On the Śaṅkhya Proof for the Existence of Pradhāna Criticized by Bhāviveka

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0. The Śaṅkhya advocate the existence of pradhāna (or prakṛti) as the ultimate cause of the world. Their attempts to prove its existence are found not only in the Śaṅkhyaakārīkas, but also in the Śaṣṭitaśtras, which predate the SK and which is known only from fragments preserved in Jñānabodhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayatīkā and Śīṃhasūri’s Nyāyāgamāनusārī. In the sixth chapter of his Madhyamakahrdayakārikā Bhāviveka (ca. 490–570) criticizes a Śaṅkhya proof for the existence of pradhāna consisting of a thesis, five logical reasons, example, application, and conclusion. Since these five logical reasons have some similarity with the five logical reasons put forward in SK 15, and since the five logical reasons of the SK are regarded as inheriting the same meaning from the five logical reasons of the ST, some previous studies relied only on the SK for their examination of Bhāviveka’s criticism. However, a close examination makes it clear that there are some differences between the logical reasons in the ST and the SK.

The aim of this paper is to show, by comparing the logical reasons for the existence of the pradhāna listed in the MHK, the ST, and the SK, that the Śaṅkhya proof referred to by Bhāviveka is more closely related to that of the ST than the SK.

1. The Śaṅkhya proof mentioned by Bhāviveka in his MHK 6.25–26 is as follows:

asti pradhānam bhedānām anyayāt pariṇāmatah |
kāryakāraṇābhāvāc ca saktito vaiśvarāpyatah ||25||
yad yathoktaṃ tathoktaṃ tat (1*) kapālaśakalādivat(*) |
tathā ca bhedās (2*) tadvantas(*) tasmād bhedāh sakārāṇāh ||26||
(1*) kapālaśakalādivat Ms, SG; karparāṇām kalādivat L, He (2*) tadvantas Ms, SG, He; tadvattas L

Pradhāna exists; because of (1) the homology of various individual things [concerning three constituents, i.e., sukha, duḥkha, and moha], (2) the transformation [of various individual things], (3) their cause-effect relationship, (4) their power [to produce their own effect], and (5) their manifoldness.

Whatever is described above (i.e., that which possesses homology, etc.) is so (i.e., has pradhāna as...
one and the same cause), like potsherds (kapāla) and pieces of wood (ṣakala), and so forth. And likewise, various individual things possess them (i.e., homology, etc.). Therefore, various individual things have [one and the same] cause (i.e., pradhāna).

The five logical reasons in the SK are enumerated in k.15. And the five logical reasons ascribed to the ŚT are reported, with the description of their inferential processes, in PST B153a4–5, B158a1–2, B158a5–6, B158b4–5, and B158b6–7. The following table sums them up and shows the order in which they are presented in each work:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MHK</th>
<th>SK</th>
<th>ŚT (PST)</th>
<th>ŚT (NĀA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (sam) anvaya</td>
<td>parimāṇa</td>
<td>(sam) anvaya</td>
<td>(sam) anvaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 pariṇāma</td>
<td>samanvaya</td>
<td>parimāṇa</td>
<td>parimāṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 kāryakāraṇabhāva</td>
<td>šakti pravrtti</td>
<td>šaktipravrtti</td>
<td>kāryakāraṇabhāva upakāra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 šakti</td>
<td>kāraṇakāryavibhāga</td>
<td>kāryakāraṇabhāva</td>
<td>šaktinām šaktimadavasthā mātratva/šaktipravrtti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 vaisvarūpya</td>
<td>vaisvarūpyasya-avibhāga</td>
<td>vaisvarūpya (-avibhāga)</td>
<td>vaisvarūpyasya-avibhāgaprapti vaisvarūpyagati</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though, unlike the SK and the ŚT, the MHK lists pariṇāma (“transformation”) as the second logical reason, the other four logical reasons are apparently common to all works. However, both the MHK and the ŚT give (sam) anvaya as the first logical reason, whereas the SK places parimāṇa first, and they both adopt the expression “kāryakāraṇabhāva,” whereas the SK has “kāraṇakāryavibhāga.” So the four logical reasons in the MHK seem to have a closer similarity to those of the ŚT than to those of the SK.

2. But since “kāryakāraṇabhāva” and “kāraṇakāryavibhāga” can convey the same meaning, it should be examined whether or not there is a difference in their content.

No explanation of “kāraṇakāryavibhāga” is found in the SK. But most of the early commentaries (i.e., KS, G, M, V₁, and V₂), as well as Kamalaśila in his TSP, describe the inference based on this logical reason as follows: The result (e.g., a pot) is distinguished from its cause (e.g., a lump of clay) in its capability (e.g., carrying water). Likewise, from a manifest thing (vyakta), such as the Great (mahat, i.e., intellect), etc., the existence of something unmanifest is inferred as its cause.

On the other hand, the PST gives the following explanation for the inference based on
"kāryakāraṇaḥbhāva" in the ŚT: Just as a bed, a seat and a chariot, etc., the Great, etc., have a causal relationship to each other. And based on this relationship, a single agent is inferred.\(^4\) The NĀA also adopts a seat, etc. as an example of things which are mutually connected by a causal relationship. Further, it equates this mutual causal relationship to the relationship between what is served and what serves (parasparopakāràpakārya).\(^5\) These descriptions seem to explain the inference as follows: Everything can have some kind of relationship with something else. But there must be something which establishes the relationship between them. And this is pradhāna.

Therefore, it can be said that there is a difference in content between "kāryakāraṇaḥbhāva" of the ŚT and "kāraṇakāryavibhāga" as explained by the commentaries of the SK. The former lays stress on the connection between cause and effect, whereas the latter emphasizes the distinction between them. Since this difference in content perfectly corresponds to the difference of the expression between "-bhāva" and "-vibhāga," it is likely that Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of the SK, adopted "kāraṇakāryavibhāga" fully aware of its difference from the ŚT’s "kāryakāraṇaḥbhāva."

2.1. However, explaining "kāraṇakāryavibhāga," the author of the Yuktidipikā, the most important commentary on the SK, adduces a bed, a seat and a chariot, etc. as its examples, which are mentioned in the PSṬ and the NĀA, and paraphrases "kāraṇakāryavibhāga" with "upakāraṇaḥbhāva," which is also mentioned in the explanation of "kāryakāraṇabṛhāva" in the NĀA.\(^6\) This clearly shows that the author of the YD regards "kāraṇakāryavibhāga" and "kāryakāraṇaḥbhāva" as having one and the same meaning. The author of the Jayamāṇgalā, after having provided the interpretation of the other early commentators as the first alternative,\(^7\) adopts the interpretation of the YD as the second explanation of "kāraṇakāryavibhāga."\(^8\)

But considering the commentarial characteristic of the YD that it often integrates old Sāṅkhya theories presented in the ŚT into that of the SK,\(^9\) it is highly probable that here also the author of the YD is trying to combine "kāryakāraṇaḥbhāva" of the ŚT and "kāraṇakāryavibhāga" of the SK, each of which originally had a different meaning. This surmise is supported by the fact that the author of the YD (and also of the J) adopts the explanation of the ŚT, instead of the explanation of other early commentators, when he comments on the fifth logical reason of the SK "vaiśvarūpyasyaḥvibhāgār."
things disappears at the time of cosmic absorption (pralayākāla). And pradhāna is required as the substratum into which every individual thing is merged.\(^{10}\) On the other hand, in the explanation of the fifth logical reason of the ST, the non-distinction amongst the individual things is considered to be the case when they abide in their ultimate cause, i.e., at the time of the creation of the world.\(^{11}\) Therefore, these two explanations describe the state of non-distinction at completely different times, although both infer the existence of pradhāna from the non-distinction of individual things.

Let us now turn to the YD. The author of the YD paraphrases "vaisvarūpya" and "avibhāga" with particular (vīśeṣa) and general form of existence (sāmānyya), respectively. And he explains that the former is preceded by the latter, as, for instance, things like a clay wall, etc., are preceded by water and soil.\(^{12}\) It can be said that this explanation is similar to that of the ST because in this explanation individual things are not distinct from each other at the time that they exist in their cause but they are at the time of cosmic absorption. The first explanation of the logical reason in the J can also be regarded as similar.\(^{13}\) Consequently, it is more natural to think that the interpretation of "kāraṇakāryavibhāga" in the YD (and the second one in the J) is a result of the author’s effort to equate it with "kāryakāraṇabhāva" in the ST and hence that originally these two logical reasons had a different meaning.

2.3. Bronkhorst [2007], investigating Śaṅkara’s (ca. 700–750) description in his Brahmasūtrakārāya 2.2.1 that is directed against "parimāṇa" put forth by the Śaṅkhyas as the second logical reason for proving the existence of pradhāna, concludes that the Śaṅkhyas theory mentioned here by Śaṅkara is not that of the SK, but of the ST because similar descriptions are observed in the YD, the J and the NĀA, but not in other commentaries. If that is correct, then, because the third logical reason mentioned by Śaṅkara is "kāryakāraṇabhāva,"\(^{14}\) it suggests that the logical reason "kāryakāraṇabhāva" in MHK 6.25 also comes from the ST.

2.4. Next, we have to look at what the Tarkajvāli, the auto-commentary on the MHK, says about the two logical reasons "kāryakāraṇabhāva" and "vaisvarūpya." It comments on these two, respectively, as follows:

*Pradhāna* is the primary cause. [On the other hand,] the Great and I-Cognition, etc., are the effect and, [at the same time,] the cause because they are in a process of transformation.\(^{15}\)

The "manifoldness" means various particular forms of existence, such as the Great, I-Cognition, the
five subtle elements, sense organs, and five gross elements. It is only the seed that, even though various things, such as the sprout, stem, branches, twigs, leaves, and flower, etc., come from it, is regarded as their cause. Likewise, it is understood that the single unmanifest pradhāna exists as a unique cause because various individuals are [observed] in it.\(^{16}\)

From this explanation of "kāryakāraṇabhāva," it is not clear whether or not the content of this logical reason is closer to that of the ŚT. However, in the explanation of "vaisvāryāpya," close proximity to the ŚT is confirmed because here pradhāna is considered to be a cause temporally preceded by the Great, etc., but not that which is their substratum at the time of cosmic absorption.

Taking all these materials into consideration, it can be said that the logical reasons for proving the existence of pradhāna mentioned in MHK 6.25 have closer connections with those of the ŚT than with those of the SK for the following two reasons:

1. the usage of the expression "kāryakāraṇabhāva"
2. the explanation of "vaisvāryāpya" in the TJ which is similar to that in the ŚT

However, there still remains a problem as to why "parināma" is adopted only in the MHK, instead of "parimāṇa." Some previous studies posed the possibility of a change of the text from the latter to the former during the process of textual transmission.\(^{17}\) But this seems unlikely because in the TJ the reading "parināma" is presupposed. If the original reading of the MHK had been "parimāṇa" like that of the ŚT and the SK, then the explanation of "parināma" in the TJ would also have to be regarded as a result of later revision or addition. Thus, two possible explanations remain for adopting "parināma" in the MHK. The first is the possibility that some adherent of the Sāṅkhya at the time of Bhāviveka enumerated "parināma" as one of the logical reasons. The other is that Bhāviveka intentionally changed the logical reason "parimāṇa" given in the ŚT to "parināma." However, so far there is neither affirmative nor negative material for investigating these two possibilities. Therefore, this problem remains unsolved.

As seen above, the Sāṅkhya proof criticized by Bhāviveka in MHK 6.25 has a closer relationship to that of the ŚT than to that of the SK. However, commenting on MHK 6.1, the TJ cites a verse which is almost the same as SK 3.\(^{18}\) If this part of the TJ was written by Bhāviveka and if the verse did not come from the ŚT, then Bhāviveka must have known both the ŚT and the SK. If so, why does he mention the older proof in MHK 6.25? A probable answer is that the ŚT was, as far as an inferential or logical issue is concerned, regard-
ed as being more authoritative than the SK, maybe due to its more detailed description. And the fact that Śaṅkara, as seen above, also uses the ST for his criticism of the Sāńkhya proof suggests that the ST must have been more influential than the SK in the field of logic for a long time.

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Notes: 1) See, for example, Honda [1980] and He [2013]. 2) They correspond to the Tibetan translation of PST D194a2-4, D199b4-6, D200a2-4, D200b2-4, D200b4-6, respectively. 3) PST D1248c22-26; G 18,13-17; M 19,26-20,4; V 2,28,23-29,2; V 2,26,1-8; TSP 27,16-19. 4) PST B158b4-5: kāryakāraṇabhadāvam bhedānam ekakartṛpravakatvam sādhyaḥ, yathā kila sāya-

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〈Key words〉 Bhāviveka, Madhyamakahārdayakārikā, Śaśāntantra, Sāṃkhyaṭīkā, Yuktidīpikā, pradhāna

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