Interpretations of \textit{adattādāna} in Jainism

KAWASAKI Yutaka

1. Introduction

TAS 7,10\textsuperscript{1} defines stealing as taking what is not given (\textit{adattādānam steyam}). Hence \textit{adattādāna} is used as a synonym for stealing in Jainism and both Jain mendicants and laypersons have to adhere strictly to the vow of taking only what is already given. But can Jains always take the meaning of \textit{adattādāna} in a literal sense and understand it as an exact equivalent term of \textit{steya}? For example, it is said that “when a king takes a fine or confiscates a culprit’s property he most certainly commits \textit{adattādānam},”\textsuperscript{2} since we have never ‘given’ fines to the kings or the culprit did not offer his property voluntarily to the king. If we accept the definition of \textit{steya} found in TAS at face value, this king should be a thief. Here is another example: a Buddhist \textit{sutta}\textsuperscript{3} says that a bhikkhu who smelt a flower’s scent was called ‘thief of scent[s]’ \textit{(gandhathena)} by a deity because the scent was, of course, ‘not given’ \textit{(adinna)} by the flower! Some Jain authors were well aware of the above-mentioned problems of using the term \textit{adattādāna} as a synonym for \textit{steya} and made various attempts to reinterpret the term \textit{adattādāna}. However, this issue seems to have never been examined by the scholars so far. In this paper, three interpretations on \textit{adattādāna} in Jain tradition will be investigated.

2. Agastyaśimha

First, I will discuss the interpretation found in the DasC by Agastyaśimha. This is found in the commentary on Das 4,3, where the great vow of non-stealing is discussed. There \textit{adinṇādāna} (Prakrit equivalent of \textit{adattādāna}) is explained as follows:

\begin{quote}
\textit{adinṇādānam parehīṃ parigghātassā vā aparigghātassā galaṇa[m a\textsubscript{1}]} \textsubscript{diṃn-}
\textsubscript{ādānam} . . . ettha dāvavato nāṃ\textsuperscript{3} ege adinṇādānam genḥijjā no bhāvato caubhamgo. (1) saṃbhavo se dāvavato no bhāvato jahā taṇa-sugāḍī sādhū \textit{anābhogena} ananunṇavātim genhejjā (2) coro
\end{quote}
khaṇṇamuhena paviṭṭha na kimi laddham etam bhāvato adinnaṃ na dāvato (3) anṛṇena taḥ'eva laddham etam ubhayahā (4) cauthabhāmgo suṇṇo.

Adinṇādāna: whether [an object] is possessed or not by others, taking [the object] which is not permitted is [regarded as] adinnādāna . . . In this respect [there is a case even] if one commits “adinṇādāna as substance (dravya),” he [does] not [commit “adinṇādāna] as condition (bhāva),.” [There are] four classifications: (1) If a mendicant takes unintentionally [some] grass and string and so on [all of which are] not permitted, [for him] as substance it (= adinnādāna) is arisen [, but] as condition it [is] not [arisen]. (2) If a thief enters into [a place] through a hole which was dug [intentionally by him, but] he gets nothing [worthy of stealing, for him] as condition adinna[ādāna] is arisen, but as substance [it is] not [arisen]. (3) If another [thief does] just like [former one, and] gets [something worthy of stealing, for him] as both (i.e., as substance and condition) [adinṇādāna] is arisen. (4) The fourth classification is empty.

It must be noted that Agastyasimha defines adinna as ‘what is not permitted’ (an宣扬nāta [Skt. anamajñāta]). The subject of amu-√ jñā here must not be a donor / owner in general, since he adds ‘whether [an object] is possessed or not by others.’ But we can be fairly certain that the subject is ‘Mahāvīra’ or ‘Āgama (Jaina scriptures) which was preached by Mahāvīra,’ when we consult the interpretations of adattādāna by Siddhasena (→ 4.). Thus when one takes what is not ‘given’ by Mahāvīra, that is, when he takes an object, the taking of which is prohibited in Jaina scriptures, he commits the sin of adattādāna—even if the object is offered (i.e., datta) by its owner or there is no one who owns it. In addition, it is also worthwhile to note that Agastyasimha classifies adattādāna in terms of dravya/bhāva. This seems to indicate that he pays attention to the presence/absence of the motive of stealing. According to his classification, even if one takes unintentionally (anabhogena) what is not permitted, one commits at least ‘adattādāna as substance,’ His attitude on the motive of theft seems to be different from that of Umāsvāti and Siddhasena, to be discussed below, who think that the presence/absence of motive of stealing is crucial for the commitment of steyā.

3. Umāsvāti

Umāsvāti discusses TAS 7,10 in his ‘auto-commentary’ (TASU) 4) as follows:

steyabuddhyā parair adattasya parīghitasya tṛnāder dravyajātasyādānam steyam.

Taking [any] kinds of objects such as a blade of grass and so on, which are not given by others [, in other words, which] are owned [by others], is stealing [, if one takes it] with the motive of stealing.

— 1114 —
Interpretations of adattādāna in Jainism (Y. Kawasaki)  

Here we must draw attention to TASU’s wording ‘with the motive of stealing’ (steyabuddhaya). It is clear that TASU understands the motive of stealing as the crucial factor in judging whether adattādāna is theft or not.\(^5\) Hence, according to TASU, when one takes an unoffered object without theft as a motive, he commits, naturally, adattādāna, but this is not regarded as a theft. Another important point is that TASU interprets ‘not given’ (adatta) as ‘owned’ (parighīta) and consequently, excludes ‘not owned’ (aparighīta) from the category of adatta.\(^6\) This interpretation shows a marked difference from Agastyasimha’s understanding of adatta. As already noted, he thinks that even if one takes an object which belongs to no owner he may commit adattādāna. For Siddhasena too, the ownership of an object is one of the important points in determining whether an act is adattādāna and steya.

4. Siddhasena

Let us now turn to Siddhasena’s interpretation. In his commentary on TAS (TASS), based on TASU, Siddhasena discusses TAS 7,10 at length. Due to the space limitation, this short study will summarize only three noteworthy issues found in the former part of TASS on TAS 7,10\(^7\):

(1) First, TASS states that the expression, ‘through a deed of a negligent one’ (pramattayogā), is taken from TAS 7,8\(^8\) ("pramattayogā ity anuvartate"). In other words, TASS understands that only a negligent person commits steya, although it is not clear from TASS whether a non-negligent person can also commit adattādāna or not. Incidentally, such a supplement of pramattayoga to TAS 7,10 can also be found in the Digambara commentaries on TAS,\(^9\).

(2) As is suggested above (\(\leftrightarrow 2.\)), according to TASS, in case what is being offered by an owner is at the same time what is prohibited by Bhagavat (i.e., Mahāvīra) in the Jaina scriptures, this act of taking is also certainly steya ("...diyamānaṃ api kīṣcid bhagavatā nānūjñātam āgame... tad api steyam eva").\(^10\) Thus TASS had to agree with an opponent who asserted that Umāsvāti should have made a stūtra describing “taking what has not been given by the [Jaina] Treatise is stealing” ("śāstreṇādattasyādānam steyam") instead of “adattādānam steyam.” However, TASS explains that to indicate briefly Umāsvāti did not make such a stūtra that the opponent read. In addition to this, TASS maintains that, based on such a characteristic of this stūtra, if the need arises to take human hair in a barbershop or clothes in a dump yard out of necessity, then this is not re-
garded as stealing, because in a very real sense such hair or clothes have been thrown away—in other words, there are no owners to such hair or clothes (“anena ca laksanena kharakutisambandhimänuṣakeśāder bhāvata ujjhitasya sati prayojane grahanam avakarādisthānojhitacivarāder vā na steyam iti”).

(3) When Siddhasena comments on the meaning of steyabuddhi (← 3.), he brings up the issue of taking the karmam[-particle]s in one’s soul. He argues that taking the karmams is not regarded as stealing because of the existence of the word steyabuddhi (“steyabuddhigrahaṇāt tu karmādānaṁ na steyam iti”). Siddhasena says when one takes (ādana) the jñānāvaraṇiya-karmams, etc., which are not given by anyone (adatta), and consequently, when his soul is bound by such karmams, he has no motive to steal them, even if he is negligent. This is because giving or taking a object occurs only when the object is owned by others (“paraiḥ parigrhitasya dānapraṇavrṭtir ādānam vā sambhavati”), but karmams like jñānāvaraṇiyas are not owned by anyone (aparigrhita) and there is no one who thinks “I will give” or “I will not give” (“na tu jñānāvaranādikarmaṇaḥ kaścit parigrhitāsti yo dāsyati na veti”). Limiting the range of application of adattādana and reinterpreting the meaning of TAS 7,10 for the practical use through such a discussion seems to be indispensable not only to Siddhasena but also to all the Jains who actually have to practice the vow of non-stealing every day.

5. Conclusion

It can be concluded from the above investigations that at least some of the Jain theoreticians were well aware of the problems that occur when adattādana is interpreted literally and is regarded as an exact synonym of stealing. They had to reinterpret the meaning of adatta- or to add the word steyabuddhi or pramattayoga to TAS 7,10. As a future task for the study on the concept of stealing in Jainism, it is necessary to look into the vast ocean of Jain law scriptures (Cheyasuttas) and their commentaries. It is also important from the philosophical point of view to investigate the issue in Viy 8,7 where heretics and the Jain mendicants dispute whether or not the meaning of dijjamāna (present participle: ‘what is being given’) is the same as that of dinna (past participle: ‘what has been already given’), because this is also a major issue for Jamāli, who reportedly brought about the schism of Jainism for the first time.
Interpretations of adattādāna in Jainism (Y. KAWASAKI)

1) In this paper the sūtra-number of TAS is based on the Śvetāmbara tradition.
3) S I p.440 [IX 14].
4) On the controversy over the authorship of this commentary, see Dalsukh Malvania and Jayendra Soni, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, volume X, Jain Philosophy (Part I) (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2007), pp.45–47.
5) Similar concept about the motive of stealing can be found in the Buddhist literature, for instance, in Vin III p.46 the adinnādāna-pārājika is defined as follows: yo pana bhikkhu gāmā vā araññā vā adinnam theyyasanākhānaṃ adīveyya... ayām pi pārājiko hoti... “Whatever a mendicant takes from a village or from a wilderness what is not given, **intending to steal**, ... this [mendicant] also is expelled [from the Sangha]...”
6) Vin III 46 similarly defines adinna as follows: adinnaṃ nāma yaṃ adinnam anisaṭṭham apariccattām rakkhitam gopitām mamāyyatam parapariggahitam etam adinnam nāma, “adinna is: what is not given, not let out, not abandoned; what is guarded, protected, cherished, and **owned by others**—this is adinna.”
7) I do not refer to Yaśobhadra’s commentary on TAS 7,10 in this paper, since the content of his commentary on TAS 7,10 is almost the same as that of Siddhasena.
8) TAS 7.8 runs: pramattayogāt prāṇayāeparoparapam himsā, “Taking life away through a deed of a negligent one is violence.” On the relationship between pramattayoga and violence, readers should refer to the article by Prof. Dr. Tomoyuki UNO, which will appear in Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū 学術仏教学研究, volume LXII.
9) For example, according to SAS § 690, entering the roads and gateways for the begging tour are not steyā. Such roads and gateways are commonly opened for anyone, and the mendicant does not enter the closed gateways. Or pramattayogā is supplied to this sūtra. On one hand, through pramattayoga taking anything which is not given is called steyā. On the other hand, the mendicant who is entering the roads, etc. has no pramattayoga. (bhikṣor grāmanagaradāsū bhramanakāle ratyādvārdāpraviśeṣād adattādānam prāpnoti? naiśa doṣah, sūmānyena muktavāt, tathāhi ayam bhikṣuh pihudvārdāsū na praviśati amuktavāt, athāvā pramattayogāt ity anuvartate, pramattayogād adattādānam yat tat steyām ity ucyate, na ca ratyādi praviśataḥ pramattayogo ‘sti)
10) Later Siddhasena repeats the same concept: if an object is offered by a layperson but its taking is prohibited by the Scripture, the prohibition by the Scripture takes priority over the fact of offering by the layperson (“grhinā diyate, śāstreṇa tu pratīṣṭhyate, gariyāṃ ca śāstraprātiṣedhabḥ”).
11) Similar discussions on taking karmans were made by the Digambara commentator of TAS, Pūjayāpāda, and his successors. I will quote only Pūjayāpāda’s SAS § 690 because of the space limitation: Ādāna means seizing. Taking what is not given is adattādāna and is called stealing. [Opponent insists, if so, seizing (= taking) of karmans and nokarmans would be tantamount to stealing, since [these karmans and nokarmans] are not given by others. [Then Pūjayāpāda answers, this is not a fallacy.
Interpretations of \textit{adattādāna} in Jainism (Y. KAWASAKI)

The convention regarding stealing refers [only] to objects to which giving and non-giving occur. ("\textit{ādānam grahaṇam adattādānam adattādānam steyam ity ucyate. yady evam karmanokarmagrahaṇam api steyam prāṇaṁ anṛṣadattattvāt? naiśa doṣāḥ, dāṇḍāāme yatra sambhavatas tatraiva steyavyāvahāraḥ"})) I refer to S. A. Jain, \textit{Reality: English Translation of Srimat Pujyapadacharya's Sarvarthasiddhi} (Madras: Jwalamalini Trust, 1991).

\textbf{〈Primary sources〉}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{TASU} Auto-commentary on TAS. → TAS.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{〈Key words〉} \textit{adattādāna}, \textit{steyāa}

(Assistant Professor, Otani University, Ph.D.)

—1118—