The Essence of the Sāṃkhyya
by Vijñāna Bhikṣu

Megumu Honda

(INTRODUCTORY STANZAS)

1) Salutation to that Viṣṇu! who is called the Great, is self-existent (sva-yambhū), the sprout of the (whole) world, the Lord, the universal soul (sar-vatman) and is conquering all (the enemies).

2) The true nature of the soul (ātman) has been discriminated a little by the Sāṃkhyya-kārikā. Now the Sāṃkhyya-sāra-viveka (the discrimination of the essence of the Sāṃkhyya system) is displayed by (the author) Vijnāna (-bhikṣu) (who has the discriminating knowledge).

3) In a group of the verses (of the Sāṃkhyya-kārikā) mostly the introductory (portion) to the Sāṃkhyya has been accumulated. Here, therefore, only the portions not mentioned there is described a little.

4) I have fully explained the self-nature of the Primordial Matter (prakṛti) and others in my Sāṃkhyya (pravacana) bhāṣya. Here, therefore, the same will again be told only in brief way.

(THE FORMER PART)

(THE FIRST CHAPTER)

As all the self-conceit (abhimāna) of agency (kartrtvā) etc. has been ceased,

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1) Ed. by 1) Fitz-Edward Hall; A treatise of Sāṅkhyā Philosophy by Vijnāna Bhikshu. BL. Calcutta, 1862. 2) Taraprasanna Das Gupta, at the Sanskrit Press (Saṃskṛta-pustakālaya), Calcutta. The only reason why I publish here, with all imperfections, my tentative translation to submit it under scholars' improvement is that I have not heard of a translation of this work yet.
and as the property of the affection (raga), the aversion (dveṣa) etc. being the result of the (self-conceit) is never produced any more by the intuitive perception (sāksātśikāra) which discriminates (the difference between) soul and non-soul, furthermore as the formerly produced acts (karman) do not cause to begin to mature (vipāka) (their fruits) any more by the burning off—in a form of extirpation—of the concurrent agents (sahakarin) such as ignorance (avidya), affection and others. (As the result of the above-mentioned,) as soon as, after having begun (to acquire), one completes (to acquire such intuitive perception and non-maturation of the fruits of his acts), he must not have the re-birth (punar-janman) (any more) and consequently he must have the emancipation (mokṣa) in a form of absolute cessation (atyanta-nivṛtti) of the threefold misery (duḥkha).—thus proclaim the heavenly and the traditional scriptures in loud voices.

The heavenly scriptures said in this (sense);

“But the man who does not desire; he who is without desire, who is freed from desire; his breaths do not depart, (but) are dissolved only here2).”

“If a person knows the self as ‘I am this’, then wishing what and for desire of what should he suffer in the body?3)”

“When all the desires that dwell in the heart are cast away, then does the mortal become immortal, then he attains Brahman here (in this very body)4).”

“He who entertains desires, thinking of them, is born (again) here and there on account of his desires. But of him who has his desire fully satisfied, who is a perfected soul, all his desires vanish even here (on earth)5).” and so on. The Kurma Purāṇa and other traditional scriptures said also;

“Affection, aversion and all other faults (doṣa) are based on error (bhrānti), because the fault as the result of this (error) is good and evil (works),

3) Brh. Up. IV. 12. See also Aniruddha ad SS. III. 78.
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—thus said the heavenly scripture. Just through the force of this (error) all the bodies are produced on all (the souls)6).

The Mokṣadharma said;

"The sense-organs and the objects of that sense-organs do not approach the one who is without desire (tarsula), and the body-owner (dehin=atman) who has left behind the instruments (i.e. the sense-organs) does not deserve (to be called) the body any more. Therefore from the seed of the affection whose nature is desire the offsprings are produced7)."

(The opponent questions;) Though without affection, (man) can reach the hell and others through the force of mere act (karman). Why it is proper that the affection is the concurrent agent of the act and this (agency) causes to begin to mature (the act)? (The author replies;) Because in the hell and others, though without special (višeṣatas) affection, there exists general (sāmānyatas) affection. For of those who have gone to the prohibited woman and others the hell in a form of a close embrace with woman who, as it were, consists of heated iron, is produced just from the affection of the woman and others.

Even if the five called ignorance, egotism (asmita), affection, aversion and fear8) can only be the cause to begin to mature the birth and others, they can (also) be the concurrent agents of the acts. 1) For in the (following) heavenly scripture;

"The object to which the mind is attached, the subtle body goes together with the act, being attached to it alone9)."

it is proved that they are (really) the concurrent agents of the acts when the attachment in general, which is originated from self-conceit, affection, aversion etc. and is called the deposited impression (vasana) from the object, alone causes to begin to mature the birth and others. And 2) for the tra-

6) Kurma Purāṇa II. 2. 20c–d; 21. See also Sāṃkhya-pr. -bh. p. 25.
7) Mbh. XII.7762b; 7763; 7751.
8) Cf. Yoga Sūtra II. 3; SK. 47; SS. III. 37, where, however, tenacity (abhinivesa) is counted instead of fear (bhaya).
ditional scripture said;

"Wherever the intelligent (manas) body-owner (dehin) holds the whole with the intellect (dhi), by love, aversion or fear too he goes to the form same with that." 

and so on. And 3) for also by (following) two Yogasūtras;

"The latent-deposit of act has its root in the obstacle."

"So long as the root exists, there will be maturation from it (that is) birth, length-of-life and enjoyment."

it is said that the obstacles (kleśa) are the cause, when they cause to begin to mature, though unseen. The above-mentioned words (of the Yogasūtra) point out (as follows); even if there exist the ignorance and the egotism, the affection is necessary, and the aversion and the fear have their roots in the affection. Therefore the affection is the principal cause of the birth etc.

(The opponent questions;) The heavenly scripture;

"And his acts terminate, when he is seen—the higher and the lower (self)."

and so on, has just mentioned that the knowledge is the destroyer (nāśaka) of former acts, why (knowledge can be) regarded as the burner (dāhaka) (of former acts)? (The author replies; This is) not (correct), because by the words;

"The awakened ones (buddha) call the one who has burnt his acts by the fire of the knowledge the learned (paṇḍita)."

the burning also is (known) easily (lāghavāt) by hearing, therefore it is suitable that the very intention of the burning (dāha) is imagined also in the words destruction (nāśa) and others. And the burning of the acts becomes fruit-less by the cutting off (uccheda) of the concurrent agent called obstacle. But the destruction of the acts will occur only after the destruc-

10) Not identified yet.
11) Yoga Sūtra II. 12.
12) Yoga Sūtra II. 13.
14) Not identified yet.
tion of (the fluctuation of) the mind-stuff (citta) at the end of the enjoyment which has (already) caused to begin. Therefore, as the non-origination (anutpatti) of the fruit of the acts can take place only through the medium of the destruction of the generally accepted ignorance, the knowledge does not destroy the acts because of the (complicated) heaviness (gauravat)—thus and so on are dilated by us in the Yogavarttika, therefore we give here the mere direction of the subject. To conclude, it is proper that the supreme purpose of the soul (parama-puruṣārtha) in the form of the absolute cessation (atyanta-nivrūṭti) of the three-fold misery (duḥkha) is accomplished at the cessation of the obstacles called ignorance, egotism, affection and others by the intuitive perception (saksat-kāra) of the discernment (viveka).

Thus are the two Yoga Sūtras;

"That which is to be escaped is misery yet to come"\(^\text{15}\).

"The means of attaining escape is unwavering discriminative discernment\(^\text{16}\)."

End of the Chapter on the Supreme purpose of the Soul called the fruit of the discriminative discernment (put) at the first (part)—because it is more important—in “The Essence of the Sāṃkhya” written by celebrated Vijnānabhiṣṣu.

\textbf{(THE SECOND CHAPTER)}

(The opponent questions;) Now what is the nature (sva-rūpa) of the knowledge which discerns (the difference between) soul and non-soul (ātmānātma-viveka-jñāna)? (The author) replies upon it. First the soul is generally well-known as one who experiences (anubhavitr) pleasure and misery, and the non-soul is an un-intelligent class (jāda-varga) such as the Primordial Matter (prakṛti) and others. To know these two (i. e. soul and non-soul) as dissimilar (vaidharmya) each other, viz. of the nature of changeability (parināmin) and unchangeability (aparināmin) etc., defective (doṣa) and meritorious (guṇa), to be abandoned (heya) and to be appropriated (upādeya), and as separate

\(^{15}\) Yoga Sūtra II. 16.
\(^{16}\) Yoga Sūtra II. 26.
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(prthaktva)—is the discriminative knowledge (viveka-jñāna). Thus (runs) the heavenly scripture;

“That soul is not this, not this. It is incomprehensible for it is not comprehended. It is indestructible for it is never destroyed. It is unattached for it does not attach itself. It is unfettered. It does not suffer. It is not injured17).”

The traditional scripture also (runs);

“Now he, having been instructed by the mirror of his preceptor, has turned back his eyes and has of himself looked straight on at the other transformation (vikriya) which stays from stupidity (maudhyāya). Now 'I am not that Primordial Matter, for that is of foul nature (kaluṣātmika), I am of pure and enlightened self-nature (suddha-buddha-svabhāva)—knowing thus he (the soul) abandons this (the matter). Thus, so long the soul is prescribed as being purified from the body, organs and others, whole of this (matter) with its productions (vikāra) is being practised to be abandoned, like the skin of a snake18).”

The Sūtra also (says);

“Thus the discrimination results from the study of the principles by ‘Not so! Not so!’ (and) from abandoning19).”

A definition (laksana) of the knowledge of the truth is given in the Matsya Purāṇa;

“In this production described as those which are from the Unevolved (avyakta) up to the individual (elements; viṣeṣa), the (real discriminative) knowledge is said to know the difference between the intelligent (cetana) and the un-intelligent (acetana)20).”

Even if the discriminative knowledge is no more than to know the difference (bhedā) each other, still it is just qualified (viṣeṣyaka) to be in the soul and is the cause to emancipation (mokṣa), because the heavenly and

18) Mahābhārata?
19) SS. III. 75, which omits 'thus (evam)'.
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the traditional scriptures run;

"Verily it is the soul that should be seen\textsuperscript{21})."

and so on.

(The opponent questions;) In the Patañjali's work and others it is said that the ignorance is of the form to understand (buddhi) the soul (atman) in the non-soul (anatman). Isn't it a different way of thing (prakāra) etc. that (the ignorance) is to be destroyed by the discriminative knowledge which is qualified to be in the soul? (The author replies; that is) not (correct).

For such a sort of ignorance is destroyed by the discriminative knowledge qualified to be in the soul (only) through the medium of the discriminative knowledge qualified to be in the non-soul\textsuperscript{22}). And the non-dialectic (nirvikalpaka) knowledge on the soul produced by contemplation (yoga) can be the cause to the emancipation (only) through the medium of the discriminative knowledge, not directly, for (such non-dialectic knowledge by itself) can not remove the ignorance. The notion that I am yellowish, doer, pleased and so on is no more than (a production of) an ignorance. (This notion is) settled by the heavenly and the traditional scriptures to be a cause (hetu) to metempsychosis (samsāra) and worthless object, and what removes such (a notion) is only the discriminative discernment (viveka-khyāti) in the from that I am not yellowish and so on, for in the same object this (notion) can be removed (virodha) only by the notion on the absence (abhāva) of a thing to be seized, because otherwise even the non-dialectic intuition on a conch-shell will fall into the state to be denied (virodhita) by notion that it is silver. Moreover in the above-mentioned notion the denial of the notion on the thing to be seized means inevitably that the non-dialectic knowledge is the remover of a delusion (bhrama), (therefore the denial of the notion and the non-dialectic knowledge) should not be considered as separate, because of (useless) complicatedness (gaurava). Also it is said that there is no higher teaching than the (following) heavenly scripture with regard to the teaching of the discrimination;

\textsuperscript{21}) Brh. Up. II. 4. 5; IV. 5. 6.

\textsuperscript{22}) Does he admit two kinds of viveka-jñāna?
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"Now therefore there is the teaching, not this, not this for there is nothing higher than this, that he is not this".

and so on. And the words of the Gītā and others;

"Those who knows, with the eye of knowledge, the difference between field and field-knower and the release from the material nature of beings, (they) go to the highest."

teach that the discriminative knowledge is the cause to emancipation. Therefore the discriminative knowledge only is the cause to know emancipation, because it removes the ignorance directly. But the intuitive perception (sākṣāt-kara) of the isolated soul (kevalatman) by contemplation (yoga) lets us know the absence of properties (dharma) which belong to the limiting condition (upadhi) and the breaking of (such) limiting conditions through the means of non-perception (anupalabdhi) (of the outer object) fit for contemplation. Therefore (such intuitive perception can) cease the ignorance. By this, to know the equality (samata) of all beings and to know that the soul is the nature of all (beings) and so on, which are told in the heavenly and the traditional scriptures, should in all the philosophical systems be understood as nothing but the result (śeṣā-bhūta) of this discriminative knowledge, because the other knowledges can not directly remove self-conceit (abhimāna).

In the school of Brahmamīmāṁsā, however, it is excellent that is the result from the discrimination of the Supreme Soul (paramatman), in the precept of Sāmkhya school, on the contrary, (it is excellent) that is the result from discrimination of the common soul (sāmānyatman), ——this is hinted here.

(The opponent questions;) Is the absolute eradication (uccheda) of the ignorance not possible even by the above-mentioned discriminative discernment? For, as the discriminative discernment can only shut out (pratibandhaka) the ignorance, the self-conceit rises again after the loss (nāśa) of the discriminative discernment, like in the case that even he who knows the discrimination between conch-shell and silver mistakes in the other time the conch-shell for silver. (The author replies; that is) not (correct), because of

24) Bhagavad Gītā XIII. 34.
an inequality of the example. It is reasonable that, even when an intuitive perception is produced on a conch-shell and others, a delusion (bhrama) will rise again, because the errors (doṣa) being in the color (and form) by distance etc. and the errors effecting its color (and form) by veil are possible to happen. But here the beginninglessly deposited impression (anādi-vāsanā) at the self-conceit on the non-self is certainly the error to which those who assert that everything exists (sarvāstika) consent (sammata), because no other error is observed in the conceit on what is merely produced. It is said that this deposited impression of wrong knowledge (mithya-jñāna) terminates (niṣṭha) in the intuitive perception of the discrimination only when the steady deposited impression which is originated successively is eradicated by the discriminative discernment. As even a small part of wrong exists in the soul because of a bit of deposited impression inevitably preceded by that (impression), the self-conceit does not arise any more when this termination in the discriminative discernment is produced, because there is no more error called deposited impression—this, however, is a very rough (judgement). On the contrary if it is accepted as an error that the motive (kāraṇa) of discrimination consists of mutual reflexion (pratibimbana) etc. between the intellect (buddhi) and the soul (puruṣa), then the intuitive perception of discrimination is come up only after having driven away this error. Then this (error) is no more a cause of further delusion (bhrama) because it is now fruitful (phalavattva), for a judgement (kalpana) that this, being not aided by the good work (dharma) born from contemplation, is an error rises. And the termination in the discriminative discernment is defined in the Gītā and others;

“Both illumination and activity and delusion (i.e. the essential characteristics of the three constituents), son of Pāṇḍu, he does not loathe when they have arisen, nor crave when they have ceased.

Sitting as one sitting indifferent, who is not perturbed by the constituents, abandoning all undertakings, he is called the man who has transcended the

25) Read anātmany atra abhimāne.
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...constituents.

(In the above-cited) ‘transcended the constituents’ means ‘restricted (nivṛtta) the self-conceit of the constituents’. But first we will speak more of the definition of the knower (jñānin).

(The opponent questions;) Even if so, due to the endless peculiar forms of categories (padartha) incompatible (pratiyogin) with the discrimination it is impossible to apprehend all the categories with discrimination. How, therefore, can the discriminative discernment be the cause to the emancipation? (The author replies; This is) not (correct), because it is possible to apprehend (all the categories) with discrimination by the common forms of visibility (dṛśyatva) and changeability (parināmitva) etc. For instance; the seer is different from what is manifested (prakāṣya) directly by him, because he is the one who manifests (prakāśaka). When the one manifests the other, he is different from the other, as in the case a light (is different) from a jar. And by the inference that a function (vṛtti) is (different) from what is manifested by that function, first the intellect (buddhi) is proved to be the witness (saksin) through the discrimination (of it) from the function of the intellect and the object attained to (ārūḍha) it which are seen in the interior. And this contradiction with the logical rule that the same thing cannot be object and subject simultaneously (karma-kartā-virodha) is an ordinary reasoning (anukāla-tarka). Here is a direct word (saksat-pada) in order to remove the fallacy (vyabhicāra) in the soul because it is his own object through the medium of a function or belonging to the soul itself.

(The opponent questions;) In this inference the discrimination must be proved only from a function of the intellect, because only this (intellect) is directly seen by the soul, not the premordial Matter etc. (are directly seen by the soul). (The author replies; it is) not (correct). For, as there is no being unknown to the functions, in this inference, because of the easiness (laghavat) and a group of reasoning (tarka) to be described, the witness (of the soul) to all the functions is proved only as having all-pervading (vibhu),

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26) Bhagavad Gītā XIV. 22; 23a-b; 25c-d.
27) Cf. SS. VI. 49.
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unchangeable (kutastha), eternal (nitya), single (eka) and intelletive (jnana) self-nature. For instance, in the inference of Nyaya school: 'the earth has its maker, because it is made', the maker, because of the easiness, should be single, eternal and so on—(the above-mentioned reasoning is) like this. Here all-pervasion means unchangeability etc. and limited-and-dividedness (paricchinna-bhinnatva) means dividedness as one who is transformed (parinaami-bhinnatva) etc. Therefore where is an acceptance (graha) of the discrimination between the intellect and the soul as a nature of one who sees and one who is seen, by the inference accompanied with it, it is possible to accept the discrimination between the soul and the non-soul though they are common by their transformable and untransformable forms etc. Therefore only this discernment of the difference between the material being and the soul (sattva-purusa-anyata-khyati) is declared to be the cause to the emancipation here and there in the commentary of Vyasa on the Patanjali's Yoga Sutra). For, being accompanied with an acceptance of the discrimination between one who sees and one who is seen in the form of the discernment of the difference between the material being and the soul, in the above-mentioned manner one can accept the discrimination of the primordial Matter and others. Here the quality of purity (among constituents) in the Intellect is meant by the word 'material being (sattva)'. And thus, even if there is no distinguishing (visisya) knowledge on the categories of the primordial Matter and others, the discriminative knowledge on it is possible. By this (explanation) the previous utterance, that the removal of the ignorance arises from the discrimination between one who sees and one who is seen, is also justified. Further a discrimination inducted from generality (samanyato driya) arises in the seer also by the inference that the soul is different form the primordial Matter and its results because it is not transformed (aparinamitva). But the modern pretenders of Vedantist (vedanti-bruva) think that the soul is discriminated from the primordial Matter and others only because they (i.e. the primordial Motter etc.) are

28) E. g. YS. III. 49.
seen and from all the unintelligent things (jāda) such as the primordial Matter and others because it (i.e. the soul) is the seer—(and say)

"As a seer of jar is different from a jar and is never a jar (itself) by all means, so a seer of body is not a body (itself) because he has a form 'I' and so on29.)

This (assertion) is not (correct), because even the soul can be seen according to the heavenly scriptures;

"Verily it is the Soul that should be seen30.)"

and so on, and because the primordial Matter and others are not included owing to the intention to say that it is directly sees, it (i.e. the soul) can see (them) only through the medium of instrument (karaṇa, sense-organ). It is settled by the heavenly scripture and others that one should consider thus; to be seen means to be pervaded (vyāpya) by the function of the soul, not to be pervaded by the fruit in a form of perceivedness (prakāśyatva), because he whose self-nature is perception (prakāśa) by himself is in separation (viraha) from the need of (other's) perception. Therefore, as in this case there is neither to be seen nor to be perceived in the soul, that (i.e. your assertion) is vain, too. For, as you said 'though being experienced that I......', the soul is not pervaded by the fruit called intelligence (caitanya) and also Buddhists approve that the intellect, even when intoxicated by pleasure, misery and others, is not pervaded by intelligence because it perceives by itself, just so, like at the soul also at the intellect the discrimination of the intellect, though being expected absolutely, is not proved to be the form that it is seen, because it is not proved that (the intellect) is seen,—thus the detractive criticisms (dūṣana) are noticed in the other places in my commentary (on the Sāṃkhya-pravacana?) etc. This is hinted.

(The opponent questions;) Thus an acceptance of the discrimination might be possible as a form of generality, nevertheless there are many generalities i.e. the changeability (parināmitva), the production by combination (saṃhath-
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The opponent questions again; If so, as (according to you) the discrimination only can be the remover of all the self-conceit by its common form, how it is possible to be said in the heavenly and the traditional scriptures that the acceptance of discrimination is the cause to emancipation by the individual form like ‘I am not a body, nor sense-organ’ and so on? (The author replies; This is) not (correct), because the subordinate (avan-tara) discriminations are nothing but a diversification (prapañca) of the common (sāmānya) discrimination.

End of the Chapter on the Self-nature of the discriminative knowledge as the Cause to Emancipation in “The Essence of the Sāṃkhya” written by celebrated Vijñāna-Bhikṣu.

(to be continued)

LIST OF QUOTATIONS

I śruti; 1) Ś. Br. 1; 2) Brh. up. 4; 3) Śvet. up. 1; 4) Mait. up. 1; 5) Muṇḍ. up. 2

II smṛti; 1) M bh.; a) Bhag. Gītā 2; b) Mokṣadharma 2; c) Anugītā 2; d) Bhārata 1
2) Manu 2
3) Purāṇa; a) Viṣṇu 2; b) Kūrma 4; c) Matsya 2
4) not verified 5

III sūtra 1) Sāṃkhya 6; a) bhāṣya 2
2) Yoga 4; a) bhāṣya 4; b) vārttika 1

IV (reference only) 1) Brahmamīmāṃsā 1; 2) Vaiśeṣika 2; 3) Naiyāyika 1;
4) Bauddha 1

V Citation not verified (except śruti & smṛti) 6

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