Theory of Perception in the 8th Adhyāya of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*

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The 8th *Adhyāya* of VS has three parts: i) the introductory sūtras (1~3), ii) sūtras on the object of perception (4~13) and iii) sūtras on sense organs (14~17). This paper treats the sūtras of the second group.

1. 8-4

C reads: *guṇa-karmasv asannikṛṣṭeṣu jñāna-niṣpatter dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ kāraṇakāraṇaṃ ca*. PST quotes this sūtra, which runs: *yon tan dan las rnam phrad la šes pa ḥgrub paḥi phyir rdsas rgyu ste. rgyu ḥi rgyu yañ no.*¹⁾ It corresponds to the text of V: *guṇa-karmasu sannikṛṣṭeṣu jñāna-niṣpatter dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ. kāraṇa-kāraṇaṃ ca*²⁾.

There are two textual problems. The one is that only C reads *asannikṛṣṭeṣu* while the others read *sannikṛṣṭeṣu*. *Sannikarṣa* is a kind of *sambandha* which is either *saṃyoga* or *samavāya*³⁾. It is a separable relation, and hence *saṃyoga*, which is a quality. Both quality and action are said to have no quality in 1-1-15 and 16. If *sannikarṣa* is the same as *saṃyoga*, it cannot occur in terms of quality and action. Therefore the reading of C seems plausible. It is, however, incompatible with the theory that perception arises from *sannikarṣa* of sense organ and object (3-1-13). Quality and action are the object just as substance is (8-14). If perception of quality or action arises without *sannikarṣa*, it incurs the possibility of perception without *sannikarṣa* which is impossible at all. There must be some *sannikarṣa* of quality or action with the sense organ.

What kind of relation is it? The key to this question is the other problematic phrase *kāraṇakāraṇaṃ ca* which is omitted in U. C, PST and V give a similar explanation of this phrase⁴⁾. The signification of *kāraṇakāraṇa* implies that *sannikarṣa* is, in cases where quality or action

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is the object, not a direct contact of sense and object, but an indirect connection based on the conjunction of sense and substance, which is expressed as *saṃyukta-samavāya*. This does not mean that here is the influence of Uddyotakara, because the term *saṃyukta-samavāya* is used in VS 10-18, although in a different situation, and because the same conception is found in PDh⁵⁾. The term *kāraṇakāraṇa* is found in 10-15, so that the phraseology itself is not unfamiliar to VS. And the interpretation of U is free from disorder without the phrase.⁶⁾ These might show the antiquity of the phrase. Tentatively following the majority reading, the sūtra would be like this: *guṇa-karmasu sannikṛṣṭeṣu jñāna-niṣpatter dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ kāraṇa-kāraṇaṃ ca*.

The interpretation of this sūtra differs considerably among the commentaries, but we can say at least this much: this sūtra expresses the Vaiśeṣika's basic principle of ontology that substance is the fundamentals of reality, based on which the theory of perception is constructed.

2. 8-5: *sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu sāmānya-viśeṣābhāvāt tata eva jñānam*.

V omits this sūtra, but it is quoted in NV⁷⁾ and the *Tattvopaplavasimha*.⁸⁾ The ambiguity of “*tata eva*” is a problem. C reads it as “only from the contact of (sense and) substance”, which is enough plausible, although there still remains another possibility of reading it as “from themselves alone”. An interesting passage relevant to this sūtra is found in the *Śataśāstra*:⁹⁾

[Text] And again, if a definiens (可相 *lakṣya*) is realized through a definiendum (相 *lakṣaṇa*), why does not one entity become two entities.

[Commentary] If a pot is known to exist because of beingness, a definiendum of a pot, and if a definiens is not realized without a definiendum, then beingness again requires the definiendum of beingness. If it is known to exist without requiring any further definiendum, it should be also the case with a pot etc.

This material indicates the origin of this sūtra: i.e. when it is asserted that the perception of substance, quality and action requires *sāmānya-viśeṣa* as a qualifier (8-6), it is natural to ask how *sāmānya-viśeṣa* is cognized. The sūtra 8-5 seems to be the answer to this question.

C explains *sāmānya-viśeṣa* in 8-5 as '*sattā* and *antyā viśeṣāḥ*'. But *antyā viśeṣāḥ* are the object of yogic perception to which no regard is given here. It should be, as in 8-6, 'universal-differentia', the integration of two categories representing the double characteristics of a qualifier. In the vaiśeṣika categoriology universals except beingness are differentiae at the same time so as to serve as a qualifier of an object, if not it does not cause perceptual judgment but doubt (2-2-19).

3. 8-5~9

C explains this part based on the relation of qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and qualificand (*viśeṣya*). This interpretation is traced back not only to PDh¹⁰ but also to the early Mādhyamikas as mentioned above, and hence it must have its origin at an early stage of the history of VS. But it should not be overlooked that this part has another aspect the importance of which cannot be overvalued; i.e. the fact that this is the only place in VS where six categories appear all together, and that with a stratified structure.

4. 8-9: *samavāyinaḥ śvaityāc chvaitya-buddheḥ śvete buddhis te kārya-kāraṇa-bhūte.*

This sūtra explains the reason why perception arises based on the qualifier-qualificand relation. C explains it as follows:

The knowledge of quality 'white' arises from (a) the universal of whiteness which is inherent in quality 'white' and (b) the knowledge of the universal of whiteness. (c) The relation of universal and quality is also to be understood (as the cause). Therefore the cognition of qualifier is the cause and the cognition of qualificand is the effect.

This exposition is virtually the same as the three necessary conditions of perception found in Vyo: (1) the existence of qualifier, (2) the qualifier-qualificand relation and (3) the knowledge of qualifier.¹¹

Strangeness lies in the term *samavāyin*, which appears to designate the relation of *samavāya* as the requirement of perception. But commentators

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put it into *sambandha* without exception.¹²⁾ It is probably because the qualifier-qualificand relation is of two kinds, i.e. *samavāya* and *saṃyoga*, which is implied by the sūtra 7-2-20.¹³⁾ As far as 8-9 is understood with the help of the concept of *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*, the term *samavāyin* which excludes the relation of *saṃyoga* seems defective. Why did not the sūtra-kāra use the general word *sambandha* which makes the explanation perfect? It is possible to take 8-9 as restricting the qualifier-qualificand relation only to *samavāya*.¹⁴⁾ But no such theory is known to the later Vaiśeṣika. The key lies in the term *kārya-kāraṇa-bhūta*. What is to be explained in 8-9 is why perception arises as knowledge of an object qualified by the qualifier. For this it is required to elucidate a rigid causality underlying the phenomenon of perception, a solid basis for the qualifier-qualificand relation. And *samavāya* is the answer. In later times *samavāya* is construed as including non-causal nexus,¹⁵⁾ but in VS it is exclusively the causal nexus,¹⁶⁾ while the relation of *saṃyoga* does not lead to necessary consequence. This is probably the reason of exclusion of *saṃyoga* which may sometimes be a qualifier-qualificand relation as in the case of a man and a stick.

But there seems yet another reason. Showing the relation of *samavāya* here, this part comes to contain all the six categories. As is known from the criticism of the Mādhyamika, the Vaiśeṣika's conception of the qualifier-qualificand relation is based on the theory of *padārtha*, especially on the substance-property dichotomy. The appearance of six categories in 8-5~9 is not a mere coincidence. It indicates that this theory of perception was built up with a close connection to the stratified structure of categories.

5. 8-10, 11

C explains these two sūtras as the cases devoid of *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*. Owing to this C reads *kāraṇānvīṣeṣāt* of 8-11 as “because the reason mentioned above, i.e. the absence of the qualifier-qualificand relation, (applies here) indiscriminately” (p. 64. 1), which appears farfetched.

These two sūtras treat the instances contrary to those of the preceding

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sūtra: Cognition of substances which are not related by inherence does not become the cause of one another because of non-simultaneity of causes (8-10).¹⁷⁾ Likewise, cognition of substance, quality and action which are not related by inherence does not become the cause of one another because of difference of causes (8-11).¹⁸⁾

**6. 8-12, 13: ayam eṣa kṛtaṁ tvayā bhojayānam iti buddhy-apekṣā.
dr̥ṣṭeṣu bhāvād adr̥ṣṭeṣv abhāvāt.**

C again relates these sūtras to *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*, which makes the import obscure. It has been explained in 8-5~9 that perception necessitates prerequisite cognition. These two sūtras seem to be the illustration and demonstration of this theory. 8-12 illustrates the theory with several examples: e.g. when we say, “It has been done by you”, we have beforehand the knowledge of what has been done. And 8-13 is the demonstration of the theory: i.e. because knowledge arises when objects have been experienced, and knowledge does not arise when objects have not been experienced.

7. 8-14: artha iti dravya-guṇa-karmasu.

Lastly, 8-14 explains what are objects. Sometimes this sūtra is mentioned as evidence for the supposition that once there was a stage of three *padārtha* theory in the history of VS, but it is far afield insofar as it appears in this context where six categories play an important role. But why *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are not referred to in this sūtra, albeit the knowledge of them is explained in 8-5? Probably because it is meant that the cognition of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* works only as prerequisite for perception and does not take the form of ordinary perception.

Conclusion

The main gist of this part is to assert that reality has the stratified structure of six categories in accordance with which perception arises. Still there remains a problem that *viśeṣa* in this part is not the same as

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the fifth of the standard six *padārtha* theory, i.e. the ultimate differentia. Most probably it is because the limitation of the fifth category only to the ultimate differentiae occurred in later times and again the ultimate differentiae do not concern the ordinary perception, although they work as an important factor of *yogipratyakṣa* which is another topic.²⁰⁾

Abbreviations

- C *Candrānanda's Vṛtti on VS*, GOS 136, Baroda 1961.
NK *Nyāyakandalī*. See PDh.
NV *Nyāyavārttika*, CalSS 18 & 29, Calcutta 1936-44 (rpt. Kyoto 1982).
PDh *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha with NK*, VizSS 4, Varanasi 1895.
PST *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, Peking ed. 139, Tokyo 1957.
U *Upaskāra*, KSS 3, 1923.
V *Vyākhyā on VS*, Darbhanga 1957.
VS *Vaiṣeṣikasūtra*. See C.
Vyo *Vyomavati, Śivakumāraśāstri G.M.* 6, Varanasi 1983, 84.

- 1) PST 60a4. See C p.174. It is wrongly rendered as the same reading as C.
- 2) Nozawa, *JIBSt* 23-1, p. (26).
- 3) *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, Peking ed, V35a4: *h̥brel pa ni rnam pa gñis te ldan pa dan̄ h̥du paḥo*. Cf. K116b2. 7-2-20: *saṃyogino dan̄dāt samavāyino viṣeṣāc ca*. This belongs to an opponent, but its intention is not denied.
- 4) C p.62.15: Since substance is the inherent cause of quality and action, neither quality nor action but substance is the cause of contact which is the cause for the occurrence of knowledge concerning quality and action which are not directly in contact with the sense organ. Therefore knowledge of quality and action arises from the inherence in the conjunct.

PST 60a5: Knowledge does not occur in respect of quality and action which are not manifested by their substratum. Therefore substance as the substratum of them is the cause of the knowledge of them in that it makes them manifest. The cause of knowledge of quality and action is the contact between sense organ and object. Substance, for instance a pot etc., which is the cause of it (i.e. the contact), is the cause of the cause.

V p.75.15: As regards the knowledge of quality, action and universals of a pot etc., the pot etc. in contact with the eyes etc. are the cause of conjunction between the eyes and the pot, since, just as the eyes are the cause, the pot is also the cause. "And the cause of the cause". The pot would never be the cause of knowledge of color etc. of a pot, because it is the indirect cause

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- (*anyathāsiddha*) through the medium of conjunction. It would rather be the cause of the cause, since it is the cause of conjunction of the eyes with a pot which is the cause of knowledge of color etc. of the pot.
- 5) p. 186. 19: *rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśeṣv aneka-dravya-samavāyāt sva-gata-viśeṣāt svāśraya-sannikarṣād niyatēndriya-nimittam utpadyate.*
- 6) U p. 200. 19: When knowledge arises concerning qualities like color etc. and actions like throwing upwards etc, substance is the cause. These two are cognized only when residing in perceptible substance, so that the perceptibility of substance is the basis of this case.
- 7) NV p. 668. 9: Unlike the knowledge of substance in which a qualifier, substantiality, exists in substance, none like that exists in universal-differentia.
- 8) *Tattvopaplavasīmha, Bauddha Bhārati Series* 20, Varanasi 1987, p. 7.3.
- 9) Taisho 1569, p. 175a27: (修妬路) 復次若以相可相成何故—不作二。(釈) 若汝以有為瓶相故知有瓶者, 若離相可相之物則不成。是故有亦變更有相。若更無相知有法為有者, 瓶等亦應爾。 Tucci, *Śataśāstra, GOS* 49, 1929, p. 47.
- 10) p. 112. 19. Miyamoto, “*svarūpa and viśeṣaṇa*,” (in Japanese) *Essays in honor of Prof. Tamura*, 1982, p. 154.
- 11) Miyamoto, *Toyo Gakuho*, 57-3, 4, 1976, p. 227. Vyo II, p. 46. 26.
- 12) C p. 63. 16, V p. 76. 13, U p. 202. 16.
- 13) See 3) and Vyo I, p. 22. 24. It is a criticism against those who explain the relation of *saṃkhyā* and *guṇa* as another kind of *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*.
- 14) Some Mimāṃsakas limit *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva* only to *samavāya*, though the latter is not the same as the Vaiśeṣika's. Takenaka, *JIBSt* 21-1, 1972, p. (86).
- 15) PDh p. 324. 21, NK p. 325. 15: e.g. the relation of an eternal substance and the ultimate differentia.
- 16) 7-2-29: *ihēti yataḥ kārya-kāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyayāḥ*. It is also known from the correspondence of *samavāyin* of 3-1-8 and *asyêdaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇam* of 9-18.
- 17) C reads: *dravyeṣv anitarêtarakāraṇāt kāraṇāyauḡapadyāt*. But the the editor of C supports *anitarêtara-kāraṇāḥ* of V and U, which makes 8-10 thus: *dravyeṣv anitarêtara-kāraṇāḥ kāraṇāyauḡapadyāt*. See C p. 231. 3~5. Further, V inserts *pratyayāḥ* after *-kāraṇāḥ* and U has another sūtra after this which is not found in any other version.
- 18) C: *tathā dravya-guṇa-karmasu kāraṇāviśeṣāt*. V reads *kāraṇa-viśeṣāt*. U omits 8-11, but it has no particular element of later origin.
- 19) Isaacson, ‘Yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*) in early Vaiśeṣika’.
- 〈Key Words〉 Vaiśeṣikasūtra, perception, *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*, *samavāya*, *padārtha*
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