Preliminary Conception of Zen
Social Ethics (Continued)

Problem of "Anjin" (安心, Peace of Mind)

Hakugen Ichikawa

By "Anjin" is meant here spiritual calmness created by Prajñā. Prajñā is a unique intuition that sees the true nature of things as they are (Yathābhūtam). "Zazen-shin" (坐禅箴, Instruction in Zazen) by Dōgen (1200-1253) reads: "A bird flies as a bird does; a fish swims like a fish!" The essence of things seen by Prajñā or Yathātatthadārśana (如実見, seeing into the truth as it is) is named "Suchness" (tathatā) or "Emptiness" (śūnyatā), because it is beyond our daily expression which is the result of discriminative consciousness (vijñāna). So it is simply termed "suchness" or, negatively, "emptiness", Prajñā sees "emptiness" in "suchness", and in "suchness" "emptiness". This is to see "coincidentia oppositorum", or rather, to see "non-duality" (不二, Advaita) in things. Attaining non-duality is going beyond dualism of thought, for instance, pleasure and pain, good and evil, life and death, ignorance and enlightenment, and so on. Through this dual attitude of life comes nervous irritation. Seeing non-duality, we attain calmness of mind. A Zen poet says:

In fine weather 晴れて好し
In cloudy weather 曇りても好し
Beautiful indeed 不二の山
And never changing 元の姿は
This peak of Fuji! 変らざりけり

"Peak of Fuji" is a symbol of our Self. Our true self is unchangeable in any circumstances; in prosperity or in adversity, in war as well as in peace. The Logic of "Anjin" is that of non-duality; in the logic of non-duality, being is being, non-being is non-being, and at the same time being is non-being, and vice versa. This logic is termed by Dr. Suzuki,
deriving from the phrase in the Diamond Sūtra (Vajracchedikā), "logic of Sokuhi (即非)", which may be formulized as follows:

A is non-A, therefore A is A.

For instance, "suffering is not suffering, so it is suffering." In Prajñā, as we stated, we see into the nature of things as they are, become one with "suchness" of them, and in this absolute unity we lose sight of, or are free from, their aspects objectively grasped,—here suchness becomes, or rather, is emptiness: non-duality, or "sokuhi"-experience reveals itself. The logic of "sokuhi" is nothing but that of peace of mind ("Anjin") in Buddhism. However, it must be distinguished from that of the so-called "Akirame" (あきらめ, resignation in the usual sense), the latter still remaining on a plane of discriminative mind. "Akirame" is to adapt ourselves to our circumstances by changing their meanings for us through a sort of philosophical reflection, while "Anjin" is above such reflection, and also isn’t the same as what is called "self-possession" or "presence of mind" based on a dual mode of life.

Our consideration suggests now "Anjin" in itself is not a kind of "ideology," a form of intellectual adjustment or adaptation to surroundings, historically as well as socially conditioned. So a well-known verse:

The believing mind is not dual,
What is dual is not the believing mind.
Beyond all languages,
For it there is no past, no present, no future. 非古来今

The believing mind, "Anjin" as such, is beyond all forms. This formless self or mind, however, isn’t some-thing distinguished from forms,—then it is also a sort of form. To be free from all forms is at the same time to be free to take any form, if necessary. "Let your mind (or thought)”, says a sutra, “take its rise without fixing it anywhere (応無所住而生其心).” To be "beyond all language" is no other than being "all language". Peace of mind creates itself anywhere in any condition, not only in democratic states but in fascist ones, and it takes whatever forms of ideologies it likes. There is no intrinsic connection between Anjin and ideology so far.
as they are in different dimensions. The relation between them might be considered as only casual. It follows that a man of Anjin may be, and may become a democrat, a fascist or a socialist according to circumstances. It may be no wonder that the followers of Prajñā-Buddhism, under the same situation, should hold their respective ideologies opposing with one another.

The central subject of Zen is "how to be" instead of "what to do (or to think)". How about, then, the question of "what to do?" —the matter of morals in Zen Buddhism? Morals or ideology are not an affair of taste for which there is no accounting.

We come into being in society, and become aware of ourselves in contact with other men. It isn't possible for us to live in society ignoring the rules of human relations. Even an outlaw has a sense of duty towards his circle. We cannot find, with the exception of the insane, any man without moral sentiment, whereas we meet today in our country a number of people without religion. This suggests that a Buddhist too has necessarily morals in some form or other. It proves that he virtually enters the domain of ideology. Needless to say, this region is that of discussion and choice, that of duality instead of nonduality. In the field of social ethics, it isn't possible for us to support and resist militarism at the same time. Sometimes a Buddhist comes across the totalitarianism forced upon by the state authority, which implicitly threatens the people to accept it with a menace of death,—as we experienced under the militarism of recent Japan. Erich Fromm says:

The "yes" to God is the "no" to Caessar; the "yes" to man is the "no" to all those who want to enslave, exploit, and stultify him.

In the face of political power, arises the question of choosing our attitude of escape, compromise, or criticism. To remain non-choosing is impossible for us: even non-choosing is a form of choosing. Choice is a matter of "either-or" and not one of non-duality—a matter of pure subjectivity, "Anjin" in itself. The firmness of one's "Anjin" alone cannot assure the truth of one's ideology, and the deepness of one's pure subjectivity cannot make up for the scantiness of one's social thought. It isn't
rare that the decisiveness of Anjin goes together with the conventionalism of moral thoughts. Profundity of one's Anjin isn't always the evidence of the validity of one's view on the social questions.

There are two types of Peace of mind (Anjin):

Type A. Being undisturbed in adversity.

Ryōkan (1757-1831), a Zen monk in the Tokugawa era, once wrote to one of his friends, “Meet a disaster willingly when you meet with it, die willingly when you die,—this is the secret of escaping a disaster.” This type of Anjin attaches little weight to the social thoughts, it is solely concerned with the mental attitude of life and is secured within its subjectivity: its primary aim is to have one adapt oneself to surroundings instead of changing them. This attitude held true especially in the middle ages when the people didn't find any difference between the laws of nature and those established by man. This kind of amor fati is an ideology helpful in maintaining the status quo of society. It comes under the “philosophy of interpretation” in a broad sense. However, I don't think that “Being master in every situation (随分作主)” is the same as mere adaptation to one's environment. Brotherly love of the Buddhist would be compared to the parental one wishing their children to be happy both in a spiritual and in a physical sense.

The question of bread for myself is a material question, but the question of bread for my neighbours, for everybody, is a spiritual and religious question. Society should be so organized that there is bread for all, and then it is that the spiritual question will present itself before men in all its depth. (Berdyaev)

Type B. Peace of mind creating and verifying itself in the practice of realizing peace and happiness of the world, not only by the spiritual but also by material and social means.

An objection may be raised here: the essential problem of Buddhism is nothing but the problem of life-and-death, the other questions, e. g., the social, the economical and the political should be left to the respective sciences. However we must pay attention to the fact that the early
Buddhism attached much importance to the social problems as well as to the life-and-death question, as a natural consequence of egoless love (karunā) of Buddhism. Today, scientific analysis of such problems may well be entrusted to social sciences. Yet we find so many a different explanation and answer to settle the matter on the part of sciences. So we have to choose the better one without prejudice and out of the Buddhist love. Then we find ourselves in the intermediate region where Buddhism and social sciences closely relate to each other. Without this vital relation, religious ethics is liable to fall into conventional opportunism. This relation does not bury religion in the various "-isms" of this world, so far as it maintains a critical attitude towards history from its supra-historical standpoint. Here is, so to speak, disconnected connection between the "Dharma-dhatu, 法界 (supra-historical world) and the "Loka-dhatu 世間界" (the historical world). The Dharma-dhatu is a world vision created by the Prañā-intuition, through its contemplation of this world, miserable and unreasonable. This world vision is by no means the Buddhists' "ideal world" in the usual sense: the Dharma-dhatu will never be realized in this mundane world, while the "ideal world" in a secular sense is expected to be realized on earth in the distant future: the former views the world from the absolute and super-historical standpoint, the latter from the relative and historical one.

There is a break between the Dharma-dhatu and the Loka-dhatu, and yet they have a vital relation to each other. J. M. Murry wrote when he concluded one of his essays:

The Church is the Church only when it is in a condition of vital tension between the two realization: that the Kingdom of God cannot be established in the world in time, and that the Kingdom of God must be established in the world in time.

Also the Dharma-dhatu must be established in the world in time: efforts to remove the social evils are required here in time. But the logic of the Dharma-dhatu will never be allowed to be connected straight to that of the Loka-dhatu. If the logic of harmony of the former is directly
applied to the social problems, the righteousness of protest and resistance against the social evils will be denied. Mere preaching of “peace and harmony” can never remove, as our history proves, the objective existence of those evils, which are cleared only by reforming practices. Here is the field of Buddhist social ethics that intermediates the Dharma-dhātu and the Loka-dhātu. Therefore social ethics of religion need to have a special perspective, different from the mundane ethics. It must contain angles both relative and absolute towards history. In human history we often see the struggles between the suppressor and the suppressed. Both sides try to protect their own interests. Apparently here is a problem of group egosim, which is found not only on the part of the suppressor as we see it easily but also on the part of the suppressed. Simone Weil noticed egoism and cruelties of the revolutionary groups when she took part in the resistance movements in Spain, and she called the revolution “opium of the people”. But we must distinguish the group egoism of the suppressed from that of the suppressor. The protest and resistance of the suppressed claiming the fundamental rights of man are focused on the freedom and happiness of all mankind. Nevertheless it is the undeniable fact that the reforming movement within them is still imbued with egoism.

The Dharma-dhātu is the world of love and harmony, created by the egoless Prajñā. As such it has the two functions, namely, to affirm the reforming activities for the welfare of all mankind, and to criticise the ego-centeredness hidden even in those activities of good intentions. So in the Dharma-dhātu, not only the logic of peace and that of harmony but also peace of mind and that of the world are completely unified. The egoless self in Prajñā is founded, as we stated before, upon the logic and wisdom of non-duality, which is nothing but the logic of “Anjin” in Buddhism. Now, the two types of Anjin, in my view, do not necessarily contradict each other: the former may possibly be included in the latter as the attitude to hold oneself in adversity, in the practice of devoting oneself to creating the world of peace and happiness. Thus we find our lives
worth living in the vital tension between the reformation of the world and the contemplation and realization of the Dharma-dhatu. In other words, peace of mind reveals and confirms itself in the act of constructing a new world through the dialogic tension of the Loka-dhatu in time and the Dharma-dhatu in eternity. Here we are confronted, as we mentioned above, with some important problems, for instance, a question of truth or validity of applying the law of harmony and interpenetration of Dharma-dhatu straight to Loka-dhatu (our society of class antagonism), and a problem of non-violence as the only way of cutting off a vicious circle of violence and that of violence in pressing situations, for example, the “legitimate self-defense” against burglary and murder.


(2) Prajñāpāramitā is not prajñāpāramitā and therefore it is prajñāpāramitā. 般若波羅蜜。即非般若波羅蜜。是名般若波羅蜜。

(3) “Suffering is not suffering, therefore it is suffering”.—This proposition is of course illogical and nonsense in the field of formal logic. But it doesn’t belong to this field. The experience indicated by this proposition is one of the different dimension. The subject “A” in this case denotes “A” directly experienced in Prajñā intuition, while on the other hand, “A” in the predicate is not “A” in itself, “A” as pure experience. For example, the subject “Fire” (“A”) is, or more exactly, denotes, fire itself really burning and burns any hand that touches it, but “fire” in the predicate is mere idea (presentation, 表象) of fire itself indicated by the subject “Fire”; it is a content, an object in that sense, of our consciousness. In the above proposition, “A” as the subject and “A” in the predicate suggest the stratum construction of experience. The subject “A” suggesting the Prajñā intuition is not the same as “A” in the predicate. It becomes clear that the logic of “Sokuhi” or of Prajñā is not in direct opposition to formal logic, because the dimension of the former is different from that of the latter, in other words, “Sokuhi” logic does not deny, in the above sense, formal logic.

Our daily experience where formal logic is accepted as a matter of course—suffering is suffering, delight is delight; suffering is not delight, and vice versa,—always holds a certain viewpoint from which a certain object
Preliminary Conception of Zen Social Ethics (Hakugen Ichikawa) (19)

is viewed: there are always certain things that are to be viewed from
certain points of view, thus our experience consists of subject and object,
or the inner and the outer world. In the Prajñā experience, however,
there is no discrimination, no dualism of subject and object, mental and
physical, viewpoints and things viewed. Suffering in Prajñā is not suffering
objectively perceived from which (object) we (subject or ego) try to
escape in our nervous tension of subject versus object. In Prajñā, in this
unio mystica, so to speak, suffering is suffering, and yet it is not suffer-
ning (object) as one to be escaped by the sufferer (subject), in this sense, it
is non-suffering, or it is “as if” suffering. No nervous irritation is here-
 pacification of the soul is performed. Now, the subject “A” (fire or suff er-
ing in the above cases) or more precisely, Prajñā experience (fire or suf-
fering as such) indicated by the subject “A” is never annihilated by the
“non-A”. the negation in the predicate, so it is concluded, “therefore it
is suffering: suffering as such, or sunya suffering.”

(4) 僧璨，信心録，Sengtsan (died 606). The Hsinghingming, tr. by R. H. Blyth.
(7) Dōgen cites in his “Tenzo-kyō un” (典座教訓, Instruction of Cooks in
Zen Monastery) the question and answer between Tōzan (洞山) and his
disciple Seppō (雪峰) concerning the latter’s sorting grains of rice from
those of sand, and suggests the truths that (1) choosing is non-choosing,
so it is choosing; and that (2) the choosing service should be performed
with most sincere and careful mind. We are suggested by the second item
that our thoughts and practices in society should serve the purposes by
conforming to the law and principle of the respective situations. Kitaro
Nishida, 西田幾多郎 (1870-1945), a notorious philosopher in recent Japan,
defined, in his later years, his philosophy as “The absolute objectivism”.
To be above the “-ism” does not mean falling into an “opportun-ism”
(8) Mumonkan（無門閥）Chap. II. tells a story: Once a man was asked,
“Does a man of Enlightenment too fall into the world of causality (be
chained to the law of causality)?” He answered: “the enlightened one
never falls into the world of causality (不落因果)” On account of this ans-
swer, he was made a fox after he died. However, on hearing a great Zen
master Hyakujō (百丈, Po-chang) speak “The enlightened one does not
ignore the law of causality and see it clearly (不昧因果), he (the fox) open-
ned his spiritual eye and restored his humanity. Putting aside the traditio-
nal interpretation and take “causality” as the laws of the mundane world
in history. Then, “not falling into causality” suggests the break between
religion and history. But it is not possible for us, as we saw above, to live
in society ignoring morality. Living in society, we cannot but fall into the world dominated by the law of causation. Thus we have both the absolute and the relative perspective towards history. Now, on the converging point of the relative perspective (落因果), and the absolute one (不落因果), the Buddhist attains the highly unique enlightenment which sees clearly the law of causality without being enslaved by it (不昧因果). However, if this enlightenment is taken as something objective which we must seek and cling to, then we will lose this and fall again into the relative perspective.

(9) John Middleton Murry (1889- ), Heaven and Earth, 1938.
(10) For example, democratic freedom is by no means the product of few saints and clergy, but that of the secular and organized people awakened to their rights of man.
(11) Simone Weil (1909-1943), a French philosopher who died young in England. She took part in the revolutionary movement in Spain for a while.
(12) S. Weil, La condition ouvrière, 1951.
(13) Endless progress (or optimism towards history) and everlasting repetition (or pessimism towards history) of human history. We are in the structural construction of history, so to speak.

---

Philosophy East and West
A Journal of Oriental and Comparative Thought

Vol XIII, No 2 On Philosophical Synthesis, G. R. Malkani/ Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy, Edward Conze/ Causality, Eternal or Momentary? Winston L. King/ Indian Thought and Humanistic Psychology; Contrasts and Parallels between East and West, Henry Winthrop/ Paradoxical Logic, John Perry/ Sources of Indian Tradition, Daya Krishna


Vol. XIII, No. 4 On Philosophical Synthesis, A. R. Wadia/ A Comparison of Confucian and Platonic Ethical Views, Carsun Chang/ Śūnyavāda: A Reinterpretation, Harsh Narain/ The Sphere and Significance of Ethics, Morality, and Religion in Hindu Tradition, Balbir Singh Gauchhwal/ Conze on Buddhism and European Parallels (Comment and Discussion), Alex Wayman/