Sāṃkhya in the Buddhagotra

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Here the question whether the Buddhagotra is a work of Vasubandhu\(^1\) (A. D. 320-400) or not\(^2\) will not be under discussion. The author of this work refers to and refutes the Sāṃkhya school after the Vaiśeṣika\(^3\) both of which doubt the existence of buddhagotra. The main purpose of this article is to criticize what is called Sāṃkhyaic assertion according to the author in this work. As we will see later this work is giving us more detailed account in a certain part of the Sāṃkhya system than what is given in the Sāṃkhya Kārikā and the commentaries upon it. Nevertheless, we cannot help to doubt the veracity of author’s report, for instance 1) momentariness of thing, 2) three units of the object, the subject and the perception in no. 35 seem to be a hypothetic argument of an imaginary Sāṃkhya constructed by the Buddhist author, and 3) the atomism in no. 10 looks like of Vaiśeṣika, not of Sāṃkhya. Moreover the four inferences in no. 30 are evidently taken from Jainism, never from Sāṃkhya! A tentative translation of the text with notes is given hereafter.

I Everything has its own-nature

1) 聲有自性與自性不異故 (Taisho. vol. XXXI. p. 790b) The sound (śabda) has its own-nature (svabhāva), because it is not different from the Self-nature.

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1) Kokuyaku Issai Kyō, Yuga Bu 國譯一切經瑜伽部 vol. 11 佛性論解題 p. 255.
2) Kenryū Tsukinowa；究竟·乘實性論について, Nihon Bukkyōgaku Kyōkai Nenpō vol. 7. p. 138.
3) In the passage refuting the Vaiśeṣika view the author mentions 此即近善遠八種不可思因 (Taisho vol. 31 p. 789a) which seems to refer to the Sāṃkhya Kārikā 7. cf. Junkichi Imanishi; A Historical Examination of the Sāṃkhya Kārika, with Particular Reference to Verses 7 and 9, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies vol. VIII. No. 2. pp. 566-7.
Here the Self-nature can also mean the Premordial Matter (prakṛti) which also is translated 自性 in Chinese. In this case the text may suggest that the sound as a member of five subtle elements is a production in its origin from the Premordial Matter, therefore the sound is not different in its nature from the Premordial Matter.

2) 有自性故是故可滅。若無自性如幻化火無有實性無對治故水不能滅 (ibid., p. 790c) Because it has own-nature it can be destroyed. When it does not have its own-nature, it, like an illusory fire, is not the real existence (sattā) to which there is no antidote (pratipakṣa), therefore even water cannot quench (such a fire).

Here “Because it has own-nature it can be destroyed” means the own-nature can have its manifestation (āvirbhāva) and disappearance (tirobhāva), and “destroy” does not mean that the existence is extinguished into non-existence.

3) 若無自性則火與樵不得異 (loc. cit.) If there is no Self-nature, the fire cannot be different from fuel.

II Subject and Object, Epistemology

4) 能量所量二法成就。所以諸法各有自性故不空 (ibid., p. 791a) The subject of perception (pramatṛ) and the object of perception (prameya) are proved. As everything has its own-nature, they (i. e. the Subject and the Object, being included in everything) are not non-substantial.

This proposition is introduced by the above-stated Sāṃkhyaic assertion that everything has its own-nature or it exists.

5) 由觀所量故得成能量 (loc. cit.) From the examination of the object of perception the subject of perception is proved.

The reason of the preceding proposition 4).

6) 能量所量更互相成是二各自有性而更互相合故一名能量一名所量 (loc. cit.) The Subject and the Object of perception are mutually proved. As they have their own-natures and unite with each other, we give one the name of the Subject of perception (pramatṛ) and the other the Object of perception (prameya).

7) 體本自性是有但未相對故未有名 (loc. cit.) Their substantialities originally
exist due to their own-natures, still they do not have their names simply because they have no mutual cooperation as yet.

8) 譬如燈為能照瓶為所照燈瓶二物本性是有但相對時名能照故量義得成（loc. cit.）For instance, though a lamp being the illuminator and a jar being the illuminated exist due to their own-natures, we give them the names the illuminator and the illuminated only when they have mutual cooperation. Just like that our proposition to the perception (which here means pramātra and prameya) is proved.

9) 證量相似故取燈為譬（ibid. p. 791b）To prove (our proposition to) the perception we adopt an example of lamp because of the similarity (with each other).

III Atomism

10) 隆虛微塵常不可空故聚衆多成塵色義則爾（ibid., p. 791c）As an atom (paramāṇu) is eternal and is never void, a mass (of atom) is accumulated into object. The state of matters in the material form (rupa) also is same (with that in the atom).

As no Śāṅkhya-text deals with atomism, this passage might be an intervention from Vaiśeṣika or Sarvāstivādin because in Śāṅkhya Sūtra V. 82–88 atom is characterized as anityatā, kāryatva and anirbhāgatva.

IV Inference

11) 先須證見後則比知如先曾證見火與烟相應有火時見烟雖不見火而由於前會見火故比度前時知有火（loc. cit.）First the direct perception (pratyakṣa) should be and next the inference (anumāna) comes. For instance; Formerly man saw by his direct perception the necessary connection between fire and smoke and (consequently he saw) that the (existence of) fire can be inferred by the smoke. Later on, as he sees smoke, though seeing no fire, he can infer the existence of fire from the fact that he saw formerly the (necessary connection between) fire (and smoke).

Explanation of Śāṅkhyaic inference are found in Śāṅkhya Kārikā 4–6, Śāṅkhya Sūtra I. 100; V. 28–36.
12) From the object such as form etc. the Premordial Matter can be inferred.

V Satkārya

13) The Premordial Matter produces the five subtle elements etc. (Therefore) the Premordial Matter is the cause and the five subtle elements are the results. The result exists already in its cause.

Here "produce" must not mean directly, but indirectly. The author mentions five subtle elements because śabda which he has taken up at the beginning of his refutation on Sāṃkhya is included in them.

14) Because of the existence of the result in its cause the measured (individuals) are not annihilated, like everything has its own-nature.

The original of लय may be parimana cf. लय in Samkhya Kārikā 15.

15) In the Premordial Matter as the cause the result exists, in the phenomenal world (as the result) the Premordial Matter (as its cause) exists. Therefore (the Premordial Matter) can be inferred (from the phenomenal world).

16) As the cause (of the phenomenal world) exist (infallibly), the Premordial Matter does not remain unproved.

VI The Location of the Premordial Matter

17) In spite of the closeness and the openness, why (a Buddhist opponent can dispute that the Premordial Matter) has no location?

The closeness includes पर्यभिति, अप, तेजस्, वायु, रूप, रस, गांध्य and स्पर्श, while the openness includes अकाश and शब्द. These two terms do not occur in the proper Sāṃkhya texts.

18) Prior to the Premordial Matter the openness and the closeness do not exist yet.

19) At that time these two do not exist yet.
20) 無物先自性 (loc. cit.) Nothing is prior to the Premordial Matter.

21) 迦毘羅仙為阿修利婆羅門說昔初唯有一暗冥此中但有智田 (loc. cit.) Sage Kapila taught Brāhmaṇa Āsuri that in the Beginning there was only one darkness (tamas) in which there lived only the knower of the land (kṣetrajña).

kṣetrajña in Śāmkhya means the soul. Cf. Mait. Up.; tamo vā idam agra āsīd ekam (V. 2) 金七十論：迦毘羅仙人為阿修利略說如此。最初唯闇生此闇中有智田智田即人人有智故稱為田（Taisho vol. 54 p. 1262b）Māṭharavṛtti: “tama eva khalv idam agra āsīt” tasmiṁs tamasi kṣetrajño ’bhivartate prathamam (ad SK 71).

**VII Example in the proof of Satkārya (?)**

22) 第三是其譬喩 (loc. cit.) The third is the example for it.

What the third means, is not clear. Might it mean “like everything has its own-nature” in 14)?

23) 無異即是譬 (ibid. p. 792b) As (the proposition and the example) are not different, it can be the example for (our syllogism).

24) 由無異故第三得成 (loc. cit.) Because of the non-difference (of the proposition and the example) the third can be proved.

25) 數有 (loc. cit.) There are a multitude (of the result).

26) 但唯有數數即義 (loc. cit.) No more than a multitude (of the result), which means object (?)..

**VIII The Difference of the cause from its result**

27) 若因果一者則無言語故汝難亦無 (loc. cit.) In case the cause and its result are unified one, the word would not be, therefore your disputation will not be brought about.

28) 是因是果 (loc. cit.) (But in reality) the cause is different from its result.

**IX Inference of the existence of the Premordial Matter**

29) 由色所比故非不可得 (ibid., p. 792c) Because it is inferred by the form (rupa), (the Premordial Matter) is not unperceived (anupalabdha).
30) 若無可比比量亦得成如比有四句一有比無二無比有三有比有四無比無 (loc. cit.) If the (positive) thing by which (the subject of the proposition) is inferred does not exist, the inference can be ascertained. There are four cases, viz. 1) the inference of non-existence from existence, 2) the inference of existence from non-existence, 3) the inference of existence from existence and 4) the inference of non-existence from non-existence.

The classification of these four inferences does not appear in any of the Sāṃkhya text. It is obviously a Jaina inference shown as heu in the Sthāna-āṅga, see Satiś Candra Vidyabhūṣaṇa; History of Indian Logic, 1921, p. 162.

I owe this information from the kind suggestion of Mr. J. Nakata.

31) 如類比果因自性亦爾 (loc. cit.) Like in the case of (the inference of) the atom in which (an atom as) the cause is inferred by (the dust etc. as) its result, so is in the case of (the inferring the existence of) the Premordial Matter.


32) 取非證非所證如地下水不可可知見比自性我亦如是 (loc. cit.) An indirect perception can infer an unperceived; like the underground water though unseen is inferred (from a well, spring etc.), so is in the case of the Premordial Matter and the Soul.

This logic seems to be not strict.

33) 如燈自成比量亦爾 (loc. cit.) Like the lamp is proved by itself, so is in the case of the inference (of the existence of the Premordial Matter).

Does it mean that the existence of the Premordial Matter is self-evident? If so, it seems to be far from proper Sāṃkhya argument. Cf. Sāṃkhya Kārika 8, 15; Sāṃkhya Sūtra I. 109–110.

X Memory

34) 儲知有故證量比量並成若無證比復何所憶 (loc. cit.) Because the memory (smṛti) exists, both of the direct perception (drṣṭa or pratyakṣa) and the inference (anumāna) are proved. If the direct perception and the inference
do not exist, what is the use of the memory?

The memory is not discussed in the Sāṃkhya texts except Sāṃkhya Sūtra II. 43 smṛty-anumānač ca.

35) 憶知由自性所以得成一異有無等造。初念取境則備三義一境二人三智並一時俱有至第二念時前三已滅後三續起。1) 前後同類是為一義 2) 前後各一亦是一義 3) 前後無有是為異義 4) 前能生後是其有義 5) 前滅後生是其無義。備此諸義故有憶知。由自性故憶知得成。[ibid., p. 783a] Because of its own-nature the memory is proved to consist of the identity, the difference, the existence and the non-existence etc. In the first moment of grasping the object there should be three units viz. the object (what is perceived), the subject (who perceives) and the perception\(^1\), which occur in the same moment. In the second moment, however, the previous three disappear and the subsequent three follow\(^2\). 1) When the Previous and the Subsequent are cognate, it is called the identity. 2) When the Previous and the Subsequent are the same each, it also is called the identity. 3) When the Previous does not exist and the Subsequent exists, it is called the difference. 4) When the Previous produces the Subsequent, it is called existence. 5) When the Previous disappears and the Subsequent appears, it is called non-existence\(^3\). The memory exists because it is provided with these (five natures). (Therefore we maintain that) the memory is proved because of its own-nature\(^4\).

36) 憶知若是無常云何修習（loc. cit.）If the memory is transient, how can we repeat discipline?

37) 有忘失（ibid., p. 793b）There is a lapse of memory.

38) 是知先生後減故說忘失（loc. cit.）A lapse of memory is mentioned because

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1) Quite unique? This triplet does not seem to be of Sāṃkhya, but of Nyāya or Buddhist Logician.
2) Theory of the momentariness of thing, because it is refused in Sāṃkhya Sūtra I. 34–40, V. 77, does not seem to be of Sāṃkhya, but of Buddhist Viśīnavādin.
3) This classification or criticism of the memory is quite unique, for no Sāṃkhya text mentions it.
an idea occurs previously and is lost later.

39) 由作故得成 (loc. cit.) (The lapse of memory) is proved because of the instrument (karaṇa).

40) 有別物故心得是常 (loc. cit.) The mind can be eternal because it is different from (its instruments).

Here the mind seems to include buddhi, ahaṅkāra and manas.

41) 本有 (loc. cit.) (The mined) exists originally (in its cause Premordial Matter).

42) 我是所覺 (loc. cit.) The Soul is to be understood (by the mind).

Recently P. Pradhan published a new original of Vasubandhu’s works in which, as scholars have pointed out, few Sāṃkhyaic views are refuted.

1) vak-paṇi-pāda-pāyu-pasthānām api ce ’ndriyatvam upasāṃkhyātav-yam, vacanā-dāna-viharaṇo-’tsargā-nadeśv ādhipatyāt (p. 40, Ⅱ. 9-10) Tongue (as tal king organ), hand, foot, anus and genital organ should also be added as the organs, because they control over talking, grasping, going, excretion and pleasure.

2) kathām ca Sāṃkhyaścāṃ pariṇāmaḥ? “avasthitasya dravyasya-’ntaranivṛttatau dharma-’ntara-prādurbhāva” iti (p. 159, Ⅱ. 18-19) And how is the Sāṃkhyaic transformation? (They say) “Of the steady substance the appearance of a new attribute after the ceasing of one (previous) attribute (is our transformation).”

3) Vārṣaṇa-vādaś cai ’vam dyotito bhavati; “yad asty eva tat. yan nā ’sty nā ’sty eva tat. asato nā ’sti sambhavaḥ. sato nā ’sti vināśa” iti (p. 301, Ⅱ. 1-3). The words of Vārṣaṇya elucidated thus; “what exists alone can exist. What does not exist never exist. Of the un-existent there should not be the origination. Of the existent there should not be the destruction.”

2) Shoji Tamura; The Sāṃkhya Doctrine known to Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmamakośa, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, vol 13 no. 2 pp. 130-2.
3) Apparently the author has taken it up from the Mahāvibhāṣā (Taisho vol. 27 pp. 729c—730a). see also Sāṃkhya Kārikā 26.
4) Kamalaśīla presents us a more detailed account about the same discussion of pariṇāma in his Tattvasaṃgrahapaññjikā (p. 23. 1. 22 ff.)
5) The Mahāvibhāṣā (Taisho vol. 27. p. 997a) has the same sentence.