The *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I vv. 10-11 ab as Quoted in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*

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0 It is pointed out by E.M. Stern that Bhāsarvajña quotes the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1 (*PVin* I) vv. 10-11ab in his *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (*NBhūṣ*).¹⁾ I would like to investigate and clarify how Bhāsarvajña interprets these verses and what he has in his mind in citing them.

1 At first, the situation in which they are quoted in *NBhūṣ* should be described. Bhāsarvajña, commenting on his *Nyāyasāra*'s paragraph '*caḥ-ṣuḥsparśasamyogād ghaṭādidravyajñānam*', maintains that the word *dravya* (substance) is stated here to show that the substance of *avayavin* (a composite whole) such as pot etc. is something different from *guṇas* (qualities) such as color (*rūpa*) etc. This is established, Bhāsarvajña says, by perception (*pratyakṣa*) because, as everyone knows, perception such as 'this is a pot' occurs different from appearance of its color when the sense organs are operating, and does they are not occur when not operating.²⁾ Against this, however, some one propounds an opposing view, which is a quotation from *PVin* I vv. 10-11ab.

1-1 I should, now, explain the meanings of these verses according to Bhāsarvajña's interpretation.

Some opponent (Dharmakīrti) may argue as follows: "Even when the sense organ is not operating, the cognition of 'this is a pot' can occur. For, even if one can not perceive a pot because of its not being the object of the eyes for some reason, the cognition of 'this is a pot' can be attained through touching it."³⁾ [v. 10abc]

Some one⁴⁾ maintains that the substance can be perceived through the two sense organs, i.e. the visual sense organ (*cakṣuṣ*) and the tactual one (*sparsana*). Accordingly, when a pot is perceived not through the visual

sense organ but through the tactual one, what is perceived is the substance itself as is different from qualities such as color etc.⁵⁾ [v. 10d]

The opponent, however, argues that this view is not right, because the cognition of 'this pot',⁶⁾ which is attained through the tactual sense organ, includes color in it. [v. 11ab]

According to Dharmakīrti, any cognition except perception is determinate (*savikalpa*).⁷⁾ Therefore, the cognition of 'this pot', which is considered to be occurring through the tactual sense organ, is no more than a determinate mental cognition, which combines the memory of a pot's color with touch (*sparsa*) of the pot.⁸⁾ Consequently, he insists that even when the visual sense organ is not operating the cognition of 'this pot' can occur together with qualities such as color etc., which is quite contrary to the experience mentioned above by Bhāsarvajña.

1.2 I should, then, investigate Bhāsarvajña's refutation against the above argument implied in these verses.

1.2.1 He replies "This objection is utterly wrong. For no one accepts that color appears in the cognition of 'this pot' which has occurred through the tactual sense organ. Immediately after a pot is perceived (as a substance), the cognition of its color occurs as an inferential knowledge. It is, therefore, not proper to hold that the cognition of 'this pot' does not occur (as perception) through the tactual sense organ."⁹⁾ Here is a clear distinction between the Naiyāyikas' and the Buddhist logician view on perception. The former, considering it determinate in principle, allows the perception of 'this pot' to occur different from its qualities such as color etc. While the latter, rejecting determinate perception and allowing only indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) one, insists that color must also appear in the determinate cognition of 'this pot'.

1.2.2 Bhāsarvajña further argues as follows: "How is it possible for us to have such a cognition as 'what was seen by me is now touched by me',¹⁰⁾ unless we cognize an entity (*vastu*) as is different from its qualities such as color, touch etc.?"

This statement which is originally found in the *Nyāyavārttika* (NV)

stems from the Naiyāyika's proving of existence of *ātman*. In his *Nyāyabhāṣya* (*NBh*), Vātsyāyana, commenting on the *Nyāyasūtra* (*NS*) 3. 1. 1.,¹¹⁾ mentions the experience of 'I am now touching the same thing that I saw before', and maintains that there should be *ātman* as an identifiable agent of the visual cognition and the tactual one.¹²⁾ Uddyotakara, answering some opponent view that the visual sense organ and the tactual one can not have one and the same object because the former has color and the latter has touch as its object respectively, states that both the sense organs can perceive the substance itself which has color and touch even without perceiving those qualities.¹³⁾ Thus, Uddyotakara holds that the experience of 'what was seen by me is now touched by me' is effective not only in proving the existence of *ātman* but also in proving the existence of *avayavin*, which the visual sense organ and the tactual one share as a common object. Bhāsarvajña is no doubt indebted to Uddyotakara for his argument here.

1. 2. 3 Bhāsarvajña mentions two instances of perceiving a substance without perceiving its qualities, which are also originally found in *NV* ad *NS* 3. 1. 1. and 38. For example, when a blind man touches hot water he can perceive the substance of water itself even without perceiving cold touch, the peculiar quality of water.¹⁴⁾ This case is refuted by the Buddhist logicians from the standpoint of *kṣaṇabhaṅga*. It is not the substance of water but hot touch that one perceives through the tactual sense organ, because there is no permanent entity of water, according to the *kṣaṇabhaṅga* theory. What happens is: in connection with fire, cold touch of water is perished and hot touch is produced anew, and the latter is perceived through the tactual sense organ.¹⁵⁾

Bhāsarvajña replies to it from the Nyāya standpoint. "It is said that qualities of effects are produced in accordance with those of causes."¹⁶⁾ It means that when the substance of water remains as it is, any other quality can not be produced anew. The Naiyāyikas regard hot water as one mingled with molecules of fire. It is not because of touching water but because of touching molecules of fire that one feels hot. When mo-

lecules of fire are gone out one feels cold because of the peculiar quality, i.e. cold touch inherent in water.¹⁷⁾ Accordingly, a quality inherent in water is produced only in accordance with one inherent in its cause, and any other quality is not produced anew merely in connection with some other substances. Therefore, it is not right to maintain that, in connection with fire molecules, hot touch is produced anew after cold touch inherent in water being perished.

In this way, Bhāsarvajña, basing his argument on the Nyāya causality, asserts that such experiences as touching hot water and seeing crystal on a blue cloth lead to the conclusion that we can perceive the substance itself even without perceiving its qualities.

2 In the next place, I should explain the original context in which the above-mentioned verses appear in *PVin I*.¹⁸⁾ In *PVin I* v. 4ff., Dharmakīrti defines perception, examines its definition in detail and establishes his own view that it is free from determinate cognitions (*vikalpas*).

2.1 He argues in v. 9ff. as follows: "If perception were dependent upon determinate cognitions, it could be prevented from occurring on the strength of one's will. Besides, perception would need no proximate objects, for cognition of an object such as cow etc. would occur even if the object is not closely connected with the sense organs. Perception, therefore, does not depend upon determinate cognitions."¹⁹⁾ [v. 9abc]

Some one refutes it. "Among the two *vikalpas* of 'this' and 'that', the cognition of 'this' in such a case as 'this cow' cannot occur unless there is a cow in immediate proximity. Accordingly, the cognition of 'this', which is characterized by perceiving a proximate object, is expected to be perception."²⁰⁾ [v. 9d]

2.2 Against the opponent view propounded in v. 9d, Dharmakīrti mentions a disapproving evidence that the cognition of 'this' can occur even without proximate objects. That is the following case. When there is a pot in front of you in a dark place, it is as good as nonexistent to you because you can not see it. Nevertheless you can get the cognition of 'this pot' by touching it.²¹⁾ [v. 10abc]

The opponent²²⁾ refutes it again. "It is unreasonable to consider the pot you are touching as good as nonexistent, because it is the substance itself that is touched by you."²³⁾ [v. 10d]

In reply Dharmakīrti argues as follows: "(Even then), color must be also included in the cognition of 'this pot', which is quite unreasonable. Because the cognition of color cannot occur through the tactual sense organ. Therefore, this color is only the appearance of the past one you saw before."²⁴⁾ [v. 11ab]

Dharmakīrti, thus, maintains in vv. 10-11ab that the cognition of 'this' in such a case as 'this pot' or 'this cow' does not necessarily depend upon proximate objects, which leads to his conclusion that perception can not depend upon *vikalpas*.

3.1 From the above contextual investigation of *NBhūṣ* and *PVin I*, it is evident that Bhāsarvajña quotes and criticizes *PVin I* vv. 10-11ab in a completely different context from their original one, although their meanings are not so much different in both texts. In *PVin I*, vv. 10-11ab are placed as one of the objections to *savikalpakapratyakṣavādins*, while in *NBhūṣ* they are employed as a corroboration of the Nyāya theory of *avayavin*. In other words, Bhāsarvajña retorts upon Buddhist logicians, stating that the Buddhist objection propounded in v. 10abc that a pot can be cognized through the tactual sense organ is in itself the very reason why the substance should be perceived as an *avayavin* which is different from such qualities as color etc., because it is a substatum common to the visual cognition and the tactual one. I do not think I am going too far in saying that Bhāsarvajña intends to add this case to the above-mentioned examples of hot water and crystal.

3.2 It is also noteworthy that a long quotation from *PVin I* v. 4ff.²⁵⁾ appears in another section of *NBhūṣ* (i.e. the Bhāsarvajña's refutation of the Dharmakīrti's theory of *pratyakṣa*), and that the quotation abruptly ends after v. 9abc is explained and just before v. 9d begins.²⁶⁾ The question remains to be solved why he quotes and criticizes vv. 10-11ab in a different context instead of criticizing them together with vv. 4-9. The key

to it can be found in v. 9d.

As already mentioned above, in the original context of the discussion on vv. 9d-11ab in *PVin I*, the cognition of 'this' in such a case as 'this pot' is a crucial topic as a factor indicating an immediate proximity between the sense organs and the objects. But in *NBhūṣ*, v. 9d is intentionally omitted, and accordingly the cognition of 'this' is ignored in the subsequent discussion. The point of the discussion instead moves to the cognition of 'pot' which is an *avayavin* distinct from qualities.

Moreover, referring in another section to the topic of the cognition of 'this', Bhāsarvajña states: "If the opponents argue that the cognition of 'cow' could occur without proximate objects, how could they explain the fact that the cognition of 'this' could occur without proximate objects?"²⁷⁾ He does not seem to give a peculiar significance to the cognition of 'this', which seems to be contrary to the view stated in v. 9d.

Considering the above, it seems unlikely that the view described in v. 9d is that of the Naiyāyikas. As is expected, Bu-ston attributes v. 9d to the Mimāṃsakas and quotes one verse from the *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV).²⁸⁾ Urged by this comment of Bu-ston, I examined ŚV, *pratyakṣa*, vv. 249cd-253 to find an argument parallel to v. 9d. Kumārila asserts in ŚV 250cd-251ab as follows; "In the case of [perceiving] *gotva* (cowness), we can find neither anything closer to the sense organs nor any other cognition [than *gotva*] regarded as perception. Consequently this (= *gotva*) alone is perception for us (the Mimāṃsakas)."²⁹⁾ It is clear that this assertion of Kumārila is parallel to v. 9d in emphasizing an immediate proximity of objects with the sense organs.

As a conclusion we can say as follows. *PVin I* vv. 9d-11ab is originally the argument between Kumārila and Dharmakīrti. Bhāsarvajña who knows this does not only omit these verses in his refutation against Dharmakīrti's *pratyakṣa* theory, but also cut off v. 9d from them to insert the remaining vv. 10-11ab into the another portion so that he can deliberately make use of them for corroborating the theory of *avayavin* even without changing their meanings.

- 1) E.M. Stern: *Additional fragments of PVin I-II*, WZKS 35, 1991. *PVin I* (ed. and tr. by T. Vetter, Wien, 1966) vv.10-11ab=*NBhūṣ* (Varanasi, 1968) 154.28-155.01: avidyamānābhede'pi tadakṣāgocaratvatah/ sprśato'py asti sā budhir dravyaṃ tatspārśanaṃ yadi/ nāyaṃ ghaṭa itī jñāne varṇapratyavabhāsanāt/
- 2) *NBhūṣ* 154.24-27. *ādīgrahaṇaṃ* of 154.25 should be omitted. Cf. Ms of *NBhūṣ*, Pāṭaṇa. Joshi places *avayavitvam* instead. Cf. L.V. Joshi: *A Critical Study of Pratyakṣapariccheda of NBhūṣ*, Ahmedabad, 1986, p.494. 3) *Ibid.* 155.02-06. *tasmāt* of 155.04 could be *yasmāt*. 4) He is, in this case, considered as a Naiyāyika. 5) *Ibid.* 155.07-08. *dhī* of 155.07 should be *dvī*. Cf. Ms. 6) The inconsistency in the expressions of '*ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ*' (v. 11ab) and '*ghato 'yaṃ*' (*NBhūṣ* 154.26) could be said to show some deliberate artifice of Bhāsarvajña.
- 7) Cf. *PVin I* v.4. 8) *NBhūṣ* 155.08-10 (= *PVin I* 48.10-13). Cf. Stern, *op. cit.* 9) *Ibid.*, 155.10-13. 10) *Ibid.*, 155.19-20. Cf. H. Marui: *On the perception of vāyu*, (in Japanese) *JIBS* 29-2, p.645. 11) NS 3.1.1: darśana-sparśanābhyām ekārthagrahaṇāt/ 12) *NBh* (Culcatta, 1936-44) ad NS 3.1.1, 710.04-712.03. 13) *NV* (see *NBh*) ad NS 3.1.1, 711.07-11. 14) *NBhūṣ* 156.04-05. Another instance is to perceive crystal on a blue cloth. 15) *Ibid.*, 156.06-07. *kṣaṇikatvāt siddhe* of 156.07 should be *kṣaṇikatvāsiddheḥ*. Cf. Ms. 16) *NBhūṣ* 156.08-09. Cf. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 2.1.24. 17) Cf. U. Mishra: *Conception of Matter*, Allahabad, 1936, pp.310-311. 18) I am much indebted for the following explanation to H. Tosaki: *Annotated translation of PVin I Pratyakṣa Chapter* (3) (In Japanese), *Indian Philosophy and Buddhism*, 1989. I also express my thanks to Dr. M. Ichigo, who gave me valuable suggestions in reading Tibetan texts. 19) *PVin I* 46.09-20=*NBhūṣ* 180.09. Cf. Steinkellner: *New Sktfragments of PVin I*, WZKSO, 1872. 20) *Ibid.*, 46.21-24. 21) *Ibid.*, 46.24-48.04. Cf. *Tosaki, op. cit.* 22) As will be stated later, this opponent is considered as a Mīmāṃsaka. Cf. 4) 23) *PVin I* 48.05-07. 24) *Ibid.*, 48.08-13. 25) *NBhūṣ* 178.19-180.14. Cf. Steinkellner, *op. cit.* 26) *Ibid.*, 180.14. 27) *Ibid.*, 181.20-21. 28) *The Collected Works of Bu-ston*, pt.24, 67.02ff.: ...dañ po la, gshon nu ma len na re, rtog pa la, der rtog dañ, ḥdir rtog gñis las, ḥdir rtog don ñe ba la ltos ba las...; 67.05ff.: ...ku mā ri las/ de ltar rnam rtog lam du mtshuñs na yañ/ gañ du dbaṅ po dañ ḥbrel rjes su ḥbrañ/ de ni mñon sum de bshin ḥjig rten na/ di ni mtshan ñid med kyañ grags pa yin/ she na,... =ŚV, *pratyakṣa*, v.254. Cf. *Tosaki, op. cit.* 29) ŚV, *pratyakṣa*, vv.250cd-251lab: pratyāsannataraṃ gotve pratyakṣatvena sammatam/ vijñānaṃ nānyad astīti pratyakṣam idam eva naḥ/

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