EU Foreign Policy : From Cooperation to Diplomacy

Dr. Michael Reiterer¹⁾

Adjunct Professor for International Politics, University of Innsbruck

At the EU GAKKAI meeting in November 2004 at Waseda University, Prof. Toshiro Tanaka presented a paper “From the Convention through the IGC to European Constitutional Treaty”²⁾ while I spoke on “The New Constitution for Europe: The European Union as a Global Actor”³⁾. It is always dangerous to re-read what one has written a while ago when history can become the merciless judge whether the analysis was correct and predictions well founded.

Prof. Tanaka did an excellent job when he wrote “The forecast seems to be not so bright and not so easy especially in some of the member states holding referendums”. In the case of France and the Netherlands, the “rough roads” he predicted even turned into blind alleys.

I expressed concern that in case of a rejection of the Constitution the “EU will be weakened as a few more compromises and possible years will be necessary to achieve greater coherence in foreign policy which is more and more in demand because of global interdependence.” While I was right on the years—if there are no further accidents along the road of the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon—it will enter into force in 2009 instead of 2006 or 2007, luckily I was not right on “more compromises” in the area of foreign policy.

There are hardly any changes in the Common Foreign and Security (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) when comparing the defunct Constitution and the new Treaty of Lisbon.⁴⁾ However, unlike the Constitution which presented everything in one piece, the Treaty of Lisbon is the usual legal patchwork, hardly readable for the experts. One change of course is that the 'EU Minister for Foreign Affairs' will have to settle with the less sumptuous title of "High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy" as some Member States, of course the UK but also (then) Poland and the Czech Republic resisted all titles and symbols which are normally associated with statehood.

How did we get to the Lisbon Treaty over the last 50 years ?

At the beginning, back in the 1950ies when starting to develop its foreign policy instruments, the European Economic Community initially (1958 - 1970) had to focus mainly on economic instruments as the common trade and customs policy was the main instrument at its disposal. Therefore granting tariff concessions or funds for development purposes (Arusha, Lome I, II; Cotonou) were the main tools.

The further development of foreign policy instruments was linked to changes in the institutional set-up of the EC which step by step developed into the European Union.

From 1970 onwards, it became clear that politics and economics cannot be artificially separated. Therefore the foreign policy consultations which had taken place outside the structures of the EC were integrated in its institutional framework.

The historic events of 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall and other fences all over Europe, accelerated the processes which lead quickly to the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The rather sudden end of bipolarity challenged the Union to become an international political player before it was institutionally prepared to do so. The experience gained

in executing the above mentioned common trade policy in the GATT and on the international scene, which turned Europe into a key player at par with the US, Japan, Canada and the emerging states of China, Korea and India, served to re-orientate the Union's foreign policy approach.

Institutionalists therefore argue rightly, that the European institutions pushed the integration process forward in order to bring stability and democracy to the young East European states thereby allowing the Union to live up to the expectations of these states but also to the ones of the European and even worldwide public.

The 1993 Summit of Copenhagen was a turning point in the process of consolidating Europe. For the first time the European heads of states or government united at the European Summit formulated concretely the accession perspective for the East European states, which caused an important political change in these countries :

After 1989 the new European states had developed very differently. Some states kept struggling with a nationalistic, backward post-communist leadership formed by former apparatchiks without much interest to build up democratic structures. Others, in turn, strengthened the free market economy and strived to cooperate with the European Union to consolidate and advance overall change. The accession perspective formulated in Copenhagen brought most of them in line with the latter model, the transformative power of the Union, its soft power, started to show its effects.

The latest enlargement of 2004/2007 is the last institutional expression of the peace generating political dimension of European integration. However, the accession perspective for the remaining South East European states including Turkey remains the main driving force and catalyst for reform, as recently confirmed by the European Commission when it reported on the progress in individual candidate countries and in formulating the main challenges ahead for those countries as well those with future accession perspectives.⁵⁾

During the last five decades it has become clear that the European Union

is not only the result of peace, as some argue, but is an active peacemaker itself – the Union is a peace project of its own right and making. Having overcome its history of terrible wars, Europe as a continent managed to grow together and to overcome its main and dangerous internal conflicts.

Thus, the EU certainly is a regional role model of a partly supra-regional soft power institution. This success also makes the Union a role model, an experimental ground for other regions, such as ASEAN in Asia, Mercosur in South America or the African Union.⁶⁾ This lead to what we call the *regional domino effect*.⁷⁾ However, the difference between other institutions and the EU is striking as exemplified by the never ending drama in Burma/Myanmar: While ASEAN treats the unacceptable behaviour of the undemocratic junta as an 'internal affair', such a conduct would never be tolerated or accepted as 'internal' within the Union as such a policy runs counter to the values uniting the EU. Thus, ASEAN is a union of interests, while the EU is a union of values.

In addition to the intra-European *policy transfer*, there is evidence of *extra-territorial effects* of the European policy on states not being part of the European Union. The degree of these effects depends on the intensity of the mutual relationship — the stronger and closer (also geographically)⁸⁾ the relationship the more visible are the "*ripples of European integration*". Thus, Europeanization does not only take place within the European Union, but has effects beyond European frontiers.

The *Treaty of Maastricht (1992)* officially supplemented economic tools in adding the political dimension. Political cooperation was incorporated into the European institutions. Furthermore, cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs⁹⁾ was added: Securing borders was deemed necessary in order to be able to provide internal security; border management became part of foreign policy and is continuously being developed. Border protection and pacification of the neighbourhood became two new important foreign policy goals.

In 1999, CFSP was officially complemented by the *European Security and*

Defence Policy. Fight against terrorism and international crime as well as illegal migration issues figured among the most important new subjects.

In 2000 the Union also changed its approach to the developing countries in signing the Cotonou Agreement with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific which replaced the various Lomé Conventions (1975-2000).¹⁰⁾ The Cotonou Agreement is based on five interdependent pillars with the underlying objectives of the fight against poverty, an enhanced political dimension, increased participation by the partner countries, a more strategic approach to cooperation focusing on poverty reduction, new economic and trade partnerships and improved financial cooperation.

In response to the unprecedented perception of a terrorist threat because of and after 9/11, *Europeanization* got a further boost. “Those areas where agreement and progress occurred were, to a greater or lesser extent, *communautarized*. Agreement on the EU’s Action Plan against terrorism, the arrest warrant, the enhanced police and intelligence cooperation, and the efforts to block funding for terrorist acts, have all taken place with extraordinary rapidity, especially for an organization that is often portrayed as cumbersome.”¹¹⁾

Pursuing these activities the already mentioned security strategy entitled “The European Security Strategy - a secure Europe in a better world”¹²⁾ was presented in 2003. If the European Security Strategy were rewritten or updated it certainly would include in addition to the existing threat potentials terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime the additional elements *environmental protection, fight against climate change and shortage of energy and security of energy supplies*.

This would be another illustration that today’s threats and root causes for conflicts are not solely of a military nature, an insight easily overlooked by those who coined the misnomer “war against terror” in the aftermaths of September 9/11. Understood correctly, this event and these developments clearly show how important it is to adopt a *soft power strategy* in the

context of a world fragmented by security-policy.¹³⁾

Whether the European Security Strategy is the basis for developing a strategy or is already a strategy in itself is being discussed in academic literature.¹⁴⁾

As indicated at the beginning we are witnessing another important phase of the development of the CFSP and EFSP: starting presumably in 2009 when the Lisbon Treaty will enter into force, the Union will have a foreign minister in all but name: the reform of foreign relations will be the hallmark of the Lisbon Treaty while the Single European Act contributed to the creation of the Single European Market, the Maastricht Treaty created the Euro and the Amsterdam Treaty brought the cooperation of justice and home affairs.

Looking back on the experiences of the post-war period, the cornerstones of the EU foreign policy are the following:

- Conflict prevention and conflict solution
- Reconciliation between former enemy states
- Problem solving through economic cooperation
- Promotion of human rights and rights of minorities
- Protection of the environment
- Social security and social harmony
- Fostering democratic governments
- Rule of law in politics and economics
- Free market economy.

Contrary to a nation state, the Union purses a policy called “effective multilateralism” placing particular emphasis on the implementation and development of international law, the strengthening of the UN Charter, both at the regional and global level. “Peace making” measures are not excluded in specific cases. However, contrary to national states and in particular to the only remaining hegemon, unilateral or only bilateral measures or ‘coalitions of the willing’ are not the preferred instruments of multilateralism.

CFSP and ESDP reflect the inner EU cooperation—they add to the

"economies of scale" the *"politics of scale"*—a process also referred to as *"Europeanization"*. The latter knows two forms: the bundling of national interests, the pooling of sovereignty, but also the transformation of national interests into European ones in order to facilitate their realisation (e. g. Bulgarian medics in Libya).

In addition to CFSP, ESDP and the cooperation in the sectors of justice and home affairs, the Union seeks to face potential threats like in the area of immigration, trafficking in women and children, trade in drugs and organised crime through the stabilization of its neighbouring countries, i. e. the Balkans, South-East Europe, the Mediterranean including North Africa and the Middle East.

The principle of effective multilateralism also affects a specific aspect of European diplomacy which builds on the above mentioned *"ripples of European integration"*, the role model of the Union in organising its foreign relations according to interregionalism: "Spreading the EU experience therefore implies promoting region building around the world ... the EU's preference for region building and interregionalism has implications not only for the foreign policy of the EU, but also for the organisation of the world polity where regional actors such as the EU gain legitimacy¹⁵⁾". I have dealt with this aspect of EU foreign policy in relation to Asia, arguing that the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM)¹⁶⁾ as well as ASEAN Plus Three are inspired not only by the model but also by the concrete policies pursued by the EU in the various forums. This is in the mutual interest: "The EU ... confirms its role as an actor through interregionalism, creating a sort of virtuous circle to legitimize not only itself and its partners but also in proclaiming foreign policy goals."¹⁷⁾

On December 21, 2007 the freedom provided by the Treaty of Schengen, control free travel across borders was added to the four existing freedoms of the Common Market for all 27 Member States. This will contribute to the process of making border lines obsolete. Common areas alongside borders will foster shared activities and development, supported by the Euro-

pean Regional Policy which favours inter - and transregional cooperation in building a common Union. Furthering common features instead of guarding borders is the new concept. Not surprisingly, regional development gets the second largest share of the European budget, only outperformed by agriculture, but the lead of the latter is shrinking.

However, not all countries can become members of the European Union. Knowing that membership perspective is the driving, transformative force, the civilian power of the Union, the Union was in dire need to come up with a policy for those geographically close countries, which will be closely linked with the Union, but without having a membership perspective.

The answer to this challenge is the

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)¹⁸⁾

The European Neighbourhood Policy was developed in 2004, with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all concerned. In this way, it also addresses the strategic objectives set out in the above mentioned European Security Strategy.

The European Neighbourhood Policy applies to the EU's immediate neighbours by land or sea : Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. The reform elements in these countries are supported by a mix of policy instruments which bind these countries as close as possible to the Union. These instruments are the integration into the Single Market, the conclusion of association and free trade agreements, the granting of access to various EU programs such as the Framework programs for research and development, MEDIA, Erasmus program for students, as well as functional cooperation in the fields of asylum, migration - , environment - and energy policy etc.

Thereby networks of relationships are created which should offset the negative effects of non-membership. The EU's foreign policy aims at exporting stability through exporting not only values but also laws and regulations, standards, norms, procedures — a distinctive feature of soft power. External factors such as the necessity of transborder cooperation to facilitate problem solving in the context of globalisation endorse this approach. Some countries, like Switzerland,¹⁹⁾ although it is not part of the ENP, prefer this approach, as it leaves them freedom in certain areas, such as the maintenance of a specific political system (direct democracy, neutrality) while cooperating closely.

However, it is important to ensure that all these instruments used are accepted by the respective populations to guarantee real cooperation, “a meeting of the minds” and not only a top down imposition of reforms and policies.

Success of this strategy also depends on the availability of alternative solutions : Russia, for instance, might be such an alternative and could attract non-members of the EU with guaranteeing the security of energy supply.

Success also hinges on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership / Barcelona Process,²⁰⁾ initiated in 1995. The so far rather limited success of this process prompted the French President *Sarkozy* to push for a new ‘*Mediterranean Union*’, to be created in 2008 during French EU-presidency if reticence by some Member States, like Germany, can be overcome. Some Member States fear a weakening of the EU through a new institution modelled on its own structures.

The Lisbon Treaty of 2007

The central change brought about by the Lisbon Treaty (also referred to as *Reform Treaty*) is the introduction of a High Representative of the Union responsible for the Foreign and Security Policy: “*The High Repre-*

sentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who shall chair the Foreign Affairs Council, shall contribute through his or her proposals towards the preparation of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council.²¹⁾

Double hated, as Secretary General of the Council and Vice-president of the Commission, the High Representative will contribute to a better coordination and more efficiency. *“The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy. He or she shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s position in international organisations and at international conferences.²²⁾*”

The High Representative will be supported by delegations of a European Foreign Service called the “European External Action Service”: *“In fulfilling his or her mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States.²³⁾*”

Other key elements of the reform of foreign policy :

Unanimity will remain the guiding principle when deciding on foreign policy issues. Legal instruments will not be used and therefore the European Court of Justice will have no jurisdiction; the European Parliament will be better integrated in the policy process but without decision-making authority.

As an integral part of CFSP, the ESDP “*shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict*

prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.²⁴⁾

In Article 28, the above mentioned missions making use of civil and military means are defined as including “*joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.*”

Is the European Union a civilian or soft power in its foreign policy ?

Ever since the term “*civilian power*” was coined in 1972 by *François Duchêne*²⁵⁾ in the context of the former European Community, the European Union is regarded as the prototype of a “civilian power” or “soft” power. This concept indicates that the European Union as an international actor pursues its interests mainly by economic and political means, and chooses military action only as a last resort if ever. In the context of the “nuclear inhibition of war gives power to many forms of collective activity which previously had far less influence : cultural example, social movements, pressure groups (subnational, national and transnational), economic capacity, and so on. Lacking military power is not the handicap it once was.”²⁶⁾ Thus, *Duchêne* who in reference to *Valéry* referred already to the *end of history*, made popular by *Francis Fukuyama* in 1989, clearly foresaw the power of non-military factors, but took primarily a nuclear capability as a military reference point, understandable in the context of the then prevailing Cold War. Also today nuclear weapons remain firmly under the control of nation states, France and the UK ; there is no role for the Union. Therefore, the European Community underestimated and neglected the military element as

a possible part of a policy strategy for a long time.

However, the end of the Cold War and the insight that the 'peace dividend' cannot be cashed in, brought about a rebound. During the breakdown of former Yugoslavia, for instance, the European Union found itself in a rather weak situation, neither being able to prevent the imminent war nor genocide in Europe, even much less the conflict in far away Rwanda.

As a result, the ground for the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as for a European Security and Defence Policy was prepared. Furthermore, in 2003 as mentioned earlier, for the first time a European Security Strategy — “*A secure Europe in a better world*” was presented. For some this was an important step for the European Union leading to more efficient actions; others, however, feared that this strategy might cause the end of the Union as a “*soft power*”.

The historic learning process of the European Union showed that a soft power without any possibility to project (military) power possibly stays “soft” which could prevent it from implementing ideals and goals like human rights or, precisely, the prevention of genocide. The realist *Henry Kissinger* brought it to the point: “In a society of sovereign states, a power can in the last resort indicate its interpretation of justice or defend its vital interests only by a willingness to employ force.”²⁷⁾

Through its enlargement,²⁸⁾ the European Union has contributed most to the peace project “Europe” confirming hereby its soft power position. In a more global sense, being the biggest development aid contributor of the world is an extension of the European peace project from which others players take profit, politically and economically.²⁹⁾

I clearly see this enlargement process as a central characteristic of its soft or transformative power as defined by *Joseph Nye*³⁰⁾ or *Mark Leonard*:³¹⁾ Each and every Member State joined voluntarily, after a referendum and after acceptance by all members of the Club. Accession is based on free choice; the European Union did not grow through forced conquests, it did not add stars to its flag after a successful acquisition. Coupled with strict con-

ditionality accession strategies are developed, implemented and monitored. Thus, common social, economic, cultural and institutional networks and shared values have been built.

Some critics argue that the European Union has no other choice than to stay a soft power, since it is neither willing nor able to become a military power, thus a *civilian power by default*.

The objective of CFSP to limit and to prevent violence in international relations, its strategy to offer conflict resolution models, to be proactive in fostering conflict prevention are some examples of a *soft power strategy of a civilian power*.³²⁾ The Stability Pact set up in the Balkans which will be transformed shortly into a regional organisation is a concrete example of and for this policy.

Developing alternative strategies such as favouring arms control and disarmament, the exhaustion of negotiating attempts *vis-à-vis* Syria and Iran, an even handed approach to the Middle East, the fight against the root causes of terrorism like exclusion, poverty, dominance and not only its symptoms, the commitment to the Kyoto-Agreement and an effective post-Kyoto regime to fight climate change effectively, a decisive stance against the death penalty and continued support for the creation of an International Criminal Court exemplify the self understanding of the European Union as soft power. Use of political and diplomatic means to solve problems through legal means and procedures are the credentials of a civilian power.

Criticism of the 'civilian power' concept of Europe builds on the following arguments or accusations :

- Not having a choice but being condemned to be a civilian power
- Naivety, since international law cannot provide an international order. Thus the prime instrument used by the Union is often weak and ineffective (e. g. blockade in the Security Council);
- Naivety, since without the possibility to project power no efficient foreign policy can be performed.
- Realists deny a non-state actor like the European Union the possibility

to compete effectively with nation states.

Those favouring the civilian power concept criticise that the Union is moving in the direction of abandoning the concept “soft power”, since it developed a military component, places battle troupes in conflict zones and strengthens its armament (e. g. headline goals, European Defence Agency ...)

³³⁾
For the first 50 years of its existence, the peace making civilian power of the European Union is acknowledged. However, in the course of the enlargement process, the European Union is faced with new challenges:

It will have to define the borders of Europe while taking into account its own capability to enlarge and the willingness of the European citizens to go along with the process. Enlargement capacity and capability are not given parameters; they can be formed and developed — an eminently political task for European politicians. Those European countries which meet the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 and later on the ones enumerated in the Treaty of Lisbon, have a right to become members, thus the process is not finished yet — the remaining countries of South East Europe and the Balkans have a European perspective.

Nevertheless, the accession negotiations with Turkey clearly showed the challenge to define the frontiers of Europe, politically, economically, culturally, religiously and last but not least geographically.

Conclusions

Europe has come a long way during the last fifty years in building up a foreign policy capacity: From external aspects of the common agricultural and trade policies, to a world wide development policy based on economic cooperation, the EU was rather driven to add a political dimension to its external relations dimension.

1989, war and genocide in former Yugoslavia and 9/11 have been landmarks: Although the success of the EU is built on its soft power and

the civil instruments at its disposal, the EU had to learn that foreign and security policy is a necessary supplement in order to be an effective international player. The EU's diplomacy is still different from diplomacy performed by nation states.

The CFSP is based on the historic experience of Europe to solve conflicts by non-military means, which lead to the so far most successful experiment in peace making and maintaining, secured by an elaborate institutional framework which is based on enforceable law. The "*community method*", a balanced procedural and negotiating technique based on law is the backbone for the success of the Union which turned into a global player because of its civil and not military means and might.

The EU has developed from a "*civilian power by default*" into a civilian power by its own choosing.³⁴⁾ This allows the Union to play a specific role in international politics whether foreign policy or security related. The Union has not only become a model for the organisation and institutionalisation of peaceful relations but also turned in an actor aiming at the peaceful violent free solution of global conflicts and tensions.

The challenge lying ahead for the incoming High Representative will be to formulate a coherent foreign policy, with the policy mix adequate for a unique institution like the European Union. Combining the tools available presently to the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations will allow³⁵⁾ to bundle efforts and to develop a European diplomacy : Diplomacy is not just another word for foreign policy but diplomacy is the technique providing the means to translate the goals of a foreign policy into action. Thus, European diplomacy will translate the goals of the CFSP and the ESDP into action, steered by the High Representative who will be supported by the Delegations of the European Union. While this diplomacy will have some features of traditional diplomacy it will be mainly shaped by the ideas and means inherent in the *soft power concept* as exposed e. g. cooperative in nature. European diplomacy is different from the diplomacy of a hegemon, because of the legal basis, the

values to be transported and the political means at its disposal. 'Effective multilateralism', 'use of civil instruments' are not slogans, but the means at the EU's disposal. European diplomacy will also exclude some features reserved for nation states such as a standing army. It will consciously renounce others like military intervention to realise national goals, while adding others like fostering human rights in campaigning against death penalty or in favour of the International Criminal Court, or favouring interregionalism as a new diplomatic tool. Overcoming internal discrepancies, diverse interests and "profound philosophical and tactical differences"³⁶⁾ will remain the main challenge for the EU 27.

In concluding I can still revert the conclusions of the before mentioned paper presented at the 2004 annual meeting of EUGAKKAI. The Lisbon Treaty should allow the EU to achieve greater coherence in its external actions in developing "an effective policy mix for the instruments available to the Union and its Member States in the areas of trade, finance, economics, politics, diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, police and military operations in order to assure that combined actions are more effective than the sum of individual actions and to assure that the EU is in a position to take effective actions, not merely expressing 'deep concern/regret/sorrow' at the lowest common denominator."³⁷⁾

The next step could be the general introduction of the *community method* into foreign policy decision making, but this presentation will have to wait at least until the 2025 EU GAKKAI annual meeting.

1) This paper is based on a presentation made at the EU GAKKAI annual meeting at Kobe, November 25, 2007. (The author expresses his own views which should not be attributed in any way to the European Commission.) Contact: michaelreiterer@hotmail.com

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 - 20) http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index.htm

- 21) Art. 13a Lisbon Treaty.
- 22) Art. 13a (2) Lisbon Treaty.
- 23) Art. 13a (3) Lisbon Treaty.
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Michael Reiterer

During the last fifty years when the EC turned into the EU, the foreign policy aspect constantly gained importance; in changing its structures and functions the EU added foreign policy tools and developed a foreign policy which is different from the foreign policy of a nation state: The goals are strongly influenced by the historic experience of the Union, focussing on conflict prevention and conflict solution, reconciliation, fostering of human rights and rights of minorities, sustainability and protection of the environment while upholding a free market economy based on the European social model.

Pursuing effective multilateralism, fostering interregionalism as a new diplomatic tool, inventing the European Neighbourhood Policy as an alternative to accession are some key instruments. Thus, a European diplomacy should translate the goals of the Common Foreign and Security and European Security and Defence Policies into action.

The Lisbon Treaty of 2007, if ratified, will streamline the foreign policy process in creating the new function of the double hated High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, supported by European Diplomatic Service, called European Action Service. Since the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003, the military component in the EU's foreign policy has become more important, as the artificial distinction between economics and politics was abandoned. Although the European Union acts as civilian or soft power e. g. it is able to influence many but not all actors by

offering the huge advantage of membership in the Union, the need for a certain military capability in order to be able to pursue its goals, is gradually recognised. Although foreign policy will remain the prerogative of the nation state, which remains the constituent element of the EU, the Europeanisation of foreign policy goals and the need to pool sovereignty in order to contribute to solving problems or to overcome crisis gains slowly momentum. The EU perceived by many as a role model is also responding to the perceptions of the international community which expects a substantial contribution of the EU to the governance of the international system commensurate with its economic might.