A Conflict between Logical Indicators in the Negative Inference
(Svabhāvānapalabdhivādin versus Vyāpakānapalabdhivādin)1)

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1. a controversial point Which logical indicator is more fundamental in the negative inference, the negative cognition of an essential property (svabhāvānapalabdhi) or that of a pervading property (vyāpakānapalabdhi)? These sharply divided opinions arose in Prajñākaragupta's commentary of Pramāṇavārttika2). He regards only the former as a fundamental indicator and criticizes the latter, for the reason that in case of the latter there is a possibility of overstepping the non-cognition of a perceptible object (drṣyaunupalabdhi). In that case, we cannot determine whether this transcendent object exists or not, because it maybe exists in non-perceptible domain. We cannot determine the absence of the object without the affirmative perception of the other object in the perceptible domain3). According to Yamāri's subcommentary, the negative indicator of this sort is "the vyāpakānapalabdhi without the direct indication of the object (yul ŋe bar ma bstan pa can gyi khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa)"4) and the theoretician, who maintains this theorem (vyāpakānapalabdhivādin) is traceable to Dharmottara5). In his commentary of Pramāṇaviniścaya, Dharmottara maintains that the absence of the pervading property is provable without the perceptible domain6). Therefore Yamāri's interpretation carries validity. The aim of this paper is to investigate the logical interpretation of this controversy, and to relate this interpretation to the multiplex development of Dharmakīrti's logic and post-Dharmakīrti's.

2. the multiplex development of Dharmakīrti's meta-logical theorem

In his early works7), there are two determinators of the logical necessity between two terms: the essential counter-relation (svabhāvapratiśānta)8) and the inductive reasoning from instances (drṣṭānta). The former is his original theorem,
but the latter is Dignāga's. Dharmakīrti seems to have tried to conform the former to the latter, and he went so far as to say that the latter determines the former. But this trial met with failure, because the essential counter-relation is a transcendental meta-regulation, by which the logical necessity is determined within its internal logical space (antarvyāptivāda), but the inductive reasoning cannot determine it without the external instances (bahirvyāptivāda). With the proof of being momentary (kṣaṇikatvānumāna) as a turning-point, the inductive theorem was divested of its logical power. This transformation of meta-theorem produced a powerful effect on the negative indicator.

3. a double interpretation of the negative indicator in Dharmakīrti's early works

(a) transcendental aspect The negative indicator (anupalabdhi-hetu) is illustrated: In the designated place, there is no jar, because it is not cognized there, though all the conditions of its cognition are fulfilled. If it were present, its existence would be cognized, and it cannot be otherwise. This implies that the existence has the completeness of conditions for cognition. In his latter works, this condition is more strictly provided: the completeness of external conditions and perceptible object, and the conditional negative indicator is called “non-cognition of the perceptible object (dṛṣṭyānupalabdhi)”. Dharmakīrti attached this condition in order to avert the theorem of his teacher Iśvarasena, mere non-observation (adarsanamātra), and he restricts the existence within perceptible domain. Thereby he composes a logical necessity: Whenever it exists, it is necessarily perceived, and hence he converts it into a contrapositive form: Whenever it is not perceived, it never exists. This logical necessity is based on the ontological equivalent which is prescribed by transcendental condition. This is why this negative indicator is deemed a variation of the essential indicator (svabhāvahetu). The stock example of a svabhāvahetu-inference is as follows: This is a tree, because it has a śīṃśapā-ness; In the designated place, there is a tree, because there is śīṃśapā-tree (or śīṃśapātva) there. Though we can interpret this logical necessity as the extentional subsumption between two classes, Dharmakīrti interprets it as intentional relation. The svabhāvahetu is ontologically defined: hetuḥ svabhāve bhavo 'pi bhāvamātānurodhini [PV1,
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v2cd) “The phenomenal form of existence is the logical indicator to the essential existence, which has ontological relation to only its phenomenal form”. In accordance with S. Matsumoto’s thesis,12) this ontological relation composes the basis of logical necessity as counter-relation. This essential counterrelation is provided as follows: (PVSV 16, 28-17, 3) “Consequently this essential existence, which has the ontological relation to only its phenomenal form, can negate its phenomenal form, if this essential existence is negated. For instance, (The absence of) tree (negates) the presence of śīṁśāpā. With the limited (phenomenal form) a particular branches, we can verify that this is (a śīṁśāpā, one of phenomenal form). Therefore the tree (tree-ness) is the essential existence of śīṁśāpā (or śīṁśāpā-ness). A phenomenal form cannot exist without its own essential existence, because there is a phenomenal formalizing (bhāvaness) only in the essential existence. That is why, a phenomenal form never diverges (from its essential existence) on the ground of the essential counterrelation (viz. the logical relation to the essential existence)”. This essential counterrelation regulates the other indicator, kāryahetu, too [PV1, v2ab]. Thus the logical necessity, the essential counter-relation: (¬svabhāva→¬bhāva)→(bhāva→svabhāva), is based on the ontological relation: (svabhāva →bhāva). In his latter works, this negative regulation: (¬svabhāva→¬bhāva) is transformed to the sādhyaviparaye bādhakapramāṇa (the determinator by which the logical indicator is negated on the assumption that the hypothetical property to be proved is conversed).13) This negative procedure is based on the negative indicator. Therefore it seems that svabhāvahetu and anupalabhiharetu mutually make a logical circularity. But this circularity proves their logical consistency.

(b) empirical aspect In spite of having the logical consistency, Dharmakīrti restricts the negative indicator within the perceptible domain, and prohibits it to overstep into the pure logical space. As previously stated, we cannot determine whether a transcendent object exists or not. Only affirmative perception can determine only the perceptible object, therefore he interprets the negative function as paryudāsa, not as prasajyapratīṣedha14). By paryudāsa-negation in this context, we cannot determine the absence of the object without affirmative perception of the other object perceptible empty domain. This negation always
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needs the counter-positive-object or locus. [On the contrary, prasajyapratiṣedha-
negations negates the locus itself, where an object occurs.

Therefore the floating object in the air is negated, too. For that reason, this
negative function does not need the counter-positive-object.] No sooner than we
find the counter-positive-object or the empty locus, we can determine the absence
of that object on the strength of paryudāsa-negation, and so we can avert the
endless regression of the criterion of negative judgments. In order to secure
the existence of locus, he requires: This negative indication has to be based
on the self-cognition (svasamvedana) [PV4, v270-v275]. The reason is that he
regards the self-cognition as the formalized field (sākāravijñāna), to say the least
of this context. [Conversely prasajyapratīṣedha has to be based on the non-
formalized field (nirākāravi jñāna), because it negates the locus itself: It negates
both counter-object and empty locus which are formalized.] How can we de-
determine the counter-positive-ness? There are two criteria for it: (PVSV 5, 13-16
etc.) “Though a complete casual series has been continuous, it is interrupted,
when another factor occurs. This interruption makes the cognition of the oppo-
site-contradictory relation. Or the mutual exclusion between perceived objects
composes it eternity and non-eternity. Here the cognition of one implies the
non-cognition of the other”. With the intention of verifying the completeness of
the perceptible condition and of determining the absence of object in the
designated locus, he required the counter-positive cognition, on the ground of
paryudāsa-negation which is interpreted in psychological phenomenon. Therefore
he regarded the contrapositive form of the essential-relation as Dignāga’s counter-
instanitation: vipakṣe asattvam eva. But, if he adapted the second criterion for
counter-positive-ness by way of the pure logical contradiction, the negative in-
dicator would not presuppose the perceptible formalized field15). In that case, the
function of paryudāsa-negation will be transformed into pasajyapratīṣedha-nega-
tion. and into a variation of “paryudāsa without perceptible domain”.

4. the separation between svabhāvānupalabdhi and vyāpakānupalabdhi-
hetu In PV1 v2 and PVSV 5, 22–25, Dharmakīrti prescribed this negative in-
dicator as the failure of the perceptible essential existence (dṛṣyātmānor asiddhi),
and classified it into two modes: the non-cognition of the essential existence

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(svabhāvānupalabdhi) and the non-cognition of the pervading essential existence (vyāpaka-svabhāvānupalabdhi). The form is the same as the negative indicator that is previously said. Here it is illustrated: Here is no smoke, because it is not cognized, in spite of fulfillment of conditions. When this essential existence is the pervading property, the former is transformed into the latter, which is the derivative form. In the designated place, there is no śīṃśapā, because there is no tree there. This śīṃśapā-example is remarkable, because it is the same as the example of svabhāvapratibandha. Therefore this derivative negative indicator, indeed, lays the foundation for svabhāvahetu, on which svabhāvānupalabdhihetu is based. Here is a logical circularity, as previously said. In any event, here, vyāpakānupalabdhi is not completely separated from svabhāvānupalabdhi. In these early works, Dharmakīrti classified the negative indicator into four groups: the affirmative cognition of counter object or counter effect, and the negative cognition of cause or perceptible essential existence. And he added four variations16). But so far as the negative indicator is concerned, svabhāvānupalabdhi lays the foundation for the other negative indicators, because the negative cognition implies the affirmative cognition, and the negation in the negative indicators is premised on svabhāvānupalabdhi-negation. The vyāpakānupalabdhihetu “There is no tree” and the kāraṇānupalabdhihetu “There is no fire” is based on the svabhāvānupalabdhihetu “It is not cognized”. Consequently, the svabhāvānupalabdhihetu is meta-regulation, and the others are object-regulations. But his latter classifications disregard this different level. In HB, finally the negative indicator is classified into three groups: svabhāva-anup., vyāpaka-anup. and kāraṇa-anup. Here vyāpaka svabhāva-anupalabdhi is transformed into vyāpaka-anupalabdhi, which is on a level with svabhāvānupalabdhi. In regard to this transformation, it seems that the prof of being momentary (kṣaṇikatvānumāna) is a turning-point17). In order to prove the property “being momentary” of the existence, the essential property of the existence is defined as “being capable of casual efficiency. Thereby the non-existence can be proved by only logical factor without perceptible verifications. From the standpoint of ontology, this proof aims at the identity of “being momentary” and “being capable of casual efficiency”. In accordance with E. Steinkellner, these two properties are restored
A Conflict between Logical Indicators in the Negative Inference (T. Tani) to the same reality, from which they are abstracted by apoha, the negative abstraction. The crossing of the two abstracted terms is regulated by the transcendental identity, not by the transcendent identity. [The word “transcendental” stands for “meta-theoretical”, here.] But from logical point of view, these two abstracted terms are composed of asymmetrical ordered pair in logical space, on the ground of modal concept. The property “being successiveness or simultaneity of the activity” is the pervading property, and the property “being capable of casual efficiency” is the pervaded property. The possibility of the former is negated in the hypothetical property “being non-momentary” on the ground of logical contradiction. Therefore the non-momentary cannot exist, and so we can get the logical necessity: What exists, is momentary. This svabhāvahetu-inference is premised on the asymmetrical logical necessity (vyāpti), of which determinator is the sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa which is based on vyāpakānupalabdhihetu. In VN, the negating capacity of this vyāpakānupalabdhihetu is grounded on the hypothetical logical contradiction in the pure logical space, not on the empirical verification in the perceptible domain. Here vyāpakānupalabdhihetu is completely separated from svabhāvānupalabdhihetu, and lays conversely the foundation for svabhāvahetu, on which svabhāvānupalabdhihetu is based.

5. the return to the controversial point, instead of conclusion The whole dispute seems to turn on the following point: Which negative function is to be adopted, paryudāsa or prasajyapratisedha? Strictly speaking, which interpretation of negative function is to be adopted, empirical or pure logical one? The former is premised on the formalized field theory (sākāravijñānavāda, satyākāravāda), and the latter, contrarily, is premised on the non-formalized field theory (nirākāravijñānavāda, alīkāravāda). Though the boundary line between these frameworks is fairly flowing because of their many dimensional ontology, it seems that Prajñākaragupta (svabhāvānupalabdhiшивädin) accepts the former theory, and Dharmottara (vyāpakānupalabdhi şik) accepts the latter. To say the least of it, each logical structure is respectively based on each own negative structural ontology, on the ground of the negative counter-relation.

(abbreviations) PV=Pramāṇavārttikam (ed. Y. Miyasaka), PVSV=PV1-svavṛtti
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1) These terms occur in the following Text of this note (2).
2) PV(P) skt 638, 20–638, 16. D273a1-b3, P331b4-332b5.
3) PV(P) skt 638, 4–6. D272b2, P331a4.
4) PV(P)Y D27b2-3, P32b7-8.
5) PV(P)Y D233b6, D235a5-6.
6) PV in (D) D6b3-5, P7b3-6.
7) This order follows E. Frauwallner. viz. FzPS Anmerkung (2).
9) PVSV 2, 16–19.
10) PVSV 10, 1f. PV4 v269, PVin3 v44. viz. E. Steinkellner: On the Interpretation of the SVABHĀVAHETUH. WZKS Bd. 18 ss117–129. note (1).
11) PVSV 2, 16. etc.
12) viz. this note (8). The following translation refers to this.
14) This interpretation refers to Y. Kajiyama and J. L. Shaw. viz. FzPS Anmerkungen (25), (27)–(29).
15) kalpitānupalabdhi aims at the proof of this transformation. PVSV 105, 15–107, 14. PV in D208b3–211a6, P306a6–309a2. viz. FzPS Anmerkung (32).
17) This interpretation refers to E. Steinkellner and Y. Kajiyama.
18) viz. this note (10).
19) viz. this note (13).
21) It is a possible cross-interpretation that the formalized empty field is transformed to non-formalized field, or its converse.

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