The other question is a conceptual one and is concerned with the Case filter in (3). As mentioned above, Baker treats it as a PF condition. Recall the Case filter is essential to explaining that overt NPs must be in adjoined positions, and not in argument positions in PLs. However, the Case filter is virtually identical to the θ-visibility condition in (1b) with its parameter set nonpolysynthetically, in that both require NPs in argument positions be assigned Case. In short, the Case filter, regarded as a universal licensing condition, plays an indispensable part in PLs, while, being totally redundant in other languages, it can or should be reduced to another condition belonging to UG. This situation is strange enough to attempt to pursue a different account of the distribution of overt NPs in PLs.

Notice that I intend these remarks to tell that the far-ranging consequences of the Polysynthesis Parameter proposed in this study deserve serious consideration. I have no doubt that this study contributes markedly to the further progress of the comparative syntax guided by the Principles and Parameters approach. The Polysynthesis Parameter is highly rewarding and is exceedingly valuable reading for anyone concerned with the comparative investigation of languages.

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Denis Bouchard: *The Semantics of Syntax: A Minimalist Approach to Grammar*


Among the recent books in generative grammar, the one under review is the most ambitious attempt to refashion the model of Grammar. In particular, this book seeks to reformulate the status of semantics in the system of Grammar so that a syntactic and a semantic representation can be always tied in a transparent manner. As a result, the model of Grammar can be grossly simplified, to the extent that almost no one has so far achieved in the tradition of generative grammar. The term "minimalist" as used in the subtitle of this book should be understood in this sense rather than in the sense of
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The book under review is organized into five chapters, which are grouped into the following three parts:

- **Part I**: The Relation between Form and Meaning
- **Part II**: Selective Semantics and the Lexicon
- **Part III**: Selective Semantics and Syntax

Part I outlines the framework adopted in this book, compared to other recent frameworks. Part II copes with the problem of polysemy in a case study of six verbs of movement in French. Part III deals with syntactic issues in the analysis of psych verbs and verb movement. Since this is a very voluminous book of 525 pages, I cannot cover the most parts of it in this brief review.

Hence I decided to focus on Part I only, especially on the following three points:

(a) What kind of meaning should be included in a semantic representation?

(b) The form of a semantic representation.

(c) The nature of a mapping from a semantic to a syntactic representation.

It should be noted first of all that this book adopts a mentalist approach to meaning where it is assumed that "there is no direct connection between human language and the world as it exists outside of human existence. Natural languages are what they are because they take place in humans and are based on human concepts" (p. 67).

The first point is concerned with the question of what kind of meaning is relevant to Grammar, a problem which is inevitable in considering the relationship between meaning and form. The author's stance is that the part of meaning relevant to Grammar is much more restricted than is usually envisaged: In particular, "only the information directly expressed by the linguistic elements in the sentence are included in the semantic representation" (p. 21; italics mine). This "linguistic relevance criterion" excludes from a semantic representation those aspects of meaning that are related to the background knowledge shared by speakers. In short, the author proposes that a clear distinction be made between situational meaning, that part of meaning pertaining to the discourse context of use, and linguistic meaning, that part of meaning relevant to linguistic analysis.

The author emphasizes that this idea is unique at least in the tradition of generative grammar. According to him, "most current approaches, including . . . the thematic roles of Chomsky and Jackendoff . . . to some extent make use of features of our knowledge of the world" (p. 5), and these approaches are "global" in that "in many respects they are more a representation of knowledge than a representation of meaning" (ibid.). The author criticizes a number of current approaches to meaning throughout this book, but his claims seem quite sound in that his argumentation is based on a wide range of data.
Though this division of meaning seems unique in the tradition of generative grammar, similar ideas are also found in other schools of linguistics. It, for example, reminds me of the distinction made by Jakobson (1936) between the whole meaning (Gesamttbedeutung) and the individual meanings (Sonderbedeutungen). The former is claimed to be the decontextualized core meaning of a linguistic unit, from which its individual meanings are derived. Such "decontextualized" meaning, as distinguished from "pragmatic" meaning, is also postulated in Frawley (1992) in explicating the method of linguistic semantics. Therefore, the idea itself might not be so novel, but this book attempts to push it to the extreme. It should also be noted, however, that whether the alleged decontextualized meaning in fact exists or not is at least controversial (cf. Searle (1979)).

The organization of Conceptual Structure envisaged in this book, then, looks like the following:

![Conceptual Structure Diagram]

Conceptual Structure consists of situational and linguistic semantics. The former part of conceptual structure pertains to general cognitive capacities, coping with knowledge of the world, and hence has no direct bearing on linguistic analysis. This includes identification of references, understanding metaphors, and so forth. The latter part, on the other hand, is the linguistically relevant aspect of meaning. Of the latter part, the subpart that directly affects the form of a syntactic representation is called grammar semantics, which will be central in considering the relationship between meaning and form. Grammar semantics provides a very abstract, schematic outline of the event expressed in a sentence, which determines the syntactic organization of the sentence, and the other components are used to fill in the details. Therefore, a representation of grammar semantics does not itself have no interpretation; rather, the actual interpretation of a sentence is obtained through the interaction of all these components.

The primary reason that the author claims that knowledge of the world should be
excluded from a semantic representation is that including that kind of knowledge makes impossible a direct mapping of a semantic into a syntactic representation. Consider, for example, a semantic representation using a set of thematic roles as primitives (e.g. &lt; agent &lt; patient &gt;). The problem is that each element in such a representation, as it stands, cannot be directly linked to a particular element in the corresponding syntactic representation. In such a case, argument linking with syntax is forced to be “indexical”, i.e. some additional mechanism, which functions as a kind of “translator”, is needed to guarantee the appropriate linking. An instance of such a mechanism is “thematic hierarchy” of various sorts exploited in a variety of frameworks (cf. Jackendoff (1990), Grimshaw (1990), etc.), or a redundancy statement like UTAH (Baker (1988)). This move makes explanatory adequacy very low and the outcome not very revealing.

Another crucial reason is that global approaches to meaning cannot treat the problem of polysemy in a revealing fashion, if not at all. If knowledge of the world is used to represent meaning, we must postulate a semantic representation per use, since each use of a lexical item is defined dependent on the contextual information. Consider now the following example:

(1) Jean a enfermé le chat dans le salon.

‘Jean shut the cat up in the living room.’ (p. 41)

In (1) Jean, le chat and le salon might be analyzed as the AGENT, the THEME and the GOAL, respectively. One might expect from this analysis that this sentence describes a situation where Jean caused the cat to move from a place to the living room. But this is only one of the situations it can refer to. It is also used to describe a situation where the cat was already in the room when Jean closed the door; in such a case, le salon would be analyzed as the LOCATION instead of the GOAL. One can also conceive of a situation where Jean did not intend to shut the cat up, i.e. he was not aware that the cat was in the room; in such a case, Jean might not be analyzed as the AGENT. And so forth. The point here is that we must postulate a different set of thematic roles for each of conceivable situations. As a result, “[a] polysemous element, one which can correspond to various situations, is treated as if it were many different lexical items, each with its own meaning; polysemy is dealt with as homonymy” (p. 11). Thus such an approach misses a significant generalization.

These are the detrimental effects of global approaches to meaning. These problems can be surmounted if we completely purge knowledge of the world from a semantic representation. The merit of such a move is twofold: If the semantic representation of a sentence can be made rather simple, (i) it can be abstract (or “schematic”) enough to directly
correspond to its syntactic structure through "homomorphic mapping" (see below), enabling us to eliminate any redundancy statement from Grammar; and (ii) to enable us to postulate an invariant core meaning underlying all the usages of a lexical item, hence avoiding the problem of polysemy. (The latter point is established in a case study of six French verbs in Part II.)

Turning to the second point, let me now take a look at the shape of a semantic representation adopted in this book. First, following Jackendoff (1983), the author adopts a semantic representation involving a decomposition of the meaning of a sentence by introducing a set of primitive elements that may be combined in certain ways. But the helpfulness of using a semantic decomposition strategy to represent meaning seems to be presupposed, and it is adopted without detailed discussion.

Second, the semantic representation is very abstract and schematic in that it is expressed in terms of a tree diagram. The tree diagram is here used as a means of expressing the combination of the semantic primitives that makes up larger meaningful units; the combination, moreover, is expressed in the form of a binary association. Therefore, the minimal expression of the combination of primitives into a larger unit looks like (2):

\[
(2) \quad A \quad B
\]

The additional idea, which becomes crucial in considering the problem of linking, is that the tree diagram itself is meaningful in that the relationship it expresses must mean something.

Since a semantic representation is expressed in terms of a tree diagram, "a semantic relationship will be part of a semantic representation only if it is expressible in terms of tree structure. If it cannot be so represented, we predict that it should have no effect on the Grammar" (p. 63). Postulating that grammar semantics takes the form of a tree diagram is a necessary step toward making possible direct mapping from a semantic to a syntactic structure.

The representation in (2) is also constrained so that the unit should be identified by corresponding to some syntactic unit. This restriction is called the "Principle of Full Identification", formulated as follows:

Every (morpho-)syntactic formative of a sentence must have a corresponding element in the semantic representation. Every formative of a semantic representation must be identified by a (morpho-)syntactic element in the sentence, which is associated with that representation. (p. 22)
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Note that the constraint is bidirectional. Therefore, it also has a number of consequences regarding the possible form of a syntactic representation, one of which is concerned with the status of a projection: A projection cannot be present unless it is identified through corresponding to a certain semantic unit. Therefore, a tree diagram as used to represent a syntactic structure cannot be a "pure format" devoid of semantic value. Consider, for example, the status of intermediate projections, which Chomsky (1985: 100) argues are identified in terms of the geometric property of a tree diagram. In light of the Principle of Full Identification, however, intermediate projections are permitted to exist only if they correspond to semantic units. As a result, a non-branching projection cannot exist at all. That is, a structure such as `[s[John]]` should not be permitted; it should be simply `[sJohn]`. In fact, it is argued that all properties of a syntactic representation should be motivated by those of the corresponding semantic representation, and vice versa.

Turning to the third point, consider, next, the nature of "correspondance" between a semantic and a syntactic representation. It is argued that a homomorphic, rather than a one-to-one, correspondence is viable. The mathematical concept of homomorphism is defined as follows: "a homomorphism is a function, from its domain to its range, which preserves some structural relation defined on its domain on a similar relation defined on range" (Dowty 1991: 567). In short, a mapping of a semantic to a syntactic representation is homomorphic if it preserves the relative relations of the element involved. In fact, being both expressed in terms of a tree diagram, they indeed look very similar, but they might be different to some extent.

One of the cases where a semantic and a syntactic representation are not parallel occurs when the process of "chunking" that "maps some of the primitives into a lexical item" (p. 93) is applied to the former. For illustration, consider the semantic representation of *frighten*, which might be decomposed into "CAUSE-FRIGHT-TO":

\[
(3) \quad \text{CAUSE} \quad \text{FRIGHT} \quad \text{TO}
\]

Since the three primitives, "CAUSE", "FRIGHT" and "TO", are together realized as a single lexical item (i.e. *frighten*), they should be chunked into one element in the corresponding syntactic representation. Consider (4):

\[
\text{A} \quad \text{B} \\
\text{CAUSE} \quad \text{C} \\
\text{FRIGHT} \quad \text{D} \\
\text{TO} \quad \text{y}
\]
Note that in (4) the nodes B, C and D in (3) are chunked into the node K. Though they are different in form, (3) and (4) are equivalent from a viewpoint of homomorphism: The dominance relationship between the arguments (i.e. x and y) is preserved.

Note that direct mapping from a semantic to a syntactic representation is possible because of the postulation that grammar semantics is represented in the form of a tree diagram. At this point, one might feel that the latter postulation is intended to make a direct mapping possible. If so, the thesis of this book will not be so appealing. It, therefore, seems necessary to motivate the postulation further. Invoking the concept of “iconicity” (cf. Haiman (1985)) might be a solution to this problem, though the author seems to be reluctant to accept the concept (p. 282).

In summary, the book in review represents a far-reaching attempt to minimize the design of Grammar by investigating the nature of the relationship between a syntactic and a semantic representation. Though it is at present an immature program with a number of problems yet to be solved, if it will prove to be tenable in the near future, it will surely provide valuable new angles from which to reconsider a variety of linguistic phenomena and even the very essence of language.

NOTE
1. The concept of iconicity is defined as follows: “[T]he form, length, complexity or interrelationship of elements in [the syntactic structure] parallels ... the form, length, complexity or interrelationship of elements in the concept ...” (Newmeyer (1992: 756)). Iconicity is assumed to be a property of the mind that is used in creating signs of all kind, including linguistic signs (Sebeok (1994)). If so, then it follows that the parallelism between a semantic and a syntactic representation might be attributed to the design of the mind.

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619.

0. はじめに

本書は1988年のGenericity in Natural Language（於Tübingen大学）での発表を中心

本稿では、本書の中心となる第1章を概観した後、その中で提示された問題に関連づけて各論文を解説する（紙面の都合上、第5,6,8章は省略）。