Uddyotakara’s vyatireki-hetu

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Uddyotakara’s Nyāyavārttika has been an object of modern indology over our own century. There, however, seems to be no common agreement as to his role in Indian logic. There are several reasons for it. One of them is the uniqueness of his terminology. Our concern is to examine one of those terms, or vyatirekin and some concepts related to it.

We will begin by considering the following formulae containing vyatireki-hetu.

P1 statement: nedam nirātmakām jīvacchariram
Reason: aprāṇādimatvavrasaṅgāt
Example: yad ubhayapakṣasampratipannam aprāṇādimat tat sarvam
nirāmakaṁ drṣṭām
Application: na cedam aprāṇādimid bhavati
Conclusion: tasmat na idam nirātmakām

It is a famous example. We, however, encounter a difficulty in interpreting these formulae. Its third formula, drṣṭānta would be translated ordinarily as follows: *All that is accepted by both parties to be without prāṇa, etc., is found to be without ātman.* If it is true, the inference expressed in these formulae would be fallacious. That is to say, it commits a fallacy of denying antecedent. Uddyotakara’s commentator, Vācaspatimīśra also pointed out that the places of nirātmaka and aprāṇādimat must be conversed.

We, however, have a good ground to believe that Uddyotakara rightly understands the structure of the above inference. That is his following explanation of it.
apraṇādīmattvam ca jivacchāsirirāt nivartate, tasmāt tadavyabhicāri nirātmakatvam api nivartisyati.

Although there is room for argument on the exact meaning of avyabhicāri, we can say that Uddyotakara deduces the negation of nirātmaka from the negation of apraṇādimat, and a relation of nirātmaka to apraṇādimat. This agrees with our logical consciousness. What does this apparent disagreement between his formula and his explanation mean?

To solve this question, we shall now look more carefully into Uddyotakara's formula.

P2 Statement: caityanyak ātmanaḥ
Reason: svātāntreye saty avyavasthanāt
Example: caksurādiyat yat cācetanaṁ tat sarvaṁ vyavasthitaviśayam

P3 Statement: nānyaḥ avavyav ayavavebhyaḥ
Reason: dravyāntarotpattideśasyavacchedāt
Example: yad ubhayasampratipannam arthāntaratvena tat tasmād bhinnadesam utpadyamānam drṣṭam, yathā gaur aśvāt

P2 is an example of vyatirekin, which Uddyotakara himself calls so. On the other hand, P3 can be regarded as an example of anvayavyatirekin. Neither P2 nor P3 seems to be fallacious.

At this stage, what has to be noticed is the exceptional property of vyatirekin. As we have already known, vyatirekin is the case where sapakṣa does not exist. Therefore, in that case, the domain of non-existence of reason must be equivalent to that of vipakṣa, otherwise this reason would lose its probative force. Considering these facts, it is possible to build up one hypothesis: The form “yat......tat sarvam......” expresses co-extensional or logical equivalence rather than implication. That is to say, the drṣṭānta of P1 will be translated as follows: All that is found to be without ātman is accepted by both parties to be without prāṇa, etc., If we accept this hypothesis, this formula would represent a coimplicant. Thus we can avoid the logical fallacy of P1 without any corrections.
In addition, it might be possible to develop this idea into the following hypothesis: The form, “yat...A...tat sarvam...B.” stands for co-extensional or a logical equivalence (A⇔B); the form “yat...A...tat...B...” stands for an implication (A→B). To verify this hypothesis, however, an exhaustive research after Uddyotakara’s inferential formulae is needed.

Having examined inferential formulae, one can then go on to consider the concept of vyatirekin. Perhaps it is right to say at the outset that this concept has two aspects: One is related to classical Sāṁkhya’s avita; and another is the property of reason developed from trairūpya.

Concerning the former, Uddyotakara introduced this concept in order to interpret NS 1-1-35, the definition of vaidharmyahetu. As a result of it, he can treat negative, or prāsaṅgic inferences in the same manner as affirmative ones⁶. Moreover, as Prof. Hadano acutely pointed out, ⁶¹ Uddyotakara transformed the concept of avita. The latter, I think, is the central point of his transformation. In fact, Uddyotakara abandoned the concept of pariśeṣa on which avita is based in classical Sāṁkhya thought, and introduced vyatireka-avyabhicāra.⁷ This is the central concept of his vyatirekin. We shall focus on this concept.

To consider this concept, it is useful to quote the following passage⁹.

avitaśyāpi vyatirekāvyabhicāritvāt pratipādakatvam iti. katham? yāvad aprāṇādīmat tat sarvaṁ nirātmakāṁ dṛṣṭām iti.

What this passage makes clear at once is that vyatireka is expressed in the form of “yat......tat sarvam......,” and that it is a relation between two negative terms.

On the contrary, avyabhicāra remains to be discussed. While Uddyotakara says that the probative force of all reasons is based on this concept⁹, he doesn’t say what this means. Its meaning must be inferred from his descriptions relevant to the concept avyabhicāra.

Out of those descriptions, the following passage, which is extracted from the definition of anaikāntika, one of the pseudo-reasons, would be most useful¹⁰.
kaḥ punar ayam vyabhicāraḥ? sādhya-tajjātiyānayavṛttitvam—yat khalu sādhya-tajjātiyānayavṛttitvī saty anyatra vartate tad vyabhicāri, tadvṛttitvāṃ vyabhicāraḥ.

This is the definition of vyabhicāra which is the opposite word to avyabhicāra. It is obvious that this definition is based on the theory of trairūpya. Moreover, we can safely say that avyabhicāra is synonymous with aikāntika, which means what must be concluded with its unique probandum, and also said to be a necessary property of reasons.¹¹)

In conclusion, (1) vyātirekān presupposes a logical concomitance developed from the theory of trairūpya; (2) This logical concomitance is called avyabhicāri, and has the same logical function as vyāptī; (3) Its formulation is different from Dignāga's one.

Abb. NS: Nyāyasūtra in Nyāyadarśana. See NV
NVTT: Nyāyavārttikatātparyātiikā in Nyāyadarśana. See NV
1) NV ad NS 1-1-35, p. 291, 1~2
2) NVTT ad NS 1-1-35, p. 291, 12~13
3) NV ad NS 1-1-35, p. 291, 10~p. 292, 1
4) P2: NV ad NS 3-1-4, p. 715, 8~p. 716, 6; P3: NV ad NS 2-1-33, p. 487, 7~9
5) This is one of the points that distinguish Uddyotakara from Dignāga. Dignāga doesn't accept that avita is an independent method. He tries to reduce negative inferences into affirmative ones. Cf. H. Kitagawa: Indo-Koten-Ronrigaku-no Kenkyu (A Study of Indian classical logic), Tokyo, 1965, p.164 ff.
6) H. Hadano: Surongaku-ha-no Ronrisetu, "vita", "avta" ni-tsute (Sāmkhya's Theory of Inference, vita and avita), Bunka vol.11, pt.3~4, 1944, pt.4, p.325~p.326
9) For example, NV ad NS 1-1-35, p. 292, 4~5; NV ad NS 1-1-35, p. 294, 3~4;
10) NV ad NS 1-2-5, p. 373, 3~5
11) See, NV p. 374, 2~4

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