SAMYOGAPṚTHAKTVANYĀYA

—as a basis of the theory of *mokṣa*—

Haruo Kurata

Principles of ritual interpretation embodied in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (MS) are often applied to the philosophical arguments by later writers of the Mīmāṃsā school. *Samyogapṛthaktvanyāya* (the principle of “distinctness of connection”)¹⁾ is one of those principles and applied to the argument about how to attain *mokṣa* (final release)²⁾; some philosophers of the Vedānta school also make use of this principle. The present writer’s intention in this paper is to compare the ways of application in the two schools.

(1) The term “*samyogapṛthaktva*” (distinctness of connection) appears in MS IV, 3, 5: “*ekasyobhayatve samyogapṛthaktvam*” which would mean “In a case where one and the same thing is both (obligatory as well as contingent, or optional), there is distinctness of connection (which is a reason for the same thing used at two cases).” According to the commentary by Śabaravāmin (c. 550 AD), we would be able to explain the meaning of this aphorism as follows: there are two vedic sentences enjoining the use of *dadhi* (curds) in *Agni-hotra*; one is “*dadhnā juhoti*” (He offers oblation with curds.) and the other is “*dadhnendriyakāmasya juhuyāt*”³⁾ (He shall make oblation with curds for one who is desirous of efficient sense-organs.) The former enjoins *dadhi* as *kratvartha* (that which subserves the purposes of action), i. e. what is used for the purpose of establishing *Agnihotra*; the latter enjoins it as *puruṣārtha* (that which subserves the purposes of man), i. e. what is used for the purpose of obtaining a result. In other words, the former shows the connection of the subsidiary, *dadhi*, with the principal, *Agnihotra*; the latter shows the connection of the subsidiary, *dadhi*, with the principal, the result. Thus one and the same thing, *dadhi*, is used for two purposes without any difficulty⁴⁾.

(2) According to the school of Kumārila (c. 650-700 AD) *mokṣa* is the ces-

sation of bondage, or the disappearance of the relation between *Ātman* and the phenomenal world⁵). As the phenomenal world, conjuncting with the human body, restrains the man, it is the way to *mokṣa* to make *Ātman* not enter a new body after the present one falls⁶). We find an interesting passage which clearly shows Kumārila's standpoint in the *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika* (TUpBhV) of Sureśvara (c. 720-770 AD), a disciple of Śaṅkara:

A person who is desirous of *mokṣa* should not perform *niṣiddhakarman* (forbidden action) as well as *kāmyakarman* (action prompted by the motive for fruits), (but) he should perform *nityakarman* (obligatory action) and *naimittikakarman* (occasional action) with the desire of destroying sin. Thus the *soi-disant* Mīmāṃsakas, rejecting *ātmajñāna* (knowledge of *Ātman*), speak of *karman* as the means to *mokṣa*⁷).

Kumārila's view would be that if one performs *kāmyakarman*, he will get *abhyudaya* (good result), and if he commits *niṣiddhakarman*, he will get *pratyavāya* (bad result or sin); as both *abhyudaya* and *pratyavāya*, if once arisen, must be experienced, they require a future body after the present one falls; that is, *kāmyakarman* and *niṣiddhakarman* have no ability to extinct *saṃsāra* (transmigration), but they become means to renewing bondage; on the other hand, if one performs *nityakarman* and *naimittikakarman*, he can eradicate past sin⁸) and avoid *pratyavāya* which should spring up if they are not performed⁹); then, he will attain the state of *mokṣa* at the moment his body falls, because there is no cause that helps his taking on a new body¹⁰).

Thus Kumārila attaches much importance to *karman*, but, in fact, he does not neglect *jñāna*. Though he declares, in his *Ślokavārttika*, that *ātmajñāna* cannot be a means to *mokṣa*¹¹), he applies *saṃyogapṛthaktvanyāya*, in his *Tantravārttika*, to dividing *ātmajñāna* into *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha*¹²).

Pārthasārathimīśra (c. 950 AD)¹³), following Kumārila, insists that *ātmajñāna* is told in two ways in Upaniṣads; that is, it is shown by "avināśi vā are'yaṃ *ātmā*¹⁴)" (Lo! This *Ātman* is indestructible.) and other sentences as *vivekajñāna*¹⁵) (knowledge of the difference of *Ātman* from the human body) which subserves the purposes of action and the function of which as the means to *mokṣa* is refuted by Kumārila, and it is shown by "*ātmānam upāśita*¹⁶)" (Meditate on *Ātman*.) and other sentences as *upāśana*¹⁷) which subserves the purposes of man¹⁸), i. e.

*abhyudaya*¹⁹⁾ and *mokṣa*²⁰⁾ as alternatives.

From the facts mentioned above, we may well state that *saṃyogapr̐thaktva-nyāya* is applied to dividing *ātma-jñāna* into two kinds and to allowing one of them, *upāsana*, to have *abhyudaya* and *mokṣa* as its results, and that the theory of practice held by Kumārila and Pārthasārathimiśra is one kind of *jñāna-karmasamuccayavāda*²¹⁾, the opinion that *jñāna* must be combined with the performance of *karman* in order to attain *mokṣa*, which is affirmed by Someśvara²²⁾ (c. 1200 AD) and Gāgā-bhaṭṭa²³⁾ (c. 1630-1700 AD).

(3) In the philosophical system of Śaṅkara constructed in his *Upadeśasa-hasrī*²⁴⁾, *mokṣa* is the cessation of *avidyā* (nescience) and the means to it is nothing but knowledge of *Brahman* or the identity of *Ātman* with *Brahman*²⁵⁾. Therefore *karman* which has *avidyā* as its cause²⁶⁾ cannot be the means to *mokṣa*. Thus Śaṅkara propagates the path of knowledge²⁷⁾ and attaches importance to the life of mendicant, which, he says, is the best way of life to get *jñāna*²⁸⁾. In the *Brahmasūtra* (BS), however, the eclectic attitude of the author is clearly found on this point to accept the value of *karman*²⁹⁾. Then commenting it, Śaṅkara gives a place to *karman* as the purifier of the mind and remote means to *mokṣa*³⁰⁾, provided that it is performed without any motive for fruits³¹⁾.

On the other hand, the author of the BS tells us the necessity of the performance of *karman* for them who do not desire to be liberated and, therefore, do not require *jñāna*, because of the presense of the scriptural passages enjoining it for the purpose of accomplishment of the duty of *āśrama*³²⁾ (life stage); Śaṅkara follows this view. Then *karman* would be overburdened to bring forth the two results. But the two are not brought about at the same time, so when *karman* becomes the means to one of them, it cannot be the means to the other. It is to settle this problem that Śaṅkara applies *saṃyogapr̐thaktvanyāya*³³⁾. He explains that there is no difficulty, because the sentence “*yāvajjīvam agnihotraṃ juhōti*³⁴⁾” (One performs *Agnihotra* as long as he lives.) shows *karman*, *Agnihotra* in this case, to be performed as an indispensable duty of *āśrama*; and the sentence “*tam etaṃ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena dānena tapasānāśakena*” (Brahmins desire to know it, this one, i. e. *Ātman*, through the study of the Veda, sacrifice, charity, and austerity consisting in a dispassio-

nate enjoyment of sense-objects.)³⁵⁾ shows *nityakarma* as a means to attain *jñāna*, as it eradicates performer's sin³⁶⁾, purifies his mind³⁷⁾, and produces *vividiṣā* (desire to know) in his heart³⁸⁾. In other words, the former shows the connection of *karman* with *āśrama*, and the latter shows its connection with *jñāna* which is the direct means to *mokṣa*.

Though Śaṅkara tells *kāmyakarma* is not the means to *mokṣa*³⁹⁾, Sureśvara⁴⁰⁾ makes use of *saṃyogaprthaktvanyāya* to his insistence that not only *nityakarma* but also *kāmyakarma*, if performed without any motive for fruits, purifies the mind of the performer and makes him embrace *vividiṣā*, so *karmans* as a whole told in the *karmakāṇḍa* of the Veda becomes the aid to *jñāna* told in the *jñānakāṇḍa*, and there should be a connection between the two *kāṇḍas*.

Other philosophers such as Maṇḍanamīśra⁴¹⁾ and Rāmānuja⁴²⁾ also refer to *saṃyogaprthaktvanyāya* in their works like Śaṅkara and Sureśvara.

(4) In conclusion, We may well assume that *saṃyogaprthaktvanyāya* is applied to placement of *jñāna* in the theory of *mokṣa* in the Mīmāṃsā school and to that of *karman* in the Vedānta school.

- 1) The term *saṃyogaprthaktva* as a compound word must be *saṣṭhi tatpuruṣa*. See the expression "*saṃyogasya prthaktvataḥ*" found in Mādhava, *Jaiminiyanyāyamālā* (JNM) ad MS IV, 3, 5-7, ĀnSS 24, (Poona 1917), p. 120; Sureśvara, *Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika* (BrUpBhV), v. 322, ĀnSS 16, (Poona 1937), p. 112. G. Jha's translation "conjunction and disjunction" would not be acceptable.
- 2) Mīmāṃsakas, striving to establish the authority of the Veda, pursue the ideal of *dharma*. They insist that it is not God but *apūrva*, a potency produced after the performance of *karman*, that gives a result to the performer. (See BS III, 2, 40; MS IX, 1, 4-5; 6-10.) We cannot find the attitude to make light of *abhyudaya* as a thing in *samsāra* in the Mīmāṃsā literature of the early stage. Kumāṛila, however, advocated his own theory of *mokṣa* while he expounded his theory of interpretation of vedic texts enjoining rituals. See *Ślokaṇvārttika, Chapter of Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* (ŚV), vv. 101-111, ChSS 3, pp. 668-672.
- 3) *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* II, 1, 5, 6.
- 4) Cf. *Brhātī* ad MS IV, 3, 5-7 (Madras 1964), p. 1027: *dadhnā juhottīti homārtha evāyaṃ viniyogaḥ. dadhnenḍriyakāmasyety eva puruṣārthaḥ; Jaiminiyanyāyamālā-vistara* (JNMV) ad MS IV, 3, 5-7; *ekasyāpi dadhno vākyadvayena nityatvaṃ kāmyatvaṃ aviruddham*. Śabarasvāmin presents another example, i. e. *khadira* wood (*acacia catechu*) used as a *yūpavṛkṣa* in the *Agniṣomīya* rite: the sentence "*khadire badhnāti*" shows it as *kratvārtha* and the sentence "*khadiraṃ vitryakāmasya yūpaṃ kuryāt*" shows it as *puruṣārtha*. We find the term *saṃyogaprthaktva* used in MS XII, 4, 13, too, where it is mentioned that *satyavacana* shown by the sentence "*satyaṃ brūyāt* (or *vada*)" to be told by a *guru* at *upanayana* is *puruṣadharma*

and that shown by the sentence “*nānṛtaṃ vadet*” (*Taittiriya Saṃhita* II, 5, 5, 6) in the *prakaraṇa* of *Darśapārnamāsa* is *kratudharma*. Cf. MS III, 4, 13, *Sādhubhāṣaṇanīyama* also brings forth two results, according to Kumārila. Cf. *Tantravārttika* (TV), ĀnSS 97 (Poona 1970), pp. 221ff. For the definition of *kratavārtha* and *puruṣārtha*, see JNMV ad MS IV, 1, 2: *kratusvarūpapauṣkalyāyaiva yo vidhiyate sa kratavārthaḥ. puruṣapritaye vidhiyamānāḥ puruṣārthāḥ*.

- 5) *Nyāyaratnākara* (NRK) ad ŚV 106cd: *śatrasambandho bandhaḥ, tadabhāvo mokṣaḥ; Śāstradīpikā* (ŚD), ChSS 188, p. 358: *na prapañcavilayo mokṣaḥ, kiṃ tu prapañcasambandhavilayaḥ*.
- 6) NRK ad ŚV 106cd: *niṣpannānāṃ dehānāṃ yaḥ pradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ yaś cānutpannānāṃ prāgabdhāvaḥ mokṣaḥ*. Prābhākaras also have the same opinion. See *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (Benares 1961), p. 341: *atyantikās tu dehocchedo niḥśeṣadharmādharma-parikṣayanibandhano mokṣaḥ*. For the negative character of *mokṣa* held by Mīmāṃsakas, see NRK ad ŚV 107ab: *abhāvātmakatve mokṣasya nityatā, nānandātmakatve*; ŚD p. 370: *ye'syāgamāpāyino dharmā buddhisukhaduḥkhecchadveṣaprayatnadharmādharmasamskārās tān apahāya yad asya svam naijaṃ rūpaṃ jñānaśaktisattādravyatvādi tasminn avatiṣṭhate.....*
- 7) The first verse is ŚV 110. Kumārila's view seems to be attacked by Śāṅkara(Ś), too. (See Ś ad BS IV, 3, 14.)
- 8) Cf. Kumārila's *Brhaṭṭika* cited in the *Nyāyasudhā*(NS), ChSS 14, p. 330: *nitya-naimittikair eva kurvāno duritakṣayam.....*; TV, p. 228: *pratyāśramavarṇanīyatāni nityanaimittikakarmanīyāpi pūrvakṛtaduritakṣayarthaṃ akaraṇanimittānāgata-pratyavāyaparīhārārthaṃ ca kartavyāni*; NRK ad ŚV 110.
- 9) Cf. Maṇḍanamīśra, *Vidhiviveka* (Vārāṇasī 1978), p. 219: *pratiśiddhasya ca niyogato'kartavyasya kriyāyām iva niyogataḥ kartavyasyākriyāyām pratyavāyo yuktāḥ*. Mīmāṃsakas follow the theory of *ṛnatraya*. (See Śābara ad MS VI, 2, 31.) Neglect of *ṛnatraya* constitutes *upapātaka* (*Manu* XI, 66-67); if one longs for *mokṣa* without paying *ṛnatraya*, he must go to Hell (*Manu* VI, 37).
- 10) ŚV 108-109.
- 11) ŚV 102cd.
- 12) TV, p. 227.
- 13) ŚD, pp. 372-377; NRK ad ŚV 102cd.
- 14) *Brhadaraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (BrUp) IV, 5, 14.
- 15) The view that this *jñāna* is the means to *mokṣa* is attributed to the Sāṃkhya system and rejected by Kumārila (ŚV 102: NRK ad ŚV 102).
- 16) *Chāndogya Up* (ChUp) VIII, 12, 6. Cf. BrUp I, 4, 5.
- 17) *upās-* means “to know A as B,” so the term *upāsana* is used as a synonym of *vidyā*, *jñāna* and other words in Upaniṣads and the Vedānta literature. It would mean the mental activity to identify one well-known phenomenal object with the supreme being. If one performs sacrifice with *upāsana*, his sacrifice will be more efficient. See ChUp I, 1, 10: *yad eva vidyayā karoti.....tad eva virjyavataraṃ bhavati*; Ś ad *Bhagavadgītā* XII, 3: *upāsanaṃ nāma yathāśāstram upāsya-rthasya viśayīkaraṇena sāmīpyam upagamyā tiladhāravat samānapratyayaḥ pravahena dīrghakālam yad āsanaṃ tad upāsanaṃ ācakṣate. jñāna in Bhagavadgītā IV. 37 is upāsana* (see NRK ad ŚV 110).
- 18) ŚD, pp. 374-375; NRK ad ŚV 104. Results are found in *vākyaśeṣa* according to

- rātrisatranyāya* (MS IV, 3, 17-19). Cf. TV, p. 227; NRK ad ŚV 104.
- 19) This is shown by the sentence “*sarvān kāmān āpnōti*” (ChUp VIII, 12, 6; VIII, 7, 1).
- 20) This is shown by the sentence “*na sa punar avartate*” (ChUp VIII, 15, 1).
- 21) Cf. TV, p. 228: *na ca teṣāṃ bhinnaprayojanatvād bhinnamārgatvāc ca bādhavikalpāparasparāṅgāṅgbhāvāḥ sambhavanti*.
- 22) NS, p. 330: *avāntarakāryabhedān na bādhavikalpau bhinnamārgatvān nāṅgāṅgi-bhāvāḥ sambhavatīti pariśeṣyāt samuccaya eva yuktaḥ*.
- 23) *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi*, ChSS 6, p. 43: *jñānakarmaṇoḥ samuccayena (mokṣa-) janakatā*.
- 24) S. Mayeda (ed.), *Śāṅkara's Upadeśasāhasri* (Upad), (Tokyo 1973).
- 25) Upad I, 1, 6-7.
- 26) Upad I, 11, 15.
- 27) Upad I, 16, 68.
- 28) Upad II, 1, 2.
- 29) H. Nakamura, *Brahmasūtra no Tetsugaka* (Tokyo 1951), pp. 470-483.
- 30) Ś ad BS IV, 1, 16; 18. Cf. ChUp I, 1, 10. That *karman* is the remote means to *mokṣa* is clearly stated by Sureśvara in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* I, 52.
- 31) BS III, 4, 27.
- 32) BS III, 4, 32.
- 33) Ś ad BS III, 4, 33: *karmābhede'pi samyogabhedāt*. The term *samyogabheda* is a synonym of *samyogaprthaktva*. Cf. ŚD, p. 373.
- 34) The source is the *Bahvṛcabrahmaṇa* according to Śabara ad MS II, 4, 1. Cf. *Āpastambaśrautasūtra* III, 14, 1.
- 35) BṛUp IV, 4, 22.
- 36) Ś ad *TaittirīyaUp*, upodghāta; I, 11, 4.
- 37) Upad I, 17, 22; Ś ad ChUp I, 1, 1; Ś's padabhāṣya ad Kena Up IV, 8.
- 38) Ś ad BS III, 4, 27. But it is only *sañcitakarman* that is destroyed by *jñāna*; *prarābhadhakarman* is stronger than *jñāna* and lasts till the end of the life of the aspirant. (See Ś ad BS IV, 1, 14-15; Ś ad BṛUp I, 4, 7.) Ś tells all of *traivarnīkas* are admitted to study *jñāna* (Ś ad BS I, 3, 34-38), but that only brahmins are allowed to enter the *sannyāśāśrama* (Ś ad BṛUp III, 5, 1); then, *kṣatriyas* and *vaśīśyas* would be able to perform *karman* to attain *jñāna* while they live in the *gṛhasthāśrama*. For the same view held by Rāmānuja, see *Śrībhāṣya* ad BS III, 4, 26: *karmavatsu gṛhastheṣu yajñādīnityanaimittikasarvakarmāpekṣā vidyā*.
- 39) Ś ad BṛUp IV, 4, 22: *vedānuvacanayajñādānatapaḥśabdena sarvam eva nityaṃ karmopalakṣyate. evaṃ kāmyavarjitaṃ nityaṃ karmajātaṃ sarvam ātmajñānotpattidvāreṇa mokṣasādhanaṭvāṃ pratipadyate*.
- 40) Ānandagiri ad BṛUpBhV, v. 322 16, ĀnSS 16, pp. 112-113.
- 41) *Brahmasiddhi* (Madras 1937), p. 27: *samyogaprthaktvena sarvakarmaṇāṃ evātma-jñānādhikāranupraveśaṃ āhuḥ, vividiṣanti yajñeneti śruteḥ*; p. 36: *idaṃ tu yuktaṃkāryāntaranirākāṅkṣāṇāṃ karmaṇāṃ samyogaprthaktvāt “tam etaṃ vedānuvacanena brahmaṇa vividiṣanti” iti vidyāṅgabhāvāḥ*.
- 42) *Śrībhāṣya* ad BS III, 4, 33: *agnihotrādināṃ iva.....vinīyogaprthaktvenobhayārthaṃ na virudhyate*. The term *vinīyogaprthaktva* is a synonym of *samyogaprthaktva*. (See Ś ad BS III, 4, 34: *yajñādināṃ vividiṣaṃ vinīyunkte*; *Bṛhati* ad MS IV, 3, 5-7. See note 5)