Arcaṭa's Views Introduced in Jaina Treatises

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1. Introduction

It is widely known that Buddhist logicians' views are introduced or quoted in numerous Jaina works, and the views of Buddhist philosopher Arcaṭa (ca. 710–770), one of the commentators of Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660), is no exception. On the basis of the fact that the manuscript of Arcaṭa's *Hetubinduṭīkā* (hereafter referred to as HBṬ) was preserved in a Jaina library in Pāṭan, and that Jaina logicians supposedly regarded him as 'a special subject,'¹⁾ we cannot overlook Arcaṭa's influence on the history of Jaina logic. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to collect and examine the passages ascribed to Arcaṭa in Jaina treatises, especially in the *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā* (hereafter referred to as SVinṬ) by Ananta-vīrya (Digambara, ca. 950–990),²⁾ and to consider the relationship between Jaina logicians and Arcaṭa by comparing the passages presented as objections in these treatises and relevant statements in the HBṬ.

2. Jaina Treatises in Which Arcaṭa's Views Are Introduced as *Pūrvapakṣa*

In the *Nyāyaviniścayavivarana* by Vādirājasūri (Digambara, ca. 1025),³⁾ for example, the following citations are found in the HBṬ: NVinVi vol. 1, 446,8–11 = HBṬ 105,5–8; NVinVi vol. 1, 468,8 = HBṬ 106,25; NVinVi vol. 2, 155,1–2 ≈ HBṬ 152,24; NVinVi vol. 2, 179,11–12 = HBṬ 15,25–16,1; and NVinVi vol. 2, 197,8 ≈ HBṬ 8,15–16. Similarly, the following citations are found in the *Dravyālaṅkāraṭīkā* by Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra: DAT 182,5–9 = HBṬ 78,18–23; DAT 183,9–11 = HBṬ 79,12–14; and DAT 184,17–20 = HBṬ 81,17–22. In each case, these passages are almost literally cited from the HBṬ. Furthermore, as Sukhalāl Saṅghavī pointed out in the introduction to his edition of the HBṬ, the literal citations are also seen in the *Syādvādaratnākara* (hereafter referred to as SVR), the *Utpādādisiddhiṭīkā* (hereafter referred to as UST) and the *Dharmasaṃgrahaṇīṭīkā*.

Conversely, regarding the passages presented as Arcaṭa's views in the *Siddhiviniścaya* (hereafter referred to as SVin) and the SVinṭ, there are minimal parallels in the HBT. The passages in question are as follows:

Passage-[1]: SVinṭ vol. 1, 106,13 (cf. HB 2*,13–14 [= HBT 39,11–12], TBV 76,32–34.)

Passage-[2]: SVinṭ vol. 1, 156,22 (cf. HBT 27,15–18.)

Passage-[3]: SVinṭ vol. 1, 190,9–12 (cf. **Passage-[8]**, HBT 146,26–147,5.)

Passage-[4]: SVinṭ vol. 1, 193,19–20 (≈ HBT 170,1–2, cf. HBT 224, 29–225,1.)

Passage-[5]: SVinṭ vol. 1, 206,13 (cf. HBT 44,24–27.)

Passage-[6]: SVinṭ vol. 1, 350,11 (cf. HB 4*,5–7, HBT 51,2–3; 16,3–5.)

Passage-[7]: SVinṭ vol. 1, 351,29 (≈ HBT 74,1–4.)

Passage-[8]: SVinṭ vol. 2, 407,25 (cf. **Passage-[3]**, HBT 146,28–147,5; 193,16–19.)

Passage-[9]: SVinṭ vol. 2, 641,18

Passage-[10]: SVin vol. 1, 177,4 (confirmed by SVinṭ 178,11–13.)

Passage-[11]: SVin vol. 2, 408,5–10 (confirmed by SVinṭ 409,22.)

It is noteworthy that five out of the 11 passages are concerned with the proof of momentariness and its relevant theories of inference. To begin with, in **Passage-[1]**, there are similar descriptions in the HB or the HBT:

[The following was stated by Arcaṭa:] The ascertainment [of the cognition that the logical reason] is a property of the subject arises from [the cognition by] direct perception. Therefore, it was stated [by Dharmakīrti] that the ascertainment of being a property of the subject is based on direct perception.⁴⁾

When comparing this statement with that of the HB or the HBT, it can be concluded that Anantavīrya, being aware of the difference between the texts of the HB and those of the HBT, might have regarded Arcaṭa's commentary that the ascertainment of *pakṣadharmatva* arises from direct perception as his original idea. In addition, Anantavīrya might have reconstituted Arcaṭa's statement as an objection in the summarized form. Arcaṭa stated that the cognition of an entity's particular characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) by means of direct perception becomes the basis for the cognition of its general characteristic (*sāmānya*) owing to the conceptual knowledge (*vikalpa*) that arises immediately after the cognition of a particular characteristic. Therefore, it is not incorrect to state that a logical reason's being a property of the subject is ascertained by direct perception (HBT 20,8–13). If we compare

this statement in the HBT with Arcāṭa's view in the SVinT, then it reveals that the expression of *-jānanāt* in the HBT shares a similarity with that of *jāyate* in the SVinT. Anantavīrya made no reference to inference despite it being one of the valid means of cognizing *pakṣadharmatva*. However, we may safely state that Anantavīrya might have wanted to focus on direct perception, which he attempted to criticize because it could also be accepted by Jaina logicians that *pakṣadharmatva* is cognized by inference or other means than direct perception. As discussed above, we can assume **Passage-[1]** to be a compressed or brief reproduction of the HBT's content.

Next, we examine passages whose parallels are found in the HBT with the first case being the **Passage-[7]**. Comparing this with the passages in the HBT, it becomes clear that its former half corresponds with the one found in the HBT, although they are not in complete accord. Again, in this case, the presentation of Arcāṭa's view in the SVinT is a summarized form of the statement in the HBT. Another example can be found in **Passage-[4]**, wherein the sentences in the HBT are quite literally quoted, even though Anantavīrya did not refer to Arcāṭa. The former half (SVinT vol. 1, 193,19) corresponds to HBT 169,28–170,3, whereas the latter half (SVinT vol. 1, 193,19–20) corresponds to HBT 224,29–225,1.

3. Arcāṭa's Views That Are Not Found in the HBT

At this point, let us observe **Passage-[6]** in which no parallel passage can be found in the HBT, although it is accompanied by the statement: *yad uktam arcāṭeṇa*.

[On the other hand, the following is stated by Arcāṭa:] The pervasion [of being existent] by momentariness is established on the basis of the exclusion of being existent (*sattva*) from the dissimilar, but not by the force of external examples (*bahirdṛṣṭānta*). In association with logical reasons as effect and particular [logical reasons as] essence, on the other hand, examples are stated.⁵⁾

In this quote, the first point to note is the term *bahirdṛṣṭānta*, which is an expression also found in Alalaṅka's SVin vol. 1, 347,5–7, although its context is somewhat different from **Passage-[6]**. Then, how does Arcāṭa consider examples or the statement of example in the HBT? He takes the position that the statement of example is unnecessary by asserting, 'The statement of example is merely for evoking one's memory but not for establishing what is to be proved' (HBT 62,9–12).⁶⁾ Thus, as far as the proof of momentariness is concerned, we can state that the content of **Passage-[6]** corresponds with that of the HBT. Furthermore, according to Dharmakīrti in his PVSV 18,9–14, examples are stated only for those

who do not understand the essential connection, i.e. the real identity (*tādātmya*) or causality (*tadutpatti*). However, when they realize the connection, only a logical reason needs to be mentioned.⁷⁾

The expression 'the exclusion of being existent from the dissimilar' in **Passage-[6]** seems to imply the application of 'a valid means of cognition that negates [a logical reason] in the opposite of what is to be proved' (*sādhya viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa*, hereafter referred to as *bādhakapramāṇa*), especially if one expresses it in Buddhist terms. If we paraphrase the statement of the SVinT, then it follows that it is impossible to prove momentariness of entities by merely stating examples. Rather, one has to depend on the *bādhakapramāṇa*. However, in the cases of the *kāryahetu* and the *svabhāvahetu* (except for the logical reason *sattva*), it is still valid to state external examples. Conversely, according to the HBT in which Arcaṭa states, 'In the case of a logical reason as essence, [the positive concomitance is established] by the function of a valid means of cognition that negates [a logical reason] in the opposite [of what is to be proved]' (HBT 51,2–3, cf. HB 4*,3, HBT 45,2–3), it is assumed that Arcaṭa believed that the *bādhakapramāṇa* could be applicable to logical reasons as essence in general. However, he did not maintain the necessity of examples or the statement of example positively in the HBT, as stated in **Passage-[6]**, in regard to particular logical reasons as essence and logical reasons as effect.

In sum, **Passage-[6]** clearly defines the applicable scope of the *bādhakapramāṇa* and the statement of example, respectively, whereas the passage in the HBT does not (cf. HBT 16,12–15.). In addition, in the HBT, Arcaṭa states that the *bādhakapramāṇa* is to be applied to logical reasons as essence in general and that the statement of example is useless, especially in regard to the proof of momentariness.

Let us now turn to a consideration of **Passage-[3]**:

[The following is stated by Arcaṭa:] The universal pervasion (*sākalyavyāpti*) of all [the entities] by momentariness is not grasped by direct perception. Rather, it is ascertained that [the logical reason] being existent (*sattva*) excluded from [the domain of] all the non-momentary is pervaded by them (= the momentary) when [the logical reason *sattva*] makes the establishment [of itself] in [the domain of] the momentary, because there is no other way due to the logic of a bird that does not see the shore. And its (= *sattva*'s) exclusion from them (= the non-momentary) is based on the exclusion of the causal efficiency that pervades it (= *sattva*). And [the exclusion] of this [causal efficiency from the non-momentary] is [based on the exclusion] of the successive or simultaneous [exertion of the causal efficiency] that pervades [the causal efficiency].⁸⁾

The content of **Passage-[3]** is also the proof of momentariness. Although this is introduced as *pūrvapakṣa* under Arcaṭa's name, we do not find this passage in the HBT. The most characteristic expression in the passage is 'the universal pervasion' (*sākalyavyāpti*), which appears to be another expression of *sarvopasaṃhāravāpti*, a technical term used by Buddhist logicians. In addition, this term often appears in Akalaṅka's own works, such as SVin vol. 1, 347,4; 382,26–27 (= 6.5cd). Judging from the situation in which the terms *sākalyavyāpti* and *bahirdṛṣṭānta* appear in the alleged objections raised by Arcaṭa, it is possible that Anantavīrya intended to present Arcaṭa's views by applying Akalaṅka's terms. Moreover, as seen in **Passage-[10]**⁹⁾ and **Passage-[11]**¹⁰⁾, there are at least two cases wherein Akalaṅka himself criticized Arcaṭa as an opponent, according to Anantavīrya. However, these two cases have no parallel passages in the HBT,¹¹⁾ and **Passage-[10]** and **Passage-[11]** are presented in such summarized forms that it is unlikely that they are literal quotations from certain works. It seems more reasonable to suppose that they are quotations of Arcaṭa's ideas or thoughts. Furthermore, it is possible that when Anantavīrya reproduced Arcaṭa's views in his SVinT, he followed Akalaṅka's manner of quoting an opponent's idea by summarizing or paraphrasing his original text.

4. Identification of the Views Ascribed to Arcaṭa

On the basis of these aforementioned observations, we can examine Anantavīrya's manner of quoting Arcaṭa and assume the following two options. First, in the case where Anantavīrya quoted Arcaṭa directly or literally, we can point out the following: (a) the possibility that he quoted passages from the missing parts of the HBT (see Jambuvijaya 1968) and (b) the possibility that he quoted passages from Arcaṭa's lost works, the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* or the *Pramāṇadvitvasiddhi*. Second, in the case where Anantavīrya quoted Arcaṭa non-literally or introduced Arcaṭa's ideas or thoughts, we can point out the following: (a) the possibility that he consulted only the HBT and presented Arcaṭa's views by summarizing or paraphrasing the passages in this text; (b) the possibility that he consulted not only the HBT but also the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (or the *Pramāṇadvitvasiddhi*) and presented Arcaṭa's views by synthesizing and summarizing the passages in these texts; and (c) the possibility that he reproduced Arcaṭa's views by consulting or utilizing treatises written by preceding Jaina logicians. One may safely state that the second option is much more likely. However, if we examine other Jaina logicians' approaches to dealing with their opponents'

views, the majority of them quoted the passages from their works literally when they presented them under the name of certain logicians, whereas those who quoted their opponents' ideas or thoughts in summarized forms are in the minority. Furthermore, because there are two cases of literal quotation from the HBT, we cannot disregard possibilities (a) and (b) from the first option. Regarding (a), relevant passages are not found in the Tibetan translation of the HBT.

For the purpose of comparison, let us examine how the views of another Buddhist logician, for example, Prajñākaragupta, are introduced or cited in the SVinT. In this case, there is presence of literal quotations from the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (hereafter referred to as PVA) as well as non-literal ones, which does not imply that Anantavīrya never literally quoted Prajñākaragupta: SVinT 57,7 ≈ PVA 286,28; SVinT 65,13–14 ≈ PVA 289,22–23; SVinT 409,11 = PVA 28,27; SVinT 423,15 = PVA 56,20. The non-literal quotations include the following: SVinT 22,19–20; 26,8–9; 39,16–17; 94,16–17; 129,24–25; 161,6–7; 162,15–16; 166,16; 188,6; and 201,10–12.

It is worth noting that a passage found in the *Nyāyāvatāravivṛti*, which includes no parallel in the HBT, is attributed to Arcaṭa by its author (NAV 323,16–324,2). Balcerowicz suggests that 'it is not improbable that the passage comes from a work of Arcaṭa which is nowadays lost, namely from his *Pramāṇadvitvasiddhi*'. He also remarks that this objection is 'a brief review of Arcaṭa's arguments'.¹²⁾ In any case, this fact clarifies that there could be a case in which there are no parallels or relevant passages in the HBT even though those views are presented under Arcaṭa's name.

5. Conclusion

After an examination of the passages ascribed to Arcaṭa in the Jaina treatises, the following four conclusions can be made. First, in most cases, Arcaṭa's views are quoted literally from the HBT, as seen in the NVinVi, SVR, DAT and UST. In the SVinT, however, literal quotations and non-literal ones are varied, and there are several passages ascribed to Arcaṭa that are not found in the HBT even though they are introduced under his name.

Second, we can safely state that Anantavīrya reproduced Arcaṭa's views by summarizing or paraphrasing the passages in the HB or HBT because Akalaṅka's terms are occasionally found in Anantavīrya's presentation of Arcaṭa's views. Because Akalaṅka quoted Arcaṭa's ideas or thoughts non-literally when he presented Arcaṭa's views as objections, it is as-

sumed that Anantavīrya followed Akalaṅka's fashion when he introduced an opponent's view. Nevertheless, it is open to debate whether all of the passages are literal quotations or not.

Third, it can be assumed that those passages are quotations from Arcaṭa's lost works. Although it is reported that Arcaṭa wrote the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* and the *Pramāṇadvitvasiddhi* along with the HBT, we cannot prove whether the passages are actually quotations from these texts because they no longer exist. However, we cannot completely deny the possibility that Anantavīrya consulted not only the HBT but also Arcaṭa's other works because the views ascribed to Arcaṭa in the SVinT include contents not found in the HBT.

Finally, it is noted that many of the alleged 'Arcaṭa's views' that appear in the SVinT differ from the statements in the HBT. Although we should regard them as the result of Jaina logicians' understanding, it is often the case wherein complicated and obscure arguments in the HBT are rearranged in a clear and concise manner in the SVinT. In this regard, the views introduced in the SVinT as Arcaṭa's would be helpful for understanding his thoughts from another perspective.

Notes

- 1) See HBT, introduction, xx and Steinkellner 1985: 78. 2) See SVin, introduction, 70–92.
 3) See SVin, introduction, 51. 4) SVinT vol. 1, 106,13: [*tad uktam arcaṭena:*] *pakṣadharmatāniścayaḥ pratyakṣāj jāyata iti pakṣadharmatāniścayaḥ pratyakṣata ity ucyata [iti]*. 5) SVinT vol. 1, 350,11: [*yad punar uktam arcaṭena:*] *sattvasya vipakṣād vyāvṛtteḥ kṣaṇikatvena vyāptisiddhiḥ, na bahirdṛṣṭāntabalena, dṛṣṭāntavacanam tu kāryahetvapekṣayā svabhāvaviśeṣāpekṣayā ca*.
 6) See also Kano 2011: 237. 7) See also Steinkellner 2004: 230; 240. 8) SVinT vol. 1, 190,9–12: [*yad uktam arcaṭena:*] *sarvasya kṣaṇikatvena sākalyavyāptigrahaṇam nādhyaḥsatāḥ, api tv akṣaṇikāt sarvataḥ sattvaṃ vyāvarttamānam tīrādarśīśakuninyāyena gatyantarābhāvāt kṣaṇike vyavasthitim kurvat tena vyāptam iti niścīyate, tataḥ tadvyāvṛttiś ca tadvyāpikāyā arthakriyāyā vyāvṛtteḥ, asyāś ca vyāpakayoḥ kramayaugapadyayor [iti]*. . . (See also Shiga 2013: 27). Cf. HBT 15,17–16,1. 9) SVin vol. 1, 177,4: *sāmānyaviśayā vyāptiḥ tadviśiṣṭānumiter iti cet*. 10) SVin vol. 2, 408,5–10: *yadi svapakṣe pratyakṣavṛtṭyā tatra vyāpakānupalabdhir nirṇīyeta*. 11) For the **Passage**-[10], see Shiga 2013: 25–27. 12) See Balcerowicz 2001: 147–148.

Abbreviations and bibliography

TBV: *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*, Sukhalāl Saṅghavī and Becaradās Doṣī (ed.), Ahmedabad 1924–1931 (repr. Kyoto 1984). **DAṬ:** *Dravyālaṅkāraṭīkā*, Muni Jambuvijaya (ed.), Ahmedabad 2001. **NAV:** *Nyāyāvatāravivṛti*, see Balcerowicz 2001. **NVinVi:** *Nyāyaviniścayavivarāṇa*, Mahendra Kumar Jain (ed.), Varanasi 1949, 1954 (repr. Delhi 2000). **PVA:** *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*, Rāhul Sāṃkṛtyāyana

(ed.), Patna 1953. **PVSV**: *Pramāṇavārttikasavṛtti*, Raniero Gnoli (ed.), Roma 1960. **SVR**: *Syādvādaratnākara*, Lādhāji Motilāl (ed.), Poona 1926–1930. **SVin**: *Siddhiviniścaya*, Mahendra Kumar Jain (ed.), Varanasi 1959. **SVinT**: *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā*, see SVin. **HB**: *Hetubindu*, Ernst Steinkellner (ed.), Wien 1967. **HBṭ**: *Hetubinduṭīkā*, Sukhalāl Saṅghavi and Jinavijayaṇi (eds.), Baroda 1949. **Balcerowicz 2001**: Piotr Balcerowicz, *Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, Stuttgart: F. Steiner. **Jambuvijaya 1968**: Muni Jambuvijaya, “A Comparative Study of the Utpādādisiddhiṭīkā and the Hetubinduṭīkā”, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 12/13, 187–191. **Kano 2011**: Kyo Kano, “Dichotomy, *antarvyāpti*, and *dṛṣṭānta*”, in Helmut Krasser et al. (eds.), *Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 231–254. **Shiga 2013**: Kiyokuni Shiga, “Conflicts and Interactions between Jaina Logicians and Arcaṭa”, *Jainakyō kenkyū* ジャイナ教研究 19, 19–68. **Steinkellner 1985**: Ernst Steinkellner, “On a Newly Identified Manuscript of the Hetubinduṭīkā in the Asiatic Society of Bengal”, *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, vol. XXVII, no. 4, 78–83. **Steinkellner 2004**: Ernst Steinkellner, “The Early Dharmakīrti on the Purpose of Examples”, in Shōryū Katsura and Ernst Steinkellner (eds.), *The Role of the Example (dṛṣṭānta) in Classical Indian Logic*, Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 225–251.

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