On the Date of Śivāditya:
From the Viewpoint of the Theistic Definition of *pratyakṣa*

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1. Introduction

Śivāditya, the author of the *Saptapadārthi* (SapP), etc., has been regarded by not a few scholars as "the first syncretist of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika system"\(^1\) or "the first philosopher who claimed the seven kinds of category."\(^2\) His floruit has been studied comprehensively by Telang [1920], Sastri [1951], Bhattacharya [1958] and so on, and the middle of 12th century proposed by Bhattacharya [1958] is now generally accepted as his date. In this regard, the *terminus ante quem*, i.e., the date of Bhaṭṭa Vādindra (in Devagiri in the north of Mahārāṣṭra), is almost fixed by Telang [1920: xii–xv] and Isaacson [1995: 1–5], especially the latter pinned down the probable date of Bhaṭṭa Vādindra as ca. 1230–1250 CE.

In this paper, after sorting out related issues discussed in previous studies, I come to the same conclusion as Bhattacharya [1958] as far as Śivāditya’s date concerned. Nevertheless, I focus on an aspect hitherto undiscussed, namely the *terminus post quem* of his date, comparing his theistic definition of *pratyakṣa* with that of the Naiyāyika Varadarāja. I also challenge Ghate’s observation that SapP is too terse to argue the author’s date from its content.\(^3\)

2. Śivāditya’s Works

Followings are the treatises ascribed to Śivāditya:

1. *Saptapadārthi*: many manuscripts and editions
3. *Hetukhaṇḍana* (*HKh*): an extant manuscript is reported by Telang [1920: xix]
4. *Lakṣaṇamālā*: ascription to Śivāditya is still controversial
5. *Upādhiyāritika*: just referred to in the *HKh* by the name (cf. Telang, *loc. cit.* n. 1)
6. *Arthāpattivāritika*: just referred to in the *HKh* (cf. Telang, *loc. cit.* n. 3)
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Other fragments of Śivāditya cited in Gokulanātha’s Padavākyaratnākara, Vardhamāna’s Tatvabodha, Jānakīnātha’s Nyāyasiddhāntamaṅjari, Citsukha’s Tattvapradīpika (TP), and Pratyagṛūpa’s Nayanaprasādini (TPNP) are reported by Telang [1920: xx] and Bhattacharya [1958: 62–63, 110].

3. Date and Place of Naiyāyika Varadarāja

Naiyāyika Varadarāja, a son of Rāmadeva Miśra, composed the Tārkikarakaśa (TR) and its auto-commentary the Sārasamgraha (TRSS) as well as the Bodhani (NKusBo), a commentary to Udayana’s Nyāyakusumānjali (NKus).

Although Potter [1977] estimates that among Kashmir, Āndhra, and Mithilā, Kashmir is most accepted by scholars as Varadarāja’s probable locale, this observation is caused by the misidentification of Naiyāyika Varadarāja with a person of the same name belonging to Kashmir Śaivism who composed the Śivasūtrakṛttika and the Laghućrvavimārsini. Accordingly, it seems that Mithilā is the most probable place of Naiyāyika Varadarāja (Henceforce in this paper, I will refer simply to him by “Varadarāja”).

It is reported by Kauśal [1997: 2] that Varadarāja’s definition of anubhava is cited and criticized by Śrīharsa in the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakādyya (KhKhKh). On the other hand, as to the terminus post quem of Varadarāja, Mishra [1966: 189] showed two grounds for a certain amount of temporal distance between Udayana and Varadarāja: one is that Varadarāja refers by a phrase “keciti” to some interpreter/commentator of NKus preceding to him, and the other is Varadarāja’s statement that “foreigners stumble in each step (/ each word) in the profound path of Udayana.” It is to be added as another evidence in this regard that Varadarāja reports in the NKusBo a variant reading of the text of NKus. From these facts, even though the floruits of Udayana and Śrīharsa are still open to discussion, Varadarāja’s date can be assumed in the range of 1075–1150 CE, or even 1100–1150 CE.

4. Udayana’s Theistic Definition of pramāṇa

In order to justify the theistic proposition “God (iśvara/sīva) is pramāṇa,” Udayana puts forward a new definition of pramāṇa. Since traditional interpretation of pramāṇa as a means of valid cognition (*pramākarana) is not sufficient, Udayana defines the essence of pramāna as “the exclusion of non-connection with valid cognition” (*pramāyogavayavacchedah pramāṇyam). In this regard, Udayana assumes an objection that Naiyāyika
would commit the error of the detraction of established view (apasiddhānta) in that God would come down to be admitted as the fifth pramāṇa. Udayana replies that God, being the locus of eternal valid cognition, is to be included in pratyakṣa. Nevertheless, unlike Varadarāja, Udayana does not modify the traditional definition of pratyakṣa, i.e., “to be arisen by the connection between the sense faculty and object,” rather he argues for the traditional definition that it is only targeting the non-theistic worldly affair.

5. Varadarāja’s Theistic Definition of pratyakṣa

Varadarāja slightly modifies the definition of pramāṇa put forward by Udayana: “pramāṇa is, being either the means or locus, what is pervaded by valid cognition” (sādhanāsrayayor anyataratve sati pramāvēptam pramāṇam). According to his definition of pramāṇa, Varadarāja puts forward a new theistic definition of pratyakṣa: “perception is what is pervaded by direct valid cognition.” Furthermore, he claims as if the traditional definition of pratyakṣa is not appropriate: “if only the worldly perception were intended, he (= Varadarāja himself) would have defined that ‘perception is the most efficient means for the cognition arisen by the sense faculty.’”

6. Śivāditya’s Theistic Definition of pratyakṣa

Following is the passage in SapP where Śivāditya puts forward (A) the intensional definition of pramāṇa, (B) that of pratyakṣa, and (C) the extensional list of pratyakṣa:

SapP (Eₐ), p. 60,7–9; (Eₐ), pp. 40,4–41,2; (Eₐ), p. 73,1–3; (Eₐ), pp. 105,6–106,2; (Eₐ), pp. 68,23–69,13: (A) pramāyogavyavacchinnam a) pramāṇam. (B) pratyakṣapramāyogavyavacchinnam b) pratyakṣapramāṇam. (C) tac cēṣvaragrāhhrārasanacākṣusprāṣvanāśrotamanolakṣaṇam. a) pramāyogavyavacchinnam] EₐEₐEₐEₐ; sādhanāsrayayor anyataratve sati pramāyogavyavacchinnam Eₐ b) pratyakṣapramāyogavyavacchinnam] EₐEₐEₐEₐ; sādhanāsrayayor anyataratve sati pratyakṣapramāyogavyavacchinnam Eₐ

The intensional definition of pramāṇa (A) accords to that of Udayana’s. The definition of pratyakṣa (B) is formulated by just adding the restrictive phrase “pratyakṣa-” to both subject and predicate of (A). In both definitions of (A) and (B), only one edition Eₐ has the explanatory qualifier “being either the means or locus” (sādhanāsrayayor anyataratve sati) which accords to that in the definition of pramāṇa in Varadarāja’s TRSS. If the definition of pratyakṣa has this qualifier, it is easy to interpret God (iśvara) in the extensional list (C) as being the locus of the pratyakṣa. But, it is difficult without this qualifier to in-
terpret God as the locus of \textit{pratyakṣa}.

7. The Sequence of the Presentation of the Theistic Definitions of \textit{pratyakṣa} by Varadarāja and Śivāditya

I will now investigate whether (1) Varadarāja’s theistic definition of \textit{pratyakṣa} precedes that of Śivāditya, (2) the reverse, or (3) there is no direct influence in thought. It ensues from the third alternative that Varadarāja and Śivāditya, just commonly knowing Udayana but not knowing each other, presented each theistic definition in parallel.\textsuperscript{15} Even though it is difficult to eliminate any of these possibilities, nevertheless, the first alternative seems most likely from the consideration of the following two points.

Firstly, both Udayana and Varadarāja definitely assume an objection about the detraction of established view (\textit{apasiddhānta}) that Naiyāyika would come down to admit the fifth \textit{pramāṇa} by claiming “God is \textit{pramāṇa}.” On the other hand, no evidence is found that Śivāditya assumed this kind of objection, i.e., the Vaiśeṣika-based syncretic theistic school, where \textit{pramāṇa} is of two kinds, would ensue to admit God as the third kind of \textit{pramāṇa}.

Secondly, regarding the variant reading of \textit{Ei} in each definition of \textit{pramāṇa} and \textit{pratyakṣa}, i.e., the explanatory qualifier “being either the means or locus,” this qualifier seemed to be originally ascribed to Varadarāja and influential enough to be widespread and cited by other scholars such as Meghanādāri and Mādhava.\textsuperscript{16} For, a number of Varadarāja’s original definitions of philosophical technical terms are cited by apologists of both his own school as well as other schools. Apart from \textit{pramāṇa}, \textit{pratyakṣa}, and \textit{anubhava}, it is reported that his definitions of \textit{upādhi}, \textit{kevalavyatirekin}, and \textit{jāti} are also cited in later periods.\textsuperscript{17} On the other hand, it is assumed more likely that the ur-text of SapP did not have this qualifier by appealing to the principle of \textit{lectio difficilior potior}. This estimation of the ur-text of SapP is not decisive regarding the three alternatives, nevertheless, it can be safely said that Śivāditya’s argument is originally composed in very succinct way.

Considering these two points, the first alternative, i.e., Varadarāja’s precedence, with assuming the following scenario would be more likely: Udayana at first, in order to justify the theistic proposition “God is \textit{pramāṇa},” proposed the theistic definition of \textit{prāmāṇya} (= \textit{pramāṇa}-ness). He also brings out a possible objection, namely that Naiyāyika would commit the fault of \textit{apasiddhānta} by admitting God as the fifth \textit{pramāṇa}. So, he sorted God-as-a-\textit{pramāṇa} into \textit{pratyakṣa}, but he did not even modify the traditional definition of
pratyakṣa. Thereafter Varadarāja, while slightly modifying Udayana’s definition of pramāṇa, newly presented the theistic definition of pratyakṣa. Not only pramāṇa and pratyakṣa, but also Varadarāja’s original definitions of other philosophical technical terms have been widely cited in later periods. In any case, by the time of Śivāditya, a stock-argument had been formed regarding the theistic definitions of pramāṇa and pratyakṣa as well as its subsidiary topics. Śivāditya tersely incorporated this argument into his system: he composed a very concise definition and extensional list of pratyakṣa, just like an abstract of former argument developed by Udayana and Varadarāja.

Even though other alternatives of (2) the precedence of Śivāditya’s definition and (3) the mutual non-influence are also possible, the above scenario seems more compelling in terms of the two points mentioned earlier.

8. Concluding Remarks

In this paper I focused only on the sequence of the presentation of the theistic definitions of pratyakṣa by Varadarāja and Śivāditya. But it is impossible to eliminate any of three alternatives concerning the direction of influence, thus this paper does not overturn Ghate’s observation that we cannot argue Śivāditya’s chronology from the succinct contents of SapP. Nevertheless, this very conciseness of SapP enables us to guess the sequence of the presentation of the theistic definition of pratyakṣa. For, Śivāditya’s succinct definition and extensional list of pratyakṣa would be rather cryptic unless a stock-argument of such topic had been formulated beforehand.

In any case, there still remain other alternatives of (2) Śivāditya’s precedence to Varadarāja, and (3) mutual non-reference. If these two alternatives could be eliminated, then Śivāditya’s terminus post quem would be pushed down from Udayana to Varadarāja, and the date of relevant apologists would be assumed as follows: Udayana (ca. 1025–1100) → Varadarāja (ca. 1075–1150 or 1100–1150) → Śivāditya (ca. 1100–1200 or 1125–1200) → Vādindra (ca. 1230–1250). However, the conclusion of this paper is likely to follow the first alternative, namely that Varadarāja preceded Śivāditya.


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〈Abbreviations and References〉
TPNP Pratyāgrūpa’s Nayanaprasādini ad TP, see TP.
TRSS Varadarāja’s Sārasamgraḥa ad TR, see TR.
NKusBo Varadarāja’s Bodhāni ad NKus, see NKus (Eo).
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SDS Mādhava’s Sarvadarśanasamgraha, V. Sh. Abhyankar (ed.). Government Oriental Series


Central Book Depot, 1–52.


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Prakāśan.


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