Kumāṛila and Śāntarakṣita on *saṃvāda*:

The Agreement with a Cognition and the Agreement with a Real Entity

ISHIMURA Suguru

0. Introduction

As is well known, Śāntarakṣita holds the theory that there is no restriction on the determination of the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of a cognition: the validity of a certain kind of cognition is intrinsically (*svataḥ*) determined and that of a certain other kind of cognition is extrinsically (*parataḥ*) determined (*anīyama*). In the Ślokavārttika and in the Bṛhaṭṭikā quoted in the Tattvasaṃgraha, Kumāṛila points out the problem of infinite regress (*anavasthā*) he holds to be involved in the theory of extrinsic validity (*parataḥprāmāṇya*): On the assumption that for determining the validity of an initial cognition (C1) it is necessary to verify the validity through a *saṃvāda* (C2), the validity of C2 must also be verified through another *saṃvāda* (C3) since C2 has no superiority to C1. In Śāntarakṣita's view, there never arises such a problem even under this assumption: C2 does not have to be verified through C3 since C2 has a superiority to C1.¹⁾ This difference of view comes from their different interpretations of *saṃvāda*, which is taken as an agreeing cognition or as agreement. The aim of the present paper is to make clear the difference in interpretation of the term *saṃvāda* between Kumāṛila and Śāntarakṣita and the latter's intention to interpret it differently.

1. Kumāṛila on *saṃvāda*

1.1. *saṃvāda* and *saṃgati*

To begin with, let us consider what Kumāṛila says about the problem of infinite regress in the Bṛhaṭṭikā.

[A] TS 2852–2853: *maulike cet pramāṇatve pramāṇāntarasādhyaṭā / tatra tatraivam icchanto na vyavasthāṃ labhemaḥ // yathaiva prathamam jñānam tatsaṃvādam apekṣate / saṃvādenāpi*

saṃvādaḥ punar mṛgyas tathaiva hi //

“If the validity of an initial cognition has to be established through another cognition which is valid, we cannot arrive at the establishment [of the validity of the initial cognition] since in this case we have to resort to another valid cognition to cognize the validity of the second cognition. For, just as the initial cognition asks for an agreeing cognition (*saṃvāda*) for the sake of the former, so does the agreeing cognition ask for another agreeing cognition [for the sake of the former].”

He says the same thing in the Ślokavārttika.

[B] ŚV 2.75: *saṃgatya yadi ceṣyeta pūrvapūrvapramāṇatā / pramāṇāntaram icchanto na vyavasthāṃ labhemahi //*

“If it were admitted that the validity of each preceding cognition is established on the basis of the agreement [with each succeeding cognition], we could not arrive at the establishment [of the validity] since [in this case it would follow that] we resort to another valid cognition [to establish the validity of each succeeding cognition].”

As is clear from these citations, for Kumārila the terms *saṃvāda* and *saṃgati* are mutually synonymous: they refer to the agreement of a succeeding cognition with a preceding cognition.

1.2. *saṃgati* and *anuvāda*

What is the agreement of a succeeding cognition with a preceding cognition? Let us consider the following statement by Kumārila:

[C] ŚV 2.72–73: *tenetaraiḥ pramāṇair yā codanānām asaṃgatiḥ / tayaiva syāt pramāṇatvam anuvādatvam anyathā // anyasyāpi pramāṇatve saṃgatiḥ naiva kāraṇam / tulyārthānām vikalpyatvād ekaṃ tatra hi bodhakam //*

“Therefore, it must be the case that the Vedic junction is valid precisely because the Vedic junction has no agreement with another valid means of knowledge. Otherwise, it would follow that the Vedic junction is ‘repetition’ (*anuvāda*). Of the valid means of knowledge other [than the Vedic injunction], either, agreement is not the cause of validity. Because one must select among [cognitions] with the same object, one of them indeed makes known it.”

It is to be noted that Kumārila associates the agreement with ‘repetition’ (*anuvāda*). In his view, ‘repetition’ is a cognition and the cause of this cognition as well, being classified as an invalid cognition in that it provides no new information. Accordingly, we see that by the term *saṃvāda* he means a cognition which agrees with a preceding cognition, or the succeeding cognition whose content is the same as that of the preceding cognition.

Kumārila argues that the agreeing cognition has no superiority to the preceding cognition. This point holds only if the succeeding cognition has the same content as the preceding cognition. In his view, therefore, the validity of the agreeing cognition, which has no superiority to the preceding cognition, must be verified through another agreeing cognition.²⁾

2. Śāntarakṣita on *saṃvāda*

2.1. *vastusaṃvāda*

Śāntarakṣita modifies the concept of *saṃvāda* so that there may not arise the problem of infinite regress. Let us consider the following statement:

[D] TS 2958: *ucyate vastusaṃvādaḥ prāmāṇyam abhidhīyate / tasya cārthakriyābhāsajñānād* anyan na lakṣaṇam //* *Ms: -kriyābhāsa-, TS: -kriyābhyāsa-.

“Answer: Agreement with a real entity (*vastusaṃvāda*) is called ‘validity’; and the essential characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the [agreement] is none other than a cognition in which causal efficacy appears.”

[E] TS 2962: *ādye hy avastuviṣaye vastusaṃvādalakṣaṇam / dvitīyaṃ na pravarteta tasya hetor asambhavāt //*

“For, if the initial cognition did not have a real entity for its object, there would not arise the second cognition that is the essential characteristic of the agreement with the real entity, since there cannot be the cause of the second [cognition].”

From [D] we see the following: Śāntarakṣita, by the term *saṃvāda*, means the agreement with a real entity (*vastusaṃvāda*), and not the cognition that agrees with the preceding cognition. What is important is that the agreement is validity itself and consists in the cognition of causal efficacy (*arthakriyājñāna*). In [E] it is suggested that the cognition of causal efficacy is validity itself. It is clear that Śāntarakṣita here associates the term *saṃvāda* with Dharmakīrti’s definition of validity by the use of the terms *avisamvādana* ‘non-deception, trustworthiness’ and *arthakriyāsthiti* ‘the establishment of causal efficacy’.³⁾

2.2. Superiority of *arthakriyājñāna* to an initial cognition

On the assumption that *saṃvāda* is the cognition of causal efficacy, Śāntarakṣita explains the process of verifying the validity of a cognition. According to him, the initial cognition has the cause of error (*bhrāntikāraṇa*). This cause of error is that by which causal efficacy is not cognized immediately after the initial cognition (*anantaraphalādrṣṭi*). Due to the

cause of error there arises the suspicion (*āśaṅkā*) that the initial cognition is invalid.⁴⁾ In order to remove such suspicion, it is necessary to cognize causal efficacy. After there arises the cognition of causal efficacy, the validity of the initial cognition is established. This process is explained as follows:

[F] TS 2959–2961: *arthakriyāvabhāsaṃ ca jñānaṃ saṃvedyate sphuṭam / niścīyate ca tannātrabhāvyāmarśanacetasā // atas tasya svataḥ samyak prāmāṇyasya viniścayāt / nottarārthakriyā-prāptipratyayaḥ samakṣyate // jñānapramāṇabhāve ca tasmin kāryāvabhāsini / pratyaye prathame 'py asmād dhetoḥ prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ //*

“The cognition in which causal efficacy appears is first vividly perceived and then [the cognition in question is] determined by the reflective mind which follows only that [cognition] (*tannātrabhāvin*). For this reason, because the validity of the [cognition of causal efficacy] is properly determined intrinsically, no one expects the succeeding cognition that causal efficacy has been obtained. When the cognition in which causal efficacy appears is the validity of a cognition, the validity of the initial [cognition] is also determined for this reason.”

The cognition of causal efficacy is first self-cognized and then is determined by a conceptual cognition which follows only the cognition. In this case, the cognition of causal efficacy requires no other cognition than the conceptual cognition for determining its own validity; for, there never arises the suspicion that the cognition of causal efficacy is invalid since there cannot exist any kind of cause of error at the time when the cognition of causal efficacy is determined. For the cognition of causal efficacy to be determined in this manner is for the cognition of causal efficacy to be determined intrinsically. The validity of the initial cognition is determined when the cognition of causal efficacy is determined because the cognition of causal efficacy is nothing other than the validity of the initial cognition. This is why Śāntarakṣita contradicts Kumārila's statement [A] as follows:

[G] TS 2971–2972ab: *ataś ca prathamam jñānam tatsaṃvādam apekṣate / saṃvādenāpi saṃvādaḥ punar mṛgyas tathaiva na // bhrāntihetor asadbhāvāt svatas tasya pramāṇatā //*

“And, for this reason, the initial cognition resorts to an agreeing cognition. It is not the case that the agreeing cognition also has to ask for another agreeing cognition just as [the initial cognition does]. For the validity of the [agreeing cognition] is established intrinsically on account of the absence of the cause of error.”

Finally Śāntarakṣita explicitly states that there does not occur the problem of infinite regress under the assumption made by Kumārila.⁵⁾

Conclusion

Śāntarakṣita develops the Buddhist theory of validity as the ‘non-restriction’ (*anīyama*) theory of validity in answer to Kumārila’s criticism of the theory of extrinsic validity. He, following Dharmakīrti’s definition of validity, changes the concept of *saṃvāda* from the agreement between two cognitions to the agreement of a cognition with the real entity which is the object of the cognition, so as for the term *saṃvāda* to mean the cognition of causal efficacy. In the ‘non-restriction’ theory of validity, the cognition of causal efficacy is regarded as superior to an initial cognition whose validity is to be established.

Notes

1) According to Kumārila, the problem of infinite regress comes up in the case where the validity of an initial cognition is to be verified through the cognition of the excellence of the cause of the initial cognition (*kāraṇaguṇajñāna*), too (Kataoka [2011b: 254–255]); Śāntarakṣita settles the problem in TS 2983–2995. To consider his arguments on *kāraṇaguṇajñāna* is beyond the scope of this paper.

2) TS 2860: *saṃvādaguṇavijñāne kena vābhyadhike mate* / ādyasya tadadhīnatvaṃ yadbaleṇa bhaviṣyati* // *Ms: -ke mate, TS: -kena te. “On what grounds is it held that a *saṃvāda* and a *guṇajñāna* is superior [to the initial cognition], as a consequence of which it will follow that the initial [cognition] depends on the two?”

3) Śāntarakṣita’s interpretation of *saṃvāda* as the cognition of causal efficacy is based on Śākyabuddhi’s. See Inami [1993: 111–113].

4) TS 2965–2967: *tasmād arthakriyābhāsaṃ jñānaṃ yāvan na jāyate / tāvad ādye ’pramāśaṅkā jāyate bhrāntihetutaḥ // anantaram phalādṛṣṭiḥ sādṛśyasyopalambhanam / mater apaṭutetyādi bhrāntikāraṇam atra ca // kāryāvabhāsivijñāne jāte tv etan na vidyate / sākṣād vastunibaddhāyāḥ kriyāyāḥ prativedanāt* // “Therefore, insofar as the cognition in which causal efficacy appears does not arise, there arises the suspicion that the initial cognition is invalid due to the cause of error; with respect to this [initial cognition] there exist a cause of error (*bhrāntikāraṇa*) such as the non-perception of a result [which is to be brought about by the object of the initial cognition] immediately after the initial cognition; the perception of the similarity [between the initial cognition and an erroneous cognition pertinent to the former]; the dullness of mind. On the other hand, when the cognition with the appearance of a causal efficacy (*kārya*) has arisen, there does not exist this cause of error since the causal efficacy (*kriyā*) which is connected with a real entity is directly perceived.”

5) TS 2985: *evam arthakriyājñānāt pramāṇavaniścaye / nānavasthā parākāṅkṣānivr̥tter iti sthitam* // “When the validity of the initial cognition is in this manner determined through the cognition of causal efficacy, it is established that there never arises the problem of infinite regress since the expectation for another cognition is swept away.”

Abbreviations

- Ms A manuscript of Tattvasaṃgrahasūtra. Jinabhadrasuri Tadapatrīya Grantha Bhandara no. 377.
 TS Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary Pañjikā of Shri Kamalashīla. Ed.

Swāmī Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī. 2 vols. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968. Reprint, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1981–1982.

ŚV See Kataoka[2011a].

Bibliography

Inami, Masahiro. 1993. "Bukkyōronrigakuha no shinriron: Dēvēndorabuddi to Shākyabuddi" 仏教論理学派の真理論: デーヴェーンドラブッディとシャーキャブッディ. In *Watanabe Fumimaro hakushi tsuitō kinen ronshū: Genshibukkyō to daijōbukkyō (ge)* 渡邊文磨博士追悼記念論集: 原始仏教と大乘仏教 (下), ed. Egaku Maeda, 85–118. Kyoto: Nagata Bunshodō.

Kataoka, Kei. 2011a. *Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing, Part 1: A Critical Edition of Mīmāṃsā-Ślokavārttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanāsūtra)*. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Kataoka, Kei. 2011b. *Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing, Part 2: An Annotated Translation of Mīmāṃsā-Ślokavārttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanāsūtra)*. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Key words *saṃvāda, prāmāṇya*

(M.A. Hiroshima University)

New Publication

Yūto Kawamura

The Kāraka Theory Embodied in the Rāma Story:
A Sanskrit Textbook in Medieval India.
With a Foreword by George Cardona

23cm, 1ix, 187pp., ₹650, \$22.00
D. K. Printworld, 2018