Controversy between the sākāra- and nirākāra-vādins of the yogācāra school—some materials

Yuichi Kajiyama

Sākāravāda, or the theory that knowledge is endowed with the image of its object, is maintained by the Sāṃkhya, Vedānta as well as the Sautrāntikabauddha. The theory, in Mookerjee's words,⁽¹⁾ "holds that knowlege of external reality is made possible by virtue of the objective reality leaving an impress of its likeness on the mirror of consiousness." The *nirākāravāda* is held by the Nyāyayaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsaka, Jaina, and the Vaibhāṣikabauddha, and⁽²⁾ "the theory maintains that our consiousness is clear like a clean slate and does not depart an inch from its intrinsic purity even when it apprehends the external reality. Consciousness is an amorphous substance and remains so in all its activities. It is like light and reveals the object with its form and qualities without undergoing any morphological articulation in its constitution." TS* v. 1999, as well as TSP, enumerates for criticism's sake three kinds of epistemological attitudes towards the problem of the relation between knowledge and its object: *nirākāravāda* (*anirbhāsajñānavāda*) according to which an object is cognized by knowledge not endowed with the image of the object; *sākāravāda* (*sanirbhāsajñānavāda*)—the object is cognized by the knowledge having its image; *anyanirbhāsajñānavāda*—the object is cognized by the knowledge which is endowed with an image different from that of the object.

---

* Concerning abbreviations see the end of this paper

(1) (2) S. Mookerjee, The Buddhist philosophy of universal flux, 77.

All the four schools of Buddhism can be classified from the standpoint of *akāravāda*. The Vaibhāṣika is regarded as *nirākāravādin*, while the Sautrāntika and the Vijñānavādin are *sākāravādins*. When the knowledge of a Buddha or emancipated person is concerned, the Vijñānavādin is again divided into both parties, as will be soon dealt with. For the general classification of the Buddhist schools into either of the two parties the reader is referred, for example, to TRD 46-47, where the Vaibhāṣika is represented as saying: *nirākāro bodho 'rthasahabhāvy eaksāmagryadhīnas tatrārthe pramāṇam*; the Sautrāntika and Vijñānavādin: *sākāro bodhaḥ pramāṇam*; and the Mādhyamika: *svapnoḥamah pramāṇaprameyayoḥ prati-bhāgaḥ. mukits tu śūnyatādṛṣṭeḥ... kecit tu mādhyaṃikāḥ svasthāṃ jñānam*⁽³⁾ *āhuḥ*. The Mādhyamika's attitude towards the problem is still to be investigated, though we know from the words of Ratnākaraśānti's this much that the school is also divided into the two parties.⁽⁴⁾

The epistemology of the Sautrāntika is described in SDS 33, 320-38, 271, and many other texts, Brahmanical and Jaina. Jadunath Sinha gives a good account of it in his *Indian Realism*, Chap. II; Kanakura also collects and translates into Japanese the reproductions of the Sautrāntika theory as appear in non-Buddhist works.⁽⁵⁾ Among Buddhist texts, TBh contains a brief but useful description, which is here translated. "The Sautrāntika holds the following theory. All that is manifested in the from of blue, etc. is knowledge, and not an external object (*bāhyo 'rthaḥ*), since an insentient (*jaḍa*) thing is not able to become visible (*prakāśa*). Concerning this it is said: The range of the senses [i. e. the external reality] (*indriyagocara*) is not perceptible itself, though it gives birth to the know-

(3) See also SDS 46, 368-371: *artho jñānāvito vaibhāṣikeṇa bahu manyate, sautrāntikena pratyakṣagrāhyo'rtho na bahir mataḥ. akārasahitā buddhir yog-acārasya saṃmatā, kevalāṃ saṃvidāṃ svasthāṃ manyante madhyamāḥ punaḥ*. Similar verses are found also in TRD 47. Here a group of the Mādhyamika who is said to maintain pure consciousness independent of *ākāra* seems to represent *nirākāravādin*.

(4) Cf. p.11 below (the last citation from PPU).

(5) 金倉圓照, 外教の文獻にみえる經部說 (山口博士還曆記念印度佛教學論叢 55 ff.).

ledge with the form [or image] of it [i. e. the objective reality]. The author of the [*Pramāṇavārttika*]-*Alaṃkāra* [Prajñākaragupta] says too: If a blue thing is perceived, how can it be said to be external [to the knowledge]; if a blue thing is not perceived, how can it be said to be external. [The opponent:] If that which is visible is none other than knowledge, how then do you know that there is the external reality? [The Sautrāntika:] The proof of the external reality is made through [the following reasoning] by the method of difference (*vyatireka*): Indeed, forms such as blue do not become visible at every place and every time; nor are they possible even when we suppose that they occur only due to our own material cause (*upādāna=samanantarapratyaya*), since, if so, it remains inexplicable why they occur pertaining only to a definite object. Thus, we can ascertain that there must be, apart from the immediately preceding moment of our own consciousness (*samanantarapratyaya*), something which is a cause of these [visible forms] and by virtue of which [the representations of forms] occur only at some place and sometimes. This ‘something’ is the external reality.”⁽⁶⁾

The Sautrāntika’s argument regarding the problem of why knowledge must be endowed with the image of its object is as follows.⁽⁷⁾ “Knowledge must be considered as endowed with the image of its object (*sākāra*). If

---

(6) TBh 63. 17 ff.: *sautrāntikānām matam: jñānam evēdam sarvaṃ nilādyakāreṇa pratibhāsate, na bāhyo’rthaḥ, jaḍasya prakāśayogāt. yathōktam, svākāra-jñānajanaka dr̥śya nēndriyagocarāḥ, iti. alaṃkārakāreṇāpy uktam, yadi samvedyate nilaṃ katham bāhyaṃ tad ucyate, na cet samvedyate nilaṃ katham bāhyaṃ tad ucyate. nanu yadi prakāśamānaṃ jñānam evēdam tadāsti bāhyo’rtha iti kutah. bāhyārthasiddhis tu syād vyatirekataḥ, na hi sarvatra sarvadā nilādaya akāraḥ prakāśante, na caitat svopādānamātrābalabhāvitve sati yujyate. nitya-*viśaye pravṛtṭiyogāt. tasmād asti kimcid eṣāṃ samanantarapratyayavyatir-iktam karaṇaṃ yadbalena kvacit kadācit bhavanti śakyam avasātam, sa eva bāhyo’rtha iti.* The two verses are identical with JSS v. 23 (山口益, 中觀佛教論攷 296) and PVBh 366, 17 (III, v. 718) respectively.*

(7) TBh 23, 7 ff.: *sākāraṃ cēdam jñānam eṣṭavyam. yadi punaḥ sākāraṃ jñānaṃ nēśyate, tadānākāratvena sarvatra viśaye tulyatvāt vibhāgena viśayavas-*thā* na sidhyati.*

knowledge is not admitted as having an image, it is not possible to establish objects separately from one another, since knowledge without the imprint [left by each object] would remain the same on cognizing all objects." Very similar passages are found also in DP and TSop. In connection of this kind of argumentation, the following verse of Dharmakīrti is often quoted: *bhinnakālaṃ katham grāhyam iti cet grāhyatām viduḥ, hetutvam eva yuktijñā jñānakārpaṇakṣamam.* (How can a [momentary] thing which is at a different time [from that of the direct perception grasping it] be an object of the direct perception? We reply: philosophers recognize that the essence of a sense-object consists in its being a cause capable of leaving its image in the knowledge.)

According to Ratnākaraśānti, the Mādhyamika, as well as the Yogācārin, is each divided into two groups, one maintaining *sākāravāda* and the other holding *nirākāravāda*. But the most important development is the schism among the Yogācārins. The Sautrāntika thought that what we perceive is not an external reality itself, the existence of which can be known only by inference, but the impress or image which is left by the external reality upon our consciousness. The Yogācārin advanced a step farther and said that the external reality is not existent at all, the world being nothing but our ideas which are the sole reality. Therefore, to the Yogācārin, the image of cognition is the appearance of our mind; and this necessarily implies that a cognition is always endowed with an image which is represented by our mind. Thus, all the Yogācārins must be *sākārvādins* so far as the cognition of common people is concerned. A problem, however, appears in regard to the emancipated person, who is supposed to have acquired *nirvikalpakajñāna* or non-conceptual, supermundane knowledge. Some Yogācārins thought that knowledge of an emancipated person is freed from the fetter of cognitum and cognizer and accordingly is clear like a pure crystal without specks. And they

---

(8) DP. 82, 24-26.

(9) TSop 284, 2 f. b.-285, 4.

(10) PV III, v. 248=PVn, Derge ed., 158, b 1.

held that this clear, imageless knowledge is the essence of cognition, regarding images as false, unreal stains born due to our *vāsanā*. This is the essential of the *nirākārajñānavāda*. But others from the same school criticised this theory, saying that what is not real can be never manifested, since otherwise it would entail the unfavourable doctrine of *asatkhyāti*. Every cognition, inasmuch as it is knowledge, must have an image, and yet there is no harm in that an emancipated person's knowledge is with an image, if he is freed from conceptual thinking, the fundamental of which is the bifurcation of cognitum and cognizer. This is the essential point of the *sākārajñānavāda* of the Yogācārins. What we have seen above is a fairly later aspect of the controversy regarding *sākāra* and *nirākāra*, and must have been developed after Dharmakīrti, reaching its final phase at the time of Ratnākaraśānti and Jñānaśrīmitra, i. e. in 11 th cent. Jñānaśrīmitra, a *sākāravādin*, owes much of his theory to Prajñākaragupta and Dharmakīrti, while Ratnākaraśānti, a *nirākāravādin*, seems to be more akin to Śāntirakṣita. We are not very sure of the aspect of the controversy before Dharmakīrti.

With regard to the problem of our concern, a passage of Bodhibhadra which was first introduced by Yamaguchi is well known.⁽¹¹⁾ It may be trans-

---

(11) S. Yamaguchi, *Chūkan Bukkyō Ronkō*, 308 ff. The author translates the passage into Japanese and comments on it. The passage is found in JSSN, 51, b 3 ff.: *ḥdir rnal ḥbyor spyod pa ni rnam pa gñis te, rnam pa dañ bcas pa dañ, rnam pa med paḥo. de la rnam pa dañ bcas pa ni slob dpon phyogs kyi glaṅ po la sogs pa dag gi ḥdod pa ste, rnam pa gžan gyi dbaṅ du ston pas ji skad du: nañ gi śes byaḥi ṇo bo ni, phyi rol ltar nañ (snañ?) gañ yin te, don yin źes bya ba la sogs ste rnam par śes paḥi tshogs drug tu smra baḥo. rnam pa de med pa ni slop dpon ḥphags pa thogs med la sogs pa ste, de dag rnam pa kun tu brtags pa rab rib can gyi skra śad la sogs pa ltar smra bas, don ni don tu grub ḥgyur na, mi rtog ye śes med par ḥgyur, de med pas na sañs rgyas ñid, thob par ḥthad pa ma yin no. de bžin du mi rtog ye śes rgyu ba la, don kun snañ ba med phyir yañ, don med khoñ du chud par bya, de med pas na rnam rig med ces brjod ciñ, rnam par śes paḥi tshogs brgyad dañ, kha cig cig pur smra ba ste. gcig pu ñid ni rnam pa dañ bcas pa dag la yañ kha cig go.*

lated into English as follows. "Here the Yogācārins are of two kinds, [those who maintain that knowledge is] always [endowed] with images (*sākāra*) and [those who maintain that knowledge in its absolute state is] without images (*nirākāra*). Of these, *sākāra* is propounded by Dignāga and his followers. They teach that the images of cognition belong to the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*), as is said in the following: The object of cognition is none other than internal image that appears pretending to be externally existent.... They talk only of six kinds of cognitions. *Nirākāra* is taught by Ārya Asaṅga and his followers. They maintain that the images of cognition belong to the represented nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) and are [as much false as] the hair seen by one suffering from partial blindness. Concerning this the following is said: If the object of cognition is established as an external reality there would not be non-conceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*); without it Buddhahood cannot be attained. And again: When non-conceptual knowledge is acquired, all objects never appear; therefore one must understand the non-existence of the object, and since it is inexistent the content of cognition is also inexistent. They talk of eight kinds of cognition; but some say there is only one kind. This theory of one kind [of cognition] is maintained also by some of the *sākāravādins*."

In TBh Mokṣākaraḡupta gives a similar description. "Concerning this point, some [Yogācārins, i. e. *sākāravādins*] maintain as follows: All this

(12) *Ālambanaparīkṣā* v. 6.

(13) *Mahāyānasamgraha*, ed. Lamotte, II, 14b. c=VIII, 20. c.

(14) *ibid.* II, 14 b. f=VIII, 20. f.

(15) TBh 69, 11 ff.: *tatra kecid evam āhuḥ: vijñānam evēdam sarvaṃ sarvaśarī-raviṣayabhāvena prasiddham, tac ca svasamvedanam iti na kasyacit grāhyam grāhakaṃ vā. kalpanayā tu grāhyagrāhakahāva iti vyavasthāpyate. tataḥ parikalpita-grāhyagrāhakahāvarahitaṃ vijñānam sākāram* (Read so instead of *sākāra*) *satyam iti. anye tu sakalākarakalanānāṅkitaṃ śuddhasphaṭikasamkāśaṃ vāstavaṃ vijñānam, ākāraś tv amī vitathā evāvidyayā darśitāḥ prakāśante. tasmāt grāhyam nāma nāsty eva, grāhyābhāvāt tadapekṣayā yad grāhakatvaṃ vijñānasya tad api nāstīti.*

that is commonly known to be existent as the body or object [of its activity] is none other than knowledge. And since this knowledge is conscious only of itself, there is neither cognitum nor cognizer of anything; through logical construction (*kalpanā*), however, appears the relation of cognitum and cognizer. So it is determined. Therefore, the truth consists in the knowledge which, though having [various] images (*ākāra*), is freed from the imaginary relation of cognitum and cognizer. Others [i. e. *nirākāravādins*] however, maintain: The essence of knowledge is not stained by the specks of any images and resembles a pure crystal [or the clear sky of an autumnal midday⁽¹⁶⁾]. Those images of cognition (*ākāra*) are indeed not real, and become perceptible being shown by nescience (*avidyā*). Therefore, the cognized is not existent in reality; and since the cognized is inexistent, the quality of cognizer which is ascribed to knowledge in relation to the [cognized] is also inexistent.”

These two passages, being of Bodhibhadra and Mokṣākaragupta, belong to 11 th or 12 th cent. In various places of his books, however, Yamaguchi says that Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, etc. represented the *sākāra-vāda*, while Guṇamati, Sthiramati, etc. the *nirākāravāda*. His opinion seems to be based on the above-cited passage of Bodhibhadra and Hsüan-chuang's description of different theories of the Vijñānavādins in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (成唯識論) with K'uei-chi's commentary. As well known, the information given by this Chinese source is not always parallel with what we know from Sanskrit and Tibetan sources such as the writings of Sthiramati, and it must be accepted only with reserves. Nonetheless, the present writer thinks that the controversy ascribed to Dharmapāla and Sthiramati by the Chinese tradition is equivalent in principle to that between *sākāra*- and *nirākāra-vādins*, of which some more materials from Sanskrit and Tibetan will be presented in this paper. As for the difference between Dharmapāla and Sthiramati as informed of by Hsüan-chuang and his direct disciple, Frauwallner gives a

---

(16) The bracketed words are found only in Tib. version.

succinct and excellent survey in *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, S. 396, 4-397, 6, with translations from the *Siddhi*. On reading it, we notice that the controversy between Dharmapāla and Sthiramati is in essence identical with that between Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti. Frauwallner's opinion that the origin of Dharmapāla's theory is traced back to Aśaṅga

-
- (17) Die folgende Übersetzungsprobe behandelt.....die Lehre von den Teilen des Erkennens. Über diesen Gegenstand herrschten nach den Mitteilungen Hiuan-Tsang's die verschiedensten Ansichten. Teilweise hielt man an der Auffassung Vasubandhus fest, nach der im Erkennen das Bild des Objektes erscheint, ohne dass ausdrücklich Teile unterschieden würden. Meist nahm man nach dem Vorgang Dignāgas drei Teile an. Das war auch die Ansicht Sthiramatis. Dharmapāla fügte schliesslich noch einen vierten Teil hinzu. Der Gegensatz zwischen Sthiramati und Dharmapāla beruht aber auf diesem Gebiet weniger auf der Zahl der angenommenen Teile, sondern auf folgendem. Nach Sthiramati ist nur der Bewusstseinsteil (*svasamvedana-bhāga*) wirklich, der Bild- (*grāhya-*) und Blickteil (*grāhaka-bhāga*) ist bloss Vorstellung. Nach Dharmapāla sind alle Teile wirklich. Diese Meinungsverschiedenheit hat ihre tieferen Gründe. Sthiramati folgt nämlich der Ansicht Maitreya-nāthas und Vasubandhus, nach der jedes Erkennen Vorstellung ist. Infolgedessen gehört der Bild- und Blickteil jedes Erkennens dem vorgestellten Wesen (*parikalpitaḥ svabhavaḥ*) an und ist unwirklich. Nur der Bewusstseinsteil fällt ins Bereich des abhängigen Wesens (*paratantraḥ svabhavaḥ*) und ist wirklich. Dharmapāla greift dagegen den Gedanken Aśaṅgas auf, dass die Vorstellung nur dem Denken zukommt, und führt ihn, vielleicht im Anschluss an Dignāga, weiter aus. Für ihn umfasst das vorgestellte Wesen daher nur die Beschaffenheit, welche vom Denkerkennen (*manovijñānam*) und vom Denken (*manah*) den Gegenständen der übrigen Formen des Erkennens zugeschrieben wird. Der Bild- und Blickteil aller dieser Erkenntnisformen zählt jedoch zum abhängigen Wesen und ist wirklich. Für Sthiramati ist somit die ganze Erscheinungswelt bloss Vorstellung. Für Dharmapāla kommt ihr Wirklichkeit zu, nur handelt es sich nach seiner Lehre um keine Aussenwelt, sondern bloss um Erscheinungsformen des Erkennens. Auch in der Erlösungslehre wirkt sich diese Meinungsverschiedenheit aus, wobei sich wieder der Anschluss an Maitreya-nātha und Aśaṅga zeigt. Für Sthiramati verschwindet bei der Erlösung im Zusammenhang mit der Umgestaltung der Grundlage (*āśrayapaṭṭiḥ*) jedes Erkennen, da es bloss Vorstellung ist, und nur die Soheit bleibt bestehen. Nach Dharmapāla erfahren sämtliche Formen des Erkennens eine Umgestaltung, bestehen aber auch beim Erlösten weiter.

differs from the description of Bodhibhadra who ascribes the *nirākāravāda* to the same person. Apart from this, however, Dharmapāla's theory is similar to the *sākāravāda* of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, while Śthīra-mati's to the *nirākāravāda* of Ratnākaraśānti. Fortunately, the controversy between Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti is attested by rich materials, some of which are introduced here.

The general feature of Ratnākaraśānti's *nirākāravāda* may be understood by the following passage in PPU.⁽¹⁸⁾ "Therefore, all things are the mere mind, the mere knowledge and the mere illumination. And external reality which is said to be grasped by cognition is not existent. And accordingly the cognition is not existent as having the nature of cognizer. These two [i. e. cognitum and cognizer] are the expression (*abhilāpa*) of the thinking (*manas*) and as such belong to the represented nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) of things. Where are they represented? [They are represented in] the wrong representation (*abhūtaparikalpa*) which appears pretending to be external things and which is born due to the latent

(18) PPU 161, a5-161, b4: *de bas na chos thams cad sems tsam dan, rnam par ses pa tsam dan, gsal ba tsam yin pas rnam par rig paḥi gzuñ ba phyi rol gyi don yod pa ma yin pas, rnam par rig pa rnams kyañ ḥdsin paḥi rañ bžin du yod pa ma yin te. ḥdi gñis ni yid kyi mñon par brjod paḥi phyir chos thams cad kyi kun brtags paḥi rañ bžin yin no. gañ la brtags še na, don med par yañ kun tu brtags paḥi no bo ñid la mñon par zen paḥi bag chags las skyes paḥi don du snañ baḥi yañ dag pa ma yin paḥi kun tu rtog paḥo. yañ dag pa ma yin paḥi kun tu rtog pa de ni chos rnams kyi gžan gyi dbaṅ gi no bo ñid dan ḥkhrul pa dan, phyin ci log dan, log paḥi ses pa yañ yin no. ḥdi ltar deḥi gzuñ ba dan ḥdsin paḥi rnam pa ni ḥkhrul pa dan bslad paḥi dbaṅ ḥbaḥ žig gis snañ bas brdsun paḥi phyir, yañ dag pa ma yin paḥi kun tu rtog pa de la de skad ces bya ste, deḥi rañ bžin de ni yañ dag pa ma yin paḥo. yañ dag pa ñid gañ yin ze na, gsal ba tsam mo. de ñid kyis na rnam pa de ni ḥkhrul paḥi mtshan ma dan, spros paḥi mtshan ma zes bya bar brjod de, ḥkhrul paḥi dmigs pa yin paḥi phyir ro. gñis kyi mtshan zes kyañ bya ste, gñis ltar snañ baḥi phyir ro. spros paḥi mtshan med (Read ma) thams cad ḥjig rten las ḥdas paḥi ye ses la ḥgag par ḥgyur la, des na de ni ma ḥkhrul pa dan yañ dag paḥi ye ses su yañ dag brjod do. de ñid kyi phyir de yañ yoñs su grub paḥi no bo ñid yin te.*

seeds of representation (*vāsana*), which is attached to [constructing] represented images where there are no [external] realities. This *abhūta-parikalpa* is the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) of things, ⁽¹⁹⁾ and is false, perverted and erroneous knowledge. For its aspects of cognitum and cognizer are both unreal, since they appear only due to falsity (*bhrānti*) and confusion (*viplava*). This is why it is said that [the two are represented] in the wrong representation. Their nature is not real. What then is reality? The pure illumination (*prakāśamātra*) alone is real. Thus, it is said, the images (*ākāra*) [of cognition] are marked by falsity (*bhrāntinimitta*), marked by manifoldness (*prapañcanimitta*). It is because they are objects of false [cognition]. They are also called twofold form, because they appear as two [i. e. cognitum and cognizer]. All the manifold marks are destroyed when one gets supermundane knowledge (*lokottarajñāna*). So this is rightly called real knowledge. This is the very reason why it is the accomplished nature (*pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*)."

The reason why the image of cognition is unreal is explained by him as follows. ⁽²⁰⁾ "[Represented images] such as a blue thing etc., though they are being manifested, are proved to be unreal (*alīka*), since they are contradicted [by another cognition]. Since they are proved to be unreal, their substratum itself is proved to be unreal. However, the consciousness of illumination (*prakāśa*) itself is directly intuited as free

(19) It is necessary to note that *abhūtaparikalpā* is an aspect of the *paratantrasvabhāva*, but the two bhāgas, cognitum and cognizer, as represented by it belong to the *parikalpitasvabhāva*.

(20) PPU 167, b.8-168, a3: *ññon po la sogs pa de gsal bzñ pa yin yañ gnod pa yod pañi phyir brdsun pa yañ grub po. de brdsun par grub pas na deñi bdag ñid de yañ brdsun par grub po. yañ gsal ba de rigs pa ni hñhrul pa dan bral bañ mñon sum yin pañi phyir dños po ñid du grub pa yin te. gañ gi phyir gsal ba ni gsal ba ñid kyis gñug mañi rañ bzñ yin te, gañ gi myoñ ba hñdi hñhrul par hñjog pañi bñlad pas bzag pa med pañi phyir ro. yañ ññon po la sogs pañi rañ bzñ yin pañi phyir bñlad pas byas par hñgyur la, ltar gyur bas na de myoñ ba yañ hñhrul par hñgyur ro. de bas na ññon po la sogs pa la ni gnod pa hñjug pañi skabs yod kyi gsal ba la ni ma yin no.*

from falsity, and accordingly is established as real. For illumination has as its inborn nature illuminating function, and cannot be approached by confusion (*viplavopanīta*), so that the consciousness of it might be false. On the other hand, blue is another thing [different from the illumination itself], and can be approached by confusion; therefore, the knowledge of it may be false. Thus, there may be occasions in which [the knowledge of] blue etc. is [negated] by another contradicting cognition [e. g. we see a yellow shell, and it is sublated later by another true cognition that it is white]; but it cannot happen in the case of the illumination itself."

This passage of Ratnākara's is cited as a *pūrvapakṣa* by Jñānaśrīmitra in JNA (*Sākārasiddhiśāstra*) 368, 6-10, though the Tib. translation deviates from the Skt. from time to time: *bhavatv ākāraṇām bādhanād alīkatvaṃ, prakāśamātraṃ tu satyam āmnāyaḥ, tadātmavedanasya bhrāntatvāyogena pratyakṣatvāt. prakāśasya prakāśa eva nijaṃ rūpam iti na tat tasya viplavopanītam, yena tadvedanaṃ bhrāntiḥ syāt. nīlaṃ tu rūpāntaratvāt vipalavopanītam api syād iti syāt tadvedanaṃ bhrāntiḥ. tato'sti nīlātau bādhakasyāvatāro, na prakāśe.*

Ratnākaraśānti introduces the criticism of *nirākāravāda* by the *sākāravādin* and refutes it as follows.⁽²¹⁾ "Some of the *sākārajñānavādins* of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika school say as follows: If [as the *nirākāravādin* maintains, the image of cognition] such as blue is unreal and the illumination [of cognition] is real, the [two] being incompatible entities, could not be identical; and if [blue] would not be identical with

---

(21) PPU 168, a 4 ff.: *rnal hbyor spyod pa pa dañ, dbu ma pa śes pa rnam pa dañ bcas par smra ba kha cig na re, śhon po dañ gsal ba dag brdsun pa dañ brdsun pa ma yin par gyur na, chos ḥgal ba ṇid kyiś na deḥi bdag tu ḥthad par mi ḥgyur la, deḥi bdag ṇid ma yin na yañ śhon po la sogs pa gsal bar mi ḥgyur na śhon po la sogs pa ni gsal ba yin te. sgro (ma) btags paḥi dños por gyur paḥi gsal ba las gžan ma yin paḥi phyir śhon po la sogs pa ni sgro ma btags paḥi dños por gyur ba yin žes zer te. de dag gi ltar na gsal ba thams cad phyin ci ma log paḥi rañ gi ṇo bo myoñ baḥi phyir, thams cad ḥkhrul pa med par ḥgyur ro. des na sems can thams cad rtag tu grol bar ḥgyur la, rtag tu yañ dag par rdsogs paḥi sañs rgyas ṇid du ḥgyur ro.....*

the illumination, blue could not be illumined [i. e. could not become visible]. But it is a fact that blue is seen. [But if they were identical] then, blue, etc. would not be an imagined thing, since it should not be different from the illumination which is not imaginary. [Answer :] If it is as they say, all cognitions would know the right nature [of things] ; this would entail that there are no false cognitions at all. Thus, all people would be always emancipated, i. e. all would be perfectly enlightened ones....”

This discussion continues longer, and the Sanskrit parallel of the portion of the answer is found in JNA 387, 8-23, and RNA 129, 1-12: *tathā hi sarvair eva prakārair aviparītārtha svarūpasamvedanād bhrānter atyantam abhāvaḥ syāt, tataś ca sarvasattvāḥ sadaiva saṃyaksambuddhā bhaveyuḥ*.... It is not possible to quote further due to space-limitation, though the parallels between PPU and JNA may be increased much more. The present writer believes that what is said above is enough to clarify the fundamental aspects of the controversy between the *sākāravādin* and *nirākāravādin* of the Yogācāra school.

Abbreviations: DP=Dharmottarapradīpa of Durvekamiśra, TSWS; JNA=Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī, TSWS; JSSN=Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana of Bodhibhadra, com. on Jñānasārasamuccaya (JSS) ascribed to Āryadeva. Peking ed.; PPU=Prajñāpāramitopadeśa of Ratnākaraśānti, Peking ed.; PV=Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti, TSWS; PVn=Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrti, Derge ed.; RNA=Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī, TSWS; SDS=Sarvadarśanasamgraha of Sāyana-Mādhava, ed. V. S. Abhyankar; TBh=Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta, ed. H. R. Rangaswami Iyengar, Mysore 1952; TRD=(Shaddarśanasamuccaya by Haribhadra with) Guṇaratna's com. Tarkarahasyadīpikā, Bib. Ind. CLXVII; TS, TSP=Tattvasamgraha of Śāntirakṣita with Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla, GOS; TSop=Tarkasopāna of Vidyākaraśānti, ed. G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, 1, SOR IX; TSWS=Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series.

It is by the information of Mr. Unno, Assistant, Faculty of Letters, Nagoya University, that I first came to know the existence of the controversy of our concern in PPU. On examining it, I found that the text was closely related to the *Sakarasiddhi* of Jñānaśrīmitra. Herewith I express my gratitude to Mr. Unno for the information.