On Vācaspatimiśra’s Explanation of the Cause of *samyoga*

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Vyāsa refers to eight kinds of interpretation of *adarśana* in his *Yogabhāṣya* (YB). They are worth examining from the viewpoint of Sāṃkhya studies. I shall focus on two of them and discuss the cause of *samyoga* in Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts with special reference to Vācaspatimiśra’s *adarśana* in his *Tattvavośarādi* (TV). The two are as follows: 1) *guṇānām adhikāraḥ* 2) *arthavatā guṇānām*.

The *Yogasūtra* (YS) says that *avidyā* is the cause of *samyoga*. However, on the other hand, YS 2.23 tells us that *samyoga* which is caused by *avidyā* brings the perception of capabilities (*saktis*) of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. This perception seems favorable to humans. Vyāsa interprets the perception of objects and of the Seer as *bhoga* (experience) and *apavarga* (liberation) respectively. But he carefully tells us, in commenting on YS 2.23, that *samyoga* is not the cause of *mokṣa*. He explains that *darśana*, which is the opposite of *adarśana*, is the cause of separation between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, and he asserts *adarśana* to be the cause of *samyoga*. His comment makes it clear that *adarśana* is, in his mind, functionally equivalent to *avidyā*.

Nevertheless, when we consider this idea, we cannot but feel unsettled in the explanation of the relation of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* in the *Sāṃkhya-karika* (SK), for we cannot find that either *adarśana* or *avidyā* play any important role in it. When he explains the cause of *samyoga*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa only states: *puruṣaya darśanārtham kaivalyārtham tathā pradhānasya.* The commentators primarily follow the view that *samyoga* is for the sake of *puruṣa*’s seeing primordial matter as well as his absolute isolation. What is to be noticed is that their commentaries introduce the idea of *upacāra* (*metaphor*) in explaining
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the relation of puruṣa and prakṛti. In this idea, the conjunction (samyoga) of puruṣa and prakṛti is a metaphorical expression and there is no real ‘conjunction’ of the two.

The author of the Yuktidīpikā (YD) tries to make the idea of upacāra understandable. He declares that the relation of puruṣa and prakṛti is proximity (sannidhi). According to him, samyoga is possible where any samyogas enumerated by his opponent do not exist. He states as follows: anyas tu śāstriyāḥ samyogo’rthanimittāḥ (While another ‘samyoga’ which is scriptural is that which is occasioned by purpose). The adjective ‘śāstriya’ in his statement cannot be overlooked. Although it is clearly meant that the samyoga in the kārikā is ‘śāstriya’ and is understood as ‘arthanimitta’, it is not clear whether ‘śāstriya’ is used so as to refer directly to Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s kārikā or rather merely to imply a certain authoritative source.

Explanatory descriptions of the real relation between puruṣa and prakṛti are often given using the concept of yogyatā. However, there may arise the problem: if yogyatā belonged to puruṣa, could puruṣa really be liberated? Or can puruṣa intrinsically be isolated, as SK says? Even if samyoga is yogyatā, the result is the same. In fact, we find the view that samyoga is yogyatā in the Tattvakaumudī. It is offered as the objection by Vācaspatimiśra to introduce SK66, which only says that no further creation takes place in spite of samyoga because there is no motive for it. In addition, the author of YD refers to samyoga which is characterized by yogyatā as one of the samyogas enumerated by the opponent. Therefore, it should be noted that yogyatā cannot be samyoga in itself. Thus, the samyoga which is construed as yogyatā is not necessarily favorable to the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The contexts in which yogyatā is employed are considered to require the conditions of metaphorical expression.

Furthermore, YD refers to certain ācāryas’ view of bondage. According to this, the ācāryas call samyoga ‘adhikārabandha’. P. Chakravarti pointed out that adhikārabandha was refuted by Kumārila in his Ślokavārttika. Neither of these texts give us enough information about who the ācāryas are. However, it can be said that adhikāra, in the view of some Sāṃkhya teachers,
is of great importance in explaining the relation between puruṣa and pradhāna.

It is possible to ask if the adhikāra and the arthavattva of guṇas in YB share the same sources with the references made by the author of the YD and Kumārila. However our materials are not sufficient to draw a conclusion. For instance, while ‘adhikāra’ is explained as ‘yogyatva’ in the Ślokavārttika, the author of YD does not refer to ‘yogyatva (tā)’ when he discusses the ācāryas’ view of adhikārabandha. What we can say is that there still is the fact that adhikāra and arthavattva seem to be ideas held by Śāmkhya teachers.

Vācaspatimiśra describes Vyāsa’s eight kinds of interpretation of the word ‘adarsana’ as Śāmkhya tenets in TV on YB 2.23. However he does not refer to their sources. He mainly shows that these interpretations are derived from the negative prefix ‘a-’ in adarsana. It is well known that, according to one popular formation of the grammarians, the negative prefix ‘a-’ can give six different meanings. Which meaning it has is dependent upon what the negated compound denotes. And the functions of this negative prefix are called prasajyapratīṣedha and paryudāsa. Vācaspatimiśra, when he comments on adarsana in YB 2.23, introduces these terms. He means that six Śāmkhya tenets concerning the interpretation of the word ‘adarsana’ are explained by the two types of negation. But there is a difficulty in believing that the Śāmkhya teachers regarded adarsana, the cause of samyoga, as to be interpreted in the meanings of prasajyapratīṣedha and paryudāsa because there is no evidence offered for this. It is not even certain that the other commentators consider all of the interpretations of the the word ‘adarsana’ to be those of Śāmkhya teachers. Vyāsa only states that these interpretations are mentioned in the śāstra and the Yogaśastravivarana explains that the śāstras are darśanāntaras.

In spite of the explanation in TV, there is no evidence that the six kinds of interpretation of adarsana are connected with prasajyapratīṣedha and paryudāsa in other Śāmkhya and Yoga texts. They do not completely match the meanings which the negative prefix ‘a-’ gives. Therefore it is difficult to suppose that all six of them are originally based on the prefix ‘a-’ in adarsana. It is rather possible that Vācaspatimiśra only followed Vyāsa and gave the
Why did Vācaspatimisra introduce prasajyapratisedha and paryudāsa? As we have seen above, arthavatā in Sāṃkhya is said to be of puruṣa, while in YB it is of guṇas. There is a similarity in employing it to explain the cause of saṃyoga, but differentiation is required by the consideration of its locus. Vācaspatimisra rejected the arthavatā in YB.²⁰ If he had intended to cover all of the Sāṃkhya views on the cause of saṃyoga, he should have referred to ‘arthā’ in SK. However the arthavatā in YB is of guṇas only. By adopting prasajyapratisedha and paryudāsa in his comment on six of Vyāsa’s eight kinds of interpretation of adarśana, he restricted his explanation of the cause of saṃyoga to the attributions of guṇas. In this way he could leave the arthavatā of puruṣa uninjured.

1) The Yogasūtras of Patañjali with the Scholium of Vyāsa and the Commentary of Vācaspatimisra, ed. by R.S. Bodas, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series XLVI, 1917, pp. 93-95. In this paper I make use of this edition of the Yogasūtra, the Yogabhāṣya and the Tattva-vaiśāradī.
2) YS 2.24.
3) YS 2.17.
4) YB, p. 92.
6) SK 21.
7) For instance, see Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō No. 2137, Sāṃkhya-vrtti and Sāṃkhya-saptatīrīṭti on SK 20.
8) R.C. Pandeya, Yuktidīpikā, p. 89¹-². Here I use proximity for sannidhi. The author of YD grounds the usage of sannidhi on occupying the same spot which is figuratively expressed.
9) Similar enumerations of the saṃyogas are, as already pointed out, found in the Māthara, the Sāṃkhyaasaptatīrīṭti and the Jayamaṅgalā. Cf. E.A. Solomon, The Commentaries of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā—A Study, p. 50. Here we have to pay attention to the enumeration in the Vaiśeśika doctrine. Cf. Vaiśeśikasūtra 7.2.10 (Here I follow the numbering in the text of G.O.S. 136.). In YD the opponent says: “vijñatam saṃyogadvayam.” What ‘saṃyogadvayam’ indicates is not clear. However, if it indicates karmaja and saṃyogaja, it reminds us of the classification of saṃyoga in the Praśastapādabhāṣya.)
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10) pp. 88–89.
13) p. 88.
14) For instance, *puruṣa* and *pradhāna* are inevitably called *bhokṭr* and *bhogyā* respectively.
15) pp. 89–90.
17) pp. 93–95. These can be presented as follows: a) *adhikāra* of the gunās b) non-production of primary mind c) *arthavattā* of the gunās d) *avidyā* (nescience) or the seed of mind e) the manifestation of *saṃskāra* for production f) the cognitive faculty g) the characteristic of *puruṣa* and *pradhāna* h) the knowledge (of sounds, touches and so on) which is comprehension.

(absolute to gunās: h); a), c), d), e) and f) (These are explained in the meaning of *paryudāsa*.); b) (This is explained in the meaning of *prasajyapratisedha*.)

(absolute to puruṣa and gunās: g)

Vācaspatimīśra mentions that only e) is accepted here because the diversity of experience of *puruṣas* cannot be explained in the rest.

18) p. 95.
20) Cf. n. 17).

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