The Period of Nāgārjuna and The *Fang-pien-hsin-lun* (「方便心論」 or *Upāyahṛdayaśāstra*)

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In my previous paper [*JIBS* 40, 2 (1992)], I proposed that the life of Nāgārjuna can be determined to be in the period A.D. 50 and 150, and suggested that conclusive proof for Nāgārjuna's authorship of the logical text *Upāyahṛdayaśāstra* would corroborate these dates. The present paper is intended to establish the validity of Nāgārjuna's authorship as well as to positively place the origin of this text within the proposed period.

In his *History of Indian Logic* (Calcutta, 1921), S.C. Vidyabhusana summarily introduced the *Upāyahṛdayaśāstra*, accepting Nāgārjuna as its author. In 1925, H. Ui published a research article on the same text as part of his monograph [〈方便心論の注釈的研究〉「印度哲学研究」]. The views of these two scholars differed widely since Ui categorically denied the authorship of Nāgārjuna, attributing the text to a Hinayāna Ābhidharmist. Ui's perspective was adopted and held without challenge in Japan until Y. Kajiyama refuted it in 1984 (〈認識と論理〉「講座大乘仏教」Ⅹ).

In my study, I independently reached similar conclusions as Kajiyama's, in that the textual author was Nāgārjuna, and that the text advocates the three-membered syllogism, but I disagree from his view, holding that the text was intended to be a logical treatise and not an anti-logical one as he claims. My view is based on two fundamental principles of Indian logic, namely: the treatise is based on (1) a theory of instantiation (*dṛṣṭānta*) involving *anvaya* and *vyatireka*; and (2) a streamlined system of syllogistic statements defined in terms of "linguistic excellence" (*vākyaprasāmā*, 語善).

Although Vidyabhusana dated Nāgārjuna to A.D. 250-330 (i.e., two centuries later than my hypothesis of A.D. 50-150), he adequately approximated

the dates of the *Nyāyasūtra* as mid-second century. He theorized that the *Nyāyasūtra* was redacted by Akṣapāda (*H.I.L.*, p.48) from the Ānvikṣikī tradition that goes back to the aphorisms of Medhatithi Gautama, and that it was this Akṣapāda's logic which Nāgārjuna knew and criticized.

His view is based on three historical considerations of the designated period: (1) it was the time when the Hindu literature, *Purāṇas* and *Śāstras*, were compiled by the Brāhmaṇa assemblies in the region of Vidarbha under the leadership of Jātukarṇya Vyāsa, renowned Sage compiler of those Hindu texts; (2) it was also the time when the Brāhmaṇa cultural and intellectual revival movement took place in that region, largely in reaction to the Fourth Buddhist Council which took place in Kāśmīra half a century before; (3) while Medhatithi Gautama was a native of Mithilā, Northeastern India in the sixth century B.C., Akṣapāda, a different individual, flourished at Prabhāsa in the region of Kāthiawār, Western India during the second century A.D. [*HIL*, pp. 49-50].

As to the polemical interactions attested in the *Nyāyasūtra* between Nāgārjuna and the Naiyāyikas, Vidyabhusana's interporation theory was poor and was necessarily revised subsequently. Today the following are generally accepted: (1) Nāgārjuna not only knew the sixteen categories of the Naiyāyika system [hence, he knew the *Nyāyasūtra* I], but he also knew the *Nyāyasūtra* V consisted of Jāti (誤難) and Nigrahasthāna (負処). (2) The *Nyāyasūtra* II through IV, however, may have been written after Nāgārjuna's death. Thus, the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 30-51 and the *Nyāyasūtras* II. 1. 8-19, as summarized by A. Kunst in 1951 [Cf. his preface to a Sanskrit edition, *MCB* (1948-1951)] and by Kajiyama in 1984, reflect dispute between Nāgārjuna and the Naiyāyikas at much the same stage, but not necessarily one referring to another. (3) The dispute over the autonomy of cognition (*svataḥprāmānya*) [for which *NS* V. 1. 9-10 offers an instance of a candle light] is regarded as anterior, because this theory was rejected by Vātsyāyana and discredited by Vācaspati Miśra (*Tātparyāṭīkā* on II, 1, 19) as having belonged to a pseudo-Naiyāyika (Ācāryadeśīya) and was

replaced by the theory of the heteronomy of cognition (*paratahprāmānya*) for which NS II, 1. 16 offers an instance of scale.

I think that the principle of *dr̥ṣṭānta* theorized in the *Upāyahṛdayaśāstras* can be defended as logically valid with respect to the two type-instances, “accepted by all” (具足喻) and “accepted by few” (小分喻), and their applicability as similar (同喻) and dissimilar instances (異喻) respectively. Dual instantiation (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*), (i.e., corroboration through similar and dissimilar instances) was regarded by all schools, Hindu as well as Buddhist, as an essential member statement of the syllogistic inference. In the traditional five-membered formula (*pañcāvayavin*, 五支作法), the instantiation (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) constitutes the third statement (*udāharaṇa*) immediately following the position of the *hetu* (reason).

From the logical point of view, inferential instantiation is not concerned with the similarity and dissimilarity of physical forms *vis-a-vis* the two being compared. It is exclusively concerned with the *linguistic expression or description* about similar (*sapakṣa*) and dissimilar (*vipakṣa*) classes of instances. Ui failed to see and Kajiyama seems not to have taken notice of this logical nature of *dr̥ṣṭānta*.

On one hand, the author of the *Upāyahṛdaya-śāstra* applies “whirl-wind” to exemplify the ever changing ordinary mind (散心), and the identical meaning of the two in description is understood equally by the wiseman and the fool (凡声同解, 具足喻). On the other hand, he applies “Nirvāṇa” to exemplify the stillness of the mind absorbed in concentration (定心), although the similarity between the latter two is understood by only a few (声得涅槃而凡不得, 小分喻).

In order to verify the logicity of the above application, three points must be taken for consideration. First, the author’s theory of logic is concerned with addressing established sectarian doctrians (*siddhāntas*, 所執 or 定說) in public debate. Each school is supposed to uphold its own system of thought and belief; thus, the core belief cannot be accepted by any other school dedicated to a different system. Second, from ancient times in India, every philosophical and religious school compiled its own

sacred literature (*āgama*) and made it a valid source of knowledge (聖敎量). Each school would therefore rely on this source of knowledge as a valid ground in public debate, despite the inherent incompatibility and mutual inadmissibility of conflicting sources. Third, even within one and the same religio-philosophical tradition, variation among its followers proves inevitable; some gifted persons may understand a truth fully, acquiring transcendent insight, whereas others don't. The textual author clearly anticipated each of these conditions.

In contemporary life, we often meet with situations in which people will accept an example even if it is beyond their immediate understanding, provided that it is accepted by those acknowledged as wise and professional endowed with special training and insight. The textual author correctly advocates the adoption of a similar instance as qualified in public debate if it is acceptable to both of differing systems of thought and belief (i.e., by all, wise and fool), admitting a dissimilar instance as qualified insofar as it is acceptable to men of superior insight.

The developmental history of Buddhist logic reveals a unique tendency for reduction of the number of syllogistic statements (*avaya*). Dignāga introduced the three-membered syllogism by initially dismissing the fourth and fifth statements [i.e., application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*)]. He is said also to have considered the thesis statement (*pratijñā*) itself to be linguistically superfluous. [Cf. Dignāga's critique quoted in the *Tātparyaṭīkā* (HIL, pp. 281-282)]. The only items having escaped critical dismissal but retained as linguistically indispensable, were the reason (*hetu*) and the corroborative statement of dual instantiation (*drṣṭānta*). The *Upāyahṛdayaśāstra* enunciated this reduction principle for the first time, as quoted later on, in terms of "linguistic excellence."

In his article, "The Two-Membered Syllogism," [*Rocznik Orientalistyczny* XV (1939-1940), p. 76], Kunst points out that Dignāga's theory of three membered syllogism was deeply influenced by Nāgārjuna's *Upāyahṛdayaśāstra* as well as Maitreya's theory of three membered syllogism inculcated in the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* (『瑜伽師地論』). He says:

The decision to purge the verbal instruction of all redundant elements led to the exclusion from a syllogism of all those members the functions of which were superseded by the function of another member. Thus *nigamana* went, which (according to some) was a mere repetition of *pratijñā*, and thus *upanaya* went, which was only a pedagogical indication of the qualities of the correct *hetu*. It was apparently Nāgārjuna who first noticed the redundancy of these members, and gave a stimulus to a thorough revision of the verbal instruction,

Unlike the Hindu logicians, Buddhist thinkers considered the main business of inference is (1) classifying the similar (*sapakṣa*) and dissimilar groups (*vipakṣa*) of instances so as to determine a given subject of inference as a class member of *sapakṣa*, and (2) secondarily positing a reason (*hetu*) that implies its conclusion (*sādhya*) in reference to that substratum. In the case of an inference for others (*parārthānumāna*), these two statements are of real necessity. They serve to inductively corroborate a general rule through dual instantiation and to deductively apply a reason-conclusion relation to an individual substratum. In the case of an inference for one's self (*svārthānumāna*), however, the reason statement can even be omitted, precisely because the dual instantiation *ipso facto* posits the *hetu* in the process of class determination of a given substratum. Thus, in the case of the silent movement of one's thought, the repetition which is to be created by positing a *hetu* statement can be omitted by substituting it with a similar instantiation.

The primary force motivating this trend was set forth by the logical criteria of "linguistic excellence" (*vākyaprasāṃsā*) and its contrary "linguistic deficiency" (*vākyadoṣa*, 言失), quoting [*Taiśhō*. 32 (No. 1632), p. 25 a, lines 14ff]:

"Linguistic Excellence" means (1) freedom from "three aspects of deficiency" (減有三種相), (a) deficient reasoning (*hetu-nyūna*, 因減), (b) deficient instantiation, and (c) deficient statement; (2) freedom from "three kinds of excess" (增有三種相): (a) superfluous reasoning (*hetu-adhika*, 因增) (b) superfluous instantiation (*dṛṣṭānta-adhika*, 喻增), and (c) superfluous statement (3) freedom from "three deficient statements": (a) repetitive (*punar-ukta*, 重言), (b) meaningless (*anartha-ukta*, 無義), and (c) incoherent (*apārthaka*, 欠義).

Taking all of these criteria into account, it is plain to us that the

principle of linguistic excellence intends to prescribe the statements of *hetu* and *dr̥ṣṭānta* to be neither more nor less than what is precise and appropriate to a given inference. Although this principle is concerned with *hetu* and *dr̥ṣṭānta*, as required for instructing others, it is ultimately concerned with *dr̥ṣṭānta* alone in silent movement of inner thought.

The cross-philosophical enquiry on the interaction between Nāgārjuna and the Naiyāyikas reveals the probability that Nāgārjuna's logical and dialectical treatises fit best between the times of the *Carakasamhitā* and *Nyāyasūtra*. Vidyabhusana notes that the abode of Akṣapāda known as Prabhāsa was situated beyond the rock of Girnar in Kathiawar, where we come across all the edicts of Aśoka as well as the Sanskrit inscription of Rudradāman, great Saka Satrap of Ujjainī. The date of the latter's panegyric, given as Saka Era 72nd year, corresponds to the year 150 A.D. The hypothesis of Nāgārjuna's association with Rudradāman through his *Ratnāvalī* in the regions of Western India finds a further support from the foregoing cross-philosophical investigation.

The textual author justifies his treatise on the method of debate, by setting his purposes as (1) preventing heretics and seductive rhetrics, (2) discriminating good and bad and the aspects of emptiness (分別善惡空相), (3) exposing the methods of other systems and terminating conceptual obsession (為斷戲論故), and (4) ultimately enabling the right Dharma to prevail in the world (欲令正法流布於世), [*Taishō*. 32., p. 23, lines 15 ff]. I can agree with Kajiyama's descriptive term "anti-logical" insofar as the method of debate was written for the purpose of combating misleading heretical teachings and their conceptual obsession. However, I disagree from his perspective in that I view the *Upāyahṛdaya-śāstra* to essentially be intended as a logical text to prescribe the ground rules for Buddhist debaters in contest with heretics. More importantly, the *Upāyahṛdaya-śāstra* was the ground work for Nāgārjuna to later on develop his method of dialectic in which he maximized the use of *dr̥ṣṭānta*.

〈Key Words〉 Nāgārjuna's *Upāyahṛdayaśāstra* and its Period

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