Political Education in Times of Political Apathy and Extreme Political Pathos as Global Ways of Life

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Locating political education in a global time of pathos and apathy, this article explores some complexities that derive from various notions of human distance and affect potentialities of democracy as a way of life. It begins with a diagnosis of current, global realities and discusses the philosophical act of diagnosis as such. The operations of (a)pathetics thus singled out are then critically connected to Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘pathos of distance’, Michel Foucault’s visit to Japan and William James’ essay on ‘what makes life significant’ in which he critiques an accomplished ‘democratic’ utopia of his times. The conclusion indicates how the registered complexities present political education with further challenges of (non)translatability.

Keywords: democracy; passion; inclusion; affect; distance; translation; normativity

Introduction

The title of this article locates political education in the globalized world at a given time and demarcates this time with an opposition: apathy and pathos. Against the normative expectation that democracy as a way of life will become global to lead the world toward better prospects, it seems that major pathologies related to this opposition and undermining democratic potentialities gain cross-cultural and transnational sway.

Yet, contra such realities, there is by now a global educational-theoretical consensus, valuable, in my view, that schooling should cultivate democracy in one way or another. From John Dewey’s commitment to democracy through Jacques Derrida’s qualified welcome of the implicit normativity of a democracy to come, the ‘power of all’ and its politics, its

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definitional inclusivism and its anti-exclusivist and anti-finalist vision is by now a philosophical and pedagogical common topos. As another such instance of convergence, consider Stanley Cavell’s perfectionist ideal of a democracy “that in our everyday life is always still to be achieved” (Saito, 2012, 284). This ideal could be served by using language to resist the rhetoric of accountability (Saito, 2006). The underlying philosophy chimes with the dependence of democracy upon a certain distance from one’s own culture and upon considering the “native” always in “transition, by and through language, in processes of translation”, constituting “a Cavellian education for global citizenship” (Saito, 2007, 261). Democracy requires the ethic of the spatial metaphor of distance and of the arrival at a juncture for the other: “The translator normally confronts a gap between meanings for which there is no ultimately satisfactory resolution” (Standish, 2011, 77). This opens a critical space for the translator, “that space where there is no rule to resolve the difficulty she faces”. Missing such challenges, “the monolingual may be morally blind” (ibid) and, I would add, uncomfortably situated in a democratic way of life that depends on valorizing otherness.

Like other, related educational-philosophical visions, the educational cultivation of democracy as a way of life also confronts challenges and obstacles to be overcome prior to the approximation of the recommended ideality. Accountability and the managerial outlook is one such challenge. However, other risks (many of which are well documented in the above sources), often relate not just to the managerial collective subject but also to the whole body politic expected to embrace democracy and live by it. Some such risks may be of an onto-anthropological register, as they concern the finitude and imperfectibility of life, but there are also risks of a socio-political register, risks deriving from globally dispersed ways of living. In my opinion, a kind of apathy and a kind of pathos are such pernicious pathologies. Let us call all related operations, positive or negative, ‘(a)pathetics’. (A)pathetics as investing or reserving one’s pathos, directing it toward or away from a specific object, involves energy and movement. There is a kinetic dimension in what one has learned to repel or to embrace, to pathologize or to sanitize, to join or to stave off. In this vein, (a)pathetic operations involve metaphors of disease and cure as well as of proximity and distance.

The above granted, the topic of this article could be rephrased into this complex question: what is the normative task of pedagogy in a spatiotemporality where anti-democratic conditions such as political apathy and extreme political pathos affect the demos, that is, the body politic par excellence which, as the collective subject, is expected to embody the political promise of a better world and of a corresponding education? I do not claim that I can answer this question, but, to explore it more deeply, I begin with metaphors of diagnosis, which I connect with pathos and its absence in the body politic and with the metaphor of ‘pathos of distance’. From this perspective, I read William James’ outlook on a pathos-free accomplished utopia of his times to illustrate some complexities in the (a)pathetics of relational distances and social extremes.

1. Diagnoses

Democratic education discourses, like other discourses, often begin with a chronotope, that is, with the slice of history within which and against which the normativity in question is to be deployed. Such beginnings are typically theorized through medical metaphors: diag-
noses, disease, symptoms, recovery, melancholy, therapy, blindness, pathologies, pathos and apathy. Diseases affect a body, and democracy presupposes the affectivity of a specific body which is no other than the body politic: its ills and ailments, general as they are, defer the universalizing prospects of a democracy to come.

“Indifference and apathy are the signs of a bewildered public” (Saito, 2009, 101). Among other things, this heightens “our existential need to recover political passion” (Saito, 2011, 3). We need this recovery for vigilance against the extreme political pathos that nourishes political emotions such as hatred, unjustified anger and blind fear. Surrendering to the absence of commonalities or believing in an absolutized, abstract commonality, annihilating, overlooking, fabricating or inserting distances from others enforces pernicious, new exclusionary ideologies. We also need attention to subtler and as yet unperceived or under-theorized pathologies. These invite redirections of empirical educational research, new research questions about the contemporary world and its priorities, the technological being-in-the-world, the passionate attachment to e-entertainment and media. We need to fathom whether such new passions are exclusivist of other ways of living and of those who opt for such alternatives. What kind of diverse temporalities operate underneath passionate engagements or withdrawals from segments of reality? How does the early conditioning of the self in digital times perpetuate social divisions, rework or gloss over social distance? Do new educational inequalities emerge from new ways of children’s so-called ‘time management’? Political apathy and extreme political pathos may not merely be pathologies but, more alarmingly, new ways of life and generators of new social ontologies (new class divisions, new distributions of the real) framing one’s (e.g. a student’s) experience and politicization of spatiotemporality.

The identification of ‘pathologies’, the diagnoses of ‘health’ risks of the global demos, is a very complex matter. Such metaphoric depiction of the real (educational and other) has its own risks, for instance, of pathologizing certain realities or of taking notice only of visible pathologies and risks which have already become real and thematized threats. Aristotle discussed emotions such as fear, anger and sympathy and saw the rhetorical connection of logos (e.g. the logical composition of an argument), with ethos (the character of the speaker, her credibility and trustworthiness) and pathos (e.g. the emotive disposition of the audience). “Pathos means the emotional appeal of an argument” not to rational faculties but to “subjective empathy, [...] passions or strong feelings, whether positive or negative” (Rabaté, 2016, 69). Pathos also entails that suffering may imaginatively be shared and passion stirred. One danger is the rhetorical, “low appeal to basic passions” (ibid) which creates a distance from logos and a pathologically impassionate public lacking critical distance from demagogues.

Diagnoses suffer from the risks involved in the ideological role of metaphoricity. For example, experts, academics, leaders and other groups within demos have the rhetorical and institutional power to introduce metaphors to followers who invest them with varied semantics, affective gratification and pathos. The rhetorical effect of the ‘body politic’ metaphor itself has shifted over time; its modern use likens “a political disorder to an illness” and evokes, as I see it, the medical and political metaphor of (organismic) balance. Ultimately, “the diagnosis of disease in the body politic” is a “legitimacy claim, since the elimination of a disease may be taken as something that is inherently ‘right’ and legal” (Charteris-Black, 2009, 98). But “this mythic dimension of metaphor”, “so persuasive in the communication of ideologies” (ibid), also works in another way: in my view, some “fatalistic diagnoses of diseases in the body politic” (Charteris-Black, 2009, 97) effect political apathy by passionately attributing...
a chronic or endemic nature to the pathologies of *demos*. The incurability of the latter blocks the imaginative reach of politics, depicts the real as the best possible world and de-legitimizes democracy as chimeric. Then again, the assumption of curability may overemphasize the very need for a cure, one that may seek to eliminate all diseases, all enemies, all the fascists or Stalinists and, along with them, all the Yukio Mishimas and Ezra Pounds of the world whose breaking off cultural boundaries in literature was not enough to produce ruptures of their own, internal borders, whose multilingualism (in a deeper, metaphorical sense of translation) did not suffice to heal them from political blindness and political monolingualism. Such complexities of diagnoses, of the well-meant effort to identify a problem and solve it and of the simultaneous risk of unevenly or unfairly pathologizing something other to sanitize what is near and dear to you, will operate as a subtext to my next steps. These comprise: a paving of my connection of apathetics with distance through Nietzsche’s metaphor of ‘pathos of distance’; and two critical readings. One is of Foucault’s ‘mobile’ moment of translating Japanese events into his own idiom upon his visit to Japan; the other is of James’s ‘mobile’ moment in visiting a ‘utopia’ and in translating its intricacies into a plea for democracy as a way of life that shrinks affective distances.

2. The Pathos of Distance

The Call for Papers (CfP) to which this article responds shows the dependence of politics, justice, rights and deliberation on awareness of the pressing character of the ills of terrorism, religious and ethnic tensions, exclusivist and inward state policies. The political emotions (anger, hatred, fear) which underpin such ills need to be addressed and countered through other political emotions. “The pathos lies in the need to destabilize the ground on which we stand” and “to feel the weight of political emotions of positive and of negative kinds” (CfP). This means that democracy also depends on making room for political emotions in education. Diagnosing democracy’s dependencies further leads to awareness of political and non-political questions about “how we are to live with one another and, indeed, about who we are” (CfP). As I see it, this touches precisely upon what politics in the ancient Greek sense could be: not just a managerial dealing with problems to be solved or crises to be handled but, more deeply, a question about the ideality of the *polis*, about what humanity is capable of; not so much who we now are but what humanity can become, i.e., humanity’s political reshuffling. More, in my view, this concerns not just how to live with one another, that is, not just a *modus (co)*-existendi, but who we think the other is when we perceive the other as different from us. Interpreting the question of democracy as a way of life in this light, the question of the kind of political education and human transformation called for today could also involve the question of the ‘dose’ or ‘balance’ of withdrawal and engagement, apathy and pathos, wonder and certainty, required for a democratic life to be realizable or meaningful. This may entail additional attention to the spatial metaphor of distance. It is not only about the distance from one extreme to another, but also about the pathos that is invested in the real or invented (constructed) distances separating us: class divisions, existential asymmetries and diverse political positionings in the globe, at home and in the face-to-face relationality. For instance, in classrooms, pupils come from a variety of social-political settings and existential positionings that affect in varying ways not just their experience of
learning and sharing space with other pupils but also one another’s (including the teacher’s) perception and explanation of the distances that separate them. In individualist schooling, the nominal commitment to the democratic way of life may secure liberties for all but does not suffice to undo the pathos for distinction and the self-perception of the successful pupil as exceptional and gifted, thus naturalizing the measured differences in learning outcomes.

Nietzsche, suspicious of democracy, inclusion and demotic ethical sensibilities as signs of weakness, called the “pathos of distance” “the chasm between man and man, class and class, the multiplicity of types, the will to be oneself, to stand out”. He praised this class-producing pathos of distinction and differentiation as characteristic of “every strong age” and lamented that “the tension, the range between the extremes is today growing less and less—the extremes themselves are finally obliterated to the point of similarity” (Nietzsche, 1990, 102). Nietzsche saw and opposed the mediocrity produced by bridging gaps. But, in critical distance from Nietzsche, let me emphasize that a democracy worthy of the name cannot let this risk deter the whole operation of de-normalizing and de-naturalizing distances, of eradicating their political cost. Nevertheless, I see Nietzsche’s metaphor ‘pathos of distance’ as helpful and shall evoke it throughout this article to weave my critical readings of the apathetics involved in the mobile, ‘translator’ moments of philosophers such as Foucault and James. Nietzsche’s metaphor is helpful not because of its supposed social-normative validity but precisely because of its revealing force (revealing inter alia of Nietzsche’s own elitist affirmation of the chosen).

The issue of distance and its shrinking (up to annihilation) had, in modernity, been the meeting point of extremes, there where, in our example, apathy and unconditional, raw, pathos make a common cause or are reducible to a common ground. André Gide turned Pascal’s ‘extremes meet’ (les extrêmes se touchent) into ‘extremes move me’ (les extrêmes me touchent) so as to ask: for whom are these extremes? (Rabaté, 2016, 28). In yet another twist, we may think through the issue of space, where extremes meet the very moment that they attract the (post)modern world that responds either with apathy or with unbridled pathos to the distances between those who inhabit the extremes, those for whom the extremes are or those whose gratification requires extremes. The latter pursue incriminatory utopias, de-monizing an Other, exaggerating their own (real or imagined) distance from the Other to promise the demos a populist political future.

Public apathy has many faces. It could be a retreat revealing discontent, or, in cases of disagreement, it could be respectful acceptance of one’s entitlement to a different opinion. But it could also be a withdrawal, especially affordable by those whose comfortable lives do not give them reasons to engage in politics or to engage with others. It could even be resignation (Saito, 2012, 283). But extreme pathos has many faces too. Some such faces are seen by a visiting Other. For instance, John Dewey encountered an undemocratic version of extreme political pathos in his “cross-cultural experience in Japan, in 1919 and 1921”. The “undemocratic culture of Japan at that time” made Dewey feel that his “principle of sympathetic imagination toward the different” and “humanitarian-democratic position” were incom-municable. Diagnosing “the impenetrability and inscrutability of Japanese culture” Dewey simultaneously diagnosed a cultural distance, a distance that is metaphorized as an “abyss” and “gap”: the “episode is symbolic of the abyss that constantly jeopardizes communication between different cultures. Dewey was caught out by a real gap in cross-cultural communication in a foreign place”, “where the English word ‘democracy’ was untranslatable” (Saito,
Decades later, another western philosopher, Michel Foucault, in a mobile moment too, his visit to Japan, engaged in cultural-philosophical translation and comparativism to diagnose the causes of “two great diseases of power, two great fevers” which “dominated the 20th century” (Foucault, 1994[1978], 534), fascism and Stalinism. In the relevant lecture, which has remained untranslated into English, Foucault ‘translated’ the philosophical difference of ancient Greek culture from ancient Eastern and modern Western culture as one of the appropriate distance between philosophy and the state. Unlike “China and Japan, there was not in the West, at least for a very long time” a philosophy “able to become part of [be one body with, faire corps avec – M.P.] a political practice, a moral practice of an entire society” (Foucault, 1994[1978], 537). Foucault not only lamented the shortening or annihilation of the distance between the philosopher and the state but, in what I see as a moment of pathos of distance, pathologized just any normative aspiration, just any political-philosophical crossing of the border of the descriptive. To recommend the normativity of such non-normativity he engaged in a translation of the Anglo-American idiom of analytic philosophy of language into a paradigmatic model for any political philosophy: to avoid the common cause with (or even to avoid becoming the cause of) anti-democratic diseases, political philosophy should be cured of normative and utopian visions. It should become the descriptive study of power relations with no transformative aspirations other than those of the particularist resistance of power by social agents. On this point, Foucault failed to take from Anglo-American analytic philosophy the critical distance that he took from other modernisms when analyzing their power operations. Instead, he rushed to embrace a full translation of all political philosophy into the analytic, non-normative idiom.

Foucault recurrently employed a Japanese example of those times, the Narita case, to illustrate the merits of normativity being lost in this translation: once to indicate a politically conscious kind of apathy, a decision “not to play the game of power” (543) and then to indicate what I consider a kind of pathos: “the target is power” and “an arbitrary power is answered by a violent inversion of power” (545).

To Foucault, this pathos for power with no need for ethico-political justification illustrates what he orientalized in both Japan and Iran (Papastephanou, 2018) and understood as a particularist, anti-modernist revolt of (positively meant) utopian possibility. This focus on power by farmers and left-wing Japanese activists presupposes another epochal shift, another translation of politics from one era into another, from the Western emphasis on revolution to this non-Western case of particularist revolt embraced by Foucault in the same year (1978) that he had embraced the Iranian revolution (Papastephanou, 2018): Foucault prepared its theorization in his lecture through the distance covered by the poor and the rich to the point where impoverishment ceased, to him, to be a nodal point of late 20th century politics. With regard to the “problem of the impoverishment of those who produce wealth, the simultaneous production of wealth and poverty”, “I do not say that it was totally solved in the West at the end of the twentieth century”. Yet the gap has been closed to the extent that this problem “no longer arises with the same urgency. It is doubled by another problem which is no longer that of too little wealth, but that of too much power” (Foucault, 1994[1978], 535, my translation). Foucault of France and Japan de-materialized and de-politicized the distance between the rich and the poor. One wonders: extremes either met or they ceased to move the West and the Western, mobile philosopher.

I have passed from Dewey to Foucault to indicate some subtle complications regarding
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translation (facing the risk of being de-materialized and reduced to culturalism or descriptive analytics of power), its relation to real or imagined distances from one end (or extreme) to the other and its diagnostic (a)pathetics. I will now pass to the American pragmatist philosopher William James, whose 1898 essay “What Makes a Life Significant?” offers illustrations of the complexities that preoccupy the present article. I have selected Foucault’s and James’ essays precisely because they have mobility (in its multiple meanings) as their subtext and because they involve diagnoses of pathologies, translations from one idiom (and world) to another and engagements with social distance.

3. William James, what makes a life significant?

Referring to ways of life, one may ask what makes a life significant and consider the legitimacy of the question as such. Is this question legitimate enough for educators who influence (even shape) the life of students in multiple ways? Do we, educators, not presuppose that certain ways of life (e.g. democracy, translation) are more meaningful than illiberal alternatives, yet, in a liberal manner, do we not assume that there is no one good way of living one’s life? “The first thing to learn in intercourse with others is non-interference with their own peculiar ways of being happy, provided those ways do not assume to interfere by violence with ours” (James, 2016, 50). We know that things are more complex, despite the significance of negative-duty liberalism as a necessary though insufficient politics. We need to “convert our ways of thinking” to “re-encounter different cultures as other through a process of border-crossing” and to pursue its “educational implications in terms of an art of dialogue through which one exposes oneself to the other” (Saito, 2015, 19). Distance from our ways of thinking does not always translate into the required distance from our habitual ways of living, and the metaphor of border-crossing may need, in my view, a kind of border-raising, one blocking unqualified glorification of the mobile global curious observer (and translator) of otherness. Lives involve material conditions that are not reducible to finding the right word, speaking properly about the other or growing through cultural encounters with others. Another kind of politics, another sense of crossing distances of space and time, another look at the pathos of distance and perhaps another kind of (a)pathetics may be needed.

William James, as yet another mobile philosopher, visited a ‘heterotopia’ from which he recoiled with pathos when facing its a-pathetic de-pathologization of life. In his ‘What Makes Life Significant,’ James compared modern ideal ways of life while transforming his own thinking throughout the essay. “A few summers ago I spent a happy week at the famous Assembly Grounds on the borders of Chautauqua Lake,” says James, and registers a string of normatively outstanding nouns that indicate what pervades the air of that “atmosphere of success”: “sobriety and industry, intelligence and goodness, orderliness and ideality, prosperity and cheerfulness” (James, 2016, 53). This heterotopia of accomplished modern values is “a town of many thousands of inhabitants, beautifully laid out in the forest and drained, and equipped with means for satisfying all the necessary lower and most of the superfluous higher wants of man”. The effected utopia was inter alia educational: “You have a first-class college”, “magnificent music [...] with possibly the most perfect open-air auditorium in the world. You have every sort of athletic exercise [...] and the more artificial doings which the gymnasium affords. You have kindergartens and model secondary schools” (54). It was also
paradigmatic of religious openness, inclusion and catering for various tastes: “You have general religious services and special club-houses for the several sects. You have perpetually running soda-water fountains, and daily popular lectures by distinguished men. You have the best of company, and yet no effort”. In the perfectly balanced and sanitized *topos*, there are “no zymotic diseases, no poverty, no drunkenness, no crime, no police. You have culture, you have kindness, you have cheapness, you have equality”. James thus had “a foretaste of what human society might be, were it all in the light, with no suffering and no dark corners” (55). No suffering (in Greek: *pathos*), no disease (corporeal or social), no pathology in this place of advanced temporality.

James states that he was curious to know this place, to cover this distance literally and figuratively: “I went in curiosity for a day. I stayed for a week, held spell-bound by the charm and ease of everything, by the middle-class paradise, without a sin, without a victim” (55). But precisely its lack of pathos (both as passion and disease), its de-pathologization of life, struck James as pathological. To his own astonishment, “on emerging into the dark and wicked world again”, he caught himself “quite unexpectedly and involuntarily” exclaiming: “‘Ouf! what a relief!’”. And then he makes an astonishing comment: “Now for something primordial and savage, even though it were as bad as an Armenian massacre, to set the balance straight again” (James, 2016, 55). What sense of balance does the evocation of the massacre of others (in this example, non-American others) strike? For James, it was the balance where extremes meet (without mutual annihilation) to produce a happy medium of the kind that renders the hyperbolic expendable (consider the recurrent “too” in the following): “This order is too tame, this culture too second-rate, this goodness too uninspiring”. There was “human drama without a villain”; this community was “so refined that ice-cream soda-water is the utmost offering it can make to the brute animal in man” (55). Locating brutality within humanity (annihilating the time-honoured distance between ‘animal’ and ‘man’), James longs for its manifestations (especially as they happen to others – Armenians in this case) which seem preferable to middle-class mediocrity and petty virtues.

“There had been spread before me the realization […] of all “the ideals for which our civilization has been striving: security, intelligence, humanity, and order; and here was the instinctive hostile reaction, not of the natural man, but of a so-called cultivated man upon such a Utopia” (56). In answering himself why he recoiled in facing such an accomplished utopia, James indicated his longing for a kind of pathos: “I asked myself what the thing was that was so lacking in this Sabbatical city” and “I soon recognized that it was the element that gives to the wicked outer world all its moral style, expressiveness and picturesqueness.” That was the “element of precipitousness”, “of strength and strenuousness, intensity and danger” (57). The distance between extremes (“the everlasting battle of the powers of light with those of darkness”) had been covered in that space of no mnemonics (“the ideal was so completely victorious already that no sign of any previous battle remained”). Nothing heroic that “romances and the statues celebrate and the grim civic monuments remind us of” remains, no unexpectedness “excites and interests the looker-on at life,” no extremes coexist to move the curious observer. Significantly, James characterized that utopia of “no potentiality of death in sight anywhere” as “unspeakable” (57); we may assume, untranslatable.

We may say that, for James, the place lacked the Nietzschean “pathos of distance” and agonism between extremes. “Human emotions […] require the sight of the struggle going on.” Modern adventurous industriousness (“sweat and effort, human nature strained to its ut-
termost and on the rack”), though always victorious (“yet getting through alive”), was there sacrificed on the altar of appeasement. In the touristic utopia, “there were no racks, even in the place’s historical museum; and no sweat, except possibly the gentle moisture on the brow of some lecturer” (58). Extremes had met, their distance was lost, and James singularized the outcome with the spatial metaphor of flatness: “Such absence of human nature in extremis anywhere seemed, then, a sufficient explanation for Chautauqua’s flatness.” The pathology of such flatness is declared incurable: “An irremediable flatness is coming over the world. Bourgeoisie and mediocrity, church sociables and teachers’ conventions, are taking the place of the old heights and depths and romantic chiaroscuro” (59). And it is diagnosed as a global new way of life: “The whole world, delightful and sinful” as it still appears “to one just escaped from the Chautauquan enclosure, is nevertheless obeying more and more just those ideals that are sure to make of it in the end a mere Chautauqua Assembly on an enormous scale” (59).

But James transforms his own thinking by reconsidering his view on the heroic and on human life’s “wild intensity”. The latter is manifest in the industriousness of the lower classes whose pathos (passion and suffering) is overlooked both in the middle-class touristic paradise and in the minds of the cultivated and affluent, blind as they are in their own pathos of distance from their Others. In a self-critical twist in the tale, James contemplates his own lack of onlooker curiosity: “Wishing for heroism and the spectacle of human nature on the rack, I had never noticed the great fields of heroism lying round about me.” He could not see it present and alive. “I could only think of it as dead and embalmed, labelled and costumed, as it is in the pages of romance” (60). Outside the heterotopia, the longed-for extremes do not meet, they continue to move, so long as the social distance among humans continues to have effects, so long as there are those for whom extremes are: “On freight-trains, on the decks of vessels, […] among the firemen and the policemen, the demand for courage is incessant; and the supply never fails. There, every day of the year somewhere, is human nature in extremis for you” (61). For James, a kind of pathos, sympathy, syn + pathos, for the common produced a cure of his (monolingual) blindness: “As I awoke to all this unidealized heroic life around me, the scales seemed to fall from my eyes; and a wave of sympathy greater than anything I had ever before felt with the common life of common men began to fill my soul” (ibid, 61, emphasis mine).

To all the above there relates another spatial metaphor affecting distance and extremes: leveling. “Thus are men’s lives levelled up as well as levelled down—levelled up in their common inner meaning, levelled down in their outer gloriousness and show” (65). Though he does not spell this out as democratization, James praises a leveling of humanity and laments its being obscured by an ever renewed blindness: “Yet always, we must confess, this levelling insight tends to be obscured again; and always the ancestral blindness returns and wraps us up, so that we end once more by thinking that creation can be for no other purpose than to develop remarkable situations and conventional distinctions and merits” (65), in other words, created, constructed distances that divide the demos. James’ Nietzschean moment of pathos of distance ended with the ethical, piecemeal triumph of charismatic, extreme singularity: with the advent of ever new “levellers” “in the shape of a religious prophet” or of “some Rousseau or Tolstoï” “our blindness” is re-dispelled. Then comes James’ pragmatist, meliorist utopianism: “Yet, little by little, there comes some stable gain; for the world does get more humane, and the religion of democracy tends toward permanent increase” (65).
However, adding remarkable complexity, James again shifts his perspective: he feels that for the democratic thinker the tip of the balance should not lean toward overcorrecting “our social prejudices”. He states the danger of the “love of the peasant [being] so exclusive” that the thinker “hardens his heart toward the educated man” (71). James does not want to set in opposition to the Chautauqua heterotopia an incriminatory utopia that requires the former’s demonization to justify its own futurist promise. For James, that there “was little moral effort, little sweat or muscular strain in view” in Chautauqua did not justify wholesale incrimination of it. In yet another remarkable twist, he asserts: “deep down in the souls of the participants we may be sure that something of the sort was hid, some inner stress, some vital virtue not found wanting when required.” The tensions of his essay take the form of recurring questions that “force themselves upon us”: “Is the functional utility, the worth to the universe of a certain definite amount of courage, kindliness, and patience, no greater if the possessor of these virtues is in an educated situation, working out far-reaching tasks, than” a laborer? For James, the latter could be “an illiterate nobody, hewing wood and drawing water, just to keep himself alive” (72). Reading him critically, we realize that James leaves the political, existential and social distance between extreme positionings intact; he only wants a shortening of the rhetorical and cultural distance between conflicting classes. He wants the social distance not to be translated into an unhealthy way of viewing one another’s lives: “So far as this conflict is unhealthy and regrettable,—and I think it is so only to a limited extent [a Nietzschean moment here – M.P.],—the unhealthiness consists solely” in that “one-half of our fellow countrymen remain entirely blind to the internal significance of the lives of the other half. They miss the joys and sorrows, they fail to feel the moral virtue, and they do not guess the presence of the intellectual ideals” (82).

The members of the demos “are at cross-purposes all along the line, regarding each other as they might regard a set of dangerously gesticulating automata.” Caught up in such optics, they horribly mistranslate one another. “Often all that the poor man can think of in the rich man is a cowardly greediness for safety, luxury, and effeminacy, and a boundless affection” (89). James noticed de-humanizing tendencies: “What he is, is not a human being, but a pocket-book, a bank-account”. Then come the negative passions of dangerous political effects or distorted depictions of the other’s political emotions: “And a similar greediness, turned by disappointment into envy, is all that many rich men can see in the state of mind of the dissatisfied poor” (89). And, “if the rich man begins to do the sentimental act over the poor man, what senseless blunders does he make!” For James, the upshot is that each “ignores the fact that happiness and unhappiness and significance are a vital mystery; each pins them absolutely on some ridiculous feature of the external situation; and everybody remains outside of everybody else’s sight” (90).

In my view, James’ diagnoses, apposite as they otherwise are, reduce the material to the optic, blind as he is to any deeper, more fundamental effects (of ultimately educational relevance) of the very pathos of distance as such and of constructed distances. Like Foucault, James de-materializes social distance, naturalizes it by not questioning it, by leaving it intact, and de-politicizes the effects of wealth gaps among people. Ultimately, he fails to translate social distance into political idioms of constructed inequality and avoidable injustice. In this way, a kind of untranslatability of social distance emerges as a surplus of political meaning that cannot be channeled within the confines of Foucault’s and James’ essays and resists their attempts at ‘multilingualism’.
**Conclusion: Political Education and Democracy**

Politically and socially, the differential element in human existence is often invested with a strong feeling of/for distance. Diverse affective positionings of self and other thus rationalize (an ironic operation of affect for the sake of hegemonic reason), obscure and normalize injustice. Because sometimes injustice is material, real rather than merely discursive, real in the sense of affecting not just others’ choices of ways of life but their lives themselves, it can escape the eye of the translator. What makes a (way of) life (in)significant for oneself and in the eyes of the other may originate in the (a)pathetics of one’s times, that may effect a blindness to which neither the monolingual nor the multilingual (neither the rooted nor the mobile) are immune.

Nietzsche gave to the ‘pathos of distance’ a variety of meanings “from the notion that all men living in groups cannot be called ‘equal’, to the idea of a ‘self-surmounting’ or ‘self-overcoming’ (Selbstüberwindung) of man, thanks to which one ascends to the higher humanity of the ‘Overman’” (Rabaté, 2016, 7). In a parlance that would cause unease to any adherent to any notion of democracy, Nietzsche derived the distance of transcendence (that is, one’s conversion, self-transformation, the distance of oneself from one’s consolidated self) from an elitist socio-political distance: “without the pathos of distance, such as grows out of the incarnated difference of classes, out of the constant outlooking and downlooking of the ruling caste on subordinates and instruments”, that other “more mysterious pathos”, “the longing for an ever new widening of distance within the soul itself”, “could never have arisen” (ibid).

According to Rabaté, for Nietzsche, one passes from issues of domination and subordination “to an aesthetic meaning, in which the aim is to suggest the painful or dangerous, but exalted refinement of the creation of difference within oneself.” Though Nietzsche was no simplistic reactionary opting for pre-modern nostalgic fantasies in the face of “a modern age marked by democracy, egalitarianism, and the reign of science,” he nevertheless searched for cures in, as I see it, self-related domains like “will, responsibility, self-assurance, the capacity to set goals”. From the ego’s perspective, then, only the chosen few (consider elite’s etymology), who have reached the (presumed) transcendent stage of the ego, can direct the many. This is how I read the remark that some of Nietzsche’s remedies assumed “the necessity of a chasm opening, of distance, of an order of rank”: “a new aristocracy of the mind would bring a solution” (Rabaté, 2016, 8).

As James’ reference to charismatic levelers (in the previous section) reveals, he concurred with Nietzsche, to some extent, on outstanding leaders. Both favored the perception of ways of life in plural, but while James sacralized the democratic way of life, Nietzsche recurrently asserted the will to power of the singular, exceptional ego/few, and Foucault, to the point that he echoed Nietzsche, mistrusted collective morality/ethics and collective political efforts to undo social distances so long as they did not sit comfortably with his idiom of diverse powers. Later, Foucault oriented his ‘pathos of distance’ toward the care and self-fashioning of the resistant, singularized subject. But none of them de-centered the self enough, none of them took adequate distance from the self’s view on the political. I have indicated above that Nietzsche glorified the pathos of distance, Foucault subjugated political philosophy to an anti-normative analytic idiom, de-materializing and de-politicizing social and economic injustice, and James left social distance intact, being concerned only with its cultural, visual
effects on how people see and speak of one another.

A certain ‘pathos of distance’ (to stand out, to compete with others, to excel) is noticeable in current global realities and in their localizations: to give an example, “for Japanese universities the development of human resources in an international arena is an urgent task in order to compete and be successful in the globalized world” (Saito, 2015, 18). Those embracing such pathos attribute apathy, withdrawal and inwardness to students: “young people should not stay lying ‘in a lukewarm bath’.” The (post)modernist normativity following this outlook (pertinently criticized by Naoko Saito)20 “is that Japanese young people should get out of their inward-looking state of comfort and venture onto the global stage” (ibid).

Certainly, beyond the above example, issues of (a)pathetics, diagnostics and politicizations of distance run through all stages and institutions of education. Much learning which concerns perceptions of others involves (a)pathetic rationalizations of proximity and distance – social, emotive, political, cognitive and physical. Such rationalizations affect processes of translation that operate when the mobile, educated self encounters others whose translatability depends much on whether the self is prepared critically to consider her own perception of the other’s distance as true, constructed, justified, just or unjust. For example, one may have been conditioned through schooling (and through corresponding social imaginaries) to believe that there are naturally intelligent and less intelligent people, and passionately to justify social distance (i.e., social inequality) in virtue of this – supposed – natural distance. This person’s pathos of distance in this case may not confound her as concerns democracy; for she may have a benevolent outlook on all human beings despite their luck in what she sees as the ‘natural lottery’ and she may acknowledge for all their rights and the right to participation and to sharing a common world. But her pathos of distance cannot but affect any process of translation that goes beyond facile, *modus vivendi* and (co-)existendi encounters with others; the others’ way of thinking will be the un-translatable act of the naturally inferior, cumbersome and possibly un-democratic poor relations that will always endanger the cherished though a brittle balance of coordinated un-equals.

The alternative modernism of “Beckett’s ‘un-will to power’ leading to radical impotence as the solution to the world’s quandaries” (Rabaté, 2016, 67), that is, a kind of apathy, may not escape the confines of modern searches for one remedy. But the withdrawal in taking distance, the refusal to translate, may in some cases claim deserved and worthwhile space. Unlike untranslatability *qua* challenge inherent in human enculturation, this negation of translation can sometimes be a refusal to cross borders, to bridge geographical distances and connect distant objects, without a prior commitment to bridging socio-political distances and raising borders to rampant preoccupation with one’s own self. Translation is, after all, also a Western, modern value whose rhetorical power has grown in and through current Western discourses. We educators, and we global subjects, *qua* translators and eager ‘readers’ of the other, may inevitably be monolingual, as the much celebrated border-crossing and longed for engagement with real or imagined otherness may be ethico-politically blind to non-linguistic issues of the materiality of ways of living. The political experience of injustice cannot always be channeled into new terms imported, exported and translated, without prior rethinking of one’s political comprehension of global problems.

After all, we philosophers of education, Western, non-Western, displaced, re-fashioned, resistant, uncomfortably situated or whatever else we might be or consider our (un)translatable selves to be, view others from a distance, a distance that we have not entirely taken from
our selves. Whatever designation we may attribute to ourselves or be given by others, we encounter the Other or focus on an Other deemed as worthy of translation through various subtle hegemonies. S/he is viewed after s/he has passed the filters of our own world or of the globalized culture. To this predicament, I do not think that there is just one solution and I have certainly not offered any such solution here. But what I have tried to do, and I hope it may be of some interest, is to point out some complexities of pathos and apathy operating underneath our outlook on what separates us from others. Awareness of such complexities may help us avoid the risk of turning currently normative notions such as translation, inclusion, equality, multilingualism, and democracy as a way of life into new comfort zones with soporific effects as concerns deep challenges facing the world of today. Simultaneously, it may motivate a rethinking of, and a different look at, the (a)pathetics with which legitimizations of distance are invested and then served through education worldwide. My emphasis on the materiality of the pathos of distance, on the fact that understanding the other (or failing to understanding her) does not do much to change her actual conditions of life (her lack of food or water, her living in war and experiencing injustice, her having no cultural capital and true opportunities for learning, etc), makes expectations from pedagogy more dependent on requests for global, extra-mural transformation. In turn, it burdens pedagogy with the tasks of allowing for more discontent with current realities, deeper and less culturalist explanations of what counts as untranslatability, and more desire for drastic world change. Thus, perhaps part of a normative task of pedagogy today might be to cultivate more critical awareness of the complexity of politics and of the multiple political effects (material and other) of the pathos of distance that still imbues the self and the world.

Notes

1 Democracy means power to the demos, that is, in principle, power to all. This inclusive, universal principle has been trampled from antiquity to the present in various ways, mostly by the distances (often rationalizing existential and economic asymmetries) that ruling forces have assumed between themselves and the excluded others (slaves, women, subalterns, low classes, etc). Such distances are then inserted into the politics of a collectivity and translated into divisions of dem-os of differentiated and uneven access to power.

2 As cases in point, consider new isolationism; the new, popularized biologism disseminated through media and e-sources and endorsed especially by young people as a new conventional wisdom; intensifications of discrimination against others and new gating-keeping practices, etc.

3 Consider Nietzsche’s onto-anthropology behind his explanation of the origin of values, as Rabaté sums it up, and then, consider the politics it can underpin: “For Nietzsche, original values were created by the rulers; the ‘herd-instinct of the masses’ made them forget or erase that original creative force. The analysis of Genealogy of Morality recurs in Beyond Good and Evil in the section ‘What is noble?’ [...] The ‘pathos of distance’ asserts that no original judgment of value ever came out of ‘altruistic’ motives; values only derive from the ‘egoistic’ motivations of the noble leaders of the past” (Rabaté, 2016, 20).

4 Consider the etymology of elite: the selected, the chosen, those at a distance from others. https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/elite#Etymology

5 ‘Incriminatory utopianism’ is explained and theorized in Drousioti and Papastephanou (forthcoming. Manuscript in my possession).

6 “Le XXe siècle a connu deux grandes maladies du pouvoir, deux grandes fièvres qui ont porté très loin les manifestations exaspérées d’un pouvoir. Ces deux grandes maladies, qui ont dominé le coeur, le milieu du XXe siècle, sont bien sûr le fascisme et le stalinisme” (Foucault, 1994[1978], 534).
To my knowledge.

“c’est là je pense un point important, à la différence de ce qui s’est passé en Orient, et particulièremenent en Chine et au Japon, il n’y pas eu en Occident, du moins pendant très longtemps, de philosophie qui ait été capable de faire corps avec une pratique politique, une pratique morale de toute une société” (Foucault, 1994[1978], 537).

“The construction of the new Tokyo airport on the Narita agricultural site ran into opposition from peasants and the far left of Japan for years” (Foucault, 1978, 543).

“It seems to me characteristic that, in the Narita history that has been going on for years and years in Japan, the game of opponents or those who resist is not an effort to get the most benefit possible by enforcing the law, by obtaining compensation. They did not want to play the traditionally organized and institutionalized game of the state with its demands and citizens with their rights. They did not want to play the game at all; they prevented the game from being played” (Foucault, 1994[1978], 545, my translation).

“The target is power. In the Narita case, something like that would also be found: the Narita farmers would certainly have been able to find significant benefits by accepting some of the proposals that were made to them. They refused what was to exercise on them a form of power they did not want. More than the economic stake, it is the very modality of power that was exercised over them, it is an expropriation decided in this or that way that is at stake in the Narita affair: this arbitrary power is answered by a violent inversion of power” (Foucault, 1994[1978], 545, my translation).

“Ce problème de l’appauvrissement de ceux qui produisent la richesse, de la production simultanée de la richesse et de la pauvreté, je ne dis pas qu’il a été totalement résolu en Occident en cette fin de xxe siècle, mais il ne se pose plus avec la même urgence. Il se trouve comme doublé par un autre problème qui n’est plus celui du trop peu de richesses, mais celui du trop de pouvoir” (Foucault, 1994[1978], 535).

“Astonishing in ways that have to remain outside the scope of this article.

“Let me take my chances again in the big outside worldly wilderness with all its sins and sufferings. There are the heights and depths, the precipices and the steep ideals, the gleams of the awful and the infinite; and there is more hope and help a thousand times than in this dead level and quintessence of every mediocrity”.

Ironically, as concerns the elitist Nietzschean pathos of distance and Nietzsche’s theorization of it against the laboring masses, it is precisely the laboring classes that inspire James: “And yet there it was before me in the daily lives of the laboring classes. Not in clanging fights and desperate marches only is heroism to be looked for, but on every railway bridge and fire-proof building that is going up to-day” (60).

The mobile philosopher encountered this also in Vienna where he had “a similar feeling of awe and reverence in looking at the peasant women” (62).

The rich pity the poor “for just those very duties and those very immunities which, rightly taken, are the condition of his most abiding and characteristic joys!” (90).

I have illustrated this seemingly paradoxical effect of an insult to oneself being more visible than another’s death, deprivation, etc, with the global invisibility of the Chagos case (Papastephanou, 2015).

Consider his phrase (“religion of democracy”).

Saito contrasts with such outlooks risk taking and passivity (another sense of pathos): “translation as inherent in language per se is a crucial condition for critical thinking and the education for global citizenship. Criticism of culture is essential here, but this is not to be accomplished simply through an “aggressive” or “active” mode of thinking. Rather it requires patience and receptivity, a readiness to go through the indefinite, the transitory and the vague in encountering the other, both within and outside one’s own culture” (Saito, 2015, 24).
References


