Previous studies have noted that there are two kinds of secondary predicates in English: depictive predicates and conditional predicates. However, a systematic analysis of the two kinds of predicates has not yet been done, and their relationship has not been made clear. In this paper, we will examine syntactic and semantic properties of these predicates and point out peculiar properties of conditional predicates. We argue that in a generic context depictive predicates can be interpreted as conditional predicates and that under the non-instantaneous framework proposed by Kajita 1977, depictive predicates in a generic context develop into conditional predicates. It will be shown that the relationship between the two kinds of predicates and the unique properties of conditional predicates automatically follow from our analysis.

1. INTRODUCTION. There is a construction in English containing adjunct predicates:

(1) a. John drank coffee black yesterday.
    b. John died happy.
    c. John may visit us sober. (Emonds 1985: 76)

The italicized predicates are called secondary predicates (henceforth SPs), because they are adjuncts, which are not selected by any head.¹

¹ I am grateful to Yasuhiko Kato, Yoshiyuki Igarashi, Masatake Arimoto, and Takeshi Omuro for their helpful comments. Thanks are also due to Ms. Susan Offner and Fr. David Mayer, who kindly acted as informants.¹ The predicates in the following are not secondary predicates in the sense used here and by Rothstein (1983: 148, 161), because they are not adjunct predicates. Therefore they are not dealt with in this paper.

(i) John painted the roof red.
(ii) There are twenty people sick.

The predicate in (i) is called a resultative predicate, because it expresses the resultative state of the NP in the sentence caused by an action denoted by the verb. Tsuzuki 1987 discusses a resultative predicate and concludes that it is a goal argument of the matrix verb because it imposes strong selectional restrictions on the matrix verb and it is parallel with a goal argument of a change-of-location verb. The predicate in (ii) is peculiar to there constructions. Milsark 1974 and Williams 1984 deal with this kind of predicate, and analyze it as a primary predicate.
The SPs in 1 describe the temporary states of their subjects when the actions or processes take place, and they are called depictive predicates or temporal APs by Halliday 1967, Rothstein 1983, Iwasawa 1985, and others. We will call them depictive SPs. A second kind of SP has been pointed out by Halliday and others, as shown in 2.

(2) a. John drinks coffee *black*.
    b. I can’t work *hungry*.
    d. John is very witty *drunk*.

The SPs in 2 express a condition under which the rest of the sentence holds and are therefore called conditional predicates by Halliday and others. While they have noted the distinction between depictive SPs and conditional SPs, they have not yet made a systematic analysis of this distinction.

Halliday 1967 states that some SPs can be interpreted ambiguously either as depictive or as conditional. As for the SPs in 2, those occurring in 2a, 2b, and 2c are ambiguous. He goes on to say that each SP shows different paraphrasability. For example, ambiguous SP constructions like 3a are paraphrased as 3b in the case of a depictive reading and as 3c in the case of a conditional reading. (Halliday 1977: 80)

(3) a. I eat them *raw*.
    b. When I eat them, they are raw.
       (That’s how they are when I eat them.)
    c. I eat them, if (when) they are raw.
       (That’s the condition under which I will eat them.)

He states that this distinction seems to reflect a different status in the clause: depictive SPs seem to be a constituent of the clause, but conditional SPs might not be. This is as far as Halliday goes. He states, moreover, that the distinction between the two kinds of SPs is somewhat arbitrary.

Next, let us look at Rothstein’s 1983 analysis. She presents 2c as an example, saying that 2c can be interpreted either as depictive or conditional. She paraphrases 2c into the following statements (Rothstein 1983: 173, fn.):

(4) a. The book sells at a cheap price. (depictive reading)

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2 The term ‘subject’ is used here in the sense of a subject-predicate relation. This use of subject should not be confused with the subject defined structurally.
b. The book sells only when it is cheap. (conditional reading)

Nothing further is said. She concludes that there are no syntactic features which distinguish depictive SPs and conditional SPs and that the differences between them must be taken care of by the semantic interpretation.

Lastly we will consider Iwasawa’s 1985 analysis. He noticed the different syntactic behaviors of depictive SPs and conditional SPs. Specifically, he distinguishes the two kinds of SPs by such features as preposability and the possibility of being focused. On the basis of these differences, he concludes that depictive SP is \( V'' \) complement and conditional SP is \( V''' \) complement in the sense of Jackendoff’s 1977 Unified Three-Level Hypothesis. Thus Iwasawa shows that the two kinds of SPs occupy different syntactic positions in the phrase markers. However, he does not touch upon ambiguous SP constructions such as 2a, 2b, 2c, and does not show the relationship between the two kinds of SPs. In other words, he does not clarify when SPs are interpreted as depictive and when they are interpreted as conditional.

The previous analyses have failed to make clear the relationship between depictive SPs and conditional SPs. In this paper, by examining syntactic and semantic properties of the two kinds of SPs, we will argue under the non-instantaneous theory proposed by Kajita 1977 that conditional SPs are derived from depictive SPs. We will then show that our analysis explains the relationship between the two kinds of SPs.

2. SYNTACTIC PROPERTIES OF SPs

2.1. LOCATION OF SPs IN THE PHRASE MARKERS. In this section, we analyze depictive SPs and conditional SPs from a syntactic point of view.

First, let us look at the preposability. It has been accepted that the higher the node an element is dominated by, the more easily it is preposable.\(^3\) Manner adverbs such as *easily* and *quickly* are located

\(^3\) Williams 1974 claims that the higher the element is placed in a tree, the more easily it is preposable, observing the following sentences:

(i) In the woods, John saw Mary.
(ii) ?In the drawer, I left the pins.

The PP in (i), which has a general locative meaning, ‘In the woods, X happened’, is outside VP (Pred. Phrase in his term) so that it is preposable. On the other hand, the PP in (ii) is inside VP and cannot be preposed easily. A similar argument about *with* phrases is made in Sakakibara 1982.
within a VP node in the phrase marker and modify the verbs directly. When they are placed pre-sententially, their acceptability decreases, as shown in 5a. On the other hand, a when clause, an if clause, and a without phrase, which express conditions, are considered to be outside of a VP node and modify the whole sentence. They can occur pre-sententially, as shown in 5b, 5c, and 5d.

(5) a. ??Quickly, he walked.
   b. When I tell him to, he studies.
   c. If we give him a watch, he will be pleased.
   d. Without water, we could not live for a week.

When depictive SPs are fronted, the acceptability of the constructions decreases, like that of the constructions containing manner adverbs.

(6) a. *Black, John drank coffee yesterday.
   b. ??Happy, John died.

On the other hand, conditional SPs can be fronted, like when clauses, if clauses, and without phrases.

(7) a. (?) Black, John drinks coffee.4
   b. Hungry, John can’t work.
   c. Drunk, John is very witty.

Second, let us consider the ability of SPs to occur outside of a negation scope. It has been accepted that an element within a VP node must be necessarily affected under negation.5 Manner adverbs must be affected under negation. Therefore, in negated sentences, they cannot occur in a pre-sentential position, because that position is outside of the negation scope. As seen above, even in non-negated sentences their acceptability decreases when they are preposed. What we want to show here is,

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4 Sentence 7a and sentence 10a, which will be shown later, exhibit a slightly decreased acceptability. This slight decrease in acceptability might be due to the fact that the preposed element black has a subject-predicate relation not with subject NP John but object NP coffee so that this relation is difficult to obtain. This is confirmed by the fact that depictive SP construction 6a is a little worse than depictive SP construction 6b in acceptability, though both can be considered unacceptable. In the former, an SP has a subject-predicate relation with an object NP, while in the latter, an SP has the relation with a subject NP.

5 The argument about a negation scope and focus is given by Ota 1980. It is argued there that the element within a VP node of the sentence is affected under negation and that the element hanging from an S node is unaffected under negation and that the element hanging from an S node is either affected or unaffected. The same kind of argument can be seen in Sakakibara 1982, and Takami 1987. See note 6 for a related discussion.
however, that under negation the sentences become completely un-
acceptable for the reasons mentioned above. On the other hand, *when clauses, if clauses, and without phrases can occur pre-
sententially, because they need not be within the negation scope.

(8) a. *Quickly, he didn’t walk. (Ota 1980: 482)
   b. When I tell him to, he won’t study.
   c. If we leave him alone, he will not be happy.
   d. Without water, we could not live for a week.

Depictive SPs, like manner adverbs, cannot be fronted.

(9) a. *Black, John didn’t drink coffee yesterday.
   b. *Happy, John didn’t die.

On the other hand, conditional SPs, like when clauses, if clauses, and without phrases, can be fronted.

(10) a.(?) Black, John doesn’t drink coffee.
    b. Hungry, John can’t work.
    c. Naked, Mary doesn’t look slim.

Thus, depictive SPs are clearly distinguished from conditional SPs in
that the former patterns after manner adverbs and the latter patterns after when clauses, if clauses, and without phrases. Depictive SPs are con-
sidered to be within a VP node and modify a main verb directly while conditional SPs are considered to hang from an S node and modify the rest of the whole sentence.6

2.2. SUBJECT-PREDICATE RELATIONS OF SPs. Depictive SPs and condi-
tional SPs are predicates, and hence they have a subject-predicate
relation with their subject NPs. In this section, we will look at some
properties of the subject-predicate relation of SPs. It is widely accepted

6 Sakakibara 1982 assumes the following structure for various adverbial clauses and
classes items that occur after the verb in a sentence into four classes.

```
( i )
   /
  /  
 V^4 (S) IV although, while, since,
       because (performative)
         /
 V^3 (S) III because, when, before, if, etc.
         /
 V^2 (VP) II manner adv., with phrases of attendant circumstances
          /
 V^1 (V) I
```

His motivations for dividing adverbials into four classes include differences among them in strict subcategorization or in coreference restriction. Following Sakakibara, we consider when clauses and if clauses as items of class III, which hang from an S node of a sentence.
that subject-predicate relations including obligatory control relations are usually assured by some licensing rule which minimally requires that its subject (controller) must c-command the predicate (controllee). Therefore, the predicates within a VP node can have a subject-predicate relation either with object NPs or with subject NPs, because both NPs c-command such predicates. This is demonstrated by the behavior of constructions containing a purpose clause, which is considered to be within a VP node.

(11) a. [A cat]i walked in [WHj for us to pet tj].
    (Maranz 1982: 132)

b. John bought [a dog]i [WHj to play with tj].

On the other hand, the predicates outside of a VP node can have a subject-predicate relation only with subject NPs, because only subject NPs c-command such predicates. This is illustrated by the acceptability of constructions containing a while clause or a participle phrase as seen below, which are considered to hang from an S node.

(12) a. *They kidnapped Johni while [PRO shaving himselfj].
    (Williams 1974: 185)

b. Johni was kidnapped while [PRO shaving himselfj].
    (ibid.)

c. *They kidnapped Johni, [PRO shaving himselfj].

d. Johni was kidnapped, [PRO shaving himselfj].

In section 2.1., it has been shown that depictive SPs are located within a VP node whereas conditional SPs hang from an S node. It is then predicted that depictive SPs have a subject-predicate relation either with subject NPs or with object NPs while conditional SPs can have such a relation only with subject NPs. As for depictive SPs, the above prediction is borne out. They have a subject-predicate relation either with subject SPs as in 1b and 1c, or with object NPs as in 1a, as is expected. As for conditional SPs, however, they have an unexpected subject-predicate relation either with subject NPs as in 2b or with object

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7 The licensing rule includes, for instance, a predication rule proposed by Williams 1980. Notice that two kinds of the notion 'c-command' have been so far proposed. In case predicates are immediately dominated by a VP node, the notion 'c-command' in the sense of Aoun & Sportiche 1982 must be adopted in order for object NPs to c-command the predicates. Alternatively, even if the notion 'c-command' in the sense of Reinhart 1976 is adopted, object NPs can c-command the predicates as far as the predicates are within V. As for the detailed analysis about the predication rule itself and specific analysis about depictive SPs and purpose clauses, see Tsuzuki 1987.
NPs as in 2a. In other words, as to subject-predicate relations, conditional SPs have a peculiar property, which is unpredictable from any licensing rule. One might ask then why conditional SPs have such a unique property. Later in section 4, we will seek some explanation for this question.

3. Semantic properties of SPs

3.1. Semantic restrictions on depictive SPs. In this section, we will explore semantic restrictions on the occurrence of depictive SPs. Depictive SPs describe the temporal state of their subject when the action or process takes place. It follows then that verbs must denote action or process and that SPs must denote a temporal state.

First, let us consider the restriction on verbs: verbs must denote action or process, in other words, an event. Putting it another way, verbs which denote state do not allow depictive SPs. In order to capture this fact, the notion of a dynamic/stative verb distinction is useful. Dynamic verbs describe events, whereas stative verbs describe states. There are several criteria for the distinction between the two kinds of verbs. One of them is that stative verbs do not take a progressive construction, as shown in 13.

(13) a. *John is knowing that. (stative)
   b. John is drinking tea. (dynamic)

The classification by Quirk et al. 1985 is as follows:

(14) stative  quality—be (tall), have (two legs), etc.
     state—be (angry), have (a cold), love, think,
            know, resemble, etc.

     dynamic  durative—rain, drink, improve, talk, write, eat,
               play, etc.

     punctual—sneeze, kick, catch, arrive, die, flash,
               receive, etc.

We can say, then, that dynamic verbs allow depictive SPs, while stative

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8 Quirk et al. (1985: 177, 200-8) introduce a dynamic/stative verb distinction. The same kind of distinction is given by Lakoff 1966, and Dowty 1975.

9 The list is simplified. We omit what they call ‘stance’ verbs such as stand, sit, and lie. They give stance verbs an intermediate status between dynamic verbs and stative verbs. But Lakoff 1966 classifies stance verbs as dynamic verbs (non-stative verbs in his terms) because they can take progressive forms and imperative forms like other dynamic verbs. Following Lakoff, we regard stance verbs as dynamic verbs. This analysis explains why stance verbs allow depictive SPs.

(i) John sat there sad.
verbs do not. This is demonstrated by the following examples. Sentences 15a and 15b containing stative verbs do not allow depictive SPs.

(15) a. *John is dead happy.
    b. *John respects Mary intelligent.

On the other hand, sentences 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, and 2c, where verbs, such as drink, die, visit, work, and sell, are dynamic, allow depictive SPs. In section 3.2., we will explore why some depictive SPs, such as in 2a, 2b, and 2c, can be interpreted as conditional SPs.

Next, let us look at a restriction on SPs: SPs must express a temporal state, as in 16.

(16) a. I met John drunk/naked/*tall/*intelligent.

Milsark 1974 divides adjectives into two classes according to whether or not they are allowed in the 'coda' positions of existential sentences.10

(17) a. There are twenty people sick.
    b. There is a man naked.

(18) a. *There are linguists intelligent.
    b. *There are people tall.

Milsark refers to the allowable adjectives as 'state-descriptive' and the adjectives which are not allowed as being 'property' adjectives.

(19) a. state-descriptive adjectives—sick, drunk, stoned, closed, open, naked, etc.
    b. property adjectives—tall, intelligent, stupid, fat, skinny, heavy, light, etc.

State-descriptive adjectives denote a temporary and changeable state or condition in which an entity finds itself, while property adjectives denote more or less the permanent, essential property of the entities with which they are predicated. Milsalk's classification is refined by Carlson 1977. Carlson first distinguishes generic sentences from non-generic sentences.11 The former is a sentence in which some property is attributed directly to the individual itself, while the latter is a sentence where properties are not attributed directly to the individual, but rather to a temporal part of an individual, called a 'stage'. From this point of view,

11 The notion of generic sentence used here and in Carlson 1977 is more general than the term is usually considered to be. Not only sentences with generic subjects are generic but also those with definite specific subjects may be generic. See Carlson (1977: 174-95). The same use of this term is seen in Kuroda 1972.
adjectives in predicative positions are divided into two:

(20) a. 'individual'—intelligent, fat, female, etc.
    b. 'stage'—alive dead, drunk, sober, etc.

This individual/stage distinction corresponds to Milsark's property/state-descriptive classification. Thus the adjective expressing temporary state can be defined and only such adjectives can be depictive SPs.

In this section, we have shown the semantic restrictions on the occurrence of depictive SPs. What should be noted is that the semantic restrictions mentioned above are an automatic consequence of a depictive reading.

3.2. SEMANTIC RESTRICTIONS ON CONDITIONAL SPs. In this section, we will explore semantic restrictions on the occurrence of conditional SPs. Conditional SPs describe a condition under which the rest of the sentence holds, like conditional clauses and phrases. Therefore, there are no such restrictions on the occurrence of conditional SPs like the restrictions on that of depictive SPs. Observing conditional SP constructions, however, there seem to be some restrictions on them.

First, let us compare an SP construction having no conditional reading 21a with a conditional SP construction 21b.

(21) a.(=1a) John drank coffee black yesterday.
    b.(=2a) John drinks coffee black.

The difference between 21a and 21b is that the former is a report of a particular action by John and the latter is a statement of John's habit. Sentence 21a reports John's action which took place yesterday, while sentence 21b does not entail a particular occurrence of John's action but expresses John's habit. In order to capture this difference, the notion of generic/non-generic sentences is useful. In section 3.1., we showed the notion of generic/non-generic sentences presented by Carlson. We will examine this notion to make clearer the semantic restrictions on conditional SP constructions.

Generic sentences express a general, habitual, or constant state of affairs of some sort, whereas non-generic sentences refer to a particular occurrence of an event or state of affairs. In the case of dynamic verbs, verbs are in a non-progressive present tense form for generic meaning, as shown in 22a, while verbs are in a progressive form for non-generic meaning, as in 22b.

(22) a. John walks to school.
    b. John is walking to school now.
22a is a statement about John's habit, whereas 22b is about the particular occurrence of an event, John's walking to school. When verbs are in a past tense form, the distinction between generic and non-generic is neutralized and the sentence becomes ambiguous.

(23) John walked to school.

Sentence 23 is interpreted either as John's past habit or as John's action at a particular time. Such sentences are in some cases disambiguated by time adverbs of the type occurring in la. Second, let us consider the case of stative verbs, by taking as examples the verb be and the verb look. Carlson's individual/stage adjective distinction can be used here. When such verbs occur with 'individual' adjectives, sentences are generic, as in 24a. When these verbs occur with 'stage' adjectives, sentences are non-generic, as in 24b and 24c.

(24) a. John is polite/intelligent/fat.
    b. John is naked/drunk/asleep.
    c. John looks excited.

Sentence 24a describes John's nature and characteristics, while sentences 24b and 24c express John's temporal condition at a particular time. In addition, when verbs with 'individual' adjectives are in a progressive form, sentences become non-generic.

(25) John is being polite today.

Having defined generic sentences, let us return to the case of SP constructions. It seems that all the SP constructions in 1, which have no conditional readings, are non-generic, whereas all the SP constructions in 2, which have a conditional reading, are generic, in the sense defined above. Let us take each sentence one by one, skipping sentences la and 2a, which have already been noted. Sentence 1b describes John's state at the time he died. Sentence 1c expresses the speaker's prediction about John's action at a particular time in the future. These sentences describe particular actions which took place or will take place at a particular time, and then are considered as non-generic. On the other hand, sentence 2b expresses the speaker's ability—the speaker's characteristic, and is thus generic. This is because an auxiliary verb, can, in a deontic sense, expresses the ability of the subject NP. Another auxiliary verb, will, in a deontic sense, expresses the volition or habitualness of the subject NP. Hence, sentences with will become generic too. Thus, conditional SPs are allowed.

(26) John won't work hungry.

Sentence 2c is what is called a 'medio-passive' construction. A 'medio-
passive' construction is generally considered to be the description of the essential character of the subject NP. Goldsmith 1985 states that the state of affairs (the books are sold, for example, in sentence 2c) is viewed as causally flowing out of some properties of the subject NP (the book). Hence, it can be said that the medio-passive construction is generic. This view is well supported by the fact that medio-passive is typically in the non-progressive form. Lastly, sentence 2d, where stative verb be and an 'individual' adjective co-occur, characterizes John's nature. As shown above, SP constructions which have a conditional reading as in 2 are all generic sentences. Therefore, we can say that conditional SPs are limited to a generic context.

Next, we will examine semantic restrictions on conditional SPs themselves, comparing the following sentences.

(27) a. John drinks coffee black/hot.
   b. *John can pass examinations intelligent.

Conditional SP construction 27a is acceptable, because black in the sense used here and hot denote the temporal state of object NP, coffee. In contrast, 27b is unacceptable, because intelligent describes the essential character of John. In other words, conditional SPs must be 'stage' adjectives in the sense of Carlson. This is confirmed by the fact that all the conditional SPs in 2 are 'stage' adjectives. Notice here that the same semantic restrictions hold of depictive SPs.

In sum, there are two semantic restrictions on the occurrence of conditional SPs: One is that conditional SPs are limited to a generic context. The other is that SPs must be 'stage' adjectives. What is important is that these restrictions are not an automatic consequence of conditional interpretation. This is clear from the fact that the following conditional constructions are acceptable in spite of violating the two restrictions on conditional SPs.

(28) a. I will visit John tomorrow if I feel good.
   b. John will pass the examination if he is intelligent.

Sentence 28a, referring to a particular action on the next day, is non-generic. Sentence 28b contains the 'individual' adjective intelligent in an if clause. Thus, the two restrictions on conditional SPs do not automatically follow from a conditional reading while the restrictions on depictive SPs follow from a depictive reading. This leads us to ask why conditional SPs have such unique properties that cannot be derived from anywhere. This question must be answered for an explanatory theory. Hence, in the next sections, we will seek to give a satisfactory answer.
4. A DYNAMIC APPROACH TO SPs

4.1. A PROBLEM UNDER THE STANDARD ANALYSIS. In section 2.1., it has been shown that depictive SPs are within a VP node like manner adverbs and conditional SPs hang from an S node like if clauses. Accordingly, the elements within a VP node such as depictive SPs and manner adverbs modify the verbs directly and express the temporal state of their subjects or the manner of action at the time when the action takes place. The elements hanging from an S node modify the rest of the sentence and express, for instance, the condition under which the sentence holds. Under the standard framework, it may be claimed then that SPs which are generated within VP are interpreted as depictive and SPs which are generated outside of VP are interpreted as conditional. This simple way of analysis does account for the distribution of depictive SPs, but it does not account for the peculiarities of conditional SPs, which have been pointed out in the previous sections. The first property to be considered is that the distribution of conditional SPs is restricted to a generic context. The second is that conditional SPs must be ‘stage’ adjectives. These properties are not seen in if clauses, which also express conditions, and are unique to conditional SPs. Third and lastly, as pointed out in section 2.2., conditional SPs exhibit peculiar properties in subject-predicate relations, which are unpredictable from any rule licensing such relations. Thus, conditional SPs have these three peculiar properties which cannot be derived from anywhere and one may ask their origin. The standard analysis may stipulate such properties but cannot explain why conditional SPs have such properties. To overcome this problem, we introduce the non-instantaneous grammatical theory proposed by Kajita 1977. In this theory, a particular grammar consists of basic rules and derivative rules, the latter being acquired under certain conditions on the basis of more basic rules already acquired. We will show that under this theory the unique properties of conditional SPs, and the relationship

12 'The standard framework' used here means the one proposed by Jackendoff 1977, Ota 1980, Nakajima 1982, or Takami 1987, which assumes that the bar-level position of an element corresponds to its interpretation. See notes 5 and 6 for a related discussion.

13 See Kajita 1977 for the details of this theory.
between depictive SPs and conditional SPs are well explained.

4.2. A PROPOSAL. First of all, we will examine the relationship between depictive SPs and conditional SPs, paying attention to the semantic restriction on the contexts where these SPs appear. Depictive SPs can occur either in a generic context or in a non-generic context. In contrast, conditional SPs are limited to a generic context. It will be true then that, in a generic context, SPs are interpreted either as depictive or as conditional. In order to confirm this, let us compare the paraphrasability of SP construction in a non-generic context and SP construction in a generic context.

(29) a. John drank coffee black yesterday.
   =When John drank coffee yesterday, it was black.
   *Whenever
   *If
   c. =John drank coffee yesterday, {when whenever if} it was black.

(30) a. John drinks coffee black.
   =When John drinks coffee, it is black.
   Whenever
   If
   c. =John drinks coffee, {when whenever if} it is black.

In the paraphrase of the SP construction in a non-generic context, the SP must appear in a main clause and the subordinator when must be used. In contrast, in the paraphrase of the SP construction in a generic context, the SP can appear either in a main clause or in a subordinate clause and either when(ever) or if can be used. Thus, it is shown that SP constructions in a non-generic context can only be paraphrased like depictive SP constructions and that SP constructions in a generic context can be paraphrased either like depictive SP constructions or like conditional SP constructions. What is more important, whether SP constructions in a generic context such as 30a are paraphrased like depictive SP constructions as in 30b or like conditional SP constructions as in 30c, there is virtually no difference in meaning. Furthermore, regardless of whether when(ever) is used for a paraphrase or if is used for a paraphrase, sentence 30 makes no practical difference in meaning either. That is to
say, whether SPs are interpreted as depictive or conditional, SP constructions in a generic context are virtually equivalent in meaning. It has previously been argued that SPs generated within a VP node are interpreted as depictive. It must be then that, in a generic context, even if SPs within a VP node whose readings are essentially depictive are interpreted as conditional, they express virtually equivalent meaning. We may say then that some SPs, which are within a VP node and originally interpreted as depictive, are interpreted as conditional, though such conditional reading is essentially for the elements hanging from an S node. This situation is called a kind of ‘syntactico-semantic discrepancy’ in the framework of the non-instantaneous theory. It is because depictive SPs in a generic context are semantically felt to express a condition in the manner of if clauses but are not given an appropriate syntactic position for that interpretation.

Before considering the nature of syntactico-semantic discrepancy involved in SP constructions, let us now briefly look at what syntactico-semantic discrepancy is, taking the following sentence 31 as an example.

(31) Possibly, he has made a too generous offer. (Kajita 1977: 60)

In sentence 31, possibly is felt to modify either the rest of the whole sentence or the degree adverb too. Either way of interpretation makes no practical difference. Moreover the degree adverb too is felt to be the most natural semantic associate of sentence adverb possibly, though possibly is in a sentence-modifying position. This situation is syntactico-semantic discrepancy, which is one of the properties of basic rules that motivate an extension of the rules. In the non-instantaneous theory, the following process is assumed.14

(32) If, at a certain stage of acquisition $S_i$, a syntactico-semantic discrepancy occurs, then, at the next stage $S_{i+1}$, rules of syntactic reinterpretation are introduced as derivative rules so that the discrepancy in question may be eliminated by the application of the rules.

In order to eliminate syntactico-semantic discrepancy, rules of ‘syntactic reinterpretation’ operate. Sentence 31 is syntactically reinterpreted by such a rule, and becomes sentence 33.

(33) He has made a possibly too generous offer. (Kajita 1977: 60)

By this rule, possibly has been moved from its original sentence-modi-

fying position to another position where it is directly associated with the most natural semantic partner too.

Let us return to SP constructions. Depictive SP constructions in a generic context yield a situation of syntactico-semantic discrepancy: Depictive SPs in a generic context are semantically felt to be interpreted as if clauses but are not given an appropriate syntactic position for that interpretation. In other words, depictive SPs in a generic context are semantically felt to modify the rest of the whole sentence like if clauses but are syntactically given a position to modify the main verb or the verb phrase directly, where depictive SPs are originally placed. In order to eliminate this syntactico-semantic discrepancy, depictive SPs in a generic context are syntactically reanalyzed outside of a VP node of the sentence, where SPs are in direct syntactic association with their natural semantic partner (i.e. the rest of the whole sentence). That is to say, we claim that depictive SPs in a generic context develop into conditional SPs on the model of if clauses, which are semantically similar to SPs in a generic context. For example, a structure containing a depictive SP as in 34 is converted into another structure containing a conditional SP as in 36 on the model of an if clause construction 35 by a rule of syntactic reinterpretation.

\[
(34) \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{I} \quad \text{VP} \\
\quad \text{can't} \quad \text{work} \quad \text{AP} \\
\]

\[
(35) \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{I} \quad \text{VP} \quad \text{PP} \\
\quad \text{can't} \quad \text{work} \quad \text{if I am hungry} \\
\]

The same kind of derivational process is observed in Sakakibara 1982. He claims that with phrases move upward derivatively, from the basic with phrase of attendant circumstances such as (i), to a derivative with phrase of cause, time, or condition such as (ii). (Sakakibara 1982: 79)

(i) We repeated the exercise with arms kept rigid.

(ii) With the pronoun in parentheses remaining, these sentences are more or less acceptable.

The with phrase in (i) is placed within a VP node, while the with phrase in (ii) hangs from an S node.
Thus, in a generic context, depictive SPs are reanalyzed and taken out of the VP node of the sentence, where if clauses are placed, and become conditional SPs. The syntactic reanalysis of SPs is demonstrated by the ability of conditional SPs to occur in a presentential position shown in section 2.1. It has been shown that conditional SPs behave syntactically just like if clauses, which hang from an S node. Thus, we conclude that conditional SPs are derivatively generated on the model of if clauses.

4.3. CONSEQUENCES. Let us show how our analysis accounts for the peculiar properties of conditional SPs, which would otherwise have remained unexplained. First, the distribution of conditional SPs is limited to a generic context. The reanalysis is put into motion so that conditional SPs are derived only when a situation arises where a depictive SP is felt to express a condition, i.e. a generic context. Second, conditional SPs have the following semantic restriction: SPs must be 'stage' adjectives. The same semantic restriction holds for depictive SPs as mentioned in section 3.1. Thus, by analyzing conditional SPs as deriving from depictive SPs, we can attribute this property of conditional SPs to that of depictive SPs. Third, conditional SPs have a subject-predicate relation either with a subject NP as in 2b or with an object NP as in 2a, which is unpredictable from the rules licensing subject-predicate relations as shown in section 2.2. Notice that depictive SPs also have a subject-predicate relation either with a subject NP as in 1b and 1c or with an object NP as in 1a. Moreover, as to a subject-predicate relation with an indirect object NP, conditional SPs also exhibit the same property as depictive SPs. Conditional SPs, like depictive SPs cannot have such a relation with an indirect object NP, as illustrated below.

(37) a. *My mother gives me medicine sick. (conditional)
    b. *The nurse gave John the medicine sick. (depictive)

(Rothstein 1983: 154)

Thus, conditional SPs exhibit exactly the same subject-predicate relation as depictive SPs, and so under our extension analysis we can also attribute this property of conditional SPs to that of depictive
SPs. In this way, the unique properties of conditional SPs described above follow automatically from our analysis, in which depictive SPs and conditional SPs are related by the extension. Such unique properties must otherwise be stipulated separately and why such properties are obtained by conditional SPs would be left totally unresolved.

4.4. Further developments. Within the framework of the non-instantaneous theory, we have claimed that conditional SPs are derived from depictive SPs on the model of if phrases. One thing we must note, however, is that there are some conditional SPs which have no corresponding depictive SPs. Among conditional SP constructions in 2, the verb of sentence 2d is stative. There are many conditional SP constructions whose verbs are stative.

(38) a. Rhubarb tastes bitter raw.
    b. John sounds intelligent drunk.

It was shown in section 3.1. that stative verbs do not allow depictive SPs. Hence, 2d and 38 lack their underlying structures, i.e. depictive SP constructions. This might appear to present a problem for our analysis. The non-instantaneous theory assumes, however, that since grammatical rules consist of basic rules and derivative rules and a derivative rule is acquired on the basis of more basic rules, it will no longer be necessary to derive all kinds of conditional SPs uniformly from depictive SPs by a rule of syntactic reinterpretation. Once some conditional SP constructions are derived from depictive SP constructions by reanalysis, an extension proceeds by which other kinds of conditional SP constructions may be generated directly on the model of already existing conditional SP costructions, bypassing depictive SP constructions, as long as a certain condition is met. In this case, the condition is that sentences must be generic and SPs must be 'stage' adjectives. Conditional SP constructions with stative verbs in 2d and 38 are all generic, where stative verbs and 'individual' adjectives co-occur. Moreover, SPs in 2d and 38 are all 'stage' adjectives. Thus, the condition is met, and conditional SP constructions 2d and 38 are generated directly, bypassing depictive SP constructions, on the model of more basic structures (such

16 The subject-predicate relations between object NPs and conditional SPs cannot be obtained by any licensing rule in a usual sense, as has already been pointed out. We imagine that such relations might be derivatively obtained.
as sentences 2a, 2b, and 2c) which are derived by reanalysis from depictive SP constructions.\textsuperscript{17}

Seen from a different point of view, conditional SP constructions with stative verbs are possible for the following reason: Stative verbs do not allow depictive SPs, because the depictive reading is incompatible with stative verbs. The interpretation of depictive SP constructions is that when the action or process (event) takes place, some entity is in such-and-such a condition. As a result, stative verbs, which do not express action or process, do not allow depictive SPs. However, once depictive SPs are reanalyzed as conditional SPs in a generic context, the sentence comes to mean that, if some entity is in such-and-such a condition, some entity or other has such-and-such a characteristic or habit. This interpretation is compatible with stative verbs, as long as sentences express a generic context. Thus, conditional SP constructions with stative verbs such as 2d and 38 are possible.

It has been demonstrated in Kajita 1977 and Okada 1984 that the notion 'bypass' is necessary to explain other linguistic facts. Sentence 39a, for example, is considered to be generated by passivization, but does not have its corresponding underlying structure 39b.

\begin{equation}
\text{(39) a. He was said to come from Ireland.}
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
\text{b. *They said him to come from Ireland. (Okada 1984: 104)}
\end{equation}

Sentence 39a is regarded as being generated directly, on the model of more basic structures which has a corresponding underlying structure shown below.

\begin{equation}
\text{(40) He was believed to come from Ireland.}
\end{equation}

Thus, the notion 'bypass' is independently motivated to account for other linguistic facts.

5. CONCLUSION. In this paper, depictive SPs and conditional SPs have been analyzed from syntactic and semantic points of view, and it has

\textsuperscript{17} Some stative verbs such as \textit{love}, \textit{think}, and \textit{know} do not allow conditional SPs even in a generic context, which is in fact difficult to define in sentences containing such verbs. This restriction might be partly related to the fact that they are called 'private verbs', which denote states of mind, volition, emotion, or attitude. We do not yet know the exact reason why some class of stative verbs does not allow conditional SPs and we do not pursue this problem any further. We can say at least that this might reflect the more derivative nature of conditional SP constructions containing stative verbs.
been found that conditional SPs have unique properties which cannot be derived from anywhere under the standard analysis. It has also been found that depictive SPs in a generic context can be interpreted as conditional SPs. We have then argued under the non-instantaneous theory that conditional SPs are derivatively generated from depictive SPs on the model of conditional clauses. It has been shown that our analysis automatically accounts for the relationship between depictive SPs and conditional SPs, and the unique properties of conditional SPs.

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