to be so long and exhausting that *he would go to bed as soon as he arrived*. So, I’ve told the maid to make the guest-room ready for when he arrives.

b. According to these people, who saw him leave just now, John is extremely angry. He told them *he would drive any car he met off the road*. So you’d better be careful, in case you cross his path.

(f) W’s theory is incapable of handling not only the relative past tense

in examples like these but also the past perfect in the following examples:

- (19) a. Two minutes ago John said that he was tired because he had worked hard all day and that *he would go to bed as soon as he had eaten*.
 b. John called me up two weeks ago. He said he would come back from Australia next week. He also said that the flight was going to be so long and exhausting that *he would go to bed as soon as he had arrived*. So, I've told the maid to make the guest-room ready for when he arrives.

Sentence (19a) is a repetition of sentence (1), which I am sure did not strike the reader as ungrammatical. Sentence (19b) is a repetition of (18a), but with *had arrived* instead of *arrived* in the time clause. The two sentences illustrate a commonplace in my theory, viz. that we always use the same relative tense to express the same kind of temporal relation in a past domain: we use the relative past tense for simultaneity and the past perfect for anteriority, irrespective of the location of the binding time in the domain (and irrespective of where the binding time is interpreted as lying relative to t_0). Any theory that rejects the existence of a relative past tense expressing simultaneity with a binding time that forms part of a past domain but is interpreted as posterior to t_0 will also be incapable of accounting for the use of a past perfect expressing anteriority to a binding time that forms part of a past domain but is interpreted as posterior to t_0 , as in (19a, b). This use of the past perfect thus vitiates W's theory as much as the use of the relative past in (18a, b) does.

(g) It should also be noted that W's theory is not only incapable of explaining the grammaticality of the relevant past tense forms in (14)–(15) but also wrongly predicts the grammaticality of the present tense in the same sentences. As is clear from (20)–(21) below, the present tense cannot systematically replace the relative past tense in (14)–(15) (though it can in (13a, b), since, as pointed out by Mary Lee Field, (17a, b) are impeccable).

- (20) The last time I saw him he told us about what he planned to do. When he {*was* / **is*} fifty-five he would retire. He would then undergo some kind of surgical operation. When he {*was* / **is*} sixty, he would have his autobiography written by a journalist. But he would have the world believe

that he had written it himself when he {*was* / **is*} in hospital.

- (21) a. Just now Russia announced that they would veto any decision about Iraq that {*was* / *is*} taken by the Security Council.
 b. Yesterday John promised that he would come over from Spain next week if his presence here {*was* / *is*} really required (next week).
 c. John decided a week ago that in ten days at breakfast he would say to his mother that they {*were having* / **are having*} their last meal together.

The rationale behind the use of these tense forms is that it is only in some contexts that it is possible for the speaker to ‘shift the domain’ (see section 2) from the past to the post-present, i.e. to use a present tense form (expressing simultaneity in a post-present domain) instead of a past tense form (expressing simultaneity in a past domain).⁸ W’s theory cannot handle this. It wrongly predicts that using the past tense in sentences like (14)–(15), as well as using the past perfect in sentences like (19a, b), leads to ungrammaticality. In other words, W’s theory is not borne out by the facts when it claims that SIT-times that are actually posterior to t_0 can only be represented as posterior to t_0 , i.e., that the past tense is never possible in such cases and that the present tense or *will* (which is also a “present tense”) must be used.

4.6. Wada’s Argument 6

According to Wada (2001: 334–335), my theory cannot explain why the SIT-time of an object clause depending on *said* cannot be interpreted as posterior to the SIT-time of *said*, i.e., why (22) does not yield the reading ‘John said that he would write a book’ (although it does yield the reading ‘John said that he had written a book’):

- (22) John said that he wrote a book.

According to W, my theory predicts that the posterior reading should be acceptable, since it holds that *said* and *wrote* are both absolute preterites, which locate their SIT-times in the past time-sphere without

⁸ This is in keeping with my theory, which holds that in indirect speech a shift of domain in the reported clause is a marked option, which is therefore subject to constraints.

expressing the temporal relation between them. W rejects the explanation I have proposed for this restriction, viz. that “an expectation concerning the future cannot be truthfully reported as a past fact” (Declerck (1991b: 183–184, 1999b: 26)), in other words that *I will write a book* must be reported as (23) and not as (22):

(23) John said that he would write a book.

According to W, “careful examination reveals that this explanation presupposes that the ‘point of view’ for the calculation of the CC (complement-clause) time is fixed at the same time as the MTC (matrix-clause) time. However, there is no a priori reason why it must be so; for the ‘point of view’ for the calculation of the CC time can be fixed on the speech time, which is exemplified in (24). It goes without saying that in (24) (...) the CC time is calculated based on the reporter’s point of view fixed on the speech time. This means that it is theoretically possible for the CC situation with the past tense to be calculated from the reporter’s point of view fixed on the speech time.”

(24) John said that Mary is pregnant.

Wada (2001: 335) continues as follows:

One might say that D can stipulate that in the case where the CC tense is past, the “point of view” for its calculation must be stuck on the MTC time. The question, then, arises as to why it must be so. Moreover, even if he makes this stipulation, his tense theory per se cannot deal with the phenomenon under consideration; i.e. he has to have recourse to the modality of the original speaker to explain why sentences like (22) cannot receive the posterior reading. Actually, he seems to do so. From the above discussion, I can conclude that D’s tense theory as it stands cannot account for the phenomenon at issue; it needs an extra explanatory device, i.e. an explanation based on the original speaker’s modality. This explanation is an ad hoc one because he does not construct a tense theory into which a theory of modality is systematically incorporated.

My reply to this is simple. I have always stressed—see e.g. Declerck (1990, 1991b: 160)—that temporal subordination (i.e. the incorporation of the SIT-time of the complement clause into the domain which contains the SIT-time of the head clause) represents the unmarked way of using tenses in indirect speech. Shifting the domain (i.e. using an absolute tense creating a new domain) in the complement clause is a marked choice, which is subject to restrictions. Thus, while both *was*

and *is* are possible in *John said that Mary {was / is} pregnant*, only *was* is possible in *John wrongly thought that Mary {was / *is} pregnant* or in *John hoped that Mary {was / *is} pregnant* because what is true only in John's cognitive world of thinking cannot be referred to by an absolute present tense, since an absolute tense can only refer to a SIT which the reporting speaker treats as factual-at- t_0 . In other words, while *was* ascribes the proposition 'Mary be pregnant' to John—we speak of an 'opaque' or 'intensional' reading—*is* ascribes the same proposition to the reporting speaker—this is a 'transparent' reading. In the same way, *John said that he would write a book* is not interchangeable with *John said that he wrote a book* because *wrote* entails a transparent reading in which the reporting speaker represents John's writing a book as a past SIT, whereas *would write* entails an opaque (intensional) reading in which the proposition 'John write a book' is a prediction on John's part. These two pair of examples illustrate the same requirement (perhaps due to the Gricean Maxim of Quality), viz. that a truthful report must report an intensional attitude as an intensional attitude and not as a transparent fact. W's claim that my theory cannot explain why *John said that he wrote a book* does not yield the posteriority reading (on which the writing followed the saying) is therefore mistaken. His claim that my explanation—that a prediction cannot be reported as a past fact—is an ad hoc explanation is not true either. This explanation makes reference to the data in connection with opaque and transparent readings which we also need to account for the different tense choices in *John said that Mary {was / is} pregnant* and *John {wrongly thought / hoped} that Mary {was / *is} pregnant*. Finally, though W's claim that my explanation of the non-posteriority reading of *John said that he wrote a book* "has recourse to the modality of the original speaker" is obviously correct, it is a complete mistake to claim that such "an explanation based on the original speaker's modality" is not provided for in my theory. The distinction which I make between temporal subordination and a shift of domain is based on the distinction between relative and absolute tenses. In indirect speech, relative tenses entail an opaque (intensional) reading of the clause in question while absolute tenses entail an transparent interpretation. In general, absolute tenses relate a SIT-time to the speaker's here-and-now (t_0) and thus trigger a transparent reading, whereas relative tenses relate it to another time. In indirect speech that other time is normally the time when the reported speech act was made, which means that the relative tense trig-

gers an opaque reading. All this follows naturally from my theory—there is absolutely nothing ad hoc about it.

5. Conclusion

In section 4 I have extensively reviewed W's arguments against my theory and come to the conclusion that none of them carries any weight. In addition, I have shown that some of the issues raised actually provide strong evidence against W's theory.

I would like to conclude by saying that the fact that this article has been very critical about W's tense theory does not mean that his book is a total failure or that it is not worth reading. There are many insightful ideas and sound remarks to be found in this book. The book represents an intelligent attempt at accounting for a great deal of data by means of a consistent framework. Even if, as I hope to have demonstrated, the framework is deficient, the consistency and logic with which it is applied are admirable, and the book makes stimulating reading.

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