JITĀRI AND ŚĀNTARAKṢITA

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A

Jñānaśrīmitra frequently adduces arguments from Dharmakīrti\(^1\) and Prajñākaragupta\(^2\) in support of his own, and cites many passages from Bhāsarvajña in the role of pūrvapakṣin.\(^3\) On the other hand, he quotes only one kāriki that conveys Śāntarakṣita’s own view.\(^4\) Jñānaśrīmitra’s successor Ratnakīrti quotes fifteen kārikās from the Pramāṇavārttika, fifty-three passages from Jñānaśrīmitra and five from Prajñākaragupta, whereas he quotes only three and a half kārikās of Śāntarakṣita’s own.\(^5\) Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti are disinclined to cite Śāntarakṣita, showing favour instead to Prajñākaragupta.

Jitāri quotes seventeen kārikās from the Tattvasamgraha in the Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya,\(^6\) five kārikās and two half-kārikās in the Jatīnirākṛti,\(^7\) three in the Anekāntavadanirāsa,\(^8\) and one and half in the Bālavātāratarka.\(^9\) Besides, Jitāri and Śāntarakṣita / Kamalaśīla quote the same passages from the following sources: The Daśabhūmikasūtra, the Samādhirājasūtra, the Lāṅkāvatārasūtra, the Abhidharmakośa, the Viṃśatikā and the Ślokavārttika.\(^10\) On the other hand, Jitāri does not quote a single passage from Prajñākaragupta. Like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, Jitāri quotes a large number of kārikās from Dharmakīrti.\(^11\)

Judging from the favoured sources of quotation, we can see that two groups are in contrast to each other: Prajñākaragupta, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti come under one group (School A), and Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Jitāri come under the other (School B).

B

When Jitāri deals with epistemological topics in the Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya,\(^12\) he closely follows Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. In the first chapter,
he thus argues in favour of “universal momentariness” (ksanabhaṅga) and refutes ātman, God as the “permanent agent” (nityasahakārin) and “recognition” (pratyabhijña). His exposition of the Sautrāntika doctrine in the second chapter is very brief. This light treatment is consistent with the critical attitude of Śāntarakṣita toward the Sautrāntika aspect of Dharmakīrti’s theory of “self-recognition” (svasamvedana). Jitāri and Śāntarakṣita who belong to School B are more critical of the Sautrāntikas than people of School A.

In the third chapter where the Yogācāra doctrine is expounded, Jitāri adduces Viṃśatikā and Tattvasaṃgraha in support of his criticism of the Vaiśeśikas, the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, who hold in their respective ways that external objects participate in the formation of knowledge. Here he takes the Yogācārin position that the world is nothing but a reflection brought about from our dormant consciousness (citta) which has been preserved since the infinite past.

Śāntarakṣita exhibits his Yogācārin standpoint in the bahirartha chapter of the Tattvasaṃgraha. On the other hand, he professes his Mādhyamika belief in the first kārikā of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra. In this double system of epistemology, the Yogācārin doctrine of idealism is after all considered to be a step to reach the Mādhyamika truth: “There is nothing real and the world is empty. The cognition which the Yogācārins admit as real is not ultimately real.”

Jitāri too takes this Yogācāra-Mādhyamika position. In the third chapter of the Sugatamatavibhaṅgaḥśya, his exposition of the Mādhyamika doctrine centres on Sugatamatavibhaṅgaḥkārikā the purport of which is essentially the same as that of Madhyamakālaṃkāra.

There are ten and a half kārikās of Dharmakīrti which both Jitāri and Śāntarakṣita / Kamalaśīla respectively quote. Apart from these, fifty-six are quoted from the Pramāṇavārttika in the Tattvasaṃgraha and the Pañjikā, and thirty-eight in the Sugatamatavibhaṅgaḥśya. This indicates that both Jitāri and Śāntarakṣita / Kamalaśīla are highly dependent on Dharmakīrti.
While adducing the same authority, however, Jitāri is more positive than Śāntarakṣita in defending his Madhyamika standpoint. At the end of the fourth chapter of the Sugatamatavibhaṅgaḥbhāṣya, Jitāri enumerates five Madhyamika-oriented kārikās of the Pramāṇavārttikā. There he considers Dharmakīrti to be a Madhyamika master and even says that the Madhyamika doctrine was established by Dharmakīrti. This positive attitude seems more to reflect a personal idiosyncrasy than a sectarian position different from Śāntarakṣita's.

Both Jitāri and Śāntarāṣṭita / Kamalaśīla quote from the Yuktisāṭikā and the Ratnāvalī. Whereas Kamalaśīla and Śāntarāṣṭita quote from the Madhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna the Madhyamika, Jitāri quotes from the Bodhicittavivarana of Nāgārjuna the Tāntrika. This might reflect the general trend at the end of the tenth century when Tantrism flourished. In fact, Jitāri himself composed fourteen Tāntrika works.

1) Thirty-one kārikās are quoted. 2) Thirty passages are quoted.
3) Thirty passages are quoted.
4) TS 395. A kārikā identical with TS 2871 is also quoted. But this originally from the Brhaṭṭikā. Cf. JNĀ 162.
5) RNA 1 = TS 3128. RNA 51 = TS 93ab. RNA 38 = TS 122. RNA 51 = TS 93ab. Thirty-three more kārikās are identical. But they are originally from the Śloka-vārttikā and the Brhaṭṭikā. Cf. E. Frauwallner, “Kumārila’s Brhaṭṭikā,” WZKSO, Bd. 6, 1962.
7) TS 1744, 1746, 1776. TS 1744 is composed of ŚV Ākṛti 57cd and 58ab. This fusion is original with Śāntarāṣṭita.
8) TS 1776, 1777b, 1778abc. Jitāri has fused the last two into one kārikā. See K. Shirasaki, op. cit., p. 25. Also see K. Shirasaki, “Jitāri no anekāntavāda hihan” (Jitāri’s criticism of the anekānta theory), JIBS, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1974, pp. 999–1003. 9) TS 1999, 2000ab.

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11) Forty-eight kārikās are quoted. 12) SVBh, P, No. 5868; D, No. 3900.
15) PV Pratyakṣa 349ab, 450.
16) People of School A are the Sākārāvijñānādins. Both the Sautrāntikas and the Sākārāvijñānāvādins hold that a cognition assumes a form, though the two parties differ in opinion as to whether an external object effects such a form. Jitāri criticises the sākāra theory in SVBh (P, 330b–331a), but he does not criticises the nirākāra theory, according to which a cognition in its ultimate state is formless.
17) SVBh 323a2–330b5.
18) V 12: šatkena yugapadyogat paramāṇōḥ śaḍāmśatā / śaṇāṇiḥ samānadesatvat piṇḍah syād anumātrakah // (SVBH, P. 324a)
20) SVBh 324a4–7.
21) MA 1: niḥsvabhāvā amī bhāvā sattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ / ekānēsvabhavāvena viyogat pratibimbavat // In his Mādhyamika position, he denies even the nirākāra theory. Cf. MA, P, 53a.
22) The logic behind this is as follows: Cognition can be neither singular nor plural and therefore it has no svabhāva. Whatever has no svabhāva is not real.
23) SVK 7: nēṣṭaṃ tad api dhīrāṇaṃ vipajnānaṃ pāramārtthikam / ekānēsvabhāvena viyogād gaganābhjvat //
24) PV Pramāṇasiddhi 22 (SVBh, P, 314a; TSP, p. 147), 270 (SVBh, P, 292a; TSP, p. 229), Pratyakṣa 8 (SVBh, P, 329b; TSP, p. 8), 22 (SVBh, P, 323a; TSP, p. 317), 208 (SVBh, P, 354a; MA, P, 65b), 212 (SVBh, P, 338b; MA, P, 54a), 360 (SVBh, P, 354a; MA, P, 65b), Svārthanumāna 24 (SVBh, P, 289a; TSP, p. 1032), PVin 1. 55ab (SVBh, P, 355a; TSP, p. 691).
27) YŚ 6, RĀ 1. 54 (SVBh). YŚ 12, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 45, 46, RĀ 1. 60, 4. 79 (MA).
28) MK 3. 12 (MA, P, 71b), 15. 5 (MA, P, 72a), 15. 6 (MA, P, 72b).