A Study of Pratiyogin

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The conception of 'pratiyogin' plays a very important role in all systems of Indian thought. The necessity for the postulation of such a term has usually been explained as follows. Because notion of negation or absence (abhāva) is positive and actually occurs in mind, there must exist something that corresponds to the notion of this absence. If one takes for example 'the absence of a jar' (ghatābhāva), the jar is called the pratiyogin of the absence. When one talks of an absence, one must ask "absence of what?" Since Nyāya logic etc. does not accept 'pure' absence, absence must be an absence of something.

Though many details remain to be investigated, it is very likely that, as a term of logic, pratiyogin was first employed by Udayana in the 10th century.1) It was in the later Nyāya system or Navya-nyāya, that each term came to be scrutinized with minute and hair-splitting subtlety, with the device of bringing the idea of 'function' to its logic. Thus the idea of pratiyogin came to be one of the most fundamental logical concepts in Navya-nyāya.

Furthermore, its abstract form pratiyogitā or pratiyogitva is a sort of relation or property, falling under the categories either svarūpa-sambandha or akhaṇḍo- pādhi; it is well termed 'relational abstract' by Dr. Ingalls. Since the term pratiyogitā has been exhaustively investigated and is one of the most important and perplexing topics to be found in Navya-nyāya, it seems advisable not to go into the details of the matter here.

The notion expressed by the term pratiyogin has undergone many modifications over the centuries; there is moreover a considerable divergence of opinion about it among different systems of thought, and even among the Naiyāyikas themselves. Therefore it is almost impossible to give a unitary interpretation of,


Barlingay notes in his A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic p. 54 fn., that these terms pratiyogin and anuyogin are first found in Praśastapadabhāṣya. But these terms can be traced nowhere in the very text.

—1110—
A Study of Pratiyogin (A. Uno)

and a single English equivalent to, this term. We want to introduce here some uses of the term to be found in philosophical treatises, referring to compendiums by pandits, and if possible, to trace its development.

Etymologically the term ‘pratiyogin’ is composed of three components: ‘prati’ (counter-, anti-), ‘yoga’ (connection) and ‘in’ (possessive suffix). Thus it is one of the two elements (sambandhin) between which a certain relation holds, and stands against its correlated element, i.e. anuyogin. Any relation has a direction or sense. A relation between terms proceeds from one to the other. Thus in ‘X loves Y’ the relation expressed by ‘loves’ goes from X to Y. In ‘Y loves X’ it goes from Y to X. These two propositions are different despite the sameness of the terms and the relation. The term from which the relation proceeds is called the ‘referent,’ in western logic, while the term to which the relation proceeds is called the ‘relatum.’ They can be otherwise termed ‘antecedent’ and ‘consequent’ respectively of a relation. A pair of terms ‘referent’ and ‘relatum’ roughly correspond to anuyogin and pratiyogin of the same relation. Such seems to be the original use of the term.

One term with the prefix ‘prati-’ usually presupposes the other with ‘anu-’ as its counterpart, as in the case of ‘anu-kula’ and ‘prati-kula.’ In some cases the use of the prefix ‘anu-’ is optional; when it is not joined to a term, the term is usually understood implicitly with the help of ‘prakṛta-,’ standing against its opposite term such as prati-hetu, prati-sādhyā, prati-pakṣa in Indian logic.

The term pratiyogin is broadly divided into two groups: absential (abhāviya-pratiyogin) and relational (sāṁsargika-pratiyogin). Since scholars seem to find it difficult to give a single proper English equivalent to the term, some like Dr. Ingalls use ‘adjunct’, as contrasted with ‘subjunct,’ for the relational pratiyogin, and ‘counter-positive’ or ‘counter-relative’ for the absential pratiyogin. Here, however, we want to use the original Sanskrit terms, anuyogin and pratiyogin, with a view to uniformity of terminology.

Pratiyogin to the Relation. (Relational Pratiyogin; sāṁsargika-pratiyogin)

with reference to abode-abider relation.

When an abode-abider relation (ādhārādheya-sambandha) holds between two entities, the abider is called the pratiyogin of this relation, by virtue of which it resides in the abode, and the abode the anuyogin of the same relation.

In Nyāya logic, relations are usually divided into two groups: occurrence-limiting (vṛttī-niyāmaka-sam) and non-occurrence-limiting (vṛttī-aniyāmaka-sam), in accordancce with whether or not one of the related elements (sambandhin; yogin?) resides in the other (ādhārādheya-bhāva). Conjunction can be both vṛttī-niyāmaka and vṛttī-aniyāmaka. A jar on the ground is a case of the former, while the conjunction between the palms held vertically is an example of the latter. Abode-abider relation here refers to vṛttī-niyāmaka-sambandha.

Take for instance the case in which a jar exists on the ground (bhūtale sāmyoga-sambandhena ghaṭo vartate). The abider, i.e. the jar, is the pratiyogin of the conjunction by which the jar exists on the ground, while the abode, i.e. the ground is the anuyogin of the same conjunction. Accordingly, the relation can be expressed as ‘ghaṭa-pratiyogika-sāmyogasambandha’ or ‘bhūtalānuyogika-sāmyogasambandha.’ It should be borne in mind that here the pratiyogin in question is necessarily the pratiyogin of the relation and not of the correlated element.

(b) Special Case of Pratiyogin, with reference to abode-abider relation.

If one takes the above-mentioned example, each of the related elements (sambandhin) is the pratiyogin or anuyogin not to the relation holding between them, but rather to the counter-related element. For instance, in the proposition ‘A jar exists on the ground’ (bhūtale ghaṭo vartate), the ground (≡abode) is the anuyogin of the jar (≡abider), while the jar is the pratiyogin of the ground. This relationship can be expressed by ‘ādhārānuyogikādheya’ or ‘bhūtalānuyogikādheya.’

---4--- In this case, vṛttī does not mean an entity occurrent in a locus, but its abstract, i.e. occurrence (vṛttitā, ādheytā).

---5--- This special use of pratiyogin has been here reproduce from Dr. Sen’s Mathurānātha’s Tatvavāntamānyāgirahasya, pp.30–31. Though he says that his description is based on Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya System of Philosophy & Its Technical Terms (by Maheṣa Chandra) p. 13, there is no mentioning whatsoever in the page indicated.
gika-ghaṭa" and "ādheya-pratiyogikāḍhāra" or "ghaṭa-pratiyogika-bhūtaila."

To go a step further into the relational abstract, however, the relation between the two is reversed. That is, the abodeness (ādhārata) is called the pratiyogin of the abiderness (ādheyatā), while the abiderness becomes the anuyogin of the abodeness (ādheyatānuyogikāḍhāratā). Similarly it can be said thus: "bhūtalatva-pratiyogika-ghaṭatva" and "ghaṭatvānuyogika-bhūtalatva."

(c) Vittivedyatva.

In this case, pratiyogin is defined as 'what is known (vedya) by similarity (vitti; sādṛśya).’ This is, in strict sense, a sort of modification of relational pratiyogin, though the relation in this case does not manifest itself so clearly as in the abode-abider relation mentioned above.

In a proposition such as 'The face is like the moon' (candravan mukham), the moon is the pratiyogin of similarity (sādṛśya), while the face is the anuyogin of the same. The similarity expressed by 'is like' (-vat) can, in a sense, be regarded as no less a relation than the abode-abider relation holding between the jar and the ground. The purport of this can be more easily understood by comparing the following two propositions.

(i) The ground has the conjunction with the jar.

(ii) The face has the similarity with the moon.

In each sentence, when cast in the form of compound cognition (viśiṣṭa-buddhi), there holds between viśeṣya (i.e. ground or face) and prakāra (i.e. jar or moon), a relation of conjunction (saṃyoga) or similarity (sādṛśya) respectively. In this case, pratiyogin or anuyogin refers not to its opposed correlative, but to the relation.6)

II) Pratiyogin of Absence. (Absential Pratiyogin; abhāvīya-pratiyogin)

In this case, as contrasted with preceding ones, the pratiyogin is not of the relation, but of its negation. If one takes, as an example, the absence of a jar, pratiyogita is in the jar, while anuyogita is in the jar's absence. In this

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6) It is understood in a viśiṣṭa-buddhi, that what reveals itself as substantive (višeṣya) is the pratiyogin of the relation (samsarga), while what manifests itself as feature (prakāra) is the anuyogin of the same relation. Cf. Nyāyakośa p.535; Vācaspātyam p.4449.
case, the absence in question is determined by the determinants, i.e. limiting property (avacchedaka-dharma) and limiting relation (avacchedaka-sambandha) of the pratiyogita, these three elements all residing in what is regarded as pratiyogin, say a jar. In the proposition ‘A jar exists on the ground,’ the jar does not exist on the ground by virtue of the relation of inherence (samavāya). This absence of the jar (ghatābhāva) is determined by two determinants of pratiyogita (pratiyogitāvacchedaka), that is, jarness and inherence. Strictly speaking, absential pratiyogita in this example is not a pratiyogita possessed by absence; instead, it ‘is described or conditioned by absence’ (abhava-nirūpita-pratiyogita) and ‘is existent in a jar’ (ghata-niṣṭha-pratiyogita).

(III) Svāṣraya-saṁyuktatva.

This type of pratiyogin is what is conjoined with that which is the locus of its anuyogin (=sva). In the Nyāyakośa, it is interpreted as follows: ‘Devadatta is the pratiyogin either of life or of death. Because of livingcreatureness.’ In such a syllogism, Self (ātman) is the pratiyogin either of death or of life. That is, first of all, the idea of ‘sva’ which is either death or life, is paraphrased by other alternative terms. That which is united with the loci of such alternatives, viz. anuyogin, results in the Self, that is nothing but the pratiyogin of ‘sva.’ Thus, anuyogin is related indirectly to its pratiyogin, through the medium of ‘locus’ (āśraya).

i) If death is taken as ‘sva,’ then death is either ‘separation of body from the Self’ or ‘destruction of the conjunction between the final breath and the body.’

Thus ‘sva’ which is nothing but anuyogin is either ‘separation’ or ‘destruction.’

The locus thereof is the body, and what is conjoined with the body is the Self.

ii) When life is considered as ‘sva,’ it is but the union of mind with corporeal Self. Its locus is the body, and what is conjoined with the body is the Self.

Accordingly, in both cases the anuyogin (=sva) is related indirectly to its pratiyogin.

Though there have been, among scholars, attempts to include the many types of pratiyogin within the limits of a single, unitary definition, even to the extent of reducing absential pratiyogin to relational pratiyogin, such arguments seem far-fetched. The development of the concept of pratiyogin can be
A Study of Pratiyogin (A. Uno)

summed up as follows:

1) At first the term specified the relatum, as opposed to the referent, of a relation. Later this idea came to be confined to the abode-abider relation, of which the case of ‘vittivedyatva’ is a modification.

2) Once introduced into Indian metaphysics as a whole, the idea of ‘absence’ was taken up as an indispensable and independent category in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. As a result of subtle scrutiny of the term, the concept of pratiyogin was adapted to serve as its counterpositive. The manifold structure of ‘absence’ has come to be expressed in terms of pratiyogin.

3) On some occasions, these correlative terms, anuyogin and pratiyogin are considered with reference to each other, and not to the relation holding between the two, i.e. abode-abider relation. This usage is seen in the case of \( \{ 1 \} \) (b).

4) In contrast to the preceding cases, the term pratiyogin is related to its anuyogin in a triadic relation, that is, with the intervention of another factor. This usage of the term has been exemplified by the case of ‘svāśraya-samyuktatva’.

Of the uses of the term mentioned above, the most popular are the relational and the absential. Absential pratiyogin, however, plays the most important role in Indian philosophy.

The term pratiyogitā the property which abides in what happens to be a pratiyogin is most frequently used, alike viṣayatā, in logical treatises. It is regarded as svarūpa-sambandha (self-linking relation) or ākhaṇḍōpādhi (unanalyzable imposed property), according to whether it is taken as a relation or a property. The advent of the term pratiyogin or anuyogin, as in the case of other relational abstracts, permitted the definition of many terms otherwise impossible to define. The concept of ‘vyāpti’ or invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum, for instance, cannot be defined without this term.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school classifies absence into two divisions: (1) anonyābhāva (mutual absence) and (2) saṁsargābhāva (relational absence) which is again subdivided into three types, i.e. a) prāg-abhāva (prior absence), b) pradhvamsābhāva (posterior absence) and c) atyantabhāva (constant absence).

Mutual absence is described (nirūpita) by pratiyogitā determined by self-iden-
tity relation (tādātmya) as its limiting relation. Prior absence is described by pratiyogita determined by temporal relation (kālika-sam°) as its limiting relation. Constant absence is described by pratiyogita determined by conjunction, inherence etc. Needless to say, each pratiyogita is determined by its own limiting property, such as jarness etc. Constant absence is subdivided into, (1) specific absence (viśeṣābhāva; viśiṣṭābhāva), (2) generic absence (sāmānyābhāva), (3) absence of the conjoint (ubhayābhāva) and (4) absence of alternation (anyatārābhāva) etc.

Generic absence is the absence of a thing in general. A generic term pervades all its species: smoke qualified by pure fireness (vahnitva) pervades all specific fire, such as kitchen fire (mahānāsiya-vahni), mountain fire (parvatiya-vahni). On the other hand, specific absence is the absence of a thing determined by another qualification, as, for example, the absence of ‘kitchen-fireness-determined-fire’ (mahānāsiya-vahnitva-viśiṣṭa-vahni). To formulate, the former is expressed by ‘vahnitvāvacchinna-pratiyogitakabhava,’ and the latter by ‘tat-tad-vahni-niṣṭha-pratiyogitākabhava.’ The absence of conjoint is applied to three cases: ‘p.~q,’ ‘~p. q’ and ‘~p. ~q,’ while the absence of alternation is applied to only one case: ‘~p. ~q,’ since it is nothing but ‘~(p V q).’

There is an exceptional kind of absence put forward by Sondaçopādhyāya of Mīmāṃsā school (13th century), which was finally rejected by Gaṅgeśa and others. It is an absence whose counterpositiveness is determined by a property pertaining to a different locus (vyadhikaraṇa-dharmavacchinna-pratiyogitākabhava), like the case of ‘A jar does not exist as cloth’ (paṭatvena ghaṭo nasti), where pratiyogita in the jar is determined by ‘clothness’ (i. e. vyadhikaraṇa-dharma).

Thus the emergence of pratiyogin has broadened the scope of logical inquiry and has made possible a subtler and stricter definition of each term in Indian philosophical systems.

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7) In this connection, another use of ‘viśiṣṭābhāva’ should also be noted here, which is taken as ‘the absence of conjoint’ (ubhayābhāva), the term ‘viśiṣṭa’ meaning ‘accompanied by’; thus it is of three kinds. Take for instance a qualified term ‘red jar.’ ‘Red book,’ ‘blue jar’ and ‘blue book’ correspond respectively to viśeṣyābhāva-prayukta-viśiṣṭābhāva, viśeṣanābhāva-pra°-viś° and ubhayābhāva-pra°-viś°.

8) Dineshchandra: History of Navya-nyāya in Mithilā, pp. 80–82.