THE INVISIBLE CORE OF RESISTANCE:
THE ANTI-AESTHETIC AND ANTI-ORGANIC
TENDENCY IN AARON’S ROD

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I

D. H. Lawrence’s Aaron’s Rod (1922) has been considered an unsuccessful novel for its lack of organic form and an objective representation of characters and events.¹ In addition, the thematic advocacy of a strong leader introduced by Rawdon Lilly, a protagonist seen as Lawrence’s mouthpiece, has been condemned for its implicit conspiracy with protofascism and its phallocentricity.² Against these negative criticisms, some critics have tried to reevaluate the novel mainly from the artistic standpoint. Paul G. Baker’s detailed study finds the novel’s remarkable management of aesthetic, biblical, and historical materials the equal of Lawrence’s other major novels.³ Yet, the anti-aesthetic and anti-organic peculiarity of the work seems to remain marginalized. Baker’s insights into that ironic tendency to digress from organic construction are overturned by his general conclusion that

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Aaron's Rod is “a highly complex and skillfully organized work of art” (166). It is in fact inexpedient, as L. D. Clark points out in his review of Baker’s book, to reevaluate the novel as a coherently or organically constructed work from the viewpoint of the artistic achievement. Although there can be found a tendency or symptom to seek for some kind of totality, connecting seemingly irrelevant events and giving them coherent meanings, the novel’s point is that, menaced by the other tendency which resists or ignores both the formal and thematic totality, the former cannot be dominant or natural any longer, but must be suspended, foregrounded, and put into question. It is impossible to reevaluate the novel without acknowledging this anti-organic tendency, which actually dismantles the novel’s potential inclination toward protofascistic and phallocentric ideology as well.

The prevalent view that sees Aaron and Lilly as the two halves of Lawrence, and that sees the author’s split selfhood as what “prevents Lawrence from resolving the powerful thrust toward self-discovery and rebirth” (Clark 261) might be still valid. However, the critical measure that values protagonists’ development or formation of selfhood cannot apply to the anti-developmental inclination of Aaron’s Rod. The split of Lawrence’s self, moreover, cannot be ascribed to his psychological problems alone: rather, it is closely related to the aesthetic and political ones, causing radical raptures not simply between Aaron and Lilly but also within each of them. The split can also be seen between the work and the reader as well as between the author and the work. It is the nature and implications of these ruptures, which cannot be developed or resolved but can be significantly transformed, that I would like to elucidate in the following argument.

3 In The Art of the Self in D. H. Lawrence (Athens: Ohio UP, 1977), Marguerite Beebe Howe, also regarding the novel as one of “the clearest presentations of his ego psychology” (3), states that “Aaron’s being is confirmed by Rawdon Lilly, his alter ego. The two men are complements; Lilly is analytical, verbal, asexual; Aaron is physical, emotional” (91).
4 As Tony Pinkney suggests in D. H. Lawrence and Modernism (Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 1990), it is important to recognize the “essentially synchronic nature” of the Aaron and Lilly couple, of which relation has “no beginning and no end” (107). There is no denying, however, the counter existence of the other temporal nature of the novel, which, belonging to the organic and developmental tendency, tries to engender a genuine continuity or diachronicness.
II

It must be noted first of all that the novel is self-reflexive about its immoral, unconventional stance and about the possible discrepancy it creates between author and reader. The novel’s episodic formlessness is in reality an important and inevitable effect of the author’s provocative indifference not only to the reader but to his own artistic composition and characterization. This anti-aesthetic nature peculiar to Aaron’s Rod is analogous to the free-floating and inharmonious Aaron and is quite convincingly discussed by John Worthen, who claims that the novel is “designed to make us protest” by being “as perverse and as obstinate as Aaron himself.”¹ Aaron’s obstinacy in resisting any harmonious connection with people is specifically thematized by his musical preference. He wishes to “go back to melody pure and simple” (136), abhorring any kind of chords and harmonies: “I know orchestra makes me blind with hate or I don’t know what. But I want to throw bombs” (225).² The positive tune Aaron plays on his flute is actually a “wild, savage, non-human lurch and squander of sound, beautiful, but entirely unaesthetic” (225). Besides, even in his relation to his flute, Aaron’s rod, his soul does not necessarily pass into it smoothly: “There was a big residue left, to go bitter, or to ferment into good old wine of wisdom” (187). There is a disjunction between his self and his instrument of self-expression, which, as an imperfect medium of communication, is to be broken and left behind. Aaron’s principle of conduct is veritably chance: “I believe, if I go my own way, without tying my nose to a job, chance will always throw something in my way: enough to get along with” (143). For him there are only contingent relations between being and action. What the novel protests against, in other words, is the reader’s aesthetic attitude that tries to find some organic and meaningful relations, judging their worth according to the degree to which they cohere.

The novel’s provocative indifference to the world and the constructive form is shared by Lilly. He is not “only just one proposition” but “lots of mes” (103), and so he wanders geographically, apathetic to any fixed rela-

¹ John Worthen, *D. H. Lawrence and the Idea of the Novel* (London: Macmillan, 1979) 121, 123. His view that the novel “ends with the mystical submission of one man to another” (132) differs from my later argument about the crucial discrepancy between Aaron and Lilly.

tion with the world or its people, believing that a man "should remain himself, not try to spread himself over humanity" (97) and that people never get anywhere till they "break the old forms" (120). Lilly is also allocated the similar predicament of self-expression. The representational vehicle of Lilly is words, in contrast to Aaron's music, but his words cannot be an authentic expression either, as Lilly defines his job as "to write lies" (110). When he tries to save Jim "with a certain belief in himself as a saviour" (73), Jim punches Lilly in the wind. As with Aaron, there is a gap between Lilly and the world and his utterance is not received by people without trapping him in the system of Christ/Judas betrayal: "A Jesus makes a Judas inevitable" (97). He is thus forced to admit the gap between his essence and the medium, and between his being and the world. To be sure, he proposes an organic theory of self and society; his final role may be to integrate his own as well as Aaron's split, free-floating self. But his very enunciation and the content of the theory bring about, against his or Lawrence's intention, a radical contradiction which paradoxically contributes to breaking the novel's form.

III

The theme of self-discovery, which many critics find central to Aaron's Rod should be reassessed in light of this anti-aesthetic aspect. For those critics who seek to defend the coherent form by including the novel in the picaresque or in Bildungsroman, the theme of self-realization is indispensable in supporting the generic form. Baker writes: "The growth from youth to maturity or 'consciousness' of the traditional bildungsroman is conceived in Lawrencean terms as the struggle of one man to escape the fetters of a life both meaningless and destructive" (123). William R. Barr also maintains that Aaron's development in "his perception of himself" contributes to the novel's creation of "a depth absent from other picaresque novels of comparable length."1 A reexamination of the way in which the discovery or perception of Aaron's self is represented, however, brings to light his undeveloped and repeated aberration from the identity imposed not only by society but by the narrator and Lilly.

The Invisible Core of Resistance

The following passage is often cited as proof of Aaron’s self-realization:

Then suddenly, on this Sunday evening in the strange country, he realised something about himself. He realised that he had never intended to yield himself fully to her or to anything; that he did not intend ever to yield himself up entirely to her or to anything; that his very being pivoted on the fact of his isolate self-responsibility, aloneness. His intrinsic and central aloneness was the very centre of his being. Break it, and he broke his being. Break this central aloneness, and he broke everything. It was the great temptation, to yield himself: and it was the final sacrilege. (162)

This passage describes a kind of epiphany which reveals Aaron’s hidden past intention and convinces him of the essence of his being. In addition, the revelation of the “intrinsic and central aloneness” appears to abolish “a gulf between his passionate soul and his open mind” which he has kept “wilfully, if not consciously” (163). For his “conscious mask” or his “authentic passports to be used in the conscious world” is suddenly broken: “There he sat now maskless and invisible” (163). However, if the content of his realization is his intrinsic aloneness and invisibility that refuses any kind of conformity to the conscious world, it seems difficult to fix the revelation chronologically at this moment in the novel; for as early as Chapter II (Royal Oak) Aaron’s unassimilable essence is described as “a hard core of irrational, exhausting withholding of himself,” “something in him that would not give in — neither to the whiskey, nor the women, nor even the music,” or the “invisible black dog” sitting “in the middle of him” of which presence he “knew” and “was a little uneasy” (22). Barr, who argues that it is not Aaron’s identity but rather “his perception of himself [which] can and does change” (221), might say that what is changed is not the content but the form of Aaron’s self-realization; still, the subconscious mode of his perceiving his essence does not change. Since he has “hated knowing what he felt” (163) he knew subconsciously the presence of his core before, and it is “in his own powerful but subconscious fashion” (164) that the self-realization here occurs again. Both the content and the form of the realization of his intrinsic self are thus changeless. What has changed suddenly is the narrative style and the way the reader should see Aaron. His open mind is lost but only replaced by and externalized into the narrator’s words: “These words are my own affair. His mind was music. Don’t grumble at me then, gentle reader, and swear at me that this damned fellow wasn’t half clever enough to think all these smart things, and realise all these fine-
drawn-out subtleties” (164). In other words, Aaron’s open, conscious mask, “his complete and satisfactory idea of himself” (163), is simply transposed by the narrator into a comical mask.

After justifying the intrusive translation of Aaron’s musical mind, the narrator goes on to introduce organic metaphors that purport to be the sign of Aaron’s self-sufficiency. According to the narrator, his “loneliness or single-ness” is accepted as “a fulfilment” and his unified self gets rid of his past uneasiness. The non-verbal self-sufficiency is then compared to “a thing which has its root deep in life, and has lost its anxiety,” and to the lily that is “life-rooted, life-central” and free from “that strain and that anxiety with which we try to weave ourselves a life” (166). Nevertheless, this independent “single-ness” proves to be illusory. At the beginning of the next chapter, for example, it is narrated that after his “breaking loose from one connection after another” there is “nothingness”: “There was just himself, and blank nothingness” (178). The naturally fulfilled condition is at the same time human non-existence: the state of aloneness can thus be swayed by the diametrically opposed value judgments. Besides, what Aaron uses when he talks or disputes with other people including Lilly is still words, the mode of his self-expression which is assumed to be inauthentic. His action and enunciation thus make the whole epiphanic scene fictionally and metaphorically erroneous: the stable thing-like self or the unperceivable self-sufficiency without verbal consciousness becomes a mere illusion invented by the changeable narrator.

Disclosing hiatuses between the non-human and human worlds, between his musical thoughts and articulated words, between the organic metaphors and his existence, Aaron’s endless journey makes clear the impossibility of the narrator’s enclosure of Aaron into the non-verbal and natural sphere, completely separated from society. In fact, the influence of the outside conscious world remains unavoidable and his outside mask continues to function as his passport, as is clear from the succeeding episodes where he is welcome and willing to join various people and enjoy their company. The reconnection with the outside world, of course, is not necessarily positive; he cannot sometimes discern properly how the passport is exploited by surrounding people.¹ The more excited he feels about human communica-

tion, the more drastic the reaction becomes. After he gets “worked up” (230) with the Marchesa Del Torre and robbed, “it became essential to him to feel that the sentinel stood guard in his own heart” (231). The “sentinel of the soul” (231) can be equated with the “invisible black dog” in the center of Aaron’s being, the “hard core” which resists being carried off. But the sentinel cannot prevent Aaron from being charmed by the Marchesa again. Denying deathly consummation with the Cleopatra-like Marchesa he eventually leaves her. But his broken Aaron’s rod, which means the demystification of his phallocentric and melocentric power over women, marks not the recuperation of his autonomous selfhood but the restart of his search for another partner, another mystifying bond with Lilly.

It would be worth confirming the feature of Aaron’s opposing core, which keeps operating, even if transiently and reactively, as the base of his resistance and freedom of action. Whether it is called the “invisible black dog” or “the sentinel,” the core should be differentiated not only from the passport given by society but also from a thing-like or a lily-like self-sufficient state. Its primordial characteristic is a reaction against the tendency that tries to fix him in society or in the natural world. Unlike in the traditional bildungsroman, Aaron’s self refuses to be incorporated into and identiﬁed by society;¹ nor can it make the natural world a peaceful habitat. The refractory core situates Aaron in the realm of in-between, which never warrants his undeﬁning identity, splitting his selfhood between the core and either the natural world or the alluring human world.

The most conspicuous representation of Aaron’s precarious self is the split that takes place in his dream at the beginning of the final chapter, just before his decisive encounter with Lilly’s speech. Baker construes this dream, in which Aaron is fissured between the “palpable or visible” Aaron and the second “invisible, conscious Aaron” (287) who anxiously watches the former, as “an integral part of his development” (Baker 134) and attempts to interpret its conclusion as “a prophecy of his renewed motion towards Lilly” because “the conscious self replaces the old palpable self, hitherto

¹ For the formulation of Bildungsroman, which would be useful to measure how far Aaron’s Rod is deviated from that tradition in literary history, see Franco Moretti, The Way of the World: The Bildungsroman in European Culture (Thetford: Verso, 1987) 3–73. According to Moretti, the only possible ending for the classical Bildungsroman is marriage, which, as an intermediate link between the individual and the society, constitutes the teleological plot structure and thereby directs youth as the sign of social mobility into maturity, that is, social stability.
unresponsive and insensitive to the warning cries of the truer ‘conscious self’” (Baker 138). Aaron’s position in the boat is indeed reversed after he strikes his elbow against three stakes. But the view that the dream prophesies the reunification of Aaron’s two selves and his decision to follow Lilly seems far-fetched. For the reversal is described as merely accidental: “the palpable Aaron changed his position as he sat, and drew in his arm: though even now he was not aware of any need to do so” (288). It cannot be presumed, as Baker does, that “heeding for the first time the call of his inner soul, Aaron therefore reverses his dream position” (Baker 138). The warning, which is in fact uttered by the boatmen, not by the conscious Aaron, is simply inaudible. The split of Aaron’s self makes a violent contrast with the narrator’s earlier assertion in chapter XIII that the “inaudible music of his conscious soul conveyed his meaning in him quite as clearly as I convey it in words” (164). For here in the last chapter, there is no communication, no conveyance of meaning between the two split selves. In spite of the narrator’s previous assumption that there exists an autonomy in his soul, in this dream, it is completely broken and there is no link between his intention and action.

It should be remembered, of course, that this episode is framed in a dream, that is, in an inauthentic form of narration, the content of which should not be taken literally. Aaron, in reality, does not allow either himself or others to connect dreams with real life by interpreting the meaning. He advises Lady Franks not to mind her dreadful dream of the usurpation of her house by the Novara work-people, assuring her that “whatever one foresees, and feels has happened, never happens in real life” (156). Aaron’s indifference holds true for his own dreams: he cares nothing about his “violent dreams of strange, black strife, something like the street-riot in Milan, but more terrible” (258). As regards the present dream also, he relinquishes the effort to “remember what he had been dreaming, and what it all meant” (288). In this sense, it might be said that the novel requires the reader to share Aaron’s indifference to dreams, whose form and content are illusory. Then why is this long dream description necessary, if dreams truly are insignificant? The dream, indeed, symptomatically indicates a culmination of the fragmentary narrative: the reversal of quasi-realistic narration. It seems as if the narrator is driven to take recourse in the dream form, since he is unable to manage Aaron’s increasingly uncertain and dream-like reality. For example, Aaron cannot make out the meaning of the street-riot in
Milan, which is really happening before him: "His mind and soul were in a whirl. He sat in his chair and did not move again for a great while" (187). His response to the incident, as to his dreams, is a sort of paralysis caused by an undecipherable phenomenon. Just as the outside reality becomes accidental and dream-like, so does his inner reality, of which apt representation is possible only through this dream form. The intrusive narrator could assert the consistency of the narrative function as the assistance of Aaron and the reader before. Yet we have here the fragmentary and allegorical description of Aaron, which means not only Aaron’s self but also the narration are in a state of ambiguity and discontinuity, involving a radical reversal of narrative or representational values: for if the content of the dream is faithful to Aaron’s selfhood, which our analysis judges it to be, then it is the dream form that acquires the representational authenticity because of the coherence of the form and the content, making the organic or quasi-realistic narration decidedly deceitful.

IV

Instead of the narrator who, as the mediator between Aaron and the reader, is supposed to integrate the events of the novel only to reveal the narrative discrepancy and the degradation of the organic representation, Lilly appears as the final agent who is meant to synthesize Aaron’s haphazard life and the narrative tendency to fragmentary and unrealistic representation. Aaron feels “a thread of destiny attaching him to Lilly” (288), when he wakes from his dream. The approach of Aaron to Lilly hints at a re-reversal of the narrative tendencies: it is another temptation for Aaron and the reader to mis-construe that there lies at the bottom of the novel some providential and developing principle which, transcending phenomenal narrative gaps, organically and symbolically regulates Aaron’s past and future.

In contrast to Aaron’s governing principle, chance, Lilly’s principle of conduct is destiny or providence. It seems to Sir William that Lilly believes in “the Invisible — call it Providence if you will — on his side” (143). In Aaron’s chance, the appearance or action of his being is arbitrary because there is no organic correlation between them, whereas they must be organically connected in Lilly’s providence. Lilly’s conception of dream and reality clarified in the two men’s dispute about the war is therefore peculiarly providential, marked by the life-central or self-central causality of the awake
self and its genuine action. Against Aaron, Lilly insists on the unreality of the war: “It never happened to me. No more than my dreams happen. My dreams don’t happen: they only seem” (118). What is questioned by Lilly is the state of being of people who make war or are involved in it: “No man who was awake and in possession of himself would use poison gases: no man. His own awake self would scorn such a thing. It’s only when the ghastly mob-sleep, the dream helplessness of the mass-psyche overcomes him, that he becomes completely base and obscene” (119). For Lilly, the sleeping self and the resultant delusional signification like dreams can contaminate people’s consciousness, creating a false reality. His apparently nonsensical denial of the reality of the war is thus an appeal for a radical repolarization of dream and reality into Lilly, who is awake and adheres to reality, and into the sleeping world in which dreams rule. Not only dreams but also presentiments can be a vehicle that leads to death people who are without the awake and courageous self. Listening to Herbertson’s horrible experience of the war, Lilly thinks about how a corporal Wallace might have avoided death by his own spirit or by Herbertson’s help. His death, Lilly thinks, was self-inflicted because he let himself have a presentiment: “Perhaps the soul issues its own ticket of death, when it can stand no more” (116). It might not have happened, on the other hand, if Herbertson had said: “None of that, Wallace. You and I, we’ve got to live and make life smoke” (120). Lilly’s conviction that “life controls life: and not accident” (116) shows that what is called destiny or providence refers to some genuine reality which is not determined by mechanical or occasional causality but is dependent upon one’s own “life-courage” (120). Denying sheer accidents, he persists in internally hidden determinants which underlie actions and events in the world. What attracts Aaron is this providential reality: the organic connection between the wakeful self and its authentic actions and expressions.

Lilly associates the bombing and the eventual loss of Aaron’s flute with its organic rebirth as well as death in the penultimate chapter: “It’ll grow again. It’s a reed, a water-plant — you can’t kill it” (283). Aaron there was surely resonant with Lilly, thinking of what would normally be an accidental and contingent event as natural: “And the loss was for him symbolistic. It chimed with something in his soul: the bomb, the smashed flute, the end” (283). To Aaron, Lilly again seems to be the ideal figure who embodies the organic way of living. Aaron’s split self makes him oscillate between a
reactive separation from and absorption into the world. Lilly seems to gain the balance of the self and the world: “Aaron looked at Lilly, and saw the same odd, distant look on his face as on the face of some animal when it lies awake and alert, yet perfectly at one with its surroundings” (292). The use of an image of an animal in the natural world here reminds us of the description of Aaron’s self-sufficiency compared to a thing and a lily. Lilly’s theory of the wakeful and spontaneous self and its developing consciousness is also based upon the analogy between the natural world and the human world.

The organic synthesis of the human and non-human worlds, however, reopens the fundamental hiatus again as the dialogue of Aaron and Lilly progresses. Lilly preaches to Aaron that one’s own “innermost, integral unique self” develops bit by bit “from one single egg-cell which you were at your conception in your mother’s womb, on and on to the strange and peculiar complication in unity which never stops till you die — if then” (293). There is an organic parallel between the development of one’s soul and that of an egg-cell or a tree-cell, and the organic self is marked by its self-direction, which completely excludes outside conceptual influence:

You thought there was something outside, to justify you: God, or a creed, or a prescription. But remember, your soul inside you is your only Godhead. It develops your actions within you as a tree develops its own new cells. And the cells push on into buds and boughs and flowers. And these are your passion and your acts and your thoughts and expressions, your developing consciousness. You don’t know beforehand, and you can’t. You can only stick to your own soul through thick and thin. (296)

No discrepancy exists between being and action or substance and expression in Lilly’s formulation. Yet in response to Lilly’s harangue, Aaron declares that the intersubjective relationship is indispensable in the human world and that the natural entity cannot be confused with the human being: “But you talk,’ he said, ‘as if we were like trees, alone by ourselves in the world. We aren’t. If we love, it needs another person than ourselves. And if we hate, and even if we talk’” (297). Lilly apparently admits the difference but will not discard the organic model and connect the spontaneous self with the new intersubjective relation which is to come with the change of mode from love to power; while the altruistic aim of love is “to make the other person — or persons — happy,” self-central power “urges from
within, darkly, for the displacing of the old leaves, the inception of the new" (297–298). Nonetheless, the contradiction becomes manifest when he specifies the change of mode as the reversal of the poles from male to female submission: "And of course there must be one who urges, and one who is impelled. Just as in love there is a beloved and a lover: The man is supposed to be the lover, the woman the beloved. Now, in the urge of power, it is the reverse" (298). Whether or not the center is relocated from outside into inside, because self as the center cannot grow into the other and eliminate the inside/outside polarity, the metaphor which neglects the existence of the other is incompatible with the human relation which is figured as the poles. In fact, there is no difference between the love-mode and the power-mode since they equally presuppose the interpersonal structure based on the self/other or inside/outside dichotomy; the difference lies only in the change of role and in the center/margin proportion. A large part of people are destined to find a much stronger outside center: "And men must submit to the greater soul in a man, for their guidance: and women must submit to the positive power-soul in man, for their being" (298–9). If the power-urge develops independently of any outside guidance, it is not necessary for Lilly, from his external position, to advocate reversing the poles or to urge Aaron to decide whether to yield or die. Also in terms of temporality, Lilly’s abrupt claim on Aaron’s instantaneous decision about life or death contradicts the natural growth of the new mode which the metaphor of leaves invokes. Consequently Lilly’s words become a double message, relegating Aaron and the reader to the state of a doublebind. It is an order that people must and yet must not obey: to ignore the message means to betray the power-urge, whereas to submit means to betray the self which must grow spontaneously. Lilly’s “speech-music” (297) on the autonomous self and the power-urge thus makes it impossible to bridge the gap between self and other, between the natural world and the human world, and between the work and the reader. Along with the collapse of Lilly’s organic and providential scheme, the reading that implicitly relies on this model also loses its authenticity.

V

What is at stake is the possibility for the reader to resist the temptation to neglect this antinomy and resort to violent elimination of the gap that Lilly’s
theory shows. Only our adherence to Aaron's questioning of Lilly's speech can offer the chance of another reading, a critical verbal linkage between Aaron's resistive core and the reader. It would be logical, in fact, to consider that his words are uttered from his core of aloneness, which refuses to give in to anyone or anything. Although his invisible core derives from the separation from the outside conscious world, his intrinsic being and its expression are identified here. Despite the critical truism that the title of this chapter, "Words," refers to Lilly's authentic speech-music, they are not equivalent. Aaron listens "more to the voice than the words" (296) and answers "an objection from the bottom of his soul" (297). It is Aaron who utters the authentic words, words in which there is no gap between the subject and the enunciation, rather than the phallocentric and melocentric Lilly who, betraying his indifference to the world, cannot withhold his self-contradictory speech-music. It does not follow, however, that Aaron paradoxically establishes his developing consciousness by refuting the preacher of that doctrine. His audible or visible words cannot perfectly represent his inaudible or invisible core, as the absolutely opposed perceptual adjectives denote. Aaron's enunciation, in addition, is not the spontaneous product of the developing core but the instantaneous and disjunctive reaction triggered by the external pressure. There is no guaranteed safe way from his invisibility or inaudibility to the world of representation. The point is that as long as the subject is not a self-sufficient natural being or thing, it has to be reconnected with the world, uttering words even if they convey or represent only part of the self. On the other hand, in order to utter repeatedly critical statements without being contained by the conscious world, the subject's stubborn refusal of totalitarian absorption into that world is needed.

For the reader also, Aaron's words never warrant a reading conducive to any aesthetic totality. They function, rather, as the articulated base against the novel's aesthetic and organic tendency. It is his words that sustain the novel's other countervailing tendency, making it impossible either to reassess Aaron's Rod in terms of a coherently or organically constructed work or to condemn it as an embodiment of fascistic ideology because the leadership scheme itself is led to logical impossibility. The anti-aesthetic expressions, however, do not necessarily exclude the readership; rather, they reconnect the reader anti-organically and anti-aesthetically with the work, freeing us from the double-bind caused by Lilly's enunciation. The novel
brings to the reader a not necessarily happy consciousness but a critically important one, which provokes the reader not only to rethink the standard that has valorized and canonized Lawrence’s major novels so far but also to be vigilant against the organic retotalization in Lawrence’s writing later novels like *The Plumed Serpent* (1926) and our reading them.