DIGNĀGA ON TRAIRŪPYA

Shoryu Katsura

The late Professor H. KITAGAWA, who contributed a great deal to the study of Dignāga’s logic, made a few important comments on Dignāga’s theory of trairūpya (three characteristics of proper evidence). According to him, (i) Dignāga’s formulation of trairūpya contains no restrictive particle eva; the second and the third rūpa have their own independent status and are not logically equivalent. (ii) Anvaya (joint presence) and vyatireka (joint absence), expressed respectively by a positive (sādharmya-) and a negative example (vaidharmya-drṣṭānta), stand in a relation of contraposition; though vyatireka corresponds to the third rūpa, anvaya does not correspond to the second rūpa.

In spite of my admiration for Prof. KITAGAWA’s works, I am inclined to disagree with his interpretation. If we use K(anakavarman)’s more reliable Tibetan translation of the Pramanāsamuccayavṛtti (PSV) rather than V(asudhara-rakṣita)’s, which was generally followed by Prof. KITAGAWA, then it is, I think, easy to see that Dignāga meant to supply eva at least in the formulation of the second rūpa, in which case, he was aware that the second and the third rūpa might be regarded as logically equivalent. To demonstrate this, I will present the Tibetan text of PSV ad PS II. 5cd, which discusses trairūpya, and an English translation of it. Since a good translation by Mr. R. HAYES is available in English, I will revise it only where I disagree with his interpretation.

PSV (K) 111a6–b1=(V) 30a1-4 (KITAGAWA’s ed., pp. 455–456):

```
shul gsum rtags las zhes gang bstan pa de bshad par bya ste /
   rjes dpag bya dang de mthungs la // yod dang med la med* pa’o //
V rjes su dpag par bya ba ni chos kyis khyad par du byas pa’i chos can no // de
la mngon sum mam rjes su dpag pas mthong gi(s) rjes la de’i rigs dang mthun pa
la yang spyi’i shul gyis phyogs thams cad dam phyogs gcig la yod par grub pa’o //
de gang las zhe na / de dang mthungs pa kho na la yod pa zhes nges par gzung
ba’i phyir yin gyi yod pa kho na ni ma yin no // de ltar na med pa la(m) med do
```

— 544 —
zhes brjod pas mi bya'o zhe na / 'di ni med pa nyid la med pa yin gyi / gzhan pa la'ang ma yin 'gal ba la ma yin no zhes nges pa'i don du 'gyur ro //
(*Jinendrabuddhi 105b⁵ inserts nyid after med.)

Revised Translation:

(1) The phrase (from Kārikā 1) “through an indicator that has three characteristics” (trirūpāliṅgataḥ) must now be explained.

(A proper indicator must be) present in the object of inference and in what is similar to it, and absent in what is not (similar to it). (anumeyey ‘tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsati)

The object of inference is a property-locus qualified by a property (which one wishes to know). (dharmanīśṭo dharmy anumeyah)

Having discerned, either through perception or through inference, (the indicator) in the (object of inference), one also establishes in a general manner (*sāmānyena) (its) presence either in some or all loci of the same class (*tajjātiya / sajātiya)⁵).

(2) Q: Why is it (that we say “some or all loci of the same class”; why do we not say “all” such loci)?

A: Because we must restrict (*avadhāraṇa) (the second characteristic) in the way that (the indicator is) present only in what is similar to the (object of inference) (*tattulya eva sadbhāvah), not in the way that it is necessarily present (in all loci similar to the object of inference) (*tattulye sadbhāva eva).

(3) Q: But then nothing (further) is accomplished by stating (the third characteristic) that (the indicator is) absent in what is not (similar to the object of inference).

A: It is (stated) in order to determine that (the indicator is) absent in what is not (similar to the object of inference), not in what is other than or incompatible with (the object of inference)⁶).

One of the reasons why Prof. KITAGAWA did not approve of the interpretation that the particle eva is understood in the second rūpa is that he took the phrase “only in what is similar to……” in the sense of “in all loci of the same class.” Of course, it is logically equivalent to “in some or all loci of the same class” as Dignāga rightly observed. It may be noted in passing that a fragment of the Tarkaśāstra, which precedes Dignāga, reads: “sajātiya eva sattvam.”⁷)
Although Dignāga does not mention eva with reference to the third rūpa, it must be supplied for the following reasons: (i) A younger contemporary of Dignāga, Praśastapāda, has eva in his formulation of the third rūpa. (ii) Regarding the positive and negative examples, Dignāga states: “(only) in this way, one can show that hetu is present only in sapakṣa (*sapakṣa eva sattvam) and that it is necessarily absent in the absence of the object of proof (*sādhyaḥ-yābhāve 'sattvam eva').” It is to be noted that Dignāga, unlike Dharmakīrti, never mentions eva with reference to the first rūpa.

As a matter of fact, Dignāga applies effectively the restriction by eva several times in PSV. For instance, he formulates in PS II. 21 the relation between liṅga and liṅgin, which is a forerunner of Dharmakīrti’s definition of vyāpti (pervasion), by using the eva-restriction (niyama / nges pa). In PS III. 4cd, he attacks the Naiyāyika’s definition of prati-jñā (thesis) by examining the possibilities of the eva-restriction (avadhāraṇa / nges gzung). Further, regarding the formulation of examples, he argues that vyāpti can be correctly expressed iff eva is applied properly. It is well-known that Uddyotakara severely criticized Dignāga on some points of his eva-restriction, while Kumārila and Dharmakīrti in one way or another accepted Dignāga’s usage of eva; it was Dharmakīrti who developed the idea into his theory of three types of exclusion (vyavaccheda).

As mentioned above, Prof. KITAGAWA denies the correspondence between the second rūpa and the anvaya of a positive example. Since the former, as shown above, is restricted by eva, I think it possible to assert the contrary. In fact, Dignāga clearly states in PS IV. 1–2 that both the second and the third rūpa are expressed respectively by a positive and a negative example. Therefore, the two rūpas correspond to the anvaya and the vyatireka of the examples. It is to be noted that Jinendrabuddhi (in his commentary on PSV II. 5cd) and other later Buddhist logicians call the two rūpas ‘anvaya’ and ‘vyatireka’ respectively. Although the anvaya of a positive example may be formulated differently from that of the second rūpa, for instance, “hetu is necessarily followed by sādhya” (hetoh sādhyanānuṇugamaḥ), they must be regarded as equivalent from a logical point of view.
Now, I agree with Prof. KITAGAWA when he says that anvaya (a positive example) is contrapositive to vyatireka (a negative example). I think the same is true with the second (anvaya) and the third rūpa (vyatireka). But the question arises: why do we need the two rūpas if they stand in a relation of contraposition and, hence, are logically equivalent? This has been a rather difficult problem for modern students of Buddhist logic and, in my opinion, it has not been solved successfully

Facing the same question in the passage quoted above, Dignāga answers inadequately; he merely says that the third rūpa is indispensable in order to determine the nature of vipakṣa. However, he takes up the problem again in PSV IV where he discusses at great length the necessity of the two examples: positive and negative.

Although Dignāga never abandons his position that the two examples are necessary in order to exclude such erroneous hetus as anāikāntika (inconclusive) and viruddha (incompatible), his arguments are not very persuasive as Prof. KITAGAWA has pointed out. As a matter of fact, Dignāga concedes that it is not necessary to formulate a negative example if vyāpti is stated in a positive example, and that if the two examples are well-known, either one of them is sufficient because the other will be known through ‘implication’ (arthāpatti). This seems to indicate that, theoretically speaking, the two examples (hence, the two rūpas) should be considered logically equivalent.

Nonetheless, we cannot reject completely Prof. KITAGAWA’s interpretation that each of the two rūpas has its own significance. For, as he says, while illustrating pseudo-liṅgas in PSV II. 6cd–7, Dignāga considers the cases when liṅga has the second rūpa, but not the third, and vice versa, which would be impossible if he regarded the two rūpas as logically equivalent.

To solve the riddle, I would like to propose the following. In Indian philosophy anvaya and vyatireka jointly make up a sort of method of induction. They may be formulated as follows: “When x occurs, y occurs (anvaya), and when x is absent, y is absent (vyatireka). The idea certainly goes back to the Nikāya formulae of idānpratyayatā or dharmasaṅketa. Anvaya and vyatireka are used in order to discover and establish a certain relation between two
DIGNĀGA ON TRAIRŪPYA (S. Katsura) (19)

items, for example, that of cause and result\textsuperscript{24}.

In the trairūpya formulation, anvaya and vyatireka must originally have been the method of establishing a relation between liṅga and liṅgin. If liṅga (y) is found in sapakṣa where liṅgin (x) occurs, and if it is absent from vipakṣa where liṅgin (x) is absent, then it is a proper liṅga with reference to the liṅgin (x) (or the object of inference). In this sense, hetucakra of nine types of both proper and improper evidence may be regarded as a sort of check-list to discover proper evidence in the inductive domain consisting of sapakṣa and vipakṣa. At this stage of the development of the trairūpya formulation, I don't think the restriction by \textit{eva} was necessary\textsuperscript{25}.

However, once the relation between liṅga and liṅgin was properly established and, with logical reflection, the restrictive particle \textit{eva} was introduced in the formulae of anvaya and vyatireka, I think, the inductive character of anvaya and vyatireka started to wane and the concept of 'logical nexus' (āvinābhāva / vyāpti / anubandha) crept into the Buddhist system of logic. Thus, anvaya and vyatireka with \textit{eva}-restriction came to express the result of the inductive process mentioned above, i. e. a logical nexus. At this stage, anvaya (the second rūpa & a positive example) and vyatireka (the third rūpa & a negative example) could be regarded as logically equivalent.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that anvaya-vyatireka of Dignāga's trairūpya has a kind of double function. (i) It expresses an inductive process of discovering proper evidence and establishing a logical nexus. For this purpose, the restriction by \textit{eva} is not necessary. Anvaya and vyatireka have their own raison d'etre and are not logically equivalent. (ii) Anvaya-vyatireka with \textit{eva}-restriction expresses the logical nexus which is the result of the above inductive process. Anvaya and vyatireka in this case are logically equivalent and one is implied by the other. The result of our investigation indicates that Dignāga stands precisely at a point in time when the old system of inductive logic was gradually shifting toward Dharmakīrti's system of logic based on svabhāvapratibandha or āvinābhāvaniyama.

Many thanks are due to Rev. TSULTRIM KELSANG, who provided stimulating comments on my paper given at Koyasan Univ., and Messrs. SHIMODA and SHI-
MIZU, who supplied me with valuable materials.

1) The two terms for 'evidence', linğa and hetu, seem to have a different origin; linğa, which occurs often in the Vaiśeṣika-stra, belongs to the Pramāṇa-tradition, since 'laṅgika' is a name for inference in VS, while hetu, which occurs in the Nyāyasastra Ia34 (pañcāvayava section), belongs to the Vāda-tradition; Dignāga applies 'linğa' for svārthānumāna and 'hetu' for parārthānumāna. Of course, they are regarded as synonyms as early as in VS IX. 20.


3) Prof. KITAGAWA was aware of this possibility; see op. cit. pp. 98-99, fn. (81)-(82).

4) "Dīṇnāga's Views on Reasoning (Swārthānumāna)”, J. of Ind. Phil., 8 (1980).


7) See E. FRAUWALLNER, Kleine Schriften, p. 757.


9) PSV (K) 148b4 (ad PS IV. 4): ...... de lta na gtan tshigs mthun pa'i phyogs nyid la yod pa dang / bsgrub bya med pa la med pa nyid bstan par nus pa yin gyi......

10) liṅge liṅgī bhavaty eva liṅgīn evētatar punaḥ / niyamasya viparyāye, sambandho liṅgaliṅginoḥ // (Skt. frag. in Hetubindūṭikā p. 18).

11) purvavaḍharaṇam vyartham anisṭam itaratra tu //

12) See PSV (K) 149a1-8 (ad PS IV. 4).


14) trirūpo hetur ity uktam pakṣadharme tu saṁśhitāḥ / rūḍhe rūpādvaṃśām śeṣam dṛśṭāntena pradarśyate // sādhyenānugamo hetoḥ sādhyaḥbhave ca nāṣṭī / khyāpyate yatra dṛṣṭāntaḥ sa sādharyetaro dvidhā //


16) For instance, B. S. GILLON argues that the two rūpas are not logically equivalent because he takes the universe of discourse to be divided into three parts, viz. pakṣa, sapakṣa and vipakṣa. In my opinion, pakṣa should be excluded from the universe of discourse, so that the two rūpas are logically equivalent in the domain consisting of sapakṣa and vipakṣa. Cf. GILLON & LOVE, “Indian Logic Revisited : Nyāyapravēsa Reviewed”, J. of Ind. Philos. 8 (1980).

17) See PSV (K) 150b4 (ad IV. 5): eṣa tāvan nyāyo yaḥ ubhayaṁ vaktavyaṁ viruddhānāikāntikapratipakṣaṇa (PVSV p. 11).

19) See PSV (K) 149b3-5 (ad IV. 4).
20) See PSV (K) 150b5: arthāpattya vānyatārenobhayapradarśanāt (PVSV p. 11).
21) In this connection I have learned much from Dharmakīrti’s arguments on this problem in PVin. II & HB, which are followed by Dharmottara, Mokṣākara-gupta and others. I shall discuss them in detail in a future paper. It is interesting to note that Dharmakīrti calls anvaya and vyatireka with eva ‘niyamavat’.
22) Dharmakīrti, even with his eva-restricted trairūpya formulae, treats pseudo-līngas in the same way as Dignāga, which suggests that Dharmakīrti has not completely expelled the inductive character from his system of logic. I owe this information to the MA thesis of my student, Mr. TODA (1981).
25) I must acknowledge that to come to this understanding I was much influenced by note 63 of Mr. HAYES’ article mentioned above. He distinguishes two formulations of Dignāga’s trairūpya, viz. the Kārikā formulation without eva-restriction and the prose formulation with eva. He regards the former as ‘a statement of the requirements for adding something new to our knowledge’, and the latter as ‘a statement of the requirements for the formal validity of an argument’. I think there are more than two formulations of trairūpya, which are found in the Nyāyavārttika, etc. The expression ‘inductive domain’ is also borrowed from Mr. HAYES’ paper, “An Interpretation of anyāpoha in Dīnāga’s General Theory of Inference” presented at the 5th IABSt meeting in Oxford.

5. 8. 1983.

（昭和58年度文部省科学研究費一般研究（C）の研究成果の一部である。）

（Assoc. Prof., Hiroshima University, Ph. D.）