Bhāviveka on the Yogācāra theory of *anyāpoha*

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0. The fifth chapter of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* is meant for opposing Yogācāras' view of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) as the emptiness of hypostasized subject-object duality (*grāhyagrāhakadvayaśūnya/-dvayābhāva*). According to the Yogācāras, empirical factors, characterized as a subject or an object, are constructed through concepts and language and as such they exist only nominally or conventionally (*abhilāpamātra*). Therefore, emptiness as conceived of by them is also defined as 'emptiness of an effable intrinsic nature' (*abhilāpyātmaśūnyatva*).

The present paper deals with MHK V 60–68, in which Bhāviveka, in order to dispute this view of emptiness, has to argue against Dignāga's apoha theory.

1. In MHK V 60 Bhāviveka presents the Yogācāras' view of a word meaning and points out that, in formulating the principle that everything is ineffable, they are violating the same principle.

MHK V 60: *sāmānyam abhilāpyam hi sāmānyam ca na* kiṃcana / nābhilāpyātmaśūnyatvam** evam apy upapadyate* // (*ca na] H, S, SG, Ms; na ca L₁, L₂, Ec. **nābhilāpyātmaśūnyatvam] L₁, L₂, S, SG, Ms; nābhilāpātmaśūnyatvam H, Ec) “[Yogācāras] Indeed, a universal (*sāmānya*) is what is to be denoted [by a word] (*abhilāpya*). But the universal is something indeterminable (*na kiṃcana*) [i.e., something unreal]. [Bhāviveka] If so, then it is not appropriate even to say that [the statement that all dharmas are] empty of an effable essential nature [is meaningful] (*abhilāpyātmaśūnyatva*).”

Bhāviveka says that in the Yogācāras' view a universal is what is to be denoted by a word. In the light of arguments presented in MHK V 66, what is considered here to be a universal is *anyāpoha*.¹⁾ Accordingly, Bhāviveka brings in here the Yogācāras' view that *anyāpoha* is what is to be denoted by a word.

The point is clear. If the Yogācāras argue that since a universal in the form of *anyāpoha*, which they hold to be what is to be denoted by a word, is unreal, what is denoted by a word has no essential nature, they cannot formulate this principle; even if they did, the statement

formulated would be meaningless.

2.1. Bhāviveka has stated that in the Yogācāras' view a universal in the form of *anyāpoha* is what is to be denoted by a word. He goes on to state his own view of what is to be denoted by a word.

MHK V 61: *vācyaṃ sāmānyavad vastu tadābhamatihatataḥ / tasya tenātmanā sattvān na yuktānabhi-lāpyatā* // “An entity which is qualified by a universal (*sāmānyavad vastu*) is what is to be denoted [by a word], because [the word is] the cause of a cognition in which such an entity appears. Since the universal (*tasya*) exists as such [an effable] essential nature, it is not reasonable that [the universal] is ineffable.”

According to Bhāviveka, what is to be denoted by a word is an entity qualified by a universal (*sāmānyavad vastu*). In his view what is understood from a word is such an entity. It is important to note that, as shall be shown, what Bhāviveka considers here to be a universal is not *anyāpoha* but *vi-jāṭīyenaśūnyatva* ‘emptiness of a dissimilar entity’ and that he holds the view because he considers that the word *go* ‘cow,’ for example, must refer to any cows and not to non-cows. It will be explained in MHK V 63 how the qualifier universal is treated as what is to be denoted by a word in this view. What is important is that in Bhāviveka's view the universal is not beyond verbalization and hence effable.

2.2. MHK V 62 states that when he says that an entity qualified by a universal is what is to be denoted by a word, he means the emptiness of a dissimilar entity by the ‘universal’ and that this emptiness has a claim to be regarded as a universal.

MHK V 62: *vi-jāṭīyenaśūnyatvaṃ tulyadhīvr̥ttihetutaḥ / sāmānyāt tulyajāṭīye sāmānyam iti niścitam* // “Emptiness of a dissimilar entity [i.e., being different from a dissimilar entity] is the universal, because [this emptiness is] the cause of the occurrence of the same cognition (*tulyadhīvr̥ttihetu*). [This emptiness is] determined as a ‘universal’ by virtue of similar entities having it in common.”

According to Bhāviveka, it is by virtue of the universal characterized by the emptiness of a dissimilar entity that different cognitions of the same form can occur with respect to individual entities of the same class.

2.3. In Bhāviveka's view, if an entity qualified by a universal is denoted by a word, then it naturally follows that the universal is also denoted by a word.

MHK V 63: *nāśrayasyāgrahe grāhyaṃ samkhyāvat tadgrahe grahāt / tadvat kalpyam ato vastu vācyaṃ ceṣṭaṃ pṛthag na ca** // (**ceṣṭaṃ pṛthag na ca*] H, S; *neṣṭaṃ pṛthag bhavet* L₁, L₂, Ec; *ceṣṭaṃ pṛthag bhavet* SG, Ms) “[The universal in the form of emptiness of a dissimilar entity] cannot be

grasped when its locus is not grasped. For, just like a number, it is grasped only when its locus is grasped. And, [this being the case,] it is not accepted that [the universal is] separate from [the entity which has this universal] (*prthak*). Accordingly, an entity qualified by the [universal] (*tadvad vastu*) is an object of a conceptual cognition and a significand [of a word].”

It is interesting that Bhāviveka applies the anvaya-vyatireka method to establish the non-distinction between the universal in question and its holder.²⁾ According to Bhāviveka, there does not exist the universal in question independently of the entity which possesses it, so that, when an entity qualified by the universal is denoted by a word, it must be said that the universal is also denoted by the word.

3. Now, in order to establish that an entity which is qualified by the universal in the form of emptiness of a dissimilar entity is denoted by a word, Bhāviveka must explain about two points: the first is that the emptiness of a dissimilar entity resides in all entities of the same class, in consequence of which the word *go* is used to refer to any cows; the second is that different kinds of emptiness of a dissimilar entity reside in one and the same entity, in consequence of which two different words, say, *nīla* ‘blue’ and *utpala* ‘lotus,’ are used to refer to a single entity, a blue lotus.

MHK V 64: *abhedasattvādravyābhyām* ekato 'nekavṛtti** api / tadvināṣe 'vināṣāc ca nānyasmin tanmatir na ca //* (*abhedasattvādravyābhyām] L₁, L₂, Ec; abhedāsattvādravyābhyām S, SG, Ms; abhedādravyasattvābhyām H. **ekato 'nekavṛtti] L₁, L₂, H, S, SG, Ms; ekam anekavṛtti Ec) “Furthermore, [the universal in question] exists as a single entity in many [individual] entities (*ekato 'nekavṛtti*) since it exist [in individual entities] as something undifferentiated (*abhedasattva*) and since it is not a substance (*adravya*). In addition, this universal does not perish when a substance, [which is its locus], perishes. For these reasons, it is not proper to say that the cognition of the universal does not occur in another [substance].”

MHK V 65: *anīlānutpalabhinnarūpeṇāvyavadhānataḥ* / sāmānādhikaranyam hi dvayor ekārthavṛttitaḥ //* (*anīlānutpalabhinnarūpeṇāvyavadhānataḥ] H, S, Ec; anīlānutpalābhinna-] L₁, L₂; anīlānutpalam bhinnas- SG, Ms) “Indeed, [it is established that] two [such universals] have the same locus (*sāmānādhikaranyam*) since they can reside in one and the same entity. For they are not excluded from each other (*avyavadhāna*). [In the case of a blue lotus, for example, the two universals, being different from non-blue (*anīlabheda*) and being different from non-lotuses (*anutpalabheda*), reside in the blue lotus] since [the blue lotus is] something which is differentiated from non-blue entities and from non-lotuses.”

According to Bhāviveka, the emptiness of a non-cow which a certain cow possesses is single, resides in other cows, and does not perish even if the cow perishes. This will explain the first point. Furthermore, emptiness of non-blue and that of a non-lotus do not contradict

each other, so that they can reside in one and the same entity. This will explain the second point.

4.1. From the point of view of Bhāviveka who holds that an entity qualified by a universal is denoted by a word, if *anyāpoha* as conceived of by the Yogācāras had a claim to be a universal, then it would have to be accepted that *anyāpoha* is denoted by a word. But, in his view, *anyāpoha* cannot be treated as a universal.

MHK V 66ab: *nānyāpoho 'nyasāmānyam anyadharmād* viśeṣavat* / (*-dharmād] L₁, L₂, H, S, Ec; -dharmau SG, Ms) “[Thesis:] [The universal called] *anyāpoha* [of an entity] is not a universal [common to] another entity; [Reason:] because it is a property differing from entity to entity; [Example:] like a specific property (*viśeṣa*).”

As cow *x* excludes non-*x*, so also does cow *y* exclude non-*y*. Cow *x* is qualified by *anyāpoha*₁ and cow *y* by *anyāpoha*₂. In this case, if *anyāpoha*₁ were the same as *anyāpoha*₂, then the two cows would be identical with each other. But if *anyāpoha*₁ were different from *anyāpoha*₂, these two *anyāpohas* could not be a universal. This is what Bhāviveka intends to say by stating the argument.

4.2. MHK V 66cd is to discuss the case in which *anyāpoha* that qualifies an entity is not differentiated from *anyāpoha* that qualifies another entity.

MHK V 66cd: *nābhāvasyāviśeṣatvād dhībhedaḥ kambalādiṣu* // “Absence (*abhāva*) is not differentiated (*viśeṣa*). Consequently, one could not have different cognitions of entities such as a dewlap [since such entities are not differentiated from one another].”

In Bhāviveka’s view, *anyāpoha*, as Kumārila argues, consists in absence. That is, *anyāpoha* amounts to *anyābhāva* ‘absence of others,’ or difference. A dewlap is qualified by *anyāpoha*₁ and a tail is qualified by *anyāpoha*₂. *anyāpoha*₁ and *anyāpoha*₂ are the difference from non-dewlaps and that from non-tails. According to TJ, absence has no essential nature (*ngo bo nyid med pa*, **niḥsvabhāva*) and hence is something unreal.³⁾ These two *anyāpohas* are not differentiated from each other in that both are unreal. If they were unreal, then the dewlap and the tail would become the same entity since the dewlap has no difference from the tail and the tail has no difference from the dewlap.⁴⁾

4.3. Recall that Bhāviveka adopts the anvaya-vyatireka method to establish the non-distinction between a universal and its holder. If a universal is grasped independently of an entity which is supposed to possess it, it follows that the universal is distinct from the entity.

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MHK V 67: *vastvagrahe grahāc cāsyā neṣṭe* kalpyatvavācyate** / taddvāreṇānyavācyatve tadvācyatvādi*** hīyate* // (*neṣṭe] L₁, H, S, Ec; neṣṭā L₂; neṣṭya SG, Ms. **kalpyatvavācyate] L₁, L₂, S, SG, Ms; kalpyatvavācyatve H, Ec. ***taddvāreṇānyavācyatve tadvācyatvādi] L₁, L₂, S, Ec; taddvāreṇānyavācyatve tadvācyatādi H; taddvāreṇānyavācyatvādi SG, Ms) “It is not accepted that this [universal called *anyāpoha* is] an object of a conceptual cognition and a significand of a word, since [the universal] is grasped even if an entity [supposed to have the universal] is not grasped. If [an entity which is] different (*anya*) from [the universal] becomes a significand of a word by dint of the universal, then the universal loses the properties of being a significand of a word [and of being an object of a conceptual cognition].”

In Bhāviveka’s view, what is denoted by a word is an entity which is qualified by a universal that is not distinct from the entity. Thus it follows that the *anyāpoha* the Yogācāras consider to be a universal which is distinct from its qualificand cannot be denoted by a word. In addition, if an entity which is not qualified by the *anyāpoha* were denoted by a word through the *anyāpoha*, then it would follow that the *anyāpoha* is not denoted by the word.

5. In MHK V 68 Bhāviveka concludes that the Yogācāras’ theory of ‘emptiness of an effable intrinsic nature’ is untenable.

MHK V 68: *tadanyabhinnarūpasya vastuno ’nabhilāpyatā* / na yuktaivam ato ’yuktā yogācāranayoditiḥ*** // (*’nabhilāpyatā] L₁, L₂, H, S, Ec; ’nabhilāpyatā SG, Ms. **na yuktaivam ato ’yuktā yogācāranayoditiḥ] H, S, Ec; na yuktyaiva manoyuktā yogācāranayād iti L₁; na yuktaiva manoyuktā yogācāranayād iti L₂, SG; na yuktaiva manoyuktā yogācāranayoditi Ms) “In this way, it is not untenable that an entity which is different from something different from it cannot be denoted by a word. Accordingly, the assertion of the doctrine of Yogācāras is unfounded.”

In Bhāviveka’s view, it is reasonably established that an entity qualified by a universal is what is to be denoted by a word. The universal consists in emptiness of a dissimilar entity. Both the entity and the universal are real at the conventional level. When such a view is accepted, the Yogācāras’ theory of ‘emptiness of an effable intrinsic nature’ cannot be accepted.

It is to be noted that there is a variant reading of MHK V 68ab. The Tibetan version of MHK V 68ab goes as follows:

MHK V 68ab (Tib): *de ni gzhan gyi ngo bo na // des na brjod med nyid mi rigs* // (**tasya ca bhinnarūpatvād vastuno ’nabhilāpyatā* /) “If the [*anyāpoha*] has an essential nature different from [that of] an entity, in this case it is not reasonable that this [*anyāpoha*] cannot be denoted by a word.”

If the Yogācāras argued that *anyāpoha* is distinct from an entity which is supposed to have

it, it would have to be said that the property *anyāpoha* has an essential nature different from that of the entity; otherwise, no distinction could be made between the two. If the *anyāpoha*, which the Yogācāras hold to be what is to be denoted by a word, had an essential nature, they could not maintain the theory of ‘emptiness of an effable intrinsic nature.’

6. The following points have become clear: (1) Bhāviveka considers that the theory of apoha is the Yogācāras’ linguistic theory to account for their view of emptiness as ‘emptiness of an effable intrinsic nature.’ (2) He defines *anyāpoha* as a kind of universal. (3) He tries to discredit the apoha theory within the frame of reference such that what is denoted by a word must be an entity qualified by a universal. This leads him to discuss how *anyāpoha* can be related to an entity. (4) What he means by the word *vastu* ‘entity’ is in essence an individual, referred to by the word *dravya* ‘substance’ also. This is why, in denying the property of being a universal to *anyāpoha*, he can treat *anyāpoha* as something like a specific property. (5) He regards *anyāpoha* as ‘absence of others’ or ‘difference from others.’

Bhāviveka’s arguments against the theory of apoha clearly show that in his view the world in which verbalization takes place must have the conventional reality.

Notes: 1) See also TJ ad MHK V 60 [D215b6–216a1; P239b4–6]. 2) For a full account of the anvaya-vyatireka method, see G. Cardona, “On Reasoning from Anvaya and Vyatireka in Early Advaita,” in *Studies in Indian Philosophy* (Ahmedabad: 1981). 3) See TJ [D217b3–4; P242a1–2]. 4) See Hattori [1975: 3–4].

〈Abbreviations〉 Ec: M.D. Eckel, *Bhāviveka and His Buddhist Opponents* (Harvard University Press, 2008). H: P. Hoornaert, “An Annotated Translation of *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā/Tarkajvālā* V.55–68,” *Religion and Culture* 13 (2001): 13–47. Hattori [1975]: “A Study of the Chapter on Apoha of the *Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika* (II)” (in Japanese), *Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University* 15: 1–63. L₁: Ch. Lindtner, “Bhavya’s *Madhyamakahrdaya* (Pariccheda Five) Yogācāratattvaviniścayāvatāra,” *The Adyar Library Bulletin* 59 (1995): 37–65. L₂: Ch. Lindtner, *Madhyamakahrdayam of Bhavya* (The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 2001). MHK: *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*, see Ms, SG, L₁, L₂, H, S, Ec. S: A. Saito, “Bhāviveka’s Theory of Meaning,” *JIBS* 52-2 (2004): (24)–(31). Ms: Jiang Zhongxin, “Sanskrit *Tarkajvālā-Sūtra* Manuscript Copy” (in Chinese), in *Papers in Honour of Dr. Ji Xianlin on the Occasion of his 80th Birthday* (Jiang Xi: 1991). SG: S.S. Bahulkar, “The *Madhyamaka-Hrdaya-Kārikā* of Bhāvaviveka,” *Sambhāṣā* 15 (1994): i–iv, 1–49. TJ: *Tarkajvālā*, D3856, P5256.

〈Key words〉 Bhāviveka, Yogācāra, Dignāga, *sāmānya*, *vijātiyenaśūnyatva*, *anyāpoha*, *vastu*
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