1. Introduction

Among many linguistic terms, verbs, nouns, and adjectives are probably the most familiar even to non-linguists, next to sentences and words. Intuitively, they are distinguished as follows: verbs denote action, nouns things, and adjectives property. This way of distinction is so intuitive that if one asks Japanese students who have learned English as a second language, they almost unanimously make this kind of distinction. In the functional literature as well (e.g. Croft (1991)), this is a common way to distinguish lexical categories. (I discuss this functional view in section 5.)

In contrast to functionalism, in generative grammar, where functional/semantic terms are not to be utilized, it has long been believed, since Chomsky (1970), that lexical categories are defined by the features [+V] and [+N]. Mark C. Baker, in his book *Lexical Categories* (2003) (henceforth Baker), seriously challenges this convention. Among many problems of this feature decomposition view is the fact with resultatives. Thus, if adjectives are [+V, +N] and prepositions are [−V, −N], they do
not form a natural class under any environments. But this is not the case in resultatives:

\[(1) \quad \begin{array}{ll}
\text{a.} & \text{John pounded the metal flat. (AP)} \\
\text{b.} & \text{John pounded the metal into a sword. (PP)} \\
\text{c.} & \text{*John pounded the metal a sword. (NP)} \\
\text{d.} & \text{*John polished the table shine. (VP)} \\
\end{array} \]

(adapted from Baker (p. 2))

Here, adjectives and prepositions behave alike, contrary to the prediction of the featural analysis. In addition, Baker (p. 3f) points out that generative theory has been silent with the typological issues surrounding categories. To remedy this fault, Baker proposes a novel way to distinguish categories.

According to Baker's hypothesis, verbs and adjectives are distinguished by the way of theta-role assignment: adjectives are not theta-role assignors in and of themselves, and they need the help of a functional category (Pred) to assign a theta-role. Verbs, on the other hand, are defined as licensors of subjects. One consequence of this hypothesis is that adjectives are "elsewhere" lexical categories: since nouns are defined as bears of a referential index and there are only three types of lexical categories (verbs, nouns, and adjectives) in Baker's system, there is no need to define adjectives. Baker argues that this has several desirable consequences. For example, it explains why adjectives can be modifiers and can appear in resultative constructions.

In this review article, I first review Baker's definition of verbs and adjectives and note its consequences and problems in section 2. I then endorse Rothstein's (1999, 2001) view of predicates as a more promising way to distinguish verbs and adjectives, and apply it to modifiers in section 3. In section 4, I present my proposal to equate Pred and prepositions, and extend the consequence to resultatives. Section 5 concludes the paper by making remarks on the significance of Baker's book with respect to the methodology in generative grammar. For nouns, Baker elaborates the conventional idea that they bear a referential index. I adopt this view in section 3.2 in the discussion of modifying adjectives, but apart from that, I will not discuss nouns, concen-

1 In section 4, I propose that the resultative phrases in (1a) and (1b) are projections of the same category.
2. Baker’s Definition of Verbs and Adjectives

This section outlines Baker’s basic hypothesis and discusses its consequences and problems. Below is Baker’s (p. 35) hypothesis of the verb/adjective distinction:

(2) a. $\begin{array}{c}
\text{TP} \\
T' \\
T \\
\text{NP} \\
\text{V} \\
\text{NP} \\
\text{Chris} \\
\text{hunger} \\
\end{array}$

b. $\begin{array}{c}
\text{TP} \\
T' \\
T \\
\text{PredP} \\
\text{NP} \\
\text{Chris} \\
\text{Pred}^{<\text{Th}>} \\
\text{Pred} \\
\text{AP/NP} \\
\text{hungry/teacher} \\
\end{array}$

Baker proposes that verbs and adjectives be distinguished with Pred (cf. Bowers (1993)): adjectives are not theta-role assignors in and of themselves, and they need the help of Pred to assign a theta-role. Verbs, on the other hand, are defined as licensors of subjects.

One consequence of the analysis is that the Theme argument of an adjective is an external argument, while the Theme argument of a verb is an internal argument. Baker (section 2.8) argues that this prediction is confirmed by unaccusativity diagnostics from several languages. I review here two of them: *ne*-cliticization in Italian and Noun Incorporation in Mohawk. Let us first consider Italian *ne*-cliticization:
The contrast between (3a) and (3b) is usually attributed to the original position of the subject: the (Theme) argument of ‘arrive’ originates within the VP, but the (Agent) argument of ‘call’ originates outside the VP. The ungrammaticality of (3c) shows that ‘good’ in Italian patterns with unergatives, suggesting that the (Theme) argument of ‘good’ is an external argument.

Mohawk Noun Incorporation is illustrated as follows:

(4) a. Wa'-ka-wí-rí-'ne' (unaccusative)
    Fact-NsS-baby-fall-Punc
    ‘The baby fell.’

b. *Wa'-t-ka-wír-ahsí'í-tho' (unergative)
    Fact-Dup-NsS-baby-cry-Punc
    ‘The baby cried.’

c. Ka-nuhs-iyo (thfík)
    NsS-house-be.good that
    ‘That house is good.’

d. *Ka'-nerohkw-a-núhs-a’ (thfík)
    NsS-box-Ø-house NSF that
    ‘That box is a house.’

(4a, b) show that Noun Incorporation is possible with unaccusatives, but not with unergatives. At first sight, the grammaticality of (4c) is at odds with Baker’s hypothesis that adjectives are more like unergatives structurally. However, Baker shows that ‘good’ in Mohawk is a verb rather than an adjective. For example, it can take a causative suffix, a sign of verbiness. The desired contrast comes from (4d), where the predicate is a noun. As shown in (2b), predicate nouns require Pred. Thus, the subject in (4d) is an external argument. The fact that (4d) is ungrammatical like (4b) confirms this prediction.

The reason why Baker defines verbs as subject-licensors rather than theta-role assignors is that auxiliary verbs are not theta-role assignors
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(p. 28). For auxiliary verbs, Baker assumes that subjects move to their Specifiers, which are subjects. But this forces a derivation like the following:

(5) Johni will [VP t_i have [VP t_i been [VP t_i eating]]]

Since both have and be are verbs, they license their Spec, by definition. Thus in (5), John must go through Specs of these auxiliaries before it reaches its final subject position. Although it is certainly possible to say that the EPP feature of verbs is universally strong, such a derivation does not seem to have a merit other than to maintain the hypothesis.2

One might say that the definition of verbs is that they can license its Spec, not that they must license it. Then the subject can move directly to Spec TP without going through the intermediate Spec VPs:

(6) Johni will [VP have [VP been [VP t_i eating]]]

But this raises a non-trivial question: how do we know that have and be are verbs in the first place? For nouns, which Baker defines as bearers of a referential index, it is plausible that the index exists in the lexicon (numeration) and the noun can be so defined prior to the syntax. But for verbs, the crucial notion is Spec, which is only defined in the syntax. This means that a verb cannot be so defined prior to the syntax. If anything, have and be without Spec would be classified as adjectives by default in Baker's system. Thus, to implement Baker's definition, verbs must have a Spec and one cannot have a derivation like (6).

Another issue has to do with modification. Since adjectives are not theta-role assignors per se, Baker (p. 200, n. 9) claims that "there is no connection of theta-role assignment between an attributive adjectives and the head noun." Thus, the relation between the adjective and the noun is quite different in the following:

(7) a. The woman is smart.
   b. the smart woman

In (7a), with the help of Pred, a theta-role is assigned to the woman, and thus we get the interpretation that the woman is smart. But in

2 One might say that floating quantifiers can be evidence for the intermediate traces (cf. Baker (p. 28, n. 4)):

(i) Theyi will [VP (all) t_i have [VP (all) t_i been [VP t_i eating]]]

But see Bobaljik (1995, 1998) for arguments that floating quantifiers are adverbs and cannot be evidence for a trace.
(7b), there is no such relation. How do we get the interpretation that the woman is smart in (7b) as well, then? Baker (p. 204ff) claims that this is a job of semantics, not of syntax. Baker basically adopts the usual semantic formula for modification utilizing a conjunction. Thus, (8a) has the semantics of (8b):

\begin{align}
\text{(8)} & \quad \text{a. } [\text{N red book}]
\nonumber \\
& \quad \text{b. } \lambda x \exists y \left[\text{Red'}(y) \& \text{Book'}(x) \& \text{same (Book')}(x, y)\right]
\end{align}

That is, X is a red book if and only if there is something that is red and the thing is the same book as X. This is a little different from the standard semantic formula of modification which simply uses conjunction. This is because in Baker’s system, nouns have a criterion of identity. But this point is not important here, and what I would like to note is that in the semantics in (8b), Red’ seems to be functioning as a theta-role assignor. Compare (8) with the (somewhat simple) semantics of a sentence:

\begin{align}
\text{(9)} & \quad \text{a. } \text{The book is red.}
\nonumber \\
& \quad \text{b. } \text{Red'}(\text{the book})
\end{align}

What (9b) indicates is that Red’ is the predicate of (thus assigns a theta-role to) the book. As far as this aspect is concerned, it is not different in (8b). To the extent that predicative adjectives and attributive adjectives have the same function semantically, Baker’s system to treat them differently in the syntax is not well motivated.

Another problem is concerned with the contrast between adjectival modification and nominal compounds:

\begin{align}
\text{(10)} & \quad \text{a. } \text{a butterfly net}
\nonumber \\
& \quad \text{b. } \text{a mosquito net}
\nonumber \\
& \quad \text{c. } \text{a ponkish house}
\end{align}

(10a) means a net for catching butterflies but (10b) means a net for keeping mosquitoes away. But this is due to our world knowledge, and not a job of grammar (cf. Carstairs-McCarthy (2002: 62)) With [N N], if we don’t know the meaning of the nouns, we don’t know the exact relation between them. But the interpretation of [A N] is quite different. As long as we know that X in [X N] is an adjective (e.g. by morphology or the accent pattern), we know at least that the N is X, without knowing what X means. Thus in (10c), which contains a

\footnote{I am abstracting away from non-intersective cases like alleged communists. See Bourchard (2002) for details. One important conclusion of Bourchard (2002) that I would like to endorse is that there is no need to have different syntactic structures for the two meanings of old friends (i.e. long-time friends and aged friends).}
hypothesised word whose category can be presumed by the adjectival suffix, one can at least tell that the house is ponkish, whatever the word means. It is not clear how this difference is captured if adjectives are not theta-role assignors, as hypothesised by Baker.

In defense of his assumption that there is no theta-role assignment between an attributive adjective and the head noun, Baker (p. 200, n. 9) states:

[S]ome predicate adjectives take external arguments (e.g., long, dangerous), and others take internal arguments (e.g., unlikely, clear). This difference is neutralised when the adjectives are used attributively: an unlikely event and a clear proposal have the same syntactic structure as a long story and a dangerous proposal. If theta-role assignment were involved, this would be a problematic violation of the UTAH.

The same point can be made with modification by participles. However, rather than supporting Baker's view, participles raise a problem for it. The situation of participles is as follows:

(11) a. Present participles involve the external argument for unergatives but the internal argument for unaccusatives.

(a walking man, a falling apple)

b. Past participles involve the internal argument.

(*a walked man, a fallen apple)

The generalization must make reference to the thematic structure of the verb. For example, since walk lacks an internal argument but past participles require one, *a walked man is ungrammatical. When the verb has a transitive/intransitive alternation (like eat or sink), the situation is more complicated. With past participles, the relevant role is the internal argument (an eaten apple, a sunk boat). With present participles, the relevant role is either external or internal, depending on whether the intransitive counterpart is unergative (an eating man) or unaccusative (a sinking boat). The thematic structure is schematized as follows:

(12) a. Transitive

\(\text{eat} \ (\text{Agent, Theme}) \quad \text{sink} \ (\text{Agent, Theme})\)

b. Intransitive

\(\text{eat} \ (\text{Agent}) \quad \text{sink} \ (\text{Theme})\)

c. Participle

\(\text{eating} \ (\text{Agent}) \quad \text{sinking} \ (\text{Theme})\)

It might be that the derivation starts with the transitive, and goes to the intransitive to the participle (a→b→c). Alternatively, the derivation
starts with the intransitive \((b \rightarrow c)\) or starts with the transitive but skips the intransitive part \((a \rightarrow c)\). It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss which is correct. For present purposes it is enough to recognize that the thematic relation with participles is rather complex, but still systematic. The situations in (11) and (12) seem hard to capture if no theta-role assignment is involved in modification, as hypothesized by Baker, and suggests that modifying participles are theta-role assignors. By natural extension, modifying adjectives are theta-role assignors as well.

Although Baker is concerned about the UTAH violation, the UTAH is concerned with theta-assignment within the maximal projection of the predicate. If modifying adjectives constitute AP, theta-assignment by the adjective to the modified nouns occurs outside the maximal projection of the adjective. Thus, the UTAH would have nothing to say about the theta-role assignment in modification, if any.\(^4\)

\(^4\) Another way of differentiating is to say that the UTAH applies when the theta-role assignor is of type \(<e,t>\) (predicate), not when the theta-role assignor is of type \(<e,e>\) (modifier). This distinction goes back to Siegel (1980), and although I believe Baker (p. 207) is right in criticizing this way of distinction and claiming that there is only one type of adjectives, we still seem to need to have a way to exempt some usage of adjectives from the UTAH. But this does not mean that theta-role assignment in modification has no constraint; we have just seen that participle modifiers show some regularity in theta-role assignment. It is somewhat surprising that, in contrast to numerous and detailed works on the theta-role assignment by predicates, there seems to have been very few works on the theta-role assignment by modifiers. The current discussion reveals that there is not even an agreement as to whether modification involves theta-role assignment or not. Thus, it is not surprising that no one to my knowledge has proposed a principle analogous to the UTAH in modifying contexts. If the present discussion is correct and modification does involve theta-role assignment, researchers should fill this gap, for which participles might be a good start.

I leave open the question of whether Pred is involved in theta-role assignment in modification. In analogy with predicational contexts, modifiers might require Pred for theta-role assignment. In this scenario, Modifier Phrase (ModP), proposed by Rubin (1993, 2003), is a modifying counterpart of PredP. Alternatively, to the extent that there are differences in theta-role assignment between predicates and modifiers (e.g. the relevance of the UTAH), modifiers can assign a theta-role without any additional functional projections.
3. The Count/Mass Distinction for Verbs and Adjectives

We saw in the previous section that Baker’s way of distinguishing verbs and adjectives in terms of thematic nature leaves some questions unanswered. As an alternative, this section turns to Rothstein’s (1999, 2001) view of predicates.

3.1. Rothstein’s Theory of Predicates

Rothstein’s basic intuition is to extend the mass/count distinction in the nominal domain to the predicative domain and claim that verbs denote count eventuality while adjectives denote mass eventuality: (Eventuality subsumes events and states.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>nominal</th>
<th>predicative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mass</td>
<td>furniture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>count</td>
<td>three pieces of furniture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>clever (AP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>be clever (VP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rothstein notes a subtle difference in the following:

(14)  
(a) I made John [polite]. (AP)  
(b) I made John [be polite]. (VP)

With the AP complement (14a), the eventuality is unbounded, while the VP complement in (14b) is bounded. This is illustrated in the following:

(15)  
(a) I made Mary know the answer three times.  
(b) I made Mary angry/clever (in class) three times.  

(Rothstein (2001: 290))

(15a) is ambiguous in that three times can modify either the matrix or the embedded VP. But in (15b), the only possible reading is for three times to modify the matrix VP. According to Rothstein, this is because the complement eventuality denoted by the adjectives is mass (unbounded) and thus cannot be modified by three times.

Another difference is seen in the following:

(16)  
(a) The medicine made Jane and Mary each feel sick.  
(b) *The medicine made Jane and Mary each sick.  

(Rothstein (2001: 293))

Since the distribution function of each is possible only with bounded eventuality, (16b) is ungrammatical.

It should be noted here that, although Rothstein’s distinction between verbs and adjectives is “semantic,” it is not of the type that Baker
explicitly denies as non-formal. That is, Rothstein's distinction is not couched in terms of "action" or "property." As shown in the examples above, the mass/count distinction is indeed relevant in the syntax.

As the table in (13) shows, the copula in a sense has a function like classifiers in that it makes mass countable. In languages like English, one of the clearest differences between verbs and adjectives is that while adjectives require the copula in the predicative usage, verbs do not. At this point, let us see what Baker would say about the copula. Consider:

(17) Chris will *(be) a teacher.

Note that if, as often assumed, the copula is just a "tense-supporter," there seems to be no need to have be above, since the (future) tense feature is supported by will. But the sentence is ungrammatical without the copula. (To my knowledge this problem was first noted by Déchaine (1993).) Adopting a version of feature-supporter analysis of be (p. 40), Baker (p. 50, n. 14) states that "will in English selects some other functional head which is itself an affix, therefore necessitating the presence of a verb form to attach to." But this stipulation does not readily follow from Baker's hypothesis that verbs are Spec-licensers. Under Rothstein's view, where the copula makes the eventuality countable, the account of (17) goes as follows. Tense by definition must locate the eventuality in time. This is possible only if the eventuality is countable. Given that nouns, like adjectives, denote uncountable eventualities, the only way to make the eventuality in (17) countable is to have a verb, in this case the copula. The same account holds for other modal auxiliaries.5

5 This account might not extend to other languages where the copula is often optional. According to Déchaine (1993), this is due to c-selection. Thus, while the tense in English always c-selects VP, tenses in other languages (e.g., Hebrew present tense, as well as Indonesian, to be discussed in the next section) optionally c-selects VP. It is true that one of the important goals of Baker's work is to eliminate such a mechanism as c-selection, as explicit in his statement (p. 110) in the discussion of why NPs are dominated by DPs: "it is common to say that Ds select an NP complement. My goal, however, is to eliminate arbitrary uses of categorical features from the theory." Although I believe this is an important goal, Baker (p. 46ff) offers a similar parametric account for the lack of the copula in Semitic (and other) languages.
3.2. Extension to Modifiers

One prominent difference between adjectives and verbs is that while adjectives can be a modifier, verbs cannot:

(18)  a. a hungry man (adjective)
      b. *a hunger man (verb)

This subsection extends Rothstein's view of the verb/adjective distinction to explain the contrast in (18). But before that, I will review Baker's account of (18).

Along with his hypothesis, Baker (p. 194) states, "I believe that it is wrong to make the ability to modify nouns as defining or characteristic property of the category adjective." Instead, Baker derives the modifying property from the non-thematic nature of adjectives. That is, the contrast in (18) comes from the difference between verbs and adjectives: verbs are theta-role assignors but adjectives are not. (18b) violates the theta-criterion, because the theta-role of hunger cannot be assigned to man, which is not a maximal projection and theta-roles can be assigned only to a maximal projection (p. 199). In (18a), on the other hand, no such problem arises.

I have argued in section 2 that, contrary to Baker's hypothesis, adjectives seem to assign theta-roles in modifying contexts. In the following I depart from Baker in assuming that modification does involve theta-role assignment, and see how the contrast in (18) is explained within Rothstein's view that verbs denote count eventualities while adjectives denote mass eventualities. Let us first interpret count eventualities as "temporally located," and that temporal location must be licensed by tense:

(19) I will make [sc John be polite].

Here, the matrix verb is licensed by the matrix tense. (Licensing is indicated by sharing the same index.) As for the embedded verb, it is also licensed by the matrix tense indirectly: the small clause, which contains be, is selected by make, which is licensed by the matrix tense.

Let us next see what happens if a verb modifies a noun:

(20) *I will see [NP a hunger man]

Let us follow Baker (and also a common assumption) and assume that nouns bear a referential index. The difference is that in (20), the noun phrase as a whole bears the index of the head noun (j). This index intervenes between the licensing index on see and the index on the modifying verb, causing a kind of (rigid) minimality effect. This leaves the index on hunger unlicensed and rules out (20).
In contrast to verbs, adjectives by hypothesis are not temporal locators and thus do not carry a temporal index:

(21) I will see [NP a hungry man]

Here, hungry bears no temporal index to be licensed.\(^6\)

We saw in section 2 that verbs can be a modifier if they are participles. If the present discussion is on the right track, modifying participles are not temporally located. The following confirms this expectation. In (16), repeated below, we saw that the distribution operation by each is possible with a verb:

(22) a. The medicine made Jane and Mary each feel sick.
    b. *The medicine made Jane and Mary each sick.

On the assumption that each requires a count (temporarily located) eventuality, (22) shows that verbs, but not adjectives, denote located eventuality. Now consider the following:

(23) a. I let Jane and Mary each live.
    b. ??I kept Jane and Mary each living.
    c. *I kept Jane and Mary each alive.

The sentence with a participle (23b) behaves like the one with an adjective (23c) rather than the one with a verb (23a).\(^7\) This follows if participles are more like adjectives than verbs in that they denote mass eventuality.

4. Equating Pred and Pre/Postpositions

In Baker’s view, adjectives must be a complement of Pred to be a theta-role assignor. As a language where Pred is overtly realized, he repeatedly cites Edo and Chichewa, but he also cites Japanese sporadically. Nishiyama (1999) argues that there are three allomorphs of Pred in Japanese: /de/, /ni/, and /k/. Of these, Baker seems to accept only /de/ as Pred, (implicitly) rejecting the other two, probably for reasons surrounding resultatives. In this section, I first argue that Pred and pre/postpositions are actually the same category. I then make a critical

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\(^6\) In a sense, this account is like Baker’s. For Baker, adjectives lack an index because they are not theta-role assignors.

\(^7\) Since make/let do not take a complement with a participle, I use keep. Somehow, if the participle denotes an event rather than a state (e.g. singing), it can appear with each. Thanks to John Whitman (p.c.) for this observation.
review of Baker's treatment of resultatives.

4.1. Similarities Between Pred and Pre/Postpositions

Let us start with the part which Baker (p. 223, n. 25) seems to accept: *de* is a realization of Pred in Japanese. *de* appears in the following contexts:

(24) a. hon-ga kiree-de ar-u
    book-Nom pretty-Pred be-Pres
    'The book is pretty.'

b. John-ga sakana-o nama-de tabe-ta
    -Nom fish-Acc raw-Pred eat-Past
    'John ate the fish raw.'

c. hon-ga niwa-de moe-ta
    book-Nom garden-loc burn-Past
    'The book burnt in the garden.'

Here, *de* appears as a matrix predicate (24a), secondary depictive predicate (24b), and a locative postposition (24c). One might say that the fact that *de* is used either as Pred or as a locative postposition is a mere coincidence. But consider the following sentences with *ni*:

    -Nom wall-Acc red-Pred paint-Past
    'John painted the wall (very) red.'

b. hon-ga niwa-ni ar-u
    book-Nom garden-loc be-Pres
    'The book is in the garden.'

Here, *ni* is used as a resultative predicate (25a) and a locative postposition (25b). The difference between (24c) and (25b) is that in the former, the verb is active, but the verb stative in the latter. The generalization is as follows:

(26) a. In a secondary predicate phrase, *de* is used as a depictive, while *ni* is used as a resultative.

b. In a locative phrase, *de* is used with an active verb, while *ni* is used with a stative verb.

Thus, we have the same *de/ni* alternation in predicative contexts and locative contexts. Is this a coincidence? I argue that it is not. Historically the two alternations may well have the same origin, but synchronically as well, they are likely to instantiate the same phenomenon. Below I argue that Pred and pre/postpositions are the same syntactic category, and represent it as *Pre(p/d)*.
It is a common knowledge that adverbs and PPs appear in the same environment:

(27)  a. John walked in the garden.
    b. John walked slowly.
    c. John walked in a slow manner.

Adverbs and PPs are both typical adjuncts, and are often paraphrasable (as in (27b, c)). Another common view is to equate adverbs and adjectives (cf. Radford (1988) and Baker p. 230ff, to cite recent works). Now if adjectives are predicates (or at least have predicational potentials), and if adjectives and adverbs are the same, then adverbs are also predicates. The following formula implements the view that adverbs are predicates of events:

(28)  a. Brutus walked slowly.
    b. \[\exists e \text{ [Walking (e) & Agent (e, Brutus) & Slow (e)]}\]

(28b) is a (somewhat simplified) semantic representation of (28a) in Parsons (1990: 45), and reads that there is an event which is characterized as walking, and its Agent is Brutus, and it is slow. Now if adjective, adverbs, and PPs are all syntactically equated, and if both adjectives and adverbs are predicates, then we can say that pre/postpositions are also predicates. Below I outline this intuition formally, starting with the semantics of Pred.

Nishiyama (1999: 215, n. 7) suggests that the semantics of Pred is a lambda-operator, following Heggie (1988). Thus, we have the following structure:

(29)  a. hon-ga kiree-de ar-u
     book-Nom pretty-Pred be-Pres
     ‘The book is pretty.’
    b. \[\text{Pre(p/d)P <pretty’(book)>}\]

\[\text{NP <book> \hspace{1cm} Pre(p/d)’ <\lambda x.\text{pretty’}(x)>}\]
\[\text{hon}\]
\[\text{AP <pretty’(x)> \hspace{1cm} Pre(p/d) <\lambda x>}\]
\[\text{kiree}\]
\[\text{de}\]

The notation \text{Pre}(p/d) implements the intuition that pre/postpositions and Pred are the same category. In (29b), the AP itself is defective as a predicate.\(^8\) To be a full-fledged predicate, it must be an open formula,

\(^8\) In this respect I share the view of adjectives with Baker, although the exact
for which a lambda-operator is necessary. A similar idea is found in Rothstein’s (2001) *Predicate Formation*.

Let us next consider a locative sentence:

(30) a. hon-ga niwa-ni ar-u
    book-Nom garden-loc be-Pres
    ‘The book is in the garden.’

    Pre(p/d)P <IN-garden’(book)>

    NP <book>
    Pre(p/d)’ <λx.IN-garden’(x)>

    NP <garden’(x)> 
    Pre(p/d) <λx-IN>

niwa

ni

The difference is that for pre/postposition, the semantics is not just a simple lambda-operator; it has a specific meaning corresponding to each lexical entry. λx-IN has a function to make an open formula, but in addition, it adds the semantics of “in” to garden’(x), yielding IN-garden’(x). The resulting formula IN-garden’(book) indicates that the sentence involves a one-place predicate, and does not analyze the postposition itself as a two place predicate.

The semantic representations in (29b) and (30b) basically hold for the English sentences in (31a) and (31b), respectively:

(31) a. The book is pretty.

b. The book is in the garden.

Apart from linear order, a notable difference is that while Pred in Japanese is overt as in (29), it is null in (31a). As shown in (29b), the semantics of Pred seems trivial in that it just adds a lambda-operator, in contrast to a more substantial meaning of the postposition in (30b). This is probably the reason why Pred is null in so many languages. Despite such differences, what is common between Pred and pre/postposition is that both contain a lambda-operator. This is the intuition behind postulating Pre(d/p) as a cover term.

One remaining important issue is the meaning of ‘be.’ The above semantics of Pred is different. As argued in sections 2 and 3, I depart from Baker in assuming that modification by adjectives involves theta-role assignment, and that what differentiates verbs from adjectives is not the presence of Pred but the countability of eventuality. I leave open the question of whether verbs also involve Pred.
analysis of Japanese and English sentences treats *ar- and be* as semanti-
cally vacuous, apart from carrying a tense (and, in Rothstein’s view,
making the mass eventuality countable). It is usually assumed that, in
contrast to the semantically empty ‘be’ in predicative sentences like
(29a) and (31a), ‘be’ in (30a) and (31b) is a lexical verb meaning “to
exist.” If ‘be’ in (30a) and (31b) is semantically vacuous, where does
the existential interpretation in (30a) and (31b) come from? To answer
this question, consider the following Indonesian sentences:

(32) a. Jon ada di Jakarta 
    'John is/was/will be in Jakarta.'

    b. Jon pergi ke Jakarta 
    'John goes/went/will go to Jakarta.'

    c. Jon datang dari Jakarta 
    'John comes/came/will come from Jakarta.'

The verbs in the above sentences can be dropped with the same mean-
ing:

(33) a. Jon di Jakarta (locative)

    b. Jon ke Jakarta (goal)

    c. Jon dari Jakarta (source)

Crucially, (33a-c) do *not* mean, “John is sleeping in Jakarta,” “John flew
to Jakarta,” or “John defected from Jakarta,” respectively. The reason
seems simple: when a verb is missing, the recovered meaning is the
most basic (primitive, or impoverished) one presumed from the context.
Thus, the appropriate meaning would be ‘exist’ with a locative PP
(33a), ‘go’ with a goal PP (33b), and ‘come’ with a source PP (33c).
In this way, the “existential” meaning is not necessarily entailed by ‘be’
*per se*.

It is seemingly a trivial but actually a surprising fact that many lan-
guages use the same verb for the so-called “predicative” ‘be’ and “exis-
tential” ‘be.’ This is the case for Japanese and English, as we saw
above. See Verhaar (1967-1973) for a cross-linguistic tendency of the
isomorphism between predicative ‘be’ and existential ‘be.’9 With this

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9 Indonesian *ada* is another example of the copula which is used both in existen-
tial and predicative sentences:
being the case, it seems natural to have a unified analysis of the two types of 'be.' However, probably due to the difficulty of what to do with the existential interpretation, there are few serious works to achieve this unification.\(^{10}\) If, as argued above based on the Indonesian facts, the existential meaning is presumed contextually, there seems to be no obstacle for treating the "existential" 'be' as semantically vacuous. This makes a unified analysis of 'be' possible.

Let us return to the Japanese Pre(p/d) \(de\) and \(ni\). In (26b), I made a generalization that \(de\) is a locative predicate for an active predicate, while \(ni\) is a locative predicate for a stative predicate. But consider the following sentence, where \(ni\) seems to be used to denote a goal:

\[
(34) \quad \text{John-ga} \quad \text{koen-ni} \quad \text{it-ta} \\
\quad \text{-Nom park-ni go-Past} \\
'\text{John went to the park.}'
\]

At first sight, it is puzzling that the same particle \(ni\) is used in a locative phrase (30a) and a goal phrase (34). But a close examination reveals that the semantics of \(ni\) in (34) is not 'toward' but 'as far as' or 'into.' Consider the following contrast, originally due to Yoneyama (1986), cited in Jackendoff (1990: 89):

\[
(35) \quad \begin{array}{l}
\text{a.} \quad \text{?John-ga} \quad \text{koen-ni hasit-ta} \\
\quad \text{-Nom park-ni ran-Past} \\
'\text{(intended) John ran to the park.}' \\
\text{b.} \quad \text{John-ga} \quad \text{koen-ni hasit-te it-ta} \\
\quad \text{-Nom park-ni ran-and go-Past} \\
'\text{John ran as far as the park.}'
\end{array}
\]

In (35a), the verb hasir- 'run' denotes a manner of motion and does not felicitously imply that John is in the park in the end. In (35b), on the other hand, the verb ik- 'go' is added, and this guarantees that John is in the park in the end. Thus, the "endpoint" is the core notion of \(ni\). With this semantics, it makes sense that \(ni\) is also used in a resultative, as we saw in (25a). Indeed, like \(ni\) in Japanese, English also uses into

\[
(\text{i}) \quad \text{Jon ada-lah guru} \\
\quad \text{be-Emph teacher} \\
'\text{John is a teacher.'}
\]

Somehow, an emphatic marker -lah emerges with the predicative sentence above, and the usage seems to be limited to nominal predicates.

\(^{10}\) Stowell (1978) is an initial theoretical attempt to do this. He argues that both types of 'be' are raising predicates, but does not discuss the semantic issue.
in a resultative with a PP:

(36) John beat the metal into a sword.

(36) entails that John’s task is complete and the metal is now a sword, and this interpretation goes hand in hand with the semantics of into, which also entails an endpoint. In fact, into is often used in a way atypical of prepositions:

(37) a. John rushed into a house.
    b. The witch turned into a dog.
    c. Bill talked John into taking a walk.

In ordinary prepositional usage in (37a), John is in the house. But (37b) does not mean that the witch is in the dog but that the witch is a dog. In the same way, (37c) means John did take a walk. This suggests that, although Pred in English is usually null, it can sometimes be realized as into, as in (36) and (37b, c). In this conception, the literal translation of (25a) is “John painted the house into red.” This sentence itself is ungrammatical, probably because English prepositions (or overt realization of Pre(d/p) in English) do not take an adjective as their complement. Since Japanese ni has no such constraint, it emerges in (25a).

Combination of what looks like a preposition and an adjective seems to be common cross-linguistically. Consider the following Indonesian example:

(38) mata mereka dengan tajam mengawasi buah-buah catur
    eye their with sharp observe things chess
    ‘Their eyes watched the chessmen sharply.’

(Arwan Tuti Artha, Main Catur)

From a Eurocentric point of view, one might say that, given dengan ‘with’ is a preposition, tajam ‘sharp’ must be a noun. But there is no evidence that tajam is nominalized in (38). In the present analysis, (38) makes perfect sense; dengan is a generalized category of Pre(d/p). Thus, the adjective tajam, with the help of Pre(d/p) dengan, becomes the predicate of the event (or their eyes, depending on the interpretation).

Along with resultatives, ni also appears with adverbs:

11 Bowers (1993) suggests that as in “I regard John as crazy” is the phonological realization of Pred in English. Note that, like into, as is an atypical preposition, in that it appears before adjectives. Such a behavior makes sense if as is Pre(p/d).
(39) John-ga sizuka-ni arui-ta
   -Nom quiet-Pre(p/d) walk-Past
   ‘John walked quietly.’
This is consistent with the present analysis equating PPs, adverbs (with
Pred), and adjectives (with Pred). (Note that (39) is paraphrased as
“John walked in a quiet way.”) Japanese ni functions as a locative
postposition (30a), as a resultative suffix (25a), and as an adverbial suf-
fix (39), motivating the postulation of Pre(p/d) as a cover term for Pred
and pre/postposition.12

4.2. Pred in Resultatives
Baker (appendix) claims that pre/postpositions are not lexical cate-
gories but functional categories, stating that “P can thus be thought of
as an adjective-like functional category, much as determiner/pronoun is
a noun-like functional category and Pred is a verb-like functional cate-
gory” (p. 303). By this he means that adjectives are defective predi-
cates and that they require Pred to become a full-fledged predicate like
verbs. The same analogue is claimed between adjectives and pre/post-
positions plus NPs. His position is summarized as follows:

(40) a. V is equivalent to Pred + AP
    b. A is equivalent to P + NP/DP
(40b) is illustrated in the following:

(41) a. John beat the metal flat.
    b. John beat the metal into a sword.
(42) a. The leaves turned yellow.
    b. The witch turned into a dog.
In (41) and (42), APs and PPs seem to appear as the resultative phrase
and the complement of turn, respectively. In other words, by (40b)
Baker claims that resultative complements are AP, not PredPs. This is
incompatible with the analysis outlined in the last subsection equating
PredP with PP. Although I agree with Baker that prepositions are

12 /k/ also appears with an adverb (haya-ku aruku ‘to walk quickly’) or with a
predicate (aka-ku nuru ‘to paint red’). We return to /k/ in the next subsection. As
for the semantics of adverbs, I utilized the event argument in (28b), like quiet(e).
Alternatively, the adverb can be predicated of the Pre(p/d)P, yielding λx.quiet’(x) +
walk’(John) → quiet’(walk’(John)). While the former is convenient for multiple
adjuncts, the latter is more transparent to the syntax. I leave this choice open.
functional categories, if the present analysis is correct, the fact that PPs can be a resultative phrase in (41b) strongly suggests that what looks like AP in (41a) is actually PredP, or, in the terminology introduced above, the resultative complements are Pre(p/d)P for both (41a, b). Below I first review Baker’s rationale for postulating AP as a resultative phrase, and then show why it cannot be convincing.

One goal of Baker’s system of lexical category is to predict the distribution of adjectives: adjectives appear where neither verbs (Spec-licensers) nor nouns (index bearers) can appear. One such environment is a modifying position, as we saw earlier. Another environment where adjectives can appear but verbs cannot is the resultative constructions:

(43) a. I beat the metal flat.
    b. *I beat the metal break.

Here I do not intend to claim that Rothstein’s hypothesis, which analyzes flat as a mass eventuality and break as a count eventuality, would correctly account for (43). As noted by Baker, (43b) is grammatical in some languages as a serial verb construction, and as also discussed by Baker, many language-particular factors are involved to allow such a construction.

Let us first see how Baker derives the contrast in (43). As a matter of fact, Baker’s account becomes somewhat complicated here. First, he adopts an abstract generative-semantics-style lexical decomposition approach. Second, he allows a way to assign a theta-role after incorporation at LF, which actually rules in (43b) as a case of serial verb constructions. But the core idea is the same as the case of modification: there is something wrong in theta-role assignment in (43b) but not in (43a), on the assumption that flat is not a theta-role assignor. In (43b), break cannot assign its theta-role to the metal because it is outside the maximal projection of break. Since flat is not a theta-role assignor, no such problem arises.

To rule out (43b) as a violation of the theta-criterion but exempt (43a) from it, it is crucial for Baker that flat in (43a) is not dominated by PredP. This is because, in Baker’s system, although adjectives are not theta-role assignors per se, the combination of A + Pred does assign a theta-role. Thus, if Pred were ever present in (43a), (43a) would also violate the theta-criterion and should be as bad as (43b), contrary to fact.

As evidence that no Pred is present in resultatives, Baker (p. 223) cites the following Edo examples:
(44) a. Ozo gbé èmátòn (*ye) pèrhè (resultative)
   Ozo beat metal Pred flat
   'Ozo pounded the metal flat'
b. Uyi yá èmátòn *(ye) pèrhè (causative)
   Uyi made metal Pred flat
   'Uyi made the metal to be flat'
On the assumption that ye is Pred in Edo, Baker takes its absence in
(44a) as evidence that resultatives do not involve Pred. Note that in
causatives as in (44b), ye appears. This is because, according to Baker,
'metal' is a small clause subject and receives a theta-role, for which
Pred is necessary in Baker's system. But consider the following coun-
terparts from Japanese:
(45) a. John-ga kabe-o aka-ku nut-ta (resultative)
   -Nom wall-Acc red-Pred paint-Past
   'John painted the wall red.'
b. John-ga kabe-o aka-ku si-ta (causative)
   -Nom wall-Acc red-Pred make-Past
   'John made the wall red.'
   -Nom wall-Acc red-Pred paint-Past
   'John painted the wall (very) red.'
b. John-ga kabe-o makka-ni si-ta (causative)
   -Nom wall-Acc red-Pred make-Past
   'John made the wall (very) red.'
Japanese has two types of adjectives, and aka appears with ku and
makka appears with ni in resultative and causative constructions. Note
that ku and ni appear in both constructions. According to Baker, Edo
causative in (44b) requires ye because, in his system, adjectives require
Pred (ye) for predication and causatives are predication structures.
With this logic, the fact that ku and ni appear in Japanese causatives as
in (45-46b) indicates that they are Pred in Japanese. Then, the fact
that the same ku and ni appear in resultatives as in (45-46a) indicates
that resultatives involve Pred, contrary to Baker's analysis. Admittedly,
the identification of ku and ni as Pred might be fundamentally flawed,
and I cannot account for why ye does not show up in Edo resultative in
(44a). However, as far as Japanese is concerned, there seems to be lit-
tle justification for postulating different structures for resultatives and
causatives. To the extent that the evidence is equivocal across lan-
guages, Baker's argument based only on one side of the evidence seems
to be weak.

Baker is actually aware of the fact in (46a), but he dismisses the possibility of $ni$ as Pred; he takes $ni$ "to be a postposition, equivalent to to in English" (p. 219, n. 22), and states that "[$ni$] is not otherwise an element with predicative force" (p. 223, n. 25). But its causative usage in (46b) shows that $ni$ does have predicative force. If the discussion in the last subsection is correct in identifying $de$ and $ni$ as Pre(p/d), (46a) cannot be ignored so lightly. The same is true for $ku$. He does cite an example like (45a) (p. 242), but glosses $ku$ just as AFF, meaning "inflectional affixes," without mentioning Nishiyama’s (1999) arguments that $de$ and $ku$ are allomorphs of Pred. See also Nishiyama (2005).

It is somewhat regrettable that Baker discusses Japanese data only selectively. After all, the ultimate evaluation of his hypothesis depends on the existence of Pred with adjectives, and Japanese is one of the few languages where the existence of Pred is independently argued for. Since the copula in most languages is verbal and thus can be regarded as a dummy, one must find a non-verbal (and thus likely to be contentful) element in a language. Since Japanese $de$ and $ku$ are obviously non-verbal, Japanese is an ideal language to test Baker’s hypothesis. We have seen above that even such an ideal language cannot give a strong support for Baker’s analysis of resultatives. The shallowness of the discussion in a particular language which often accompanies a discussion of many languages is a topic in section 5.

What would Baker say about the interpretation that the metal is flat after I beat the metal flat, if resultatives do not involve Pred? Recall that in the case of modification, Baker shifted the burden of accounting for the interpretation to semantics, giving a formula for modified structures. Thus, Baker could have done the same thing for resultatives, giving a formula as follows (cf. Parsons (1990)):

\[(47)\]

\[\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{I wiped the table clean.} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \exists e, e' [\text{Wipe (e) \& Agent (e, I) \& Theme (e, the table) \& Clean (e') \& Theme (e' the table) \& CAUSE (e, e')}] \\
\end{align*}\]

But this is not what Baker did. Instead, he assumes that the resultative interpretation is a job of syntax and resorted to lexical decomposition. The intuition behind this analysis is that (47a) involves a complex predicate:

\[(48)\]  

I [wipe clean]-ed the table.

That is, *wipe* and *clean* form a semantic unit. This is why the table is clean if (47a) is true. But (48) cannot be a correct syntax as it is. So
Baker first decomposes the verb as follows:

(49)  a. I wiped the table
      b. I [CAUSE BE WIPED] the table.

That is, every verb is decomposed into [CAUSE BE V-ED], the last part corresponding to an adjective. Next he combines WIPED and the resultative adjective clean:

(50)  I [CAUSE BE [WIPED-clean]] the table.

After a series of predicate raising and lexical insertion, we have I wiped the table clean. Although Baker gives arguments for lexical decomposition in his section 2.9, his approach to postulate an underlying adjective for any verb seems to be unconstrained. For example, recursion is one of the salient properties in the phrasal syntax, but somehow there seems to be no recursion in the decomposition syntax. Consider:

(51)  a. x CAUSE [y CAUSE [z BE HIT]]
      b. Mary HIT Bill John

(51a) seems to violate no principle in the decomposition syntax, if any, and would yield a sentence like (51b), whose intended meaning is ‘Mary made Bill hit John.’ But there seems to be no such single lexical entry in any language.

Regarding unergatives, Baker decomposes work as [CAUSE BE WORKED]. At this point let us see how Baker would analyze resultatives with unergatives as follows:

(52)  a. The joggers ran the pavement thin.
      b. John laughed himself silly.

One might extend Baker’s analysis of transitive resultatives in (50) to (52a) as follows:

(53)  *The joggers [CAUSE BE [RUN-thin]] the pavement.

But this is obviously wrong, because the pavement is not an argument of run but such an interpretation is obtained by (53). Although the construction in (52) is rare and might be outside the scope of Baker’s theory, the failure in (53) indicates that Baker’s lexical decomposition does not have wide empirical coverage and makes the approach questionable.

As far as I can tell, there are two reasons why Baker adopts lexical decomposition: (i) to explain why there is a resultative interpretation, and (ii) to explain why there is a predication relation between the resultative adjective and the object. For (i), see Rothstein (2003). For (ii), there is one obvious alternative: to postulate Pred in the resultative phrase. The reason why Baker does not take this alternative is the
contrast in (44): in Edo, ye (Pred) does not show up with resultatives. If this fact can be accounted for on independent grounds and the Japanese paradigm in (45) and (46) reflects real syntactic structures, we can assume that the resultative phrases involve Pred. Then we can have a predicative interpretation without recourse to lexical decomposition.

If Baker's decomposition analysis is not tenable, how can we get the correct interpretation of resultatives? I do not offer a new insight here, only citing Bowers' (1997) analysis of resultatives:

(54) a. I wiped the table clean.

```
PredP
  NP
    I
    Pred
      wiped
      VP
        NP
          the table
          V
            t
            V'
              NP
                PredP
                  NP
                    PRO
                    Pred'
                      Pred
                        AP
                          clean
```

b. The joggers ran the pavement thin.
The upshot is that for Bowers, transitive resultatives are control constructions, and intransitive resultatives are raising constructions. (54) reflects the fact that the table in (54a) is an argument of the matrix verb *wipe*, and the pavement in (54b) is an argument of the result adjective *thin*. In this way, PRO or the trace in (54) correctly guarantees that the result adjectives are predicated of the (fake) direct object.

5. Concluding Remarks: Methodology in Generative Grammar

In this paper I have discussed several issues relevant for the evaluation of Baker's theory of verbs and adjectives. Although I believe there are problems in Baker's specific way of handling the topic, that by no means should shadow the importance of the book. Above all, this work is the first formal study of the issue of categories without resorting to a stipulative feature system. The topic is often discussed in the functional literature in terms of notions like "action" or "property." In the introductory chapter Baker discusses at length why it is important to pursue a formal analysis of such a function-loaded topic. His attempt is successful in that it shows we can understand the nature of lexical categories using only formal (syntactic) notions. But the achievement is not limited to showing the significance of formal linguistics in relation to functionalism. I would like to conclude this review article by arguing that Baker raises an important issue of the methodology in generative grammar.

Until the 1970s, most generative theories were constructed based
mainly on English. The method in generative grammar is deduction and one does not have to survey every language. But as long as the theory is for the initial state of grammar (Universal Grammar), which can develop into every possible human language, testing with many languages is ultimately called for (cf. Chomsky (1981: 9)). When the GB Theory appeared in the 1980s with its restrictiveness and high applicability, the generative circle applied the theory to many languages with fruitful results, and there was an atmosphere that finally generative grammar can have a theory of UG. (In fact, Baker’s 1988 book is one of the most influential works of the decade.) The situation is more or less the same in the Minimalism era, although the degree of universal application might be less.

On the other hand, even after the 1980s, there are numerous works which concentrate on one language or two. Some of them are application of Chomsky’s theory to languages other than English, but others are quite independent of Chomsky’s specific theory. Rothstein’s (1999, 2001) work is of this latter type. Rothstein proposed a theory of verbs and adjectives based on English. But she did not discuss how her theory can be applied to other languages, and we wondered in note 5 how the verbless sentences can be analyzed with her theory. One unfortunate thing about generative grammar is that outside the theory by Chomsky, if one researcher proposes a theory based on one language or two, it is rarely the case that the theory is tested on other languages by other researchers. Thus, I know of no work that applies Rothstein’s theory of predicates to other languages. It is often the burden of the authors themselves to apply their own theory to other languages. This is a difficult task, and Baker is a talented scholar in this respect.

Certainly, if the hypothesis is tested in many languages, it can be a good candidate for the principle of UG, but there is a trade-off: if the scope of the study by a single author extends to many languages, discussion of each language is bound to be shallow. After all, there is a physical limitation on a single author in the number of languages over which s/he has a good command. We saw in section 4.2 that Baker’s treatment of Japanese Pred is unsatisfactory.\footnote{In the functional literature as well, the shallowness of the treatment of an individual language is observed. For example, Pustet (2003), based on the survey of} Impressionistically, it is
like hypothesizing that stones on a beach are black, and looking for black stones there. With the multi-language generative approach, one searches for the black stones in many languages to confirm the hypothesis. This can be done by consulting published materials or native speakers of each language at hand. In the case of beach-searching, it is also quite easy to spot white stones, if any, and if the number is too large to be ignored, the hypothesis that stones on the beach are black is falsified.

However, in the case of grammar, if one is preoccupied with finding black stones, the “white stones” are often overlooked, unless one has a full knowledge of the language, either by being a native speaker or through intensive field work or learning. Probably Rothstein’s theory works quite successfully as far as English is concerned. This is because she has native knowledge of the language and has considered many issues in the language. But the applicability of her theory to other languages is yet to be seen. In contrast, as far as the language coverage is concerned, Baker’s theory is more impressive. But we have seen its drawbacks of the shallowness of discussion of each particular language. Thus, it is the matter of choice between quality and quantity. As a formal linguist, should we seek an in-depth analysis of a particular language, or should we cover as many languages as possible? Ideally we should do both, but in practice, that is impossible, apart from theories stemming from the authority.

The above question is, in my view, an incarnation of the old problem more than 160 languages, argues that adjectives which appear without a copula (–copula, verb-like) are more transient (or dynamic) than adjectives which appear with a copula (+copula, noun-like), citing Japanese examples as follows:

- (i) –copula: noroi ‘slow’ (temporarily/permantly) +copula: noroma ‘slow’ (permantly) (Pustet (2003: 106))

But there is a doublet which shows the opposite character:

- (ii) –copula: karui ‘light’ (temporarily/permantly) +copula: karoyaka ‘light’ (temporarily, dynamic)

A more serious problem is that the discussion overlooks the solid fact in Japanese that loan words (mainly from Chinese) almost always appear with the copula, which accounts for the majority of the data. See Nishiyama (1999) for a discussion. See also Newmeyer (1998: ch. 6) for the difficulty of typology.

14 The Oxford Studies in Comparative Syntax series, which includes another impressive book by Baker in 1996, is built on the explicit idea to cover many languages.
of the tension between descriptive adequacy and explanatory adequacy: principles in UG must be rich enough to accommodate a wide variety of data, but must also be restrictive enough to develop into every possible human language. Probably there is no answer to the question. With a simple hypothesis and rich empirical evidence from many languages, Baker again offers one model of the generative methodology. Whether his specific hypothesis ultimately turns out to be tenable or not, his arguments would have repercussions in many corners in linguistics for years to come. In this respect alone, Baker’s book is worth careful reading.

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