Expanding Mind:

Conflict Concerning Transmigration in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*

KONDŌ Hayato

1. Introduction

The *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* (*PYŚ*), which is regarded as a unified whole of the *Yogasūtra* and its commentary *Yogabhāṣya*, elucidates Sāṃkhya doctrines, as indicated by its epithet *sāṃkhyapravacana* (“exposition of Sāṃkhya”) in the colophon. The *PYŚ* bases its cosmogony and terminology on those of the classical Sāṃkhya system represented by Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (*SK*). However, there are several discrepancies between the *PYŚ* and the *SK* regarding the doctrines such as the evolutionary scheme, part of which is presumably derived from Vindhyavāsin, a predecessor of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.¹⁾ This paper aims to bring forward further evidence to show the relationship between Vindhyavāsin and the *PYŚ* by identifying advocates appearing in the *PYŚ* who hold different views on what transmigrates.

2. Different Views on What Transmigrates

This paper investigates the following passage from the *PYŚ*.

Others understand that the mind contracts and expands like a lamp [illuminating the inside of] a [small] pot and a [large] palace, and attains the size and takes the form of the body. That being so, [according to these others,] it is proper [to assume an existence of] the intermediate existence (*antarābhāva*) and [its] transmigration. [However,] according to the Ācārya, exclusively the function (*vytti*) of the mind, which is all-pervading, contracts and expands.²⁾

The author of this passage refers to the view of the “others” on the size of the mind and transmigration of the intermediate existence, and clearly distinguishes it from the Ācārya’s view. Previous scholars of this passage have argued that the “others” can be identified with the Sāṃkhyas on the basis of much later sources, that is, the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* and Vijñāna-bhikṣu’s (ca. 16th c. CE) commentary *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*.³⁾ However, sufficient evidence can be found to identify the “others” with the Sāṃkhyas as early as the commentary

Tattvavaiśārādī (TV) by Vācaspati Miśra (ca. 10th c. CE). Vācaspati elaborates this view of the “others” as follows:

In the course of the discussion, [the author of the *PYŚ*,] desirous of refuting another view on the size of the mind, states the view—“a [small] pot and a [large] palace.” According to the understanding of the “others,” there is no means of proving that the mind exists outside the body, because [the mind] is located in the body, and the effect [of its function] can be observed. Further, the mind is not minute in size, because [otherwise] it would result in that the five sensations do not occur simultaneously (*aparyāyeṇa*) when an elongated *śaṣkūlī* (*dīrghaśaṣkūlī*) is eaten. There is indeed no basis for assuming the sequence [of the five sensations], because [such a sequence] is not [actually] experienced. Furthermore, it is impossible that the mind (*manas*), which is single and minute, simultaneously has a relationship with the sense faculties located in different parts [of the body]. Therefore, through the logic of the remainder (*pāriśeṣyāt*), the mind attains the size of the body like a lamp located in a [small] pot and a [large] palace. The contraction and expansion of this [mind] occur even in the bodies of ants and elephants, because [the mind’s] “form” [or] size attains the size of the body [it inhabits]. [An opponent, refuting the “others,” states:] If so (i.e., the mind attains the size of the body), how can this [mind] be connected with the womb (*kṣetra*) and seed (*bīja*) [on the occasion of rebirth]? To be precise, this [mind] without a support cannot reach from the dead body to the blood and sperm located in the body of parents, because [the mind] depends on others. Actually, [for example,] if a post and such like does not move, its shadow does not move either. Similarly, if a canvas does not move, a picture, which has it as a support, does not move either. If that is the case, it follows that there would be no transmigration. In reply to such [an objection], [the “others”] state—“**That being so, it is proper [to assume an existence of] the intermediate existence and [its] transmigration.**” “That being so” [here means that] if [the mind] attains the size of the body, this [mind] discards the former body in order to obtain another body and obtains another body through the intermediate connection with the body that carries beyond (*ātivāhikaśarīra*). One should indeed transmigrate into another body through that [connection between the mind and the body that carries beyond].⁴⁾

In this passage, the “others,” who hold that the mind attains the size of the body, refute an opponent, who considers the *manas* to be minute. This passage contains two notable features that will enable an identification of these “others” with the Sāṃkhyas: (1) examples and terminology parallel to the *SK*, and (2) an elongated *śaṣkūlī* as an example.

The opponent objecting to the “others” mentions a post and a canvas as an example of the mind’s dependence on others. These examples precisely correspond to those presented in *SK* 41, according to which the transmigrating *liṅga* requires a support such as a post in which to reside: “Just as there is no picture without a support [such as a canvas], or there is

no shadow without a post and such like, so the *liṅga* does not exist without a support of the specific (*viśeṣa*).”⁵⁾ Furthermore, another parallel can be found immediately after the *TV* passage quoted above. They maintain that the subtle body (*sūkṣmaśarīra*), which is stable (*niyata*) from creation to cosmic absorption (*mahāpralaya*), is located, as a support of the mind, in the central part of the body (*TV* 184.11–16). In addition, they also maintain that the subtle body is extracted from the gross body that is composed of the six sheaths (*ṣāṭkauśika*) on the occasion of transmigration. The argument parallel to this can be found in the *Tattvakaumudī*, Vācaspati’s commentary on the *SK*. Vācaspati justifies transmigration of the subtle body by quoting *Mahābhārata* 3.281.16, according to which Yama extracted the thumb-sized (*aṅguṣṭhamātra*) *puruṣa* from dead Satyavat.⁶⁾ This is the first ground for identifying the “others” with the Sāṃkhya.

The second ground is the use of the elongated *śaṣkulī* as an example. If the mind, according to these “others,” did not attain the size of the body, the five sense faculties would not operate all at once. An elongated *śaṣkulī*—a sweet, dry, fragrant sesame cake⁷⁾—is used as an example of the simultaneous operation of the five sense faculties: when it is eaten, the five sense faculties presumably operate to grasp its smell, taste, chewing sound, and length.⁸⁾ This example is often found in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises to establish the singleness and swiftness of the *manas*: even when grasping an object causing several sensations like a *śaṣkulī*, the single *manas* swiftly moves to each place where the sense faculty operates, and we consequently tend to believe that several sensations occur simultaneously.⁹⁾ Notably, according to the *Nyāyamañjarī* by Jayanta (ca. 840–900 CE), it is for Brahmin Kapila, who is commonly regarded as the founder of Sāṃkhya, that the five sensations simultaneously occur when an elongated *śaṣkulī* is eaten.¹⁰⁾ More notably, Vācaspati himself specifies in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṅkā* (*NVTṬ*) that this simultaneous occurrence of several sensations constitutes the Sāṃkhya doctrine.¹¹⁾ Furthermore, in another passage of the *NVTṬ*, Vācaspati mentions the all-pervading inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇasya vibhutve*) along with this example.¹²⁾ The opponent here, assuming the inner organ, namely *manas*, which pervades the body, holds that the five sensations occur simultaneously. This view of the all-pervading inner organ can be attributed to Vindhyavāsini both because he is a unique advocate of the all-pervading organ (*indriyavibhutva*) among Sāṃkhya masters and because he accepts the predominance of the *manas* among the organs, as it is the one in which all the objects can be cognized.¹³⁾ These two features are aptly sufficient to identify the “others”

who appear in the *PYS* with the Sāṃkhyas; however, it will be premature to conclude that the “others” are identified with Vindhyavāsin, because it is the Ācārya, not the “others,” who holds the all-pervading mind in the same manner as Vindhyavāsin. Thus, we should clarify whether the Ācārya can be identified with Vindhyavāsin.

3. Vindhyavāsin and the All-Pervading Mind

The difference between the “others” and the Ācārya lies in the extension range of the mind: the “others” hold that the range is limited within the body, whereas the Ācārya holds that the mind pervades beyond the body. To examine the possibility that the Ācārya, according to whom the function of the all-pervading mind contracts and expands, is identified with Vindhyavāsin, a key term that we should note is *function* (*vr̥tti*). The term *vr̥tti*, which is postulated as being required in the Sāṃkhya theory of perception, that is generally based on the sense faculty’s operation after arriving at its object (*prāpyakārin*), serves as a medium that links the sense faculty to its object. Vindhyavāsin’s theory of the all-pervading sense faculty, however, does not require the sense faculty to arrive at its object, and thus the all-pervading sense faculty, motivated by a transcendental principle such as the aims of the *puruṣa* (*puruṣārtha*), is transformed into the form of an object; that is, the *vr̥tti* latent in the sense faculty becomes manifest.¹⁴⁾ Vindhyavāsin thus attaches particular significance to the *vr̥tti*. Significantly enough, Vindhyavāsin’s concept of the *vr̥tti* is conceived as being reflected in the following *TV*. Vācaspati highlights the distinction for the postulation of the subtle body: the “others” hold that the intermediate existence transmigrates, whereas the Ācārya, who holds that the *vr̥tti* of the all-pervading mind contracts and expands (i.e., transforms), does not postulate the subtle body. Vācaspati, specifying the latter as the author’s own view (*svamata*, *TV* 184.9–10), initially specifies that the subtle body cannot be confirmed by any means of knowledge, and subsequently, mentioning the “extraction” in *Mahābhārata* 3.281.16 again, definitely states that the *puruṣa*, which is untransferable “potentiality as consciousness” (*citiśakti*), cannot be extracted. He further construes that this “extraction” of the *puruṣa* means that “the consciousness (*citi*) and the function (*vr̥tti*) of the mind cease to exist in the respective [body]” (*TV* 184.11–16). To put it another way, the presence of the function of the *puruṣa* and the mind is regarded as life, and the absence of the function as death. Its basic idea is common to the argument on the manifestation of the *vr̥tti* in the theory of perception. A similar, more noteworthy view appears in the

Yuktīdīpikā, an anonymous commentary on the *SK*, and is attributed to Vindhyavāsin. In the passage, Vindhyavāsin is regarded as having conceived the idea that the sense faculty is all-pervading, and thus birth occurs by their function (*vr̥tti*), and death is abandoning this function; therefore, he holds that there exists no subtle body.¹⁵ The passage relates the process of birth and death to the *vr̥tti*. Birth is defined as the presence of the *vr̥tti*, and death as the absence of the *vr̥tti*. This idea precisely agrees with the view of the Ācārya as elaborated by Vācaspati. Thus, we can identify the Ācārya, who mentions the *vr̥tti* of the all-pervading mind, with Vindhyavāsin.

4. Concluding Remarks

In view of the *TV*, we can identify the “others” who appear in the *PYŚ* with the general Sāṃkhyas, who do not assume the all-pervading sense faculty, through parallels with the *SK* and the example of the elongated *śaṣkulī*, and can identify the Ācārya with Vindhya-vāsin. We can thus ascertain the extent of Vindhyavāsin’s authority in the *PYŚ*. This paper has contributed to a verification of the relationship between Vindhyavāsin and the *PYŚ*.

Notes

- 1) See Chakravarti 1951, 141; Frauwallner 1958, 114n31. 2) *PYŚ* ad 4.10 (*Pātañjalayogasūtrāṇi*, ed. Kāśīnātha Śāstrī Āgāṣe [Punyākhyapattana: Ānandāśramamudraṇālaya, 1904], 183.3–184.1): *ghaṭa-prāsādapradīpakalpaṃ saṃkocavikāśi cittaṃ śarīraparimāṇāṅkāramātram ity apare pratipannāḥ. tathā cāntarābhāvaḥ saṃsāraś ca yukta iti. vr̥ttir evāṣya vibhūnaś cittasya saṃkocavikāśinīty ācāryaḥ . . .*
- 3) See Woods 1914, 311n2; Murakami 1978, 551–52. 4) *TV* (see *PYŚ*) ad 4.10 (183.18–184.6): *prasaṅgataś cittaparimāṇavipratipattiṃ nirācīkīrṣur vipratipattiṃ āha—ghaṭaprasāda iti. dehapradeśa-vartikāryadarśanād dehād bahiḥ sadbhāve cittasya na pramāṇam asti. na ca itad aṇuparimāṇaṃ dīrghaśaṣkulībhakṣaṇādāv aparyāyeṇa jñānapaṇcakānūtpādaprasaṅgāt. na cānanubhūṭyāmānakrama-kalpanāyāṃ pramāṇam asti. na caikam aṇu mano nānādeśair indriyair aparyāyeṇa saṃbandhum arhati. tat pāriśeṣyāt kāyaparimāṇaṃ cittaṃ ghaṭaprasādavartipradīpavat. saṃkocavikāśau puttikāhastidehayor aśyotatsyete. śarīraparimāṇam evākāraḥ parimāṇam yaśyety apare pratipannāḥ. nanv evaṃ katham aśya kṣetrajñasamyoḡaḥ. na khalv etad anāśrayaṃ mṛtaśarīraṇ mātṛpīṭṭṛdehavartini lohitaretaś prāpnoti paratantratvāt. na hi sthāṇvādiṣv agacchatsu tacchāyā gacchati. na cāgacchati paṭe tadāśrayaṃ citraṃ gacchati. tathā ca na saṃsāraḥ syād ity ata āha—tathā cāntarābhāvaḥ saṃsāraś ca yukta iti. tathā ca śarīraparimāṇatve dehāntaraprāptaye pūrvadehatyāgo dehāntaraprāptiś cāntarāsyātivāhikaśarīrasaṃyo-gād bhavatas tena khalv ayaṃ dehāntare saṃcareṭ.* 5) *SK* 41 (in Gangānātha Jhā, *An English Translation with the Sanskrit Text of the Tattva-kaumudī (Sāṃkhya) of Vāchaspati Miśra* [Bombay: Tookaram Tatya, 1896]): *citraṃ yathāśrayam rte sthāṇvādibhyo vinā yathā chāyā | tadvad vinā viśeṣair na tiṣṭhati nirāśrayaṃ līṅgam ||* 6) *Tattvakaumudī* (see *SK*) ad *SK* 41 (58.2–6). 7) See Kapadia 1947, 295–96; Om Prakash 1987, 227n2, 429. See also Woods 1914, 311n3. 8) See Jacob 1911, 62; Kapadia 1947, 296. Also, the following texts (except for those mentioned in note 10 below) say that when

an elongated *śaṣkūlī* is eaten, the five sense faculties operate all at once: *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyasvopajñavṛtti* ad v. 298 (*Ācārya Jinabhadra's Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya with Auto-commentary*, ed. Dalsukh Malvania, 2nd ed., vol. 1 [Ahmedabad: Lalbhai Dalpatbhai, 1966], 66.24–26); *Tattvabodhavidhāyini* (*Śaṃmatitarka-prakaraṇa of Siddhasena Divākara*, ed. Sukhalāla Saṃghavī, vol. 1 [Kyoto: Rinsen Shōten, 1984], 247.18–19); *Anekāntajayapatākāvivarāṇa* (*Anekāntajayapatākā by Haribhadra Sūri*, ed. H. R. Kāpadīā, vol. 1 [Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1940], 158.30–31); *Nyāyakumudacandra* (*Nyāya-kumudacandra of Śrīmat Prabhācandrācārya*, ed. Mahendra Kumar, 2nd ed., vol. 1 [Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991], 270.22–23, 271.13); *Prameyakamalamārtanḍa* (*Prameyakamala-martanḍa by Shri Prabha Chandra*, ed. Mahendra Kumar Shastri, 3rd ed. [Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1990], 18.3–9, 126.16–19); *Nyāyavinīśayavivarāṇa* (*Nyāyavinīśaya-vivarāṇa of Śrī Vādirāja Sūri*, ed. Mahendra Kumar, 2nd ed., vol. 1 [New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith, 2000], 521.23–26); *Dharmottarapradīpa* (*Pañḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa*, ed. Dalsukhbhai Malvania [Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1955], 63.5). 9) See Frauwallner 1953, 393. 10) *Nyāyamañjarī* (*Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa*, ed. K. S. Varadacharya, vol. 2 [Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1983], 409.14–15): *suṣaṇḍhi śītalām dūrghām aśnantaḥ śuṣkaśaṣkūlīm | kapilabrāhmaṇās santi yugapat pañcabuddhayaḥ ||* See also *Vyomavatī* (*Vyomavatī of Vyomaśivācārya*, ed. Gaurinath Sastri, vol. 1 [Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1983], 158.19). 11) *NVTI* ad 3.1.33 (*Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā of Vācaspatimiśra*, ed. Anantalal Thakur [New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996], 480.7–8). 12) *NVTI* ad 3.2.8 (499.12–14). 13) See Chakravarti 1951, 188–89; Murakami 1978, 389–90. 14) See Kondō 2013. 15) *Yuktidīpikā* ad SK 39 (*Yuktidīpikā*, ed. Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi, vol. 1 [Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998], 230.6–7). See also Chakravarti 1951, 142.

Bibliography

- Chakravarti, Pulinbihari. 1951. *Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought*. Calcutta Sanskrit Series, no. 30. Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House.
- Frauwallner, Erich. 1953. *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*. Band 1. Salzburg: Otto Müller Verlag.
- . 1958. "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ost-Asiens* 2: 84–139.
- Jacob, Colonel G. A. 1911. *A Third Handful Popular Maxims: Current in Sanskrit Literature*. 2nd ed. (rev. and enl.). Bombay: The "Nirṇaya-Sāgar" Press.
- Kapadia, H. R., ed. 1947. *Anekāntajayapatākā by Haribhadra Sūri*. Vol. 2. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, no. 105. Baroda: Oriental Institute.
- Kondō Hayato 近藤隼人. 2013. "indriyavṛtti: Tōtatsu sayōsetsu to kankan henzaisetsu no sōkoku" indriyavṛtti: 到達作用説と感官遍在説の相剋. *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 印度学仏教学研究 61 (2): 815–811.
- Murakami Shinkan 村上真完. 1978. *Sāṃkhya tetsugaku kenkyū* サーンクヤ哲学研究. Tokyo: Shunjūsha.
- Om Prakash. 1987. *Economy and Food in Ancient India*. Part 2. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan.
- Woods, James Haughton, trans. 1914. *The Yoga-System of Patañjali*. Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 17. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Key words Sāṃkhya, Vindhyavāsin, *Tattvavaiśārādī*, *Yuktidīpikā*, Vācaspati Miśra, *dīrghaśaṣkūlī*

(Project Research Fellow, Uehiro Project for the Asian Research Library,
The University of Tokyo Library System, PhD)