The School of New Logic (Navya-nyāya) does not accept the semantic theory of suggestion (vyañjanā) proposed by the Dhvani School of poetics, which postulates the semantic power of the poet’s words to suggest an unstated poetic senses that are revealed only to competent readers. This paper reviews the argument against suggestion given by Jagadīśa, the 17th-century New Logician, in his Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (vṛtti to verse 24). He examines the two types of suggestions—lakṣaṇā-mūla-vyañjanā and abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā—and reduces the first type to metaphorical signification (lakṣaṇā), and the understanding based on the second type to a kind of perception. The theory of suggestion assumes the symmetric communication of poetic senses between the poet and the competent reader, but Jagadīśa’s reductionism of suggestion severed this communication. The reader is freed from the job of restoring the poet’s message, and has the liberty to interpret and relish poems without restraint. This form of liberal poetics conforms with the liberal epistemology of testimony presented by Gaṅgeśa and adopted by Jagadīśa.