SAMĀNYA, SĀRŪPYA, AND SĀDṚŚYA

—Kumārila’s criticism of the similarity theory
(Ślokavārttika, Ākṛtivāda, kk. 65cd ff.) —

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Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (600–660 A. D.) sets forth his own theory of the universal (samānya) in the Ākṛtivāda (kk. 1–65ab) of the Ślokavārttika (ŚV). Then he mentions a different view that the universal is sārūpya, and deeply inquires into it. Jayamīśra (10th c. A. D.), author of the Sarkarika which is a commentary on ŚV, attributes this view to Vyāḍi (4th c. B. C.), a great grammarian, and he points out that Vindhyanāśin (5th c. A. D.), a Sāṃkhyā philosopher, also held this view1).

First Kumārila questions, “There are those who regard the universal as sārūpya, but what do they mean by the word ‘sārūpya’?"2) He gives the following two alternatives: A. samanarūpabhāva (being of one and same form or nature) and B. sādṛśya (similarity)3). Jayamīśra illustrates the difference between A and B. A means ‘one’, something like a common property that Devadatta and Yañnadatta own jointly, and B means a similar rūpa (form or nature) which one has with reference to another4). In other words, we can say A is the same rūpa that individuals own in common, while B is a similar rūpa that individuals own severally. So the latter, that is, each similarity is different in individuals and not the same rūpa common to them all. Kumārila declares that A indicates nothing but the universal, namely, the class-essence (jati) that he himself maintains5).

Therefore it is not A but B that we must examine thoroughly here. Though Kumārila mainly criticizes the view that sārūpya means sādṛśya, neither he nor the commentators on his works, Jayamīśra and Pārthasārathīmiśra (1050–1120 A. D., the author of the Nyāyaratnakara and the Śastradīpikā), explain anything about sādṛśya itself, nor do they state which school advocates this

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view. We, however, know some Jaina philosophers held that \textit{samanya} (the universal) is \textit{sadrśya}. Before examining Kumārila's criticism of the \textit{sadrśya} theory, I would like to make clear the basic conception of \textit{sadrśya} in the Jaina school.

Māṇikyanandin (9th c. A.D.), a Jaina philosopher, divided \textit{samanya} into two kinds, viz., \textit{tiryaksāmānaya} and \textit{ārdhvatāsāmānaya}. He explains the former as follows: "\textit{Tiryaksāmānya} is a similar modification (\textit{sadrśaparīṇāma}), for example, cowness (\textit{gotva}) in individual cows like \textit{khaṇḍa}, \textit{muṇḍa}, etc."\textsuperscript{6} Prabhācandra (980–1065 A.D.), who comments on Māṇikyanandin's \textit{Parṇkṣamukhasutra}, while regarding \textit{sadrśaparīṇāma} as the cause of the universal notion (\textit{anuvṛttipratyaya}) which covers individuals, defines it to be non-eternal (\textit{anītya}), non-ubiquitous (\textit{asarvagata}), many (\textit{anēka}) as a property of each individual, different (\textit{vibhinna}) in each individual, and perceptible (\textit{pratyakṣa}) like colour, etc\textsuperscript{7}. Knowing this, we can understand the difference between the Jaina conception of \textit{samanya} and Kumārila's. As for Kumārila, he also regards \textit{samanya} as the cause of the universal notion, but he considers it to be eternal (\textit{nītya}), ubiquitous (\textit{sarvagata}), and one (\textit{eka}) as the common nature of many individuals\textsuperscript{8}.

Having elucidated the Jaina conception of \textit{sadrśya}, I will proceed to examine Kumārila's criticism of the \textit{sadrśya} theory. Obviously, we cannot say one thing is similar to another without an object or objects to which the first can be compared (\textit{pratiyogīn}). So says Kumārila, "If you mean \textit{sadrśya} by the word \textit{sārūpya}, you must explain what is similar to what."\textsuperscript{9} This statement implies that he rejects similarity between individuals, for individuals exclude each other when they are understood in the light of the particular (\textit{viśeṣa}) such as \textit{sābaleya-ness}, \textit{bāhuleya-ness}, etc\textsuperscript{10}.

Next Kumārila discusses a supposed response to his criticism by those who try to establish similarity between individuals\textsuperscript{11}. They insist that there is similarity on account of a similar form of individuals. Jayamiśra mentions two defects of this view. First, the similarity based on the similar form of individuals is not necessarily found everywhere, even in the same class of individuals, while the universal is found in every individual. Among individual cows which belong to the same class, there are some cases where some cows lack some parts, legs, horns, etc. In this case we cannot find the similarity between them.
and other cows having all parts. Secondly, even though we were to accept the similarity advocated by them, the knowledge based on it would be “This is similar to that”, not the universal notion which covers all the individuals belonging to the same class. So long as Kumārila holds the universal causes the universal notion, it is natural that he should refuse to admit that similarity, which does not have such a function, is the universal.

Prabhācandra’s following statement seems to be an answer to the above criticism. That is, “[when the universal is defined to be similarity (sādṛśya), we can explain the universal notion,] because we secondarily admit identity (ekatva) between different individuals.” He distinguishes between two kinds of identity, viz., primary (mukha) and secondary (upacarita). Because different individuals of the same class have a similar form, the similarity based on it can be regarded as secondary identity, which causes the universal notion.

Kumārila does not refer to this view of the Jainas, but he seems to presuppose a similar view and rejects it. “The universal notion ‘Cow’ is not caused by the misunderstanding (bhrānti) ‘This is a śābaleya (spotted cow)’ [which occurs with reference to a bāhuleya (black cow), etc.], for the nature of śābaleya (śābaleyasvarūpa) is not the nature of Cow in general.” According to Jayamisra’s explanation, this statement intends to reject the following view: if cowness (gotva) is [secondarily] defined as similarity to a śābaleya (śābaleyasarūpya), a bāhuleya, etc. can be regarded as having cowness because they have śābaleyasarūpya, and consequently the universal notion ‘Cow’ can be said to occur with reference to them. If we examine precisely, this view does not allow us to say that the universal notion ‘Cow’ occurs with reference to a śābaleya, for it does not have śābaleyasarūpya. Though it may have similarity to a bāhuleya (bāhuleyasarūpya), the latter is not regarded as cowness even secondarily.

The above explanation, I suppose, is slightly different from Kumārila’s original intention. Pārthasārathimiśra, however, seems to explain that intention more precisely, He hypothesizes the following view: since a śābaleya is a cow, if one mistakes a bāhuleya, etc. for a śābaleya, then there may occur the universal notion ‘Cow’. In other words, one who [secondarily] admits identity between a śābaleya and a bāhuleya, etc. can say that a bāhuleya, etc. are cows because
a śabaleya is a cow. Regarding this view, he points out discrepancy: it is true that a śabaleya is a cow but the nature of śabaleya (śabaleyarūpa=śabaleyatva) is not the nature of Cow in general (gorūpa=gotva). Kumārila criticizes the view in question as follows: “[If the nature of śabaleya were the nature of Cow in general,] no notion of ‘Cow’ would occur with reference to individual cows besides śabaleya, even if they are very similar to it. We, however, actually have such a notion in them. The nature of Cow never exists elsewhere but in them.”

According to Kumārila, as mentioned before, it is the nature of Cow, viz., cowness (gotva) that is eternal, ubiquitous, and one and that causes the universal notion ‘Cow’. So since we cannot explain the universal notion by similarity which is different in each individual cows, the universal must be accepted as the cause of the universal notion. Conversely speaking, as far as we cannot prove the universal notion to arise from similarity, we cannot regard the latter as the universal. Thus we can say that the heart of Kumārila’s criticism of the similarity theory consists in pointing out the impossibility of arriving at the universal notion on the basis of similarity.

Next Kumārila described another view that there was a standard individual that appeared in the world prior to any other member of its class, and that similarity to it causes the universal notion. Kumārila’s criticism of this view amounts to the following four points:

1) It is impossible to admit the very existence of such a standard individual that is said to be known to everybody.
2) Even if we admit its existence, similarity to it cannot cause the universal notion, for it can only cause the notion “This is similar to that.”
3) We cannot explain what the standard individual is.
4) Even if it is said to have been created by God, we moderners cannot determine whether the present individuals are similar to it or not, for we cannot perceive it today.

Finally he declares that similarity itself could never be recognized without the universal.

Now it is necessary to examine Vindhyanivāsin’s assertion that the universal is sārūpya among individuals. What does sārūpya really mean? According to
Jayamiśra’s explanation, the assertion does not mean that the universal is similarity, but that the universal is precisely the nature of individuals, not absolutely different from them. Kumārila concludes that those who could not understand the true meaning of the assertion mistook sārūpya for sādṛśya (similarity). Kumārila and his followers, however, say nothing about who made this mistake. Though G. Jha regards those in error as the Vaiśeṣikas and D. Venkatramiah as the Baudhāyas, we do not have any ground for assuming that the Vaiśeṣikas or the Baudhāyas held the universal to be similarity. So I would offer the hypothesis that Kumārila’s opponents in this context might have been some of the Jainas who later developed the theory of sādṛśaparīṇāma.

2) ŠV (=Ślokavārttika), Ā (=Ākṣṭivāda), kk. 65cd–66ab: sārūpyam eva sāmānyam pīṇḍānām yena kalpyate/ tena sārūpyaśābdena kiṃ punaḥ pratipadyate/
3) vide note (5), (9).
4) cf. ŠKK, p. 20. 7–10.
5) ŠV, Ā, k. 66cd: sāmānarūpabhaś cae jātiḥ sāsmābhir ḫasyate/
6) Partkṣamukhasūtra (with PKM=Prameyakamalamārtanda, Bombay, 1941), IV–3–5: sāmānyam dvedhā/ tiryagūrdhvatābhedāt/ sādṛśaparīṇāmas tiryak khaṇḍa-muṇḍādiṣu gotvavat/
8) This view is common to Indian realists such as the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, and the Mīmāṃsakas, who seem to depend on Prasastapāda’s definition of the universal. cf. Praśastapadabhaṣya (Viz. S. S.), p. 311. 14–17; T. Takenaka, The Theory of the Universal in Indian Realism (TŌHŌGAKU, No. 48, 1974).
9) ŠV, Ā, k. 67ab: sādṛśyam atha sārūpyam kasya kenēti kathyatām/
10) cf. ŠV, Ā, kk. 67cd–68a.
11) cf. ŠV, Ā, k. 68bcd.
13) cf. PKM, p. 481. 3–5: nanu sādṛśye sāmānye “sa evāyaṃ gauḥ” iti pratyayaḥ kathām śabalam drśtvā dhavalam paśyato ghājeteti cet? “ekatvopacārāt” iti brūmaḥ. dvividhāṃ hy ekatvam—muḥhyam upacaram ca.
14) ŠV, Ā, k. 69: sābaleyo ’yam iti vā bhrāntyā gaur iti nāsti dhīḥ/ sābaleyasva-
rūpaṁ ca na gaur ity avatiṣṭhate/

15) cf. ŚKK, p. 21. 9–11.
17) ŚV, Ā, k. 70: tadanyeṣu hi gobuddhir na syāt susadṛśeṣv api/ drśyate sā na
cāṇyatra gorūpaṁ tatra vidyate/
18) cf. ŚV, Ā, kk. 71–74ab.
20) cf. ŚKK, p. 23. 7–10; This is the very basic standpoint on which the Bhāṭṭas
insist on their theory of the universal. cf. ŚV, Ā, k. 31cd, kk. 46–47; T. Takenaka,
The Relationship between ‘Universal’ and ‘Individual’ (Indogaku Bukkyogaku
21) cf. ŚV, Ā, k. 76cdef: tena nātyantabhinno ‘ṛthaḥ sārūpyam iti varpiṭam/ granthe
vindhyavāsenā bhṛantaiḥ sādṛṣyam ucyate/
22) cf. The Ślokavarttika (Translated by G. Jha, Bibliotheka Indica, 1909), p. 295;
Śastrādipīka (Translated by D. Venkatramaih, G. O. S., 1940), p. 146. 4 & foot
note (33).
23) According to S. Mookerjee, Samantabhadra (7th c. A. D.), author of the Āpta-
mīṃmāṃsa, is the first Jaina philosopher that has given elaborate consideration to
the problem of the universal. He points out that there is a discrepancy between
the view of Samantabhadra and that of the later Jaina philosophers such as
Jinabhadrā (7th c.), Akalaṅka (720–780), Vidyānanda (9th c.), Prabhācandra,
and Yaśovijaya (1624–1688). The former considers the universal to be something
numerically identical in different individuals, while the latter regard it to be
merely similar characters or modifications and not one self-identical principle.
(cf. S.Mookerjee, Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism, Chap. X, Jaina Conception
of Universal) N. T. Shah, however, criticizes Mookerjee’s opinion and proves that
there is no discrepancy between the two views. (cf. N. T. Shah, Akalaṅka’s Cri-
ticism of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy, L. D. S. No. 11, pp. 147–148) If there is no
discrepancy, it may be possible to find out the origin of the similarity theory
in Samantabhadra. Even though we could not prove that he advocated it, Jina-
bhadra is known to have already advocated it. (cf. N. T. Shah, op. cit. pp. 25–26)
So it is adequately conceivable that Kumārila was aware of the primitive
similarity theory held by his contemporary Jaina philosophers.