FOCALIZATIONS OF *BECAUSE* AND *SINCE*: *SINCE*-CLAUSES CAN BE FOCALIZED BY CERTAIN FOCUSING ADVERBS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE IS NO REASON TO BAN IT

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Despite the widely accepted view that *because*-clauses can be focalized by focusing adverbs whereas *since*-clauses cannot, there are many cases in which certain focusing adverbs focalize *since*-clauses, as exemplified by a sentence like *Wearing a different one every time she went out would be only natural, particularly since a sari does not have to be washed as frequently as a dress.* The present article explains when *because*- and *since*-clauses can or cannot be focalized by focusing adverbs in terms of the following two factors: (i) the types of constructions these conjunctions participate in and (ii) the types of focusing adverbs used.*

*Keywords: causal relation, inferential process, exclusives, particularizers

1. Introduction

It has often been pointed out that while *because*-clauses can be focalized by adverbs such as *just, only, and simply,* *since*-clauses cannot (e.g. Quirk et al. (1985), Schourup and Waida (1988), Wickboldt (1997), among others):

(1) a. He went to college just {because/*since} his parents asked him to.

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b. Don’t expect me to marry you simply {because/*since} you’re rich. (Schourup and Waida (1988: 95))

According to Schourup and Waida (1988), the above grammaticality contrasts stem from the fact that the reason introduced by because conveys new information, while the reason introduced by since represents old information.

This claim, however, is not plausible for the following reasons. First, there are cases in which since-clauses can be focalized by focusing adverbs, as shown in (2):

(2) Wearing a different one every time she went out would be only natural, particularly since a sari does not have to be washed as frequently as a dress… (BNC [italics are mine!])

Secondly, just because the reason is introduced by because does not always make it possible for the because-clause to be modified by focusing adverbs:

(3) *It has rained, just because the ground is wet.
(c.f. It has rained, because the ground is wet.)

Furthermore, the contrasts between old and new information seem irrelevant in accounting for the focalizability of because- and since-clauses by focusing adverbs for reasons to be explored later.

In this article, I propose a generalization that accounts for when because- and since-clauses can or cannot be focalized by focusing adverbs. In particular, I argue that the focalizability of because and since is best explained by considering the interaction between characteristics of the constructions that these conjunctions are used in and the types of focusing adverbs.

This article is organized as follows. Section 2 makes a brief argument against information structural accounts of the focalizability of because and since. Section 3 then investigates characteristics of the constructions where because and since are used. Section 4, following Quirk et al. (1985), classifies focusing adverbs into two groups, and shows how they focalize what follows them. Based on the discussion in sections 3 and 4, section 5 presents an alternative account of the grammaticality or ungrammaticality of sentences (1)–(3) above and other examples to be given later on, and proposes a generalization about the focalizability of because- and since-clauses by focusing adverbs. Section 6 is a brief conclusion.
2. Against Information Structural Accounts

As seen in the introduction, Schourup and Waida (1988) attempt to account for the focalizability of because- and since-clauses in terms of their information structural distinction, claiming that the reason introduced by because conveys new information, while that introduced by since presents old information. As shown in (2) and (3) above, however, there are many counterexamples to Schourup and Waida’s generalization about the focalizability of because- and since-clauses. Thus, their information structural account does not satisfactorily explain the facts.

The generalization based on the information structural distinction is not only empirically inadequate but also poses two theoretical problems. One is that although the generalization states that because-clauses convey new information, this is not always true. Hirose (1991: 31) notes that sentence-initial because-clauses generally convey old information (cf. Kanetani (2005)). To see this, consider the following example:

(4) A: Why is the ground wet?
   B: #Because it has rained, the ground is wet.
   (cf. The ground is wet because it has rained.)

(Kanetani (2005: 85))

The above dialogue shows that using a sentence-initial because-clause is not appropriate to answer a why-question. The inappropriateness of speaker B’s utterance stems from the sentence-initial because-clause being presupposed. Although speaker A asks the reason why the ground is wet, the answer given by speaker B, with the sentence-initial because-clause, indicates that the reason is already known to speaker A. Hence, the incompatibility between A and B. That is, just because the reason is introduced by because does not necessarily mean that it conveys new information.

Another problem, which is similar to the first one, is that since-clauses do not always convey old information. They may present new information and be asserted as if they were independent clauses (cf. Hirose (1991: fn. 13), Kanetani (2005)). Observe the following sentence:

1 Such an information structural distinction has also been observed by other researchers (e.g. Poutsma (1904), Swan (2005), among others).
In (5), the rhetorical question *who will ever find out* occurs in the *since*-clause. Lakoff observes that speech act constructions that convey statements, such as the rhetorical question in (5), may occur in *since*-clauses as well as in *because*-clauses.\(^2\) Crucially, Hooper and Thompson (1973) argue that it is only in asserted clauses that speech act constructions ("root transformations" in their terms) can occur. Thus, *since*-clauses may be asserted as if they were independent clauses: At least the *since*-clause in (5) is asserted. Therefore, it is not likely that the reason introduced by *since* always presents old information.

In brief, just because the reason is introduced by *because* does not mean that it always conveys new information. Likewise, just because the reason is introduced by *since* does not necessarily mean that it conveys old information. It then follows that Schourup and Waida’s (1988) account of the focalizability of *because* and *since* based on the information structural distinction is not plausible. I will present an alternative account in section 5, which is not dependent upon the information structural distinction. Before that, however, we need to consider (i) characteristics of the constructions that *because* and *since* are used in (cf. Kanetani (2005)), and (ii) the meanings of relevant focusing adverbs (cf. Quirk et al. (1985)), i.e. the two main factors that the analysis to be proposed is dependent upon.

3. Interpretations of *Because*-Clauses and *Since*-Clauses: Causal vs. Inferential

3.1. *Because*-Clauses

As is well known, the conjunction *because* has two interpretations (e.g. Jespersen (1949), Rutherford (1970), Sweetser (1990), Hirose (1991), Nakau (1994), among many others). One is a causal interpretation. In this interpretation, the *because*-clause expresses the cause of

\(^2\) Lakoff (1987) observes that not all kinds of speech act constructions can occur inside subordinate clauses: Only speech act constructions that convey statements may occur in them. The rhetorical question used in (5), *who will ever find out*, for example, conveys the statement *no one will find out.*
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(non-)occurrence of the situation described in the main clause. The other is an inferential interpretation. Inferential because-clauses are understood as providing the premise from which to draw a conclusion that is expressed in the main clause. The two uses of because-clauses are exemplified in (6):

(6) a. He’s not coming to class because he’s sick.
   b. He’s not coming to class, because he has just called from San Diego. (Rutherford (1970: 97))

In (6a), the because-clause expresses the reason for his not coming to class. The because-clause in (6b) does not give a reason for his not coming to class, but is understood as providing the premise to conclude that he is not coming to class.

This functional difference between causal and inferential because-clauses is reflected in some syntactic behaviors of the because-clause. First, Rutherford (1970) observes that causal because-clauses can be nominalized into because of NP, while inferential ones cannot, as indicated in (7a, b):

(7) a. He’s not coming to class because of his sickness.
   b. *He’s not coming to class, because of his having just called from San Diego. (Rutherford (1970: 105))

The grammatical sentence in (7a) is gained by nominalizing the causal because-clause in (6a). In contrast, the sentence in (7b), which involves the nominalization of the inferential because-clause in (6b), is ungrammatical.

Second, when a negation occurs in the main clause, causal because-clauses can be inside the scope of the negation, whereas inferential because-clauses cannot (e.g. Rutherford (1970), Hirose (1991), among others). Observe the following:

(8) a. He doesn’t beat his wife because he loves her. (Rutherford (1970: 100))
   b. NEG [he beats his wife] because he loves her
   c. NEG [he beats his wife because he loves her]

(9) a. He’s not coming to class, because he just called from San Diego. (= (6b))
   b. NEG [He’s coming to class] because he just called from

3 The word “situation” here is used to cover both events and states (Lyons (1977: 483)).
c. *NEG [He’s coming to class because he just called from San Diego]

According to Rutherford (1970), the sentence in (8a) is ambiguous between the two readings in (8b, c). That is, the causal because-clause in (8a) can be either inside or outside the scope of the negation in the main clause. The inferential because-clause in (9a), on the other hand, is not ambiguous. The sentence does not allow a wide-scope interpretation such as the one shown in (9c).

Third, as Schourup and Waida (1988) and Hirose (1991) observe, causal because-clauses can be in sentence-initial position, while inferential because-clauses cannot. Observe the following:

(10) a. Because it has rained, the ground is wet.
    b. *Because the ground is wet, it has rained.

The fact that it has rained is a cause of the ground being wet. Hence, the because-clause in (10a) is a causal one. In (10b), on the other hand, the because-clause cannot be causal. The intended reading of the sentence is something like this: “From the fact that the ground is wet, I conclude that it must have rained.” In such a case, sentence-initial because-clauses are not allowed (see Hirose (1991) for a more detailed discussion).

Fourthly, Nakau (1994) observes that a causal because-clause can be clefted, as in (11a), whereas an inferential because-clause cannot, as in (11b):

(11) a. It’s because he’s sick that he’s not coming to class.
    b. *It’s because his wife told me that he’s not coming to class.

Lastly, Lakoff (1987: 474ff.) notes that speech act constructions that convey statements can occur in sentence-final because-clauses. Consider the following contrast:

(12) a. We should go on a picnic, because isn’t it a beautiful day!
    b. *Because isn’t it a beautiful day, we should go on a picnic.

The rhetorical question isn’t it a beautiful day, a kind of speech act construction, occurs in the sentence-final because-clause in (12a), and the sentence is acceptable. Such constructions, however, cannot occur in the sentence-initial because-clause as in (12b). Kanetani (2005),
reviewing Lakoff's analysis, argues that it is in inferential because-clauses, and not in causal ones, that speech act constructions can occur. To see the validity of this analysis, observe the following examples:

(13)  

a. Sam is not going out for dinner because his wife is cooking Japanese food.  

(Hooper and Thompson (1973: 494))

b. *Sam is not going out for dinner because Japanese food, his wife is cooking.  

(Kanetani (2005: 88))

Since the sentence in (13a) allows a wide-scope reading of the matrix negation, the because-clause is a causal one (cf. (8c)). Kanetani thus argues that even in sentence-final position, if the because-clause is a causal one, speech act constructions like the topicalization in (13b) are not allowed. Since sentence-initial because-clauses, in which speech act constructions are not allowed, are always causal ones, we can say, along the line of Kanetani (2005), that inferential because-clauses allow speech act constructions to occur in them, while causal because-clauses do not.

Thus far, we have observed five syntactic behaviors of causal and inferential because-clauses. Their different behaviors may be used for diagnosis of causal and inferential because-clauses. The diagnosis table is shown below:

(14)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>causal</th>
<th>inferential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. nominalization</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. wide scope of matrix negation</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. sentence-initial position</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. clefting</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. speech act constructions</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2. Since-Clauses

Let us now turn to since-clauses. The conjunction since arguably has only an inferential use (cf. Sweetser (1990), Nakau (1994),

4 The topicalization in the sentence-final because-clause in (13b), Japanese food, his wife is cooking, conveys a statement like his wife is cooking Japanese food (see fn. 2). Nevertheless, the sentence is not acceptable. Thus, Kanetani (2005) points out that because-clauses being in sentence-final position is not a sufficient condition for speech act constructions to occur in them, and that the inferential because-clause, which must appear in sentence-final position, provides the sufficient condition for speech act constructions to occur therein.
Kanetani (2005)). Here I use the term “inferential” in a wide sense. That is, even if the situations described in the main clause and the since-clause seem to express a causal relation between them, some kind of speaker’s inferential process must be involved. This can be demonstrated by the following contrast:

(15) John died {since/because} the bullet hit him in the head.

The sentence above describes the causal relation between John’s death and the bullet hitting him in the head. The causal relation in this sentence is so direct and so easy to understand that it is difficult for the speaker’s subjective inferential process to lie between the two situations. In such a context, only marginally can since connect the two situations.

In the previous subsection, the diagnosis of causal and inferential because-clauses (= (14)) has been presented. Note here that the different syntactic behaviors listed in (14) should be attributed to the different interpretations; thus, the diagnosis is not restricted to because-clauses, but can be extended to other conjunctions of reason. In what follows, to show that since-clauses have only inferential uses, I investigate syntactic behaviors of since-clauses, applying the diagnosis in (14) to since-clauses in the order of (14a)>(14b)>(14d)>(14e)>(14c).

First, like inferential because-clauses, and unlike causal because-clauses, since-clauses cannot be nominalized, as shown in (16):

(16) *Since John’s death, Mary remarried. (Wickboldt (1997: 85))

The sentence in (16) is intended to mean “John died, and for that reason, Mary remarried.” The sentence is not grammatical, although its clausal counterpart Since John died, Mary remarried is perfectly acceptable.

Second, as Hirose (1991) argues, since-clauses are not inside the matrix negation. Consider the following:

(17) a. John is not happy since he’s rich.
    b. NEG [John is happy] since he’s rich
    c. *NEG [John is happy since he’s rich] (Hirose (1991: 29))

The behavior regarding the scope of negation is parallel to inferential because-clauses, but is different from causal because-clauses (cf. (14b)).

Third, as Nakau (1994) observes, since-clauses cannot be clefted, as shown in (18) (cf. Wickboldt (1997)):

(18) *It was since they wanted to save lives that they retreated.

(Nakau (1994: 162))

Again, this is a parallel behavior to inferential because-clauses and is a different behavior from causal because-clauses (cf. (14d)).
Fourthly, as we have already seen in section 2, Lakoff (1987) observes that speech act constructions that convey statements can occur in since-clauses as well. The relevant example is repeated below:

(19) I’m going to cheat on my taxes, since who will ever find out?

Here, the rhetorical question, *who will ever find out*, occurs in the since-clause and the sentence is grammatical. This is also the same behavior as inferential because-clauses (cf. (14e)).

So far, our examination of since-clauses based on the diagnosis of because-clauses in (14) has revealed that the conjunction since introduces the premise of an inference rather than the cause of a situation. The third item of the diagnosis table (14c), i.e. sentence-initial subordinate clauses, however, seems to be contradictory to the present view, because since-clauses can appear in sentence-initial position, expressing the premise of an inference. Consider the following sentence:

(20) Since John isn’t here, he has gone home.

(Sweetser (1990: 78))

In this sentence, the speaker draws the conclusion that John has gone home from the premise that he “is not here.” The sentence-initial since-clause, however, is not a counterexample. On the contrary, it is a piece of supporting evidence for since-clauses having only inferential uses. The reason why sentences with the sentence-initial since-clause can describe an inferential process is that the conjunction since, unlike because, unambiguously introduces the premise of an inference. That is, while because-clauses may have an inferential reading only when they are in sentence-final position, since-clauses do not need such a requirement to have an inferential reading.5 From these observations, we can conclude that since-clauses do not have causal uses.

There is another good piece of evidence to show that sentence-initial since-clauses behave in the same way as inferential because-clauses. Observe the following example:

(21) … since in no real sense could they be said to have had the

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5 In order to distinguish sentence-final causal because-clauses from inferential because-clauses, another elaboration is required. In Rutherford’s (1970) terms, the former are restricted and the latter non-restricted. The difference is particularly important for distinguishing a causal relation from an inferential process for reasons to be mentioned in section 3.3.
opportunity of availing themselves of the action project, they are omitted ... from most of the following analysis. (BNC) The subject-auxiliary inversion, a kind of speech act construction expressing a statement, occurs in the sentence-initial *since*-clause in this sentence. The occurrence of this type of speech act constructions in subordinate reason clauses is characteristic to their inferential uses (cf. (14e)). Hence, the reason introduced by *since*, even in sentence-initial position, is considered not to be a cause of the situation described in the main clause, but to be the premise from which to draw the conclusion described in the main clause.

In sum, the conjunction *since* unambiguously has an inferential use.

3.3. Characteristics of the Constructions

In the last two subsections, I have argued that the reason introduced by *because* is ambiguous between a cause of another situation and the premise of an inferential process, while the reason introduced by *since* is unambiguously the premise of an inference. Kanetani (2005), following Hirose (1998), proposes a construction grammar approach to the conjunctions in question (cf. Goldberg (1995)). Kanetani states that the differences at issue are the constructional differences rather than the difference of conjunctions themselves and argues that different syntactic behaviors such as those listed in (14) should be attributed to the characteristic of each construction. More specifically, the causal relation between situation1 and situation2 is mapped onto either [C2 *because* C1] or [Because C1, C2], in which C(lause)1 and C2 denote a situation1 and another situation2, respectively. These form-meaning correspondences are understood as grammatical units called causal constructions. Likewise, an inferential process in which the speaker draws a conclusion (situation2) from the premise (situation1) is mapped onto either [C2, *because* C1], [C2, *since* C1], or [Since C1, C2]. Each of these form-meaning correspondences is an instance of what may be called the inferential construction (for more details, see Kanetani (2005)).

What is important for the present discussion is that causal constructions perform one speech act in a whole sentence, while inferential constructions perform two. The following contrast cited from Kanetani (2005) demonstrates this point:

(22) a. Is the ground wet because it has rained? (Kanetani (2005: 85))

b. Has it rained because the ground is wet.
Sentence (22a) is an interrogative sentence of the causal construction, while sentence (22b) is an interrogative sentence of the inferential construction. The arrows indicate intonation patterns. The different intonation patterns (and punctuations) suggest that the causal construction performs one speech act, i.e. the question asking whether the rain caused the ground to become wet, while the inferential construction performs two, i.e. the question asking whether it has rained and the statement that the ground is wet.

The difference reflects how we conceptualize causal relations and inferential relations (Kanetani (2005)). As for causal relations, the speaker takes as a single process the whole process in which a situation causes another situation. Consider the following example:

(23) The ground is wet because it has rained.

In this sentence, the whole causal chain in which the rain has caused the ground to be wet is taken at once. On the other hand, sentences that describe inferential relations denote the process in which the speaker (subjectively) connects two situations that may not necessarily be related in the real world. Take the sentence in (24) as an example:

(24) It has rained, because the ground is wet.

Logically, the cause of the wet ground does not have to be the rain. However, the speaker sees the wet ground, and then concludes that it has rained based on his common knowledge of the world or experience. In other words, it may not have rained, and even if it has, there need not be a necessary causal relation between the rain and the wet ground. Besides, there may be other possible reasons for the speaker to conclude that it has rained, say, to see a rainbow in the sky, to see someone get home wet, to hear the news about the rain, etc.

Note in passing that the inferential construction, whether because or since is used, requires a comma intonation between the main clause and the subordinate clause (e.g. Rutherford (1970), Sweetser (1990), Nakau (1994), Hirose (1998), Kanetani (2005)). The obligatory comma intonation symbolically functions as separating speech acts between the main clause and the subordinate clause.

Lastly, it is important to note that what is crucial in describing the focalizability of conjunctions by certain focusing adverbs is not the type of conjunctions, but the type of constructions that the conjunctions participate in. More precisely, the characteristics of causal and inferential constructions discussed in this subsection are the most important; that
is, causal constructions perform one speech act as a whole and the whole sentence is taken as one information-unit, while the main clause and the subordinate clause of inferential constructions are taken as independent information-units.6

4. Two Types of Focusing Adverbs: Exclusives and Particularizers

In the previous section, I have discussed the characteristics of the constructions that because and since participate in. In this section, I investigate how focusing adverbs focalize what follows them, i.e. another important factor crucially involved in the focalizability of because-clauses and since-clauses by focusing adverbs.

Quirk et al. (1985) draw a line between two types of focusing adverbs. One group is called exclusives, and includes just, simply, only, precisely, and the like. The other group, called particularizers, includes especially, particularly, largely, and the like. According to Quirk et al., these adverbs indicate that the utterance concerned is true in respect of the part focused, and the ways adverbs in each group restrict the utterance are different. Specifically, exclusives restrict the application of the utterance exclusively to the part focused; particularizers restrict the application of the utterance predominantly to the part focused.

Now that the basic characteristics of each group of focusing adverbs are given, let us observe the meaning of some adverbs more closely and investigate how they restrict the utterances. First, observe the dictionary definitions of some exclusives and particularizers listed in (25)–(26):

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6 Haegeman (2002), who mainly focuses on interpretations of conditional if-clauses and the applicability of topicalization in them, presents a similar observation from a generative perspective, using minimalist terminology (cf. Chomsky (1995)). Haegeman distinguishes central and peripheral adverbial clauses in terms of the different timings of their merger with the main clause, and points out that while the central adverbial clause (our because-clause in the causal construction) is part of the speech act of the matrix clause, the peripheral adverbial clause (our subordinate clause in the inferential construction) has independent illocutionary force. Haegeman’s analysis thus supports our view. For the purpose of the present discussion, however, detailed internal structures of adverbial clauses such as the ones that Haegeman presents in the latter part of her paper are, presumably, not necessary. Therefore, I will not go into detail about the internal syntactic structures.
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(25) exclusives
a. only: as a single fact or instance and nothing more or different (WEBSTER)
b. just: simply (WEBSTER)
c. simply: without ambiguity (WEBSTER)
d. merely: used meaning ‘only’ or simply’ to emphasize a fact or s[ome]th[ing] that you are saying (OALD6)
e. solely: only; not involving s[ome]b[ody] /s[ome]th[ing] else (OALD6)
f. precisely: to emphasize that a reason or fact is the only important one there is ... (COBUILD4)

(26) particularizers
a. particularly: distinctive among other examples or cases of the same general category (WEBSTER)
b. especially: in particular (WEBSTER)
c. largely: in a large manner; especially (WEBSTER)
d. mainly: used to show that a statement is true to a large degree (OALD6)
e. mostly: indicate that the statement is generally true ... in most respects (COBUILD4)
f. principally: more than anything else (COBUILD4)

The dictionary definitions of exclusives in (25) show that adverbs in this group exclude other possibilities than the one described. Exclusives thus highlight what follows them by singling it out and denying other possibilities. Considering the definitions of particularizers in (26), on the other hand, we can see that they do not exclude other possibilities. Rather, they imply that there are other possibilities than the one described. Particularizers thus highlight what follows them by comparing it with other similar examples or cases.

Let us then observe more clearly how focalizations are done by exclusives and particularizers. First, consider the following example:

(27) You can tell just by looking at me that I am all right ... (COBUILD4, s.v. just)

In (27), the by-phrase is focalized by the exclusive just. The sentence indicates that the only way the addressee can tell the speaker is right is by looking at him: No other way can be evoked.

Next, to see how particularizers focalize what follows them, observe the following sentence, which involves the focalization by the particularizer especially:
(28) Millions of wild flowers color the valleys, especially in April and May ... (COBUILD\(^4\), s.v. especially)

In this sentence, the period during which the valleys are colored by wild flowers is not limited to April and May. Rather, the focalization of the period by the particularizer implies that there are other seasons when people can enjoy the colored valleys, say, March, June, etc.

Huddleston and Pullum (2002) divide focusing adverbs into two groups from a similar point of view.\(^7\) They refer to adverbs such as only, just, precisely, simply, and the like, as total restrictive focusing modifiers; adverbs such as especially, mainly, particularly, mostly, and the like, as partial restrictive focusing modifiers. The former corresponds to Quirk et al.'s (1985) exclusives and the latter to their particularizers. Henceforth, in order to avoid confusion, I use Quirk et al.'s (1985) terms. Consider the following sentence, where the particularizer mainly focalizes the prepositional phrase that follows:

(29) I was concerned mainly about the cost.

(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 592))

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 592) say that this sentence “do[es] not say (as [it] would with only) that I wasn’t concerned with anything except the cost, but rather that I wasn’t concerned with anything else to the same extent: any other concerns are relatively minor [emphasis is mine].” As the italicized phrase “any other concerns” suggests, focalization by a particularizer implies that there are other possibilities that are not explicitly mentioned in the given sentence. Furthermore, as indicated by the parenthesized phrase “as [it] would with only,” Huddleston and Pullum also acknowledge that when an exclusive like only is used, such an implication is not present.

In sum, if exclusives restrict utterances, there are no other possibilities than those described. If particularizers are used, there are other implicit possibilities than those described.\(^8\)

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\(^7\) I thank an anonymous reviewer for calling my attention to Huddleston and Pullum (2002).

\(^8\) Biber et al. (1999: 780–781) do not distinguish exclusives and particularizers, integrating them as restrictive adverbials. They say that “restrictive adverbials [especially and only in (ia, b)] emphasize that the proposition is true in a way which expressly excludes some other possibilities [italics are mine].”
5. Analysis

The last two sections have investigated the characteristics of causal and inferential constructions and the ways exclusives and particularizers restrict utterances. Based on those observations, I propose in this section a generalization about the focalizability of because-clauses and since-clauses by focusing adverbs. Before that, however, let us observe what type of focusing adverbs can focalize what type of conjunctions and argue why.

First, causal because-clauses can be focalized by exclusives, as illustrated in (30):

(30) He went to college just because his parents asked him to.

In this sentence, the situation of his parents’ asking a favor of him has caused another situation, i.e. his going to college. The exclusive just in front of the because-clause restricts the cause to the one expressed in the sentence. Thus, the sentence in (30) denotes that only the fact that his parents asked him to go to college is the cause of his going to college. Recall that in causal constructions, the whole sentence is taken as one information-unit. In other words, the cause situation and the result situation are not taken independently, but taken as a kind of combined process. Hence, the inseparability of cause from result. That is, if there is a certain result, its cause must exist. Focalizations of because-clauses by exclusives assert that there are no other causes or reasons than the one expressed, and at the same time, presuppose that the situation described in the reason clause exists (cf. Horn (1969)).

(i) a. The villagers say jokingly that only a sick man would choose such a remote place to build.

b. A heart born especially for me, Jackie used to tease. (ibid.)

As far as (ia) is concerned, their observation is true. However, as I have argued so far, the adverb especially in (ib) does not exclude other possibilities than for me, but rather implies the presence of some other possibilities. In this respect, their observation seems inappropriate. The distinction of exclusives and particularizers (Quirk et al. (1985), Huddleston and Pullum (2002)) is crucial (especially for the present research), and therefore, I do not follow Biber et al.’s (1999) observation.

9 Horn (1969) discusses the semantics of only. He argues that “Only X” presupposes the affirmative proposition, P(X), and asserts the negative proposition, P(X and no other than X). A similar point is made by Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 588). In the present paper, I simply assume that a similar explanation holds for other exclusives, because the ways they restrict the utterance are all the same.
Therefore, exclusives may focalize causal _because_-clauses, restricting the cause situation exclusively to the one described.

Second, causal _because_-clauses may be focalized by particularizers as well as exclusives. One such example is given in (31):

(31) It was largely because of you that he failed.  
(KDEC, s.v. _because_)

The _because_-clause in (31) is nominalized and clefted, which means that the _because_-clause is a causal one (see (14a, d)). In fact, the sentence denotes the causal relation between the addressee’s action and the failure of the person referred to as _he_. The _because_-clause is focalized by _largely_, a particularizer. Again, the important characteristic of causal constructions is that the cause and result are inseparably linked. This, however, does not necessarily mean that there is only one cause for one result; there may be more than one cause for one result as far as they are inseparably linked. Consider the following example:

(32) Above all, it is because I can distinguish the narrating from the narrated and because I can (re)constitute the latter with the former that I can begin to talk about the world represented.10  
(Prince, G., _Narratology_, 1982: 60)

The _because_-clauses in this sentence are clefted; that is, they are causal ones. What is important here is that there are two _because_-clauses and that the two situations therein, i.e. that the speaker can distinguish the narrating from the narrated and that the speaker can (re)constitute the latter with the former, jointly cause another situation, i.e. that the speaker can begin to talk about the world represented (cf. Rutherford (1970)).11 Thus, there may be multiple causes for one result. If so, focalizations of causal _because_-clauses by particularizers, like the one involved in (28), do not present any problem. Such focalizations imply that there are other situations than the one expressed in the _because_-clause, which jointly cause the result expressed in the main clause. In (31), for example, “his failure” has been caused by not only the

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10 I thank Naoaki Wada for providing me with this example.
11 Rutherford (1970) provides the following example:

(i) He’s not coming to class because he’s sick and because he doesn’t like school anyway.  
(Rutherford (1970: 98))

This sentence also expresses two causes for one result; his sickness and his school phobia cause him not to come to class.
FOCALIZATIONS OF BECAUSE AND SINCE

addressee's action but also some other additional factors, but the addressee's action was the most noteworthy or the most important. Therefore, not only exclusives but also particularizers may focalize causal because-clauses, implying that there are other possible situations that, together with the situation described in the sentence, cause the one result.

Third, inferential because-clauses and since-clauses cannot be focalized by exclusives. The relevant examples are repeated below:

(33) a. *It has rained, just because the ground is wet. (= (3))
    b. *He went to college just since his parents asked him to. (= (1a))

In (33a, b), the inferential because-clause and the since-clause are focalized by the exclusive just, and the sentences are not acceptable. Since exclusives exclude other possibilities than the one described, using them in front of subordinators excludes other reasons than those described. For example, in (33a), if the sentence were grammatical, the focalization of the because-clause by the exclusive just would exclude other reasons to conclude that it has rained. However, this is not plausible. As I mentioned in section 3.3, there may be other reasons to conclude that it has rained, since an inference is merely a process in which the speaker subjectively connects two situations that need not have a necessary causal relation in the real world. Hence, it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrict the reason for the inference only to the one expressed. A similar explanation holds for the ungrammaticality of (33b). Therefore, subordinators in the inferential construction cannot be focalized by exclusives.

Fourthly, and as can be expected, inferential because-clauses and since-clauses may be focalized by particularizers, as exemplified in (34):

(34) a. Normally they were military officers, partly because the army provided a supply of trained talent, ... and mainly because the organization of defence was the crucial part of their work. (BNC [italics are mine])
    b. Wearing a different one every time she went out would be only natural, particularly since a sari does not have to be washed as frequently as a dress ... (= (2))

In (34a), the because-clauses are used to express the premises from which to draw the conclusion that they were military officers. Those because-clauses are focalized by such particularizers as partly and mainly. In (34b), the since-clause is focalized by the particularizer particu-
larly. As I have repeatedly mentioned, in inferential processes, there is no necessary causal relation between the two situations described. Rather, the two situations happen to be related to each other by the speaker. To see this, consider sentence (24), repeated here as (35):

(35) It has rained, because the ground is wet. (= (24))

In this sentence, the situation of the ground being wet happens to be used as the premise to conclude that it has rained, but at the same time, there are other possible situations that may be used as premises from which to draw the conclusion (see section 3.3). Reasons described in the inferential subordinate clauses are thus chosen from many other possible candidates. Since particularizers highlight one among other examples or cases of the same general category, they can focalize the subordinate clause in the inferential construction, without denying other possible reasons. Hence, there is no reason to ban the focalization of inferential because-clauses and since-clauses by particularizers.

The above discussion is summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>exclusives</th>
<th>particularizers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>causal constructions</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inferential constructions</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That is, the following generalization is made about the focalizability of because-clauses and since-clauses by focusing adverbs: Causal because-clauses can be focalized by both exclusives and particularizers; inferential because-clauses and since-clauses can be focalized by particularizers, but not by exclusives.

Given the above generalization, despite the widely accepted view that since-clauses cannot be focalized by focusing adverbs (e.g. Quirk et al. (1985), Schourup and Waida (1988), Wickboldt (1997)), one may predict that there are many examples like (34b) in which since-clauses are focalized by particularizers. This prediction is borne out:

(37) a. ..... since I’ve just sworn an oath to this effect, it might seem pointless to offer further assurances, particularly since I can’t back them up. (BNC)

b. Specifically since you’re from Midwest City, are you aware of any around Interstate 40 between Oklahoma City and Midwest City?

(cnn.com/US/9703/okc.trial/transcripts/may/051497.am.html?eref=sitesearch)

c. Measuring biomass in vegetation monitoring is used infrequently mostly since it involves some degree of
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destructive sampling.

(www.nps.gov/plants/restore/pubs/intronatplant/caring.htm)

d. Spring is generally a calm, cool and dry season, principally since the Atlantic has lost much of its heat throughout the autumn and winter.

(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate_of_the_United_Kingdom)

((37a–d): italics are mine)

In (37a–d), the since-clauses are focalized by particularly, specifically, mostly, and principally, all of which belong to particularizers. These findings are not surprising at all under the proposed analysis. If, as Schourup and Waida (1988) claim, since-clauses conveyed old information and were not focalized, how would the grammaticality of these examples be explained? Under the proposed analysis, their grammaticality can be explained in the same way as that of sentence (34b), and no problem arises. There are so many examples of since-clauses being focalized by focusing adverbs as in (37a–d) that we may say that the focalized since-clause in (2) (= (34b)) is not exceptional but just one example of a wider phenomenon.

I conclude this section by considering the following attested example:

(38) Carl’s Jr. has done it again.

I mean, showing us a half-clad, car-washing Paris Hilton was one thing, but they may have gone too far this time. Especially since, who really cares about Paris Hilton, anyway? (www.newsreview.info/section/BLOG08)

In this example, the speaker criticizes the content of a commercial for the burger restaurant chain Carl’s Jr., whose broadcast was prohibited

12 The examples of ungrammatical since-clauses given by Schourup and Waida (1988) are focalized by the exclusives just and simply, as in (ia, b). (It should also be noted that Quirk et al.’s (1985) and Wickboldt’s (1997) examples of unacceptable since-clauses are focalized by the exclusive only (with no explanation about the unacceptability).)

(i) a. He went to college just {because/*since} his parents asked him to.

(= (1a))

b. Don’t expect me to marry you simply {because/*since} you’re rich.

(= (1b))

(Schourup and Waida (1988: 95))

As far as these examples are concerned, their observation is correct. What I would like to emphasize is that information structural accounts would wrongly rule out even grammatical sentences such as (34b), (37a–d), and (38); in this respect, their account is inadequate.
because of the extreme content. The *since*-clause is focalized by the particularizer *especially*. In addition, the rhetorical question *who really cares about Paris Hilton* occurs in it. Note also that the *since*-clause in (38) no longer syntactically subordinates to the main clause, i.e., the *since*-clause behaves as an independent clause, though it still provides the premise from which to draw the conclusion that Carl’s Jr. may have gone too far. That is, the *since*-clause is focalized and asserted as an independent clause at the same time. These facts are exactly what is predicted by the proposed analysis; they will be difficult to account for in terms of the previous analyses which claim that *since*-clauses convey old information. Therefore, the proposed analysis is both empirically and theoretically more convincing than the analysis based on information structural distinction.

6. Conclusion

I have argued (especially in section 5) that conjunctions used in the causal construction may be focused by exclusives and particularizers, while those in the inferential construction can be focalized only by particularizers. This generalization is obtained by considering the characteristics of the causal and inferential constructions (section 3) and the ways focusing adverbs focalize what follows them (section 4). As is clear from the discussion in section 2, the status (old vs. new) of information conveyed by *because-* and *since*-clauses is not relevant to accounting for the focalizability of *because*-clauses and *since*-clauses.

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Corpus and Dictionaries

BNC=The British National Corpus [http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/]
COBUILD4=Collins COBUILD English Advanced Learners English Dictionary,
KDEC=The Kenkyusha Dictionary of English Collocations (2003), Kenkyusha, Tokyo.
WEBSTER=Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary [http://www.m-w.com]

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