An Objection in the *Hetubindu* Ascribed to the Jainas

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1. Introduction

Arcaṭa (ca. 710–77o) provides a long criticism of the Jaina view in his *Hetubinduṭikā* (HBT) 98,14–107,23. This section appears just after his direct commentary on a certain opponent’s objection in the *Hetubindu* (HB) 9*,13–14 and Dharmakīrti’s answer to it (HB 9*,15–10*,4). The aim of this paper is to: (1) examine the argument in HB 9*,13–10*4 that provides the starting point of the polemic between the Buddhists and the Jainas in the HBT, (2) clarify the context in the HB, that is, the relationship between that argument and Dharmakirti’s theory of momentariness and causal relation of things, (3) confirm whether the Jainas hold that view in HB 9*,13–14 in their own treatises, and (4) compare the statements in the HB with those of Dharmakirti’s other works, such as the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (PVSV).

2. The View Ascribed to the Jainas and Mīmāṃsakas

2.1. The Context in the HB

The objection in question is found in the arguments in the section that includes the proof of momentariness (HB 7*,17–19*,13). The opponent criticizes Dharmakīrti’s following proposition: that which arises by itself and has the property of instability does not need another cause for having the [property of instability] as an intrinsic nature, because that which has such an intrinsic nature [to produce an effect necessarily] produces [the effect] (*tatsvabhāvasya jananāt*). 1) The logical reason in this passage: *tatsvabhāvasya jananāt* (HB 8*,18–19) is the additional ground for establishing the validity of the reason “[a thing’s] not depending [on other causes than the thing itself] for its disappearance” in the proof: “All the produced things disappear momentarily, because all [those things] are established as those which do not depend
[on other causes] for their disappearances." 2) According to Arcaṇa, the opponent indirectly criticizes the additional ground, *tatsvabhāvasya jananāt*, in the objection in question and regards it as an inconclusive reason.

2.2. The Analysis of the Objection in the HB

The opponent's view is as follows:

[Objection:] If a single effect [such as visual cognition] is produced by cooperating [causes] such as eyes, etc. that have [respectively] their intrinsic natures that are different [from each other], there would be no difference in the effect, even though the causes are different [from each other]. 3)

Arcāṇa analyzes this objection as follows, ascribing it to the Jainas and Mīmāṃsakas (*kṣapaṇakajaiminīya* HBṬ 92,14): 4) It should not be accepted that plural causes, such as eyes, etc., produce a single effect (i.e., visual cognition) due to their intrinsic natures being different from each other. Different causes must produce different effects, and a single effect must arise from a single cause. Therefore, causes such as eyes, etc., share a non-differentiated property, which is a common nature (*sāmānya*), and will produce a single effect. While this common nature produces an effect when the causes are in a complete state, they do not produce an effect when they are in an incomplete state. However, even if any one of the causes is lacking, a common nature can exist on account of the incompatibility with its non-existence. Therefore, the nature common to all the causes does not always produce an effect, even though it is existent. Thus, the logical reason presented by Dharmakīrti, *tatsvabhāvasya jananāt* (HB 8*,18–19), is inconclusive, because there can be a certain cause that does not produce an effect, even though it has the nature of producing an effect. (HBṬ 92,18–27)

2.3. Dharmakīrti's Position

As Katsura 1983 points out, Dharmakīrti formulates two kinds of causal models: (1) the relationship between cause and effect (e.g., a seed, etc., and a sprout) that is analyzed in terms of continuity (*saṁtāna*), and (2) the relationship between cause and effect (e.g., eyes and visual cognition) that is analyzed in terms of momentariness (*kṣana*). 5) The first model can be reduced to the second one from the viewpoint of the ultimate truth. 6) The case mentioned in Dharmakīrti's answer (HB 9*,15–10*,4) to the objection stated above is the relationship between cooperating causes, such as a lump of clay, a potter's wheel, a string, etc., and an effect such as a pot, which corresponds to the
second model. Dharmakirti also maintains elsewhere in the HB that being cooperating causes (sahakāritva) is characterized by fulfilling one and the same purpose, or producing one and the same effect (ekārthakriyā). Even in the case where one and the same effect (e.g., a pot) arises from the assemblage of causes (e.g., a lump of clay, a potter's wheel, a potter, etc.), each capacity of the causes that constitute their assemblage exerts influence on its corresponding particular properties of the effect (e.g., being made from clay, having a particular shape, etc.). Since there are differences of object domains among capacities of causes (i.e., a lump of clay, a potter, etc.), particular properties of the effect become various in accordance with the capacities of causes. Nevertheless, those properties are one and the same as a real entity. Dharmakīrti basically attempts to justify the causal mechanism of a single effect arising from plural causes, whereas he explains that various particular properties of the effect arise from the corresponding particular capacities of the causes. Therefore, we can even say that he indirectly accepts that plural effects arise from plural causes if one takes account of those plural properties of the single effect.

3. Descriptions in Jaina Treatises

A Jaina philosopher, Haribhadrasūri (ca. 740–810), criticizes the causal model that a single effect arises from plural and different causes. His way of criticism is, however, different from that of the objection in question. Indeed, he does not accept that a single effect arises from plural causes that are different from each other, while he, in addition, assumes and enumerates possible cases: (1) plural causes might produce a single effect, (2) plural causes might produce plural effects, (3) a single cause might produce a single effect, and (4) a single cause might produce plural effects. Then he regards all of these as flawed. From this description, one can safely state that Haribhadrasūri does not consider that proper causal relationships would be either the combination of a single cause and effect or that of plural causes and effects, but that there could be more possibilities than these two. On the other hand, he seems to accept those two causal models elsewhere in his Anekāntajayapatākā (AJP), as follows:

And even if causes [such as a form-and-color, etc.] are plural, [they] do not produce an effect that has a single intrinsic nature [such as visual cognition]. If so, then the differences of causes would not differentiate [their effect] when a [single] effect is produced by cooperating causes.
whose intrinsic natures are different [from each other]. And therefore, neither would it follow that non-difference [of causes] does not differentiate [their effect] . . . If there is certainly a difference [in effect] for the reason that there is a difference [in cause], in the same way, it [would] be right that there is no difference [in effect] for the reason that there is no difference [in cause] on the basis of the restricted [relation] of non-deviation [between cause and effect].\textsuperscript{11}

In this passage, Haribhadrasūri admits that a difference in effect is based on that in cause, and that non-difference in effect is based on that in cause. However, he does not present the Jainas' own position in a positive manner, while he criticizes his opponent's (i.e., the Buddhists) view of causal relationship.\textsuperscript{12}

4. Relationship with Dharmakīrti's Other Works

The alleged Jaina view in the HB is totally different from an opponent's view in PV 1.181–184, which is, according to Dharmakīrti himself, raised by the Jainas (ahrīka). In the HB, Dharmakīrti deals mainly with the issue of causal relationship, whereas in the PV 1 and PVSV, he criticizes the Jaina ontology that one entity has two contradictory properties at the same time. Indeed, the objection in the HB is ascribed by Arcaṭa to the Jainas and Mīmāṃsakas, and relevant passages are in fact found in the Jaina and Mīmāṃsaka works, as seen above, but we cannot say that there is an exact accordance between those texts and the objection in question seen in the HB and HBṬ.

Rather, the arguments that are parallel with the opponent's view in HB 9\textsuperscript{*},13–14 appear in the polemic with the Sāṃkhyas in the PV 1 and PVSV.\textsuperscript{13} We can assume that Dharmakīrti might have borne those arguments in mind when he wrote the HB. The Sāṃkhyas attempt to explain the causal model that a single effect arises from plural causes by introducing the concept "having one and the same intrinsic nature" (ekātmata PV 1.164a, ekasvabhāvatva PVSV 83,9) or "the non-differentiated intrinsic nature" (abhinnah svabhāvah PVSV 83,9–10). This idea is analogous to that of the opponent of the HB and HBṬ, and quite similar statements are also found in the TS and TSP. The word ekātmata in PV 1.164a or ekānugatatva in TS 1767ab is paraphrased as anvaya in PV 1.163b and TS 1761d, which is the unique term to the Sāṃkhyya system of philosophy. It means "[everything's] being accompanied [by the characteristic of consisting of three qualities (traiguṇya)]" or "[traiguṇya's] occurring successively [in everything]."\textsuperscript{14} Furthermore, the first half of the following commentary by Kamalaśīla

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on TS 1767 resembles closely the objection in the HB and HBT in that both opponents justify the causal model that a single effect arises from the common nature among plural causes.  

On the other hand, if, [as the Sāmkhyas claim, plural causes] produce [a single effect] due to being accompanied by one and the same intrinsic nature even though [plural causes] such as eyes, etc. are different [from each other], [it would follow that] one and the same intrinsic nature [consisting] in those [causes] is present [also] in just one cause [out of all].

This passage suggests that Dharmakīrti might be aware of the view of the Sāmkhyas as well as those of the Jainas and Mimāṃsakas when he introduced the opponent's view in HB 9*,13–14. This assumption is also supported by the fact that the criticism of the Sāmkhya view concerning the existence of sāmānya (PV 1.163–180) is followed by the criticism of the Jainas' anekāntavāda (PV 1.181–184). As Wakahara 1996 points out, the arguments parallel with PV 1.163–180 are found in the 20th chapter (Syādvādāparikṣā) of the TS and TSP, to be more precise, TS 1759–1775, which follow after the view of a Jaina thinker called Sumati (TS 1754–1758). Although Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do not mention the specific names of persons or sects, one can identify the opponent in TS 1759–1775 as someone belonging to the Sāmkhya school. After that polemic, the view of Kumārila is introduced and criticized in TS 1776–1784. This reveals that, at least in the TS and TSP, the theory of sāmānya as a real entity asserted by the Sāmkhyas is included in the so-called syādvāda, which is often regarded as the distinctive thought of the Jainas.

5. Conclusion

In the objection introduced in HB 9*,13–14, the opponent considers the causal model that plural effects arise from plural causes or a single effect from a single cause to be legitimate, and criticizes the model maintained by the Buddhists that a single effect can arise from plural causes. According to Arcaṭa, the opponent constructs the model by assuming one and the same property that lies commonly in all the causes. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, establishes that plural causes can produce a single effect, based on the characteristic of "fulfilling one and the same purpose or producing one and the same effect" (ekārthakiṃyā) of cooperating causes. He further states that each capacity of the causes has its own object domain, and the effect, though it is single as a real entity,
comes to bear specific properties generated by the corresponding capacities. Therefore, it might be possible to assume that Dharmakirti indirectly accepts the causal model that plural effects arise from plural causes. While the opponent’s view in question is ascribed to the Jainas and Mimāṃsakas by Arcaṭa, we could not find the passages that precisely accord with those in the works of these schools, though Haribhadrāsūrī directly cites and criticizes the relevant part of the HB in his AJP.

By comparing this opponent’s view of the HB and Arcaṭa’s commentary thereon with the descriptions in the PV 1 and PVSV, on the other hand, it has been revealed that this opponent’s view conforms with the Śaṃkhyā view rather than the Jaina one. It is also confirmed by the fact that there are several parallel passages in the HBT, PV 1, PVSV, TS, and TSP.\(^{10}\) And, at least in the 20th chapter of the TS and TSP, not only the Jaina view but also the Mimāṃsaka and Śaṃkhyā ones are introduced under the chapter named Śyādvādāparikṣā. Although it is the Buddhists at that time that classify the philosophical thoughts in this way, it is likely that those three schools hold or share similar views regarding the ontology (especially regarding the issue of sāmānya and viṣeṣa) or causal theory. Naturally, further investigation of the related literature of each school is necessary to prove this hypothesis.

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15) Although the Sāṃkhyaśāstra‘ explicit assertion on the causal model that plural effects arise from plural causes cannot be found in the PV 1 or PVSV, it is likely that they accept this model as well. See PVSV 86,1-2, PV 1.170ab. Cf. TS 1761. 16) TSP 608,22-23: yadi tu punar ekasvabhāvanuṣṇatatvena bhūmā api cakṣurādayo janakaḥ syūth, tadaikas teṣām svabhāvo janaka ekasmin api kāraṇe 'sti . . . . 17) For the term syādvāda in the Jaina philosophy, see Uno Atsushi 宇野惇, "Jainakāya no syādovāda: Syādavādana jñānī 23-25" ジイナ教のスヤードヴァーダ: Syādavādana jñānī 23-25, Indogaku shironshū インド学試論集 6/7 (1965): 105-109. 18) For instance, HBṬ 94,14-15, PV 1.164, PVSV 83,9-11, TS 1767, and TSP 608,22-23.

Abbreviations


TSP Tatvasaṅgrihapati. See TS.


PVSV Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti. See PV 1.


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Bibliography


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