Arcata’s Views Introduced in Jaina Treatises

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1. Introduction

It is widely known that Buddhist logicians’ views are introduced or quoted in numerous Jaina works, and the views of Buddhist philosopher Arcata (ca. 710–770), one of the commentators of Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660), is no exception. On the basis of the fact that the manuscript of Arcata’s Hetu bindu ti kā (hereafter referred to as HBṬ) was preserved in a Jaina library in Pātan, and that Jaina logicians supposedly regarded him as ‘a special subject,’ we cannot overlook Arcata’s influence on the history of Jaina logic. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to collect and examine the passages ascribed to Arcata in Jaina treatises, especially in the Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā (hereafter referred to as SVinṬ) by Ananta-vīrya (Digambara, ca. 950–990),2 and to consider the relationship between Jaina logicians and Arcata by comparing the passages presented as objections in these treatises and relevant statements in the HBṬ.

2. Jaina Treatises in Which Arcata’s Views Are Introduced as Pūrvapakṣa

In the Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa by Vādirājasūri (Digambara, ca. 1025),3 for example, the following citations are found in the HBṬ: NVinVi vol. 1, 446,8–11 = HBṬ 105,5–8; NVinVi vol. 1, 468,8 = HBṬ 106,25; NVinVi vol. 2, 155,1–2 = HBṬ 152,24; NVinVi vol. 2, 179,11–12 = HBṬ 15,25–16,1; and NVinVi vol. 2, 197,8 = HBṬ 8,15–16. Similarly, the following citations are found in the Dravyālaṅkāraṭīkā by Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra: DAṬ 182,5–9 = HBṬ 78,18–23; DAṬ 183,9–11 = HBṬ 79,12–14; and DAṬ 184,17–20 = HBṬ 81,17–22. In each case, these passages are almost literally cited from the HBṬ. Furthermore, as Sukhalāl Saṅghavī pointed out in his introduction to his edition of the HBṬ, the literal citations are also seen in the Svādvādaratnākara (hereafter referred to as SVR), the Utpādādisiddhiṭīkā (hereafter referred to as USṬ) and the Dharmasamgrahaṇīṭīkā.
Conversely, regarding the passages presented as Arcaṭa’s views in the Siddhiviniścaya (hereafter referred to as SVin) and the SVinṬ, there are minimal parallels in the HBT. The passages in question are as follows:

**Passage-[1]:** SVinṬ vol. 1, 106,13 (cf. HB 2*13–14 [= HBT 39,11–12], TBV 76,32–34.)

**Passage-[2]:** SVinṬ vol. 1, 156,22 (cf. HBT 27,15–18.)

**Passage-[3]:** SVinṬ vol. 1, 190,9–12 (cf. Passage-[8], HBT 146,26–147,5.)

**Passage-[4]:** SVinṬ vol. 1, 193,19–20 (≈ HBT 170,1–2, cf. HBT 224,29–225,1.)

**Passage-[5]:** SVinṬ vol. 1, 206,13 (cf. HBT 44,24–27.)

**Passage-[6]:** SVinṬ vol. 1, 350,11 (cf. HB 4*5–7, HBT 51,2–3; 16,3–5.)

**Passage-[7]:** SVinṬ vol. 1, 351,29 (≈ HBT 74,1–4.)

**Passage-[8]:** SVinṬ vol. 2, 407,25 (cf. Passage-[3], HBT 146,28–147,5; 193,16–19.)

**Passage-[9]:** SVinṬ vol. 2, 641,18

**Passage-[10]:** SVin vol. 1, 177,4 (confirmed by SVinṬ 178,11–13.)

**Passage-[11]:** SVin vol. 2, 408,5–10 (confirmed by SVinṬ 409,22.)

It is noteworthy that five out of the 11 passages are concerned with the proof of momentariness and its relevant theories of inference. To begin with, in Passage-[1], there are similar descriptions in the HB or the HBT:

[The following was stated by Arcaṭa:] The ascertainment [of the cognition that the logical reason] is a property of the subject arises from [the cognition by] direct perception. Therefore, it was stated [by Dharmakirti] that the ascertainment of being a property of the subject is based on direct perception.†

When comparing this statement with that of the HB or the HBT, it can be concluded that Anantavirya, being aware of the difference between the texts of the HB and those of the HBT, might have regarded Arcaṭa’s commentary that the ascertainment of paksadharmatva arises from direct perception as his original idea. In addition, Anantavirya might have reconstituted Arcaṭa’s statement as an objection in the summarized form. Arcaṭa stated that the cognition of an entity’s particular characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) by means of direct perception becomes the basis for the cognition of its general characteristic (sāmāṇya) owing to the conceptual knowledge (vikalpa) that arises immediately after the cognition of a particular characteristic. Therefore, it is not incorrect to state that a logical reason’s being a property of the subject is ascertained by direct perception (HBT 20,8–13). If we compare
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this statement in the HBT with Arcaṭa's view in the SVinT, then it reveals that the expression of -jananāt in the HBT shares a similarity with that of jāyate in the SVinT. Anantavirya made no reference to inference despite it being one of the valid means of cognizing pakṣadharmatva. However, we may safely state that Anantavirya might have wanted to focus on direct perception, which he attempted to criticize because it could also be accepted by Jaina logicians that pakṣadharmatva is cognized by inference or other means than direct perception. As discussed above, we can assume Passage-[1] to be a compressed or brief reproduction of the HBT's content.

Next, we examine passages whose parallels are found in the HBT with the first case being the Passage-[7]. Comparing this with the passages in the HBT, it becomes clear that its former half corresponds with the one found in the HBT, although they are not in complete accord. Again, in this case, the presentation of Arcaṭa's view in the SVinT is a summarized form of the statement in the HBT. Another example can be found in Passage-[4], wherein the sentences in the HBT are quite literally quoted, even though Anantavirya did not refer to Arcaṭa. The former half (SVinT vol. 1, 193,19) corresponds to HBT 169,28–170,3, whereas the latter half (SVinT vol. 1, 193,19–20) corresponds to HBT 224,29–225,1.

3. Arcaṭa's Views That Are Not Found in the HBT

At this point, let us observe Passage-[6] in which no parallel passage can be found in the HBT, although it is accompanied by the statement: yad uktam arcaṭena.

[On the other hand, the following is stated by Arcaṭa:] The pervasion [of being existent] by momentariness is established on the basis of the exclusion of being existent (sattva) from the dissimilar, but not by the force of external examples (bahirdṛṣṭānta). In association with logical reasons as effect and particular [logical reasons as] essence, on the other hand, examples are stated, 5)

In this quote, the first point to note is the term bahirdṛṣṭānta, which is an expression also found in Alalanaṇa's SVin vol. 1, 347,5–7, although its context is somewhat different from Passage-[6]. Then, how does Arcaṭa consider examples or the statement of example in the HBT? He takes the position that the statement of example is unnecessary by asserting, 'The statement of example is merely for evoking one's memory but not for establishing what is to be proved' (HBT 62,9–12). 6) Thus, as far as the proof of momentariness is concerned, we can state that the content of Passage-[6] corresponds with that of the HBT. Furthermore, according to Dharmakīrti in his PVSV 18,9–14, examples are stated only for those
who do not understand the essential connection, i.e. the real identity (tādātmya) or causality (tadutpatti). However, when they realize the connection, only a logical reason needs to be mentioned.\(^7\)

The expression ‘the exclusion of being existent from the dissimilar’ in **Passage-[6]** seems to imply the application of ‘a valid means of cognition that negates [a logical reason] in the opposite of what is to be proved’ (sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, hereafter referred to as bādhakapramāṇa), especially if one expresses it in Buddhist terms. If we paraphrase the statement of the SVinT, then it follows that it is impossible to prove momentariness of entities by merely stating examples. Rather, one has to depend on the bādhakapramāṇa. However, in the cases of the kāryahetu and the svabhāvahetu (except for the logical reason sattva), it is still valid to state external examples. Conversely, according to the HBṬ in which Arcaṭa states, ‘In the case of a logical reason as essence, [the positive concomitance is established] by the function of a valid means of cognition that negates [a logical reason] in the opposite [of what is to be proved]’ (HBṬ 51,2-3, cf. HB 4*,3, HBṬ 45,2-3), it is assumed that Arcaṭa believed that the bādhakapramāṇa could be applicable to logical reasons as essence in general. However, he did not maintain the necessity of examples or the statement of example positively in the HBṬ, as stated in **Passage-[6]**, in regard to particular logical reasons as essence and logical reasons as effect.

In sum, **Passage-[6]** clearly defines the applicable scope of the bādhakapramāṇa and the statement of example, respectively, whereas the passage in the HBṬ does not (cf. HBṬ 16,12-15.). In addition, in the HBṬ, Arcata states that the bādhakapramāṇa is to be applied to logical reasons as essence in general and that the statement of example is useless, especially in regard to the proof of momentariness.

Let us now turn to a consideration of **Passage-[3]**:

[The following is stated by Arcaṭa:] The universal pervasion (sākalyavyāpti) of all [the entities] by momentariness is not grasped by direct perception. Rather, it is ascertained that [the logical reason] being existent (sattva) excluded from [the domain of] all the non-momentary is pervaded by them (= the momentary) when [the logical reason sattva] makes the establishment [of itself] in [the domain of] the momentary, because there is no other way due to the logic of a bird that does not see the shore. And its (= sattva's) exclusion from them (= the non-momentary) is based on the exclusion of the causal efficiency that pervades it (= sattva). And [the exclusion] of this [causal efficiency from the non-momentary] is [based on the exclusion] of the successive or simultaneous [exertion of the causal efficiency] that pervades [the causal efficiency].\(^8\)

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The content of Passage-[3] is also the proof of momentariness. Although this is introduced as pūrṇapakṣa under Arcaṭa’s name, we do not find this passage in the HBṬ. The most characteristic expression in the passage is ‘the universal pervasion’ (sākalyavyāpti), which appears to be another expression of sarvopasamḥārayāpti, a technical term used by Buddhist logicians. In addition, this term often appears in Akalanka’s own works, such as SVin vol. 1, 347,4; 382,26–27 (= 6.5cd). Judging from the situation in which the terms sākalyavyāpti and bahirdṛṣṭānta appear in the alleged objections raised by Arcaṭa, it is possible that Anantavirya intended to present Arcaṭa’s views by applying Akalanka’s terms. Moreover, as seen in Passage-[10]⁹ and Passage-[11]¹⁰, there are at least two cases wherein Akalanka himself criticized Arcaṭa as an opponent, according to Anantavirya. However, these two cases have no parallel passages in the HBṬ,¹¹ and Passage-[10] and Passage-[11] are presented in such summarized forms that it is unlikely that they are literal quotations from certain works. It seems more reasonable to suppose that they are quotations of Arcaṭa’s ideas or thoughts. Furthermore, it is possible that when Anantavirya reproduced Arcaṭa’s views in his SVinṬ, he followed Akalanka’s manner of quoting an opponent’s idea by summarizing or paraphrasing his original text.

4. Identification of the Views Ascribed to Arcaṭa

On the basis of these aforementioned observations, we can examine Anantavirya’s manner of quoting Arcaṭa and assume the following two options. First, in the case where Anantavirya quoted Arcaṭa directly or literally, we can point out the following: (a) the possibility that he quoted passages from the missing parts of the HBṬ (see Jambuvijaya 1968) and (b) the possibility that he quoted passages from Arcaṭa’s lost works, the Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi or the Pramāṇadvitvasiddhi. Second, in the case where Anantavirya quoted Arcaṭa non-literally or introduced Arcaṭa’s ideas or thoughts, we can point out the following: (a) the possibility that he consulted only the HBṬ and presented Arcaṭa’s views by summarizing or paraphrasing the passages in this text; (b) the possibility that he consulted not only the HBṬ but also the Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi (or the Pramāṇadvitvasiddhi) and presented Arcaṭa’s views by synthesizing and summarizing the passages in these texts; and (c) the possibility that he reproduced Arcaṭa’s views by consulting or utilizing treatises written by preceding Jaina logicians. One may safely state that the second option is much more likely. However, if we examine other Jaina logicians’ approaches to dealing with their opponents’
views, the majority of them quoted the passages from their works literally when they presented them under the name of certain logicians, whereas those who quoted their opponents' ideas or thoughts in summarized forms are in the minority. Furthermore, because there are two cases of literal quotation from the HBT, we cannot disregard possibilities (a) and (b) from the first option. Regarding (a), relevant passages are not found in the Tibetan translation of the HBT.

For the purpose of comparison, let us examine how the views of another Buddhist logician, for example, Prajñākaragupta, are introduced or cited in the SVinT. In this case, there is presence of literal quotations from the Pramāṇavārttikāalaṅkāra (hereafter referred to as PVA) as well as non-literal ones, which does not imply that Anantavīrya never literally quoted Prajñākaragupta: SVinT 57,7 = PVA 286,28; SVinT 65,13–14 = PVA 289,22–23; SVinT 409,11 = PVA 28,27; SVinT 423,15 = PVA 56,20. The non-literal quotations include the following: SVinT 22,19–20; 26,8–9; 39,16–17; 94,16–17; 129,24–25; 161,6–7; 162,15–16; 166,16; 188,6; and 201,10–12.

It is worth noting that a passage found in the Nyāya-vatāravivṛti, which includes no parallel in the HBT, is attributed to Arcaṭa by its author (NAV 323,16–324,2). Balcerowicz suggests that 'it is not improbable that the passage comes from a work of Arcaṭa which is nowadays lost, namely from his Pramāṇadviivasiddhi'. He also remarks that this objection is 'a brief review of Arcaṭa’s arguments'. In any case, this fact clarifies that there could be a case in which there are no parallels or relevant passages in the HBT even though those views are presented under Arcaṭa’s name.

5. Conclusion

After an examination of the passages ascribed to Arcaṭa in the Jaina treatises, the following four conclusions can be made. First, in most cases, Arcaṭa’s views are quoted literally from the HBT, as seen in the NVinVi, SVR, DAṬ and USṬ. In the SVinT, however, literal quotations and non-literal ones are varied, and there are several passages ascribed to Arcaṭa that are not found in the HBT even though they are introduced under his name.

Second, we can safely state that Anantavīrya reproduced Arcaṭa’s views by summarizing or paraphrasing the passages in the HB or HBṬ because Akalaṅka’s terms are occasionally found in Anantavīrya’s presentation of Arcaṭa’s views. Because Akalaṅka quoted Arcaṭa’s ideas or thoughts non-literally when he presented Arcaṭa’s views as objections, it is as-
summation that Anantavirya followed Akalanka’s fashion when he introduced an opponent’s view. Nevertheless, it is open to debate whether all of the passages are literal quotations or not.

Third, it can be assumed that those passages are quotations from Arcaña’s lost works. Although it is reported that Arcaña wrote the Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi and the Pramāṇadvitvasiddhi along with the HBT, we cannot prove whether the passages are actually quotations from these texts because they no longer exist. However, we cannot completely deny the possibility that Anantavirya consulted not only the HBT but also Arcaña’s other works because the views ascribed to Arcaña in the SVinT include contents not found in the HBT.

Finally, it is noted that many of the alleged ‘Arcaña’s views’ that appear in the SVinT differ from the statements in the HBT. Although we should regard them as the result of Jaina logicians’ understanding, it is often the case wherein complicated and obscure arguments in the HBT are rearranged in a clear and concise manner in the SVinT. In this regard, the views introduced in the SVinT as Arcaña’s would be helpful for understanding his thoughts from another perspective.

Notes
1) See HBṬ, introduction, xx and Steinkellner 1985: 78. 2) See SVin, introduction, 70–92.
3) See SVin, introduction, 51. 4) SVinT vol. 1, 106,13: [yat uktaṃ arcaṇena:] paksadharmataniścayayaḥ prayākṣād jāyata iti paksadharmataniścayayah prayāksata ity ucyata [iī]. 5) SVinT vol. 1, 350,11: [yat punar uktaṃ arcaṇena:] sattvasya vipakṣād vyāvṛtthe kṣanikatvena vyāptisiddhiḥ, na bahirdṛṣṭāntabalena, dṛṣṭāntavacanāṃ tu kāryahetvapekṣāyā svabhāvavṛtiṣeṣāpekṣāyā ca.
6) See also Kano 2011: 237. 7) See also Steinkellner 2004: 230; 240. 8) SVinT vol. 1, 190,9–12: [yat uktaṃ arcaṇena:] sarvasya kṣanikatvena sākalyavāpyāpitigrhaṇāṃ nādyakṣātaḥ, api tv aṅkṣāṅkāt sarvataḥ sattvaṃ vyāvarattamānaṃ tīrādārīśisakuninyāyena gatyantarābhāvāt kṣanike vyavashtithiṃ kurvat tena vyāptam iti niścīyate, tataḥ tadvīvṛttiś ca tadvīvopikāyā arthakriyāḥ vyāvṛtteḥ, asyaś ca vyāpakayoḥ kramavāpaṇagadhyayor [iī]... (See also Shiga 2013: 27). Cf. HBṬ 15,17–16,1. 9) SVin vol. 1, 177,4: sāmāṇyaviṣayā vyāptih tadvīśiṣṭānumītīt cet. 10) SVin vol. 2, 408,5–10: yadi swapakṣe prayākṣavṛtya tatra vyāpakānapaladbhir nirṇīyāt. 11) For the Passage-[10], see Shiga 2013: 25–27. 12) See Balcerowicz 2001: 147–148.

Abbreviations and bibliography
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(ed.), Varanasi 1959. SVinT: Siddhiviniścayatākā, see SVin. HB: Hetubindu, Ernst Steinkellner (ed.), 
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cayatākā, Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa, Dravyālakāraṭikā, Syāḍvādaratnākara

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