Several Affinities between the *Yuktidipikā* and the *Sāṃkhyaatattvakaumudi* in the Context of Perception

KONDO Hayato

**Introduction** In the *Sāṃkhyaakārikā* (SK) of ĪśvaraKrṣṇa (4–5th c. CE), perception is defined as “determination with reference to each [sense faculty’s] respective object” (SK5a’: *prativiṣayādhyavasāya*). Presumably following an older theory, several commentaries on the SK, such as the *Jinqishi lun* 金七十論, describe perception in terms of a sense faculty (*indrīya*) that acts as an agent of determination. However, as the SK23a attributes the function of “determination” to the intellect (*buddhi*), it follows that ĪśvaraKrṣṇa considers perception to be a function of the intellect. On the other hand, the anonymous commentary *Yuktidipikā* (ca. 680–720 CE, YD) explains the definition of perception in SK5a in consistency with this account of SK23a and Vācaspatimiśra’s *Sāṃkhyaatattvakaumudi* (10th c. CE, STK) has several striking similarities with the YD in the same context. Although these similarities have been partially discussed by Nakai (1980) (1981: 57ff.), Kumar (1981: 63ff.), Murakami (1982: 208ff.) and others, I argue that they have not been duly considered from the viewpoint of the relationship between the two commentaries. To fill this research gap, I provide further clarification regarding these similarities and, on the basis of my analysis, I propose the possibility that the STK not only followed the views expounded in the YD but also critically accepted them.

**1. Interpretations of the SK’s definition of perception “prativiṣayādhyavasāya”**

The YD and STK interpret the compound “prativiṣayādhyavasāya,” which appears in the definition of perception in SK5ab’ (*prativiṣayādhyavasāya dṛṣṭam*) as follows.

**YD ad SK5ab’ [77.4–7]**

*vāsyaṃ vāsyaṃ prati vartata iti “prativiṣayam,” kim tat, indriyaṃ tasmin yo “dhyavasāyaḥ” sa “prativiṣayādhyavasāyaḥ,” upāttaviṣayānām indriyānāṃ vṛttyupaniptāḥ sattvodrekāḥ arajastamasam yat prakāṣārapam tad “dṛṣṭam.”*

What is meant by the “prativiṣayā” is a thing which functions toward respective objects. What is it?
It is a sense faculty. The "determination" that is performed with regard to that [sense faculty] is meant by the "pratīviṣayoḥdhyavasāyaḥ." Following the function (transfiguration) of sense faculties that have received an object, there arises a form of illumination free from the rajas and tamas by a predominance of the sattva, which is "perception."

STK ad SKŚab’ [10.8–12]

viṣayaṃ viṣayaṃ prati vartata iti "pratīviṣayaṃ" indriyam, vṛttiś ca sannikṣārṣah, arthasannikṣṭam indriyam ity arthah, tasmāni "adhyavasāyam," taddāśrita ity arthah. "adhyaśaśas" ca buddhivyā-pāro jñānaṃ. upāttavisayānāṃ indriyānāṃ vṛttau satyām, buddhes tamo ’bhibhave sati yāḥ sattva-samudrekaḥ so "dhyavasāyā" iti.

What is meant by the "pratīviṣaya" is a thing which functions toward respective objects i.e. a sense faculty, and the function in this case is contact. [Therefore, "pratīviṣaya"] means a sense faculty that has made contact with an object. ["Pratīviṣayādhyavasāya"] means "determination" toward that [sense faculty that has made contact with an object] i.e. ["determination"] rested on that. The "determination" is a function of the intellect and a particular form of knowledge. When there is a function (transfiguration) of the sense faculties that have received an object, and the tamas in the intellect is overwhelmed, there arises a predominance of the sattva, which is the "determination."

The YD and STK explain the meaning of the term "prati" in "pratīviṣaya" as follows.

YD ad SKŚab’ [81.9–12]

pratigrahaṇam sannikṛṣṭartham. "viṣayaḥdhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam" iti iyati ucayamāne viṣayamātre sam-pratayat syāt. pratigra<ha> puṇah kriyamāne prati ādbhimukhya vartate, tena sannikṛṣṭendriyavṛttyapanaipāt yo 'dhyavasāyas tad "dṛṣṭam" ity etal labhyate.

The term "prati" is employed in order to signify contact. If it were solely posited that "determination toward objects is perception," any determinate notion of objects in general would be [regarded as perception]. However, when the term "prati" is employed, the [term] "prati" signifies confrontation. Therefore, it is understood [from this definition of perception] that the determination, following the function of sense faculties that have made contact [with objects], is "perception."

STK ad SKŚab’ [11.3–4]

pratigrahaṇena cendriyārthasannikṛṣtacanād anumānasmyādayaḥ ca parākṛṣṭa bhavanti.

Furthermore, as the contact of a sense faculty with [its] objects is indicated by employing the term "prati," the result is that inference, recollection, and so forth have been excluded [from perception].

These passages explicitly indicate the existence of four significant affinities between the YD and the STK. First, both interpret "pratīviṣaya" as "viṣayaṃ viṣayam prati vartate" and add the verb "vartate" (to function). Second, both identify "pratīviṣaya" as a sense faculty.2) Third, both explain that perception occurs when the sattva is predominant and the tamas becomes overwhelmed. Fourth, both assert that the term "pratī" in "pratīviṣaya"
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denotes “contact” (sannikāraṇa) with objects. In addition to these four respects, there can be found a similarity regarding the necessity of the term “prati.” The STK explains that inference, recollection, and so forth are excluded from perception by the term “prati,” which denotes “contact.” The YD also expounds the necessity of the term “prati” through answering the opponent’s objection and it agrees with the STK in that the term “prati” is employed in order to exclude inference, recollection and doubt from perception. Therefore, it may be concluded that the STK’s argumentation is a summary of the YD’s argumentation. Moreover, given the fact that the internal organs (antahkarana), such as the intellect, cannot directly make contact with objects as well as that the SK attributes perception to a function of the intellect, both YD’s and STK’s attribution of “prativiśaya” to a sense faculty is consistent and reasonable.

On the other hand, the YD and the STK present different views regarding cognitions that do not require contact between sense faculties and objects. By interpreting “prativiśayā-dhyavasāya” as a single remainder (ekāśeṣa) compound, the YD applies the definition of perception to cognition concerning desire (rāga) and so forth as well as yogic cognition. In contrast, the STK excludes consideration of the yogic cognition from the context of perception, thinking that the teaching of the Śāmkhya system is intended to instruct ordinary people only, despite admitting its existence in the commentary ad SK4. The STK, however, considers feelings such as pleasure (sukha) as forms of cognizable objects for ordinary people, and therefore, considers internal cognition concerning desire and so forth also as a type of ordinary perception. From this standpoint, there is no appreciable difference between the YD and the STK. Viewed in this light, it can be argued that Vācaspati-miśra were aware of the YD’s view that yogic cognition is a sort of perceptual knowledge, but critically addressed it within the context of pramāṇa.

2. Interpretations of the term “adhyavasāya” and “(prati) viśaya”

Several affinities between the YD and the STK regarding interpretations of the term “adhyavasāya” and “(prati) viśaya” can also be observed in the following passages.

YD ad SK5ab7 [79.9–12 ... 79.20–21 ... 81.4–6] atiprasaṅganivṛtti.vartaram. “prativiśayām dṛṣṭam” itiyaty ucyamāne yāvat kimeit prativiśayam vartate 'migrāhakatvenopagāhākatvena vā tat sarvam dṛṣṭam ity etad āpadyate, adhyavasāyagrahane punah kriyamāne na doṣo bhavati. ... tasmād adhyavasāyagrahānam kriyate sandeque mā bhūd
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Section 3

3. Conclusion This study has identified and discussed several striking affinities between the YD and the STK regarding their views and theories of perception, which do not appear in other Śāṃkhyā texts. On the basis of my analysis, I surmise that the perception theory of the STK is modeled on that of the YD to a considerable extent. However, I recognize that we must more carefully examine this surmise while taking other Vācaspatimiśra’s texts into consideration. In particular, we must examine the theory of reflection (pratibimba) and the nature of the enjoyment (bhoga) of objects underlying the theory of perception in both YD and STK, topics that I plan to address in an upcoming paper.
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Notes


4) Cf. YD ad SK30d [212.28–213.1].


6) Cf. STK ad SK4ab* [9.5–8]. See Kumar (1981: 66) and Murakami (1982: 205ff.).

7) Cf. STK ad SK5ab* [10.6–7].


Abbreviations and Bibliographical References


(This research was supported in part by a Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows)

〈Key words〉 *Yuktidipikā, Sāṃkhyaatattvakaumudi, Sāṃkhya, pratyakṣa, perception, pramāṇa* (Graduate Student, The University of Tokyo, JSPS Research Fellow (DC1))