The aim of this paper is to present H(arivarman ca. 250-350)'s analysis of the sarvāstivāda (doctrine of 'all exists') recorded in his T(attva) S(iddhī) (Ch'eng-Shih Lun, Taisho 1646, Vol. 32) §§19–23. H begins his analysis with the following questions and answers:

**DOCUMENT I**

Some people say that dharmas of the two time-epochs (adhvan) [viz. past and future] exist, while others say that they do not exist. Question [by H]: Why do they say that [those dharmas] exist or do not exist? Answer [by opponents]: Existence [may be explained as follows]: If something exists, a thought (citta) occurs with reference to it. Since a thought occurs with reference to dharmas of the two time-epochs, they [i. e., past and future dharmas] must be recognized as existing. Question [by H]: You must first give the definition of existence. Answer [by the opponents]: The definition of existence is to be an object (gocara) of knowledge (jñāna). (TS §19, 253c27–254a3)

Discussing the same subject, V(asubandhu ca. 400-480) summarizes four arguments set forth by the Sarvāstivādins in order to prove the sarvāstivāda. A (bhidharma) K(osa), ed. Swami D. Shastri, V: 25ab reads:

“(Dharmas) exist always [i. e., in all three time-epochs], for (i) it is said so [by the Buddha], (ii) [it is said by Him that consciousness (vijñāna) arises] out of two [viz. sense-organ and an object], (iii) [consciousness] takes an existing thing as its object, and (iv) [past karmas should have] a result.” (sarvakālāstita, uktavād dvayaḥ sadvīṣayat phalat; cf. A(bhidharma) D(īpa), ed, P. S. Jaini, K. 305—Read gocaratvāc.)

Since the first answer given in Document I corresponds to the argument (iii) of AK, the opponents of H must be Sarvāstivādins of his period. This is further confirmed by the fact that the Def. of existence given in the second answer exactly corresponds to S(anāghabhadra ca. 430–490)'s celebrated Def.:

H criticizes the Sarvastivādin Def. of existence by pointing out the possibility of ‘consciousness of a nonexistent object’ (asadālambanavijñāna) as follows:

DOCUMENT II Objection (by H): knowledge may occur with reference to a nonexistent object. For (1) as e.g. adhimuktimanaskāra sees ‘non-blue’ as ‘blue,’ (2) a conjured object is seen as existent though it is nonexistent, (3) ākiñcanyāyatanasamāpatti is so named because nothing is cognized [in it], (4) one sees a [nonexistent] double moon when one presses a finger on the eyes, (5) it is said in a sūtra: “I know that I have no internal greed,” (6) it is said in a sūtra: “...know that abandonment of greed towards color-form (rāpa) is called ‘abandonment of color-form’,” and (7) one sees an illusion in a dream though it does not exist. For these reasons, [we say that] knowledge may occur with reference to a nonexistent object, and it is not correct to say that something exists [only] because it is an object of knowledge. (TS §19, 254a8-9)

Whether consciousness occurs with reference to a nonexistent object seems to have been much discussed among the early schools of Buddhism. According to the V(ijñāna) K(āya) a certain Maudgalyāyana attacked the sarvastivāda on the ground that there is consciousness of a nonexistent object, but he was then severely criticized by the Sarvastivādins (Taisho 1539, Vol. 26, p. 535a; tr. by LVP, Études Asiatiques, 1925, p. 352f.; cf. Kathāvatthu, IX. 5–7). According to the M(aha)V(ibhāṣa) (Taisho 1545, Vol. 27, pp. 36a, 228b, 283a), it is the Dārṣṭāntikas who insist that there is such a consciousness. V, examining the second argument for the sarvastivāda mentioned above, uses the notion of ‘consciousness of a nonexistent object’ to refute it (AK, pp. 813–816). Furthermore, S mentions the Dārṣṭāntikas’ seven-point criticism of his Def. of existence, which shows a striking similarity to H’s criticism in Document II (NA, p. 622a16–27; tr. by LVP, MCB 5, pp. 30–31). In reply to H’s criticism the Sarvastivādins present the following arguments:

DOCUMENT III Answer (by the Sarvastivādins): knowledge does not oc-
cur with reference to a nonexistent object. For (1) consciousness arises depending upon two dharmas, viz. a substratum (āsraya) and an object (ālambana). If consciousness arose without any object, it should arise without any substratum and the two dharmas would be unnecessary. Thus there would be no Nirvāṇa (because) consciousness would arise all the time. (2) Moreover, consciousness is so named because it has an object of consciousness (vijñeya); if there were no object, there would be no consciousness. (3) It is said [in a sūtra]: “Vijñāna is conscious of an object (artha), viz. caksurviṣṭa is conscious of color-form,...and manoviṣṭa is conscious of dharma.” If you say that there is consciousness of a non-existent object, what [do you say] it is conscious of? (4) If you say that there is consciousness of a nonexistent object, it is erroneous, as some one has said: “I am crazy, if I see that which does not exist in the world” (a sūtra quoted in NA, p. 622c¹). (5) If you [can] know a nonexistent object, you will have no doubt [about it], [for] doubt can arise only when there is an object of knowledge (jñeya). (6) It is said in a sūtra: “It is impossible that I will know or see that which does not exist in the world” (quoted in AK, p. 816: yal loke nāsti tad aham jñasyāmi va draksyāmi va nēdam sthānam vidyate; also in NA, p. 622c¹⁰-¹¹ and AD, p. 269). (7) Your opinion is self-contradictory, [for] if [the object were] nonexistent, what should be known? (8) It is said in a sūtra: “Citta and caitāsikas are dharmas which have an object (sālambana).” It is also said: “All dharmas are objects.” In this connection, it is never mentioned that a nonexistent dharma can be an object. (9)...(10) It is said in a sūtra: “Contact is the combination of three items [viz. consciousness, sense-organ and an object]” (quoted in AD, p. 270: trayānāṃ samnipātah sparśaḥ...=Samyutta, II, p. 72 & Samyukta, Taisho Vol. 2, pp. 18a, 87c). If [the object] dharma were nonexistent, what would be combined [with the other two]? (11) How is knowledge of a nonexistent object obtainable? If it is knowledge, [its object is] not nonexistent; if [the object is] nonexistent, it is not known. Therefore, there is no knowledge of a nonexistent object. (TS § 19, p. 254 a⁸-²⁷; Furthermore, the Sarvāstivādins go on to criticize one by one the

The above argument (1) corresponds to the second argument for the *sarvāstivāda* in *AK*, V. 25ab, which seems to have its origin in *VK* (p. 534b; LVP's tr., p. 351f.) and which is further employed in *NA* (p. 622a²⁷ff.) and in *AD* (p. 269). Some arguments in Document III again find parallel passages in *NA* (pp. 622a²⁷⁻624c⁶; LVP's tr., pp. 31⁻47). H criticizes one after another the above eleven points of answer, and furthermore refutes all the criticism given by the Sarvāstivādins with reference to his original seven-point objection (*TS* § 19, p. 254b¹⁸⁻c²⁸). For instance, in reply to the argument (1) he argues that the Buddha taught the double condition of consciousness only because He wanted to refute the doctrine of the eternal soul held by non-Buddhists. H's conclusion is: "Therefore, there is knowledge of nonexistence and to exist is not (necessarily) to be an object of knowledge" (*TS* § 19, p. 254c²⁷⁻²⁸).

Having rejected the Sarvāstivādin Def. of existence, H goes on to examine three other Defs.: (i) to exist is to be a *dharma* included in the five *skandhas*, twelve *ayatanas* or eighteen *dhātus*; (ii) to exist is to be believed to be known by perception or other means of knowledge; (iii) to exist is to be conjoined with 'existence' (有=*satta?*). The first Def., which is commonly accepted by the early schools of Buddhism (see my note "On AK VI. 4" *Indological Review* 2, p. 27), is denied by H on the ground that there are different opinions among the schools about what constitutes a legitimate *dharma*. The second Def. is rejected by him simply because it is not definitive enough. The third Def., which reminds us of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, is criticized by asking what justifies the existence of 'existence' itself. H concludes his discussion on the Def. of existence as follows: "Therefore, it is impossible to say what is considered to be the definitive Def. of existence, [for] things exist only in the conventional sense, not in the ultimate sense." (*TS* § 20, p. 255a¹⁻¹²)

Now H insists that the past and future do not exist even in the conventional sense (*TS* § 20, p. 255a¹²⁻b¹⁰). His reasoning may be summarized as follows: (1) If a *dharma* is in the present time-epoch, it has a function; past and future *dharmas*, however, have no function, and, consequently, they do not exist. (2) If a *dharma* has no function, it does not have its own characteristic;
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consequently, it cannot be named. (3) All dharmas are produced by causes and conditions; since the past and future dharmas have no causes and conditions, they do not exist. (4) If future dharmas did exist, they would be eternal and it would be unnecessary to create them. (5) Only present and conditioned (saṁskṛta) dharmas have the three characteristics, viz. origination, cessation and duration-change. Arguments similar to the above (1) & (2) are quoted and rejected by S (NA, p. 636a7f.; LVP’s tr., pp. 125–126). It must be noted that H (§ 20, p. 255b1) in order to prove his position quotes a passage from the Paramārthaśāntyatā-sūtra (the Saṁyukta, Taisho Vol. 2, p. 92c), i.e., “When the eye is produced, it does not come from some other place, and when it disappears, it is not going to be accumulated in another place,” which is also quoted by V in the same context (AK, p. 813: caksuḥ utpadyamānāṁ na kutāścid āgacchati nirudhyamānāṁ na kvacic saṁnicayāṁ gacchati...), while V is criticized by both S and the author of AD precisely on his use of this quotation (NA, pp. 625c27–626b7; LVP’s tr., pp. 56–59; AD, pp. 266–268).

In TS § 21, the Sarvāstivādins produce twenty points of argument in support of their sarvāstivāda.

DOCUMENT IV Question [by the Sarvāstivādins]: The past and future really exist. For (1) if a dharma exists, a thought arises with reference to it as in the case of present dharmas and the unconditioned dharmas. (2) Furthermore, the Buddha taught the characteristic of rūpa as well as past and future rūpa. (3) He taught: “All rūpas, whether internal or external, gross or subtle, past, future or present, are generally called ‘rūpa-skandha’.” (4) He also taught: “The past and future rūpas are non-eternal, not to speak of the present” (quoted in AD, p. 265: rūpam anityam atttānāgatam, kaḥ punarvādaḥ pratyutpānassyā... =Saṁyutta, IV, p. 5 & Saṁyukta, Taisho Vol. 2, p. 20a; quoted in NA, p. 625c2–3 & by Yaśomitra ad AK V. 25ab). Since ‘non-eternity’ is the characteristic of the conditioned, [the past and future rūpas] must be recognized as existent. ... (5) Manovijñāna of the future depends upon the past manas; if there were no past [dharma], what would be the substratum of [mano-]vijñāna? (6) We know that past karmas will have a result in the future, which is the
correct view. ... (TS § 21, p. 255b¹²-²³ff.)

We have noted that the second and third argument for the sarvāstivāda mentioned in AK, V. 25ab, are known to H. Document IV contains all four arguments found in AK, V. 25ab (cf. NA, p. 625bff; LVP’s tr. p. 53ff.). In TS § 22 (pp. 255c⁸-256a¹⁷) H criticizes most of the points set forth by the Sarvāstivādins in TS § 21. He maintains that the Sarvāstivādin Def. of existence has been firmly denied, the Buddha taught the doctrine of past and future dharmas only for the sake of ordinary people, and past karmas are not existent though they have a result in the sense that they cause the result and disappear.

Finally in TS § 23 (p. 256a¹⁹-b⁵) H alludes to and refutes four types of sarvāstivāda, viz. that of the Sarvāstivādins, of the Vaiśeṣikas, of the Sāṃkhyaś, and of the Naiyāyikas (for tr. see H. Ui, the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, 1917, p. 55). The following final remark by H shows the trace of Nāgarjuna’s influence, and it seems to have produced a curious echo in AD (p. 270).

DOCUMENT V In Buddhism it is taught as an expedient (upāya)—not as the ultimate [truth]—that all exists and that nothing exists. For the idea that something exists definitely will lead to Eternalism and the idea that nothing exists definitely will lead to Annihilationism. Avoidance of these two extremes is called the noble ‘Middle Path’. (TS § 23, p. 256b¹-³: cf. the Mālamadhyamakakārikā, XV. 7-11 & the Prasannapada, p. 270)

CONCLUSION: As the Documents indicate, H is very well acquainted with the controversy over sarvāstivāda. His critical attitude towards the doctrine was probably shared by all the early schools of Buddhism except for the Sarvāstivādins. His reasoning resembles that of Maudgalyāyana in VK, while V and the Dārśṭāntikas of NA use the same arguments as H in order to refute sarvāstivāda. The sarvāstivāda recorded by H is much more advanced than that of VK, of MV (see LVP, MCB 5, pp. 8ff.) and of the Saṃyuktābhidharmasāra (Taisho 1552, Vol. 28, pp. 961c-962a), and it shows a close affinity with the sarvāstivāda of AK V.25ab, of S and of AD. The affinity between V and H on this subject is so close that it may well be the case that the former used TS as a source-book for his AK. Anyhow, TS gives invaluable information on the doctrinal development of the Sarvāstivādins between the time of MV and V.

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